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5preface
To students: my hope is that this book will help you to think thoughts that were not
available  to  you  before,  and  that  it  will  be  useful  in  practical  activities  of  finding
information  and  then  expressing  it  clearly.  It  aims  to  influence  both  your  grasp  of
language and your approach to searching and arguing.
To instructors: my hope is that this book will help you give a course where the students
are interested in the content for its own sake and find it  relevant to their  lives and
studies.  They  should  comment  freely  and  have  their  own  ideas  about  some  of  the
content. There are suggestions about planning and delivering a course using this material
at the end of the book. I hope to post improved and corrected versions on the sites
where I am posting this.  So comments and suggestions are welcome. Send them to
adam.morton@ubc.ca.
This text is based on a course I gave many times at the university of Alberta and the
University  of  British Columbia.  It  was an unusual  course,  meant to show philosophy
majors, and other humanities students whose main interest is not logic, that formal logic
connects with issues they find interesting. The aim was to give a course which covers the
standard symbolic logic topics but
— The wider focus is not on deduction but on search in databases. ("Database" in
computer science is very closely related to "model" in logic.) Students are more
interested in this. They do some form of database searching almost every day, and
6are frustrated at their inaccuracy. Students learn for example how to approximate
Boolean search on Google. Logical consequence drops out as a special case.
— The class and the teacher actually discuss. You don't just put up your hand when
you don't understand something.
— The course rhetoric is neutral about the place of deduction in reasoning. The
professor does not have to sell any debatable claims about effective thinking to get
the class to see that the topic is interesting and important. (Instead of assuming
them you can discuss them.)
— Students get more confidence and more facility with mathematically flavoured
thinking. By the end students should see that they can handle some topics that
they would earlier have found frightening.
— There is attention to the linguistic obstacles to phrasing a statement so it has
the consequences you want, or a search command so it gets the items you want.
So the emphasis is on organizing thoughts in words, what linguists and philosophers of
language  call  logical  form,  and  the  effect  that  awareness  of  this  can  have  on  your
thinking and problem-solving. In this connection traditional "logic problems", of the kind
found in logic puzzle books and aptitude tests,  but not usually  found in formal logic
textbooks, are discussed. This occurs mainly in the exercises. In fact, the exercises of
every chapter contain one traditional logic puzzle.
The exercises are important: you will get much more out of the course if you do most of
them, just as if you were learning a language. The exercises serve another function, too.
They prepare ideas that will be discussed in later chapters. This is important because
7some of the more difficult topics in most logic courses come towards the end, when
everyone is tired and there are many pressures on students. If you have done the earlier
exercises you will be ready for the later ideas when you meet them. I have placed these
anticipatory exercises fairly early among the exercises for each chapter, to make it harder
to avoid them.
The book is shorter than it may seem. Putting it on the web allows me to be generous
with spacing and type sizes, and there are many varied exercises. I use a lot of tables
and diagrams. There are no more words in the chapters, ignoring exercises than in a
rather smaller book.
It  is  useful  to  be  able  to  think  complicated  thoughts.  Science,  mathematics  and
economics would be impossible without them. So the delicate art of expressing yourself
accurately in language has a practical value. I think, if you will indulge me in a somewhat
mystical idea, that there is another, less practical, value to clear and subtle expression.
Having complicated stuff in mind is a central part of being human. Bees make honey,
birds sing, ants make ant-hills, and humans have subtle and complex thoughts. When we
write stories, create music, do mathematics, think about the universe, or make jokes we
are doing some of what we are here to do. And if  you can handle logic you can do
another small part of all this.
I have had help and advice on this project from a number of people over the years. They
include  Mia  Bertanjoli,  Jaqueline  Leighton,  Lisa  Matthewson,  John  Simpson,  Mojtaba
Soltani, and many students who made wonderful comments on what was and was not
8working for them. Alirio Rosales gave me a lot of help in the final preparation of the
document.
.
Vancouver, October 2017
9chapter one: representing information  
1: 1 (of 11) logic  
Logic is about information. We represent information, also called data, in the form of
sentences, tables, diagrams which impose various structures on it, and then we extract
the same or related information and use it in solving problems. Logic traditionally focuses
on arguments, in which information in the form of sentences is deduced from premises or
assumptions. For example we might have as assumptions   .
the keys are either on my desk or in my backpack
the keys are not on my desk 
and from them we could deduce the conclusion
the keys are in my backpack
The conclusion is a logical consequence of the assumptions: it can be correctly deduced
from them. We discuss logical consequence in part II of this book. 
>> "correctly deduced": that was a substitute for an explanation to come later.  but what
would it make sense to count as correct here?
>>  throughout  this  book,  the  text  will  be  interrupted  by  remarks  and  questions
formatted like this one.  if you are reading the text it would be a good idea to pause and
consider your reaction to them.  they are likely topics for questions and discussions in
class.
>> what other conclusions could be deduced from these assumptions?
Deducing conclusions from given assumptions is  often not the best way of  solving a
problem. The issue will  be discussed later in the book, in chapter 6. But the central
problem  is  that  there  will  be  many  assumptions  that  can  be  deduced  from  any
assumptions. And deducing as many as you can of these consequences will not show that
10
some particular sentence can not be deduced from them. So given some information and
a question to answer in terms of it,  you might deduce away for a long time without
getting an answer to the question, and still not know what the answer is. This should be
clearer from the example below. 
I am not going to offer you a magic problem-solving method. This does not exist. But the
resources of logic are helpful in other ways besides describing logical consequence and
deduction from assumptions. Two ways that we will discuss in detail are forming clear
instructions for searching for information, and producing clear unambiguous language in
terms of which assumptions, conclusions, and the facts that make them true or false, can
be stated. These are our main concern in this first part of the book. 
>>  instructions can tell us how to do things besides search for information.  which of
these other tasks have searching as a part?
1:2 (of 11) an example
You are investigating a crime involving corruption in high places and you have exactly
five suspects. You have put the relevant evidence for each in a numbered dossier, and
you have a summary sheet of notes, indicating each suspect with one of the code-names
Red, Green, Yellow, Blue, and Purple. To help you remember which powerful politician is
which, without risking writing down their names, you have memorized the following three
facts:
- The dossier for the politician you have named Red is either number 2 or number 5.
-  The dossier for  the politician Green has a higher number than the dossier  for the
politician Yellow.
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-  The  dossier  for  the  politician  Blue  has  a  higher  number  than  the  dossier  for  the
politician Green and lower than the dossier for the politician Purple.
A  quick-witted  friend  looks  through  the  dossiers  and  says  "dossier  3  is  pretty
incriminating,  but  I  can  see  that  there  are  some  politicians  it  cannot  be."  Which
politicians, given the information just stated, cannot be the subject of dossier number 3?
To begin answering this question, summarize the relevant information. As fully stated in
language it could be overwhelming, so inventing a notation for writing down the relevant
facts is helpful
the politicians are: R, G, Y, B, P
R = 2 or R = 5
G > Y
B > G
P > B
[suggestion 1: it helps to have the knack of inventing notations so you can focus on what
is relevant]
>> “the relevant information”: what information does this notation leave out?
Now we know that there is an ordering of the colours/politicians, but we do not know
where R fits in it. There are two possibilities, which we can represent as follows:
   possibility A   possibility B
1 P P
2 R B
3 B G
4 G Y
5 Y R     
We could have described the reasoning that leads to these as a step-by-step process, but
12
the way most people would do it is to see first that R has to be at 2 or 5 position, and
then to fit the others in.
>> what are we assuming without stating it, in doing this?  why is it best not stated?
suggestion 2:  it  helps  to  see  that  there are only so many possibilities,  and then to
represent  them  in  a  way,  particularly  a  diagram,  that  allows  us  to  use  spatial  or
numerical thinking.
You tell your friend that the dossiers are in order, from 5 for the most guilty-seeming, to
1 for the least. P is obviously the least guilty, but who is the next lowest? Your friend
reads through the dossiers and says "Red seems guilty as hell to me, the most likely to
be the culprit." Assuming this is right, who is the second to least likely?
>> well, who?
>> suggest some other questions that now have easy answers
The reasoning you did to answer this second question probably took the form of "this
therefore  that"  thinking  between sentences.  R  =5,  R =2 or  B=2,  if  R=5 then R≠2;
therefore B=2. This kind 
.of thinking is a traditional topic of logic, and this book discusses it from chapter four. But
it is important to see that we cannot often solve a problem simply by applying it.  
1:3 (of 11) databases 
This book is not about solving logic problems, of the kind found on SAT tests and other
student-torturing  devices.  In  fact,  symbolic  logic  as  taught  in  philosophy  and  math
courses  rarely  pays any attention  to  them. But  we will  regularly  mention  them and
related  activities,  in  part  because  they  illustrate  points  about  reasoning  and  the
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structuring of information, and in part because the skills they require and develop are
useful. In the rest of this chapter and the next, we are concerned with databases, like
those the diagrams for possibility A and possibility B in the example represented.  
Very often when we have a collection of information, from which we can get answers by
asking suitable questions, the collection of information can be called a  database. I am
going to use the term “database” to cover a wide range of things, basically any collection
of information (data) from which more specific information can be got by asking a precise
question. In particular, the term applies to what everyone includes as databases, namely
collections of information on computer systems that can be accessed by using programs
designed to  get  information  out  of  them. So every  time  you  look something  up on
Google, or find the location of a book by using the library computer, you are dealing with
a database. In logic, a database is very often called a  model. I shall use both terms,
usually saying “database” when we are searching in them, and “model” when we are
searching for them, as we do later in the course. I shall rarely use the word “model” until
chapter four,  and then in  five I  shall  switch and start  saying “model”.  This could be
confusing, so I am warning you now. 
>> what about diagrams? what kinds of diagrams will  fit this rough description of a
database?
Information in  computer  databases and other kinds of  databases (such as telephone
directories or boxes of index cards) can often be represented as a  table. A table has
vertical columns and horizontal rows. The intersections of the columns and the rows are
called cells, in which we can store little nuggets of info. (So for example the cell at the
intersection  of  the  alice  row  and  the  Hungry  column in  the  table  below stores  the
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information YES.) There are several different ways of writing down a database as a table.
One very simple way is possible when the information concerns a definite finite set of
individuals  and  we  want  to  know  which  ones  have  which  of  several  attributes or
properties.  The set  of  individuals  is  called the  domain  of  the database.  For  example
suppose the domain consists  of  six  dogs who – at  some given time -  can have the
attributes of being hungry, or angry, or sleepy. Then we might represent information
about them as follows. 
dogbase1 Hungry Angry Sleepy
alice YES NO NO
brutus YES YES YES
caspar NO NO NO
doodles NO NO YES
eloise YES YES NO
flossie YES NO YES
>>   the  domain  of  a  database  is  a  "definite  finite  set  of  individuals".   describe
information that is not about a definite set of things.  can there be information about an
infinite set?
Call  this  an  object  and  attribute  table.  (When  I  speak  of  a  table  without  further
explanation I will mean an object and attribute table.) The cells in the column to the left
have names of individuals, and the cells in the other columns have truth values (true or
false,  yes  or  no.)  Notice  the  way  I  have  chosen  a  bold upper-case  letter  for  each
attribute and a bold lower-case letter for each individual.  This allows a quick way of
referring to individual cells: for example the cell for Angry and caspar is Ac. The content
of Ac is NO, so the sentence “Caspar is angry”, is false. We can save words just by saying
“Ac is false” or “the truth value of Ac is False”. If you want you can think of a single cell
such as Ac as a tiny database, with one individual and one attribute. It is what we will
later call an atomic proposition.
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1:4 (of 11) queries 
We can get  a  lot  of  information  out  of  a  simple  table  like  this,  if  we ask the  right
questions. A helpful standard way to ask the questions is to begin them with the request
“find”. So 
Find the hungry dogs.
Find some angry dog.
Find the dogs that are sleepy. 
.Find the dogs that are not sleepy.
Take a moment to figure out the answers to these questions, easy though they are.
Notice how you can find the answers by looking for the right pattern of YESs and NOs in
the right places. So to find all the dogs that are not sleepy you go down the  Sleepy
column and look for the NO cells, and then collecting the dogs on the same rows as these
cells. So you get Alice, Caspar, and Eloise. I have repeated the table, below, for ease of
reference. 
>> do you always need all the objects fitting the description (criterion)?  how would you
word the question or instruction to ask for less?
These simple questions can be combined to get more complicated questions. We can ask
- Find the dogs that are both hungry and sleepy.
- Find the dogs that are hungry and not sleepy.
-  Find  the  dogs  that  are  either  hungry  or  sleepy.  [see  the  
remark on OR in section 4 below]
-  Find  the  dogs  that  are  hungry  and  sleepy  but  not  angry.  [this  
is the same as “hungry and sleepy and not angry”.] 
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- Find the individuals — dogs in this case — that are not hungry, and are angry.
- How do the hungry dogs compare to all the dogs (more, same, fewer)?
How do the dogs that are not hungry and are angry compare to all the dogs? 
dogbase1 Hungry Angry Sleepy
alice YES NO NO
brutus YES YES YES
caspar NO NO NO
doodles NO NO YES
eloise YES YES NO
flossie YES NO YES
Can you figure these ones out? Do it yourself before checking just below. And notice how
here too you can find a quick little routine with the YESs and NOs for each one. I’ll write
the answers with an obvious shorthand that will prepare for something later on: 
H & S : b, f
H & not S: a, e
H or S:  a, b, d, e, f
H & S & not A:  f 
not-H & A: the null set, Ø
H compared to all dogs: fewer - some but not all of them
not H & A compared to all dogs: none of them 
Notice how the routine you use to check for “hungry and sleepy” differs from the routine
you use to check for “hungry or sleepy”. We’ll come back to that. Notice also that when
no individual satisfies the search criterion, there still is an answer, namely the null or
empty set, usually written Ø. (If I ask you to bring me, in a bag, all the presents under
the tree with my name on them, but no one has given me a present, you come back with
an empty bag.)   
“Find  all”  begins  an  instruction,  asking  for  the  objects  meeting  some  criterion.  The
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criterion can be simple, as in “find all the individuals that are hungry” or complex, as in
“find all the individuals that are either hungry or not asleep”. Commands to find things
meeting some criterion are called queries or search commands. There is another way of
thinking of these searches, not as commands to find things but as questions about the
identity of things. For example
“They are hungry and sleepy: who are they?”
“I am hungry and sleepy and not angry: who am I?” 
Seen this way riddles, found in all human cultures and popular with small children, are a
kind of query. “I have four legs in the morning, two at noon, and three in the evening:
what am I?”, “Brothers and sisters have I none, but that man's father is my father's
son.”, “What is it that you will break even when you name it?” 
>> riddles have a charm that most other queries lack.  why?
We can search for many things. Just considering databases, we can take one and search
for the things in it that meets some condition or criterion. The examples In this section
so far have been like this. Or we can take a database and a sentence and ask for its
truth  value,  whether  according  to  the  database  it  is  true  or  false.  Note that  I  said
"according to the database": many databases contain false information. For example in
this database
Elephant Ostrich
 london YES NO
 beijing NO YES
London is an elephant and Beijing is an ostrich. But that is absurd. In some books you
may see the phrase "true in database D" (or "true in model M": databases and models
are really the same; we'll get to that). But I shall avoid this phrase because it can be
confusing and instead I will talk of a sentence holding in a database, and sometimes a
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database  (or  model)  making  a  sentence  true.  "London  is  an  elephant"  holds  in  the
database above, although it is not true (in the real world).  
Suppose we are given two databases, dogbase1 above and also dogbase2 below.
dogbase2 Hungry Angry Sleepy
alice NO YES YES
brutus NO YES YES
caspar YEd NO NO
doodles YES NO YES
eloise NO YES NO
flossie NO NO YES
Then if we are asked to find which of these databases "Eloise is hungry" holds in, we give
the answer dogbase1, since it does not hold in dogbase2. Searching for databases is
important,  as  it  connects  search,  our  interest  in  the  first  four  chapters,  to  logical
consequence, the traditional topic of logic. (In fact they are both forms of reasoning, and
pretty easily converted into one another.)
 
Simple queries require you to come up with a list of things from a database. The activity
you do in response to a query is a search. So if I say “go to the refrigerator and get me
the vegetables that are red and not rotten” those words are the query, and the search
consists in  you going over to  the fridge and getting,  say,  a fresh tomato and three
radishes, leaving two rotten tomatoes to ooze in the bottom drawer. In this case you are
physically going to the objects and getting the desired ones. One general image is of a
net that you sweep through a pool of candidates, catching just the right ones. A different
image is of a filter. You might pour the collection through a filter that only allows things
of the right kind to pass through. 
>> “Simple queries” fetch objects from the domain.  queries which get YES or NO (T or
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F) or sets of pairs or databases themselves do not.  how can we describe these queries
so that they too fetch things from a domain?
We search on the internet most days of our lives, whether on the well-known search
engines such as Google or DuckDuckGo or using the search facilities of online stores,
libraries, and specialised sites. The amount of information to be retrieved this way is so
enormous that we have to think hard about how to formulate our queries so that we
increase the chances of getting the information we want. Logic is very relevant here, as
we shall see.
1:5 of 11) what we can search for
Databases concern individuals and their attributes. (And relations between individuals, as
we will  soon see.) So searches in databases are usually  aimed at finding individuals
having particular  attributes, especially  complex attributes defined in terms of  simpler
ones. But we can search for many other things also. Two important searches are for truth
values and for databases themselves.
The truth value of a sentence is True if it is true, and False if it is false. (Now that does
not sound surprising, does it?) We can take a database and search for the truth value a
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particular sentence. For example we can take the database of dogs and search for the
truth value of "Doodles is angry". We do this by locating  the individual d in the database
and locating the attribute A, and then seeing whether the cell where these meet has a
YES or a NO. If it is YES then the truth value is True, and if it is  NO then the truth value
is False.
To illustrate a search for a database consider the following three individual and attribute
tables. 
Mon Angry aSleep Tues Angry aSleep Wed Angry aSleep
d YES NO d YES NO d NO YES
f NO YES f YES NO f NO YES
With these three databases, we can we can say "find the databases in which Flossie is
asleep ", or "find the databases in which neither Flossie nor  Doodles is asleep". We can
also ask more complicated questions, such as "find the databases in which only the angry
individuals are asleep". The answers to the three searches are {Mon, Wed}, {Tues}, and
{none of them}.
The searches can be aimed at truth values, also. We can say "find the database where
the truth value of Sf is True", and so on.
I described these as searches for databases, but each databases is named with reference
to a sort-of individual. So we can rephrase them as "find the days of the week (within
this range) when Flossie is asleep", and so on. This illustrates the point that searches for
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databases and searches for individuals are rather similar. In the early chapters of this
book the searches are for individuals, but it should not be shocked when later on it is
databases (models) that we search for.
In everyday life we switch easily between searching for individuals and searching for the
locations within which we can find them. In fact, we do not make a sharp distinction
between these. We can search in the rooms of the house for a lost phone, and also
search for the rooms in which it might be. (Suppose that it has a GPS function that we
can access on the Internet, which is accurate enough to tell us which room it is in but not
where in that room.) For many purposes after identifying the room we will have to search
in its for the phone, but there are purposes for which it would be enough to know which
room it was in. (Suppose we want to avoid taking a nap in the room where the phone
might ring.)
To repeat, the material in this section is just background for the following chapters. There
will be more detail about searching for databases when it is needed.
1:6 (of 11) a remark on OR 
In English sometimes when we say "or" we mean "one or the other but not both" - the
"exclusive" sense of or — and sometimes we mean "one or the other and maybe both" —
the "inclusive" sense. But, when in logic we say "or" we mean the second: "at least one
of the two (perhaps one, perhaps both, just not neither)". It's what "or" means when you
say: 
”It will rain or it will snow.” Surely this is still true if it rains and snows. 
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“You can come to the party if you are my friend or if you bring a present.” Surely
this doesn't mean that if you are my friend and bring a present we won't let you in.
“He is  either  lying  or confused.”  Still  true if  he turns  out  to  be both lying and
confused.
Notice that in the last of these examples the OR is inclusive, even given the “either”. We
can illustrate this point with examples about searching, too. Suppose I say "get me all
the books that are either valuable or have lurid covers". You go into the next room and
you see a book that is valuable and has a lurid cover. Do you bring it? Sure. (On the
other hand when we say “for five dollars you can have soup or salad” we probably mean
that you can’t have both.)
>>  there is an important distinction in the philosophy of language between statements
which are false and those which are misleading, because they can lead people to have
false beliefs.  give some examples.  how is this relevant to the two senses of OR?  Which
one does it suggest is basic? (hard questions)
1:7 (of 11) relations 
Much information cannot be represented with an object and attribute table. For most
information is based not on individual things having single attributes,  but on several
things bearing some  relation to one another. So, to stick with our six dogs, we might
want to know which dogs chase which other dogs, on a particular morning. Suppose that
Alice chases Caspar. We cannot express this by saying just “Alice chases and Caspar is
chased”, as that would be true if Alice chased Doodles and Flossie chased Caspar but
Alice did not chase Caspar. We need to have, as basic units of information “_ chases …”.
That is, we need the information how the dogs relate to one another. These are relations.
“Chases” is a two-place relation, as are “loves”, “is to the north of”, and many others.
There  are  also  three-place  relations,  such  as  “is  between”  (“Calgary  is  between
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Vancouver and Montréal”, “NYC is between DC and Boston”) and “is the sum of” (“17 is
the sum of 9 and 8”). An important fact about language and about reality is that  we
cannot describe the world without relations. One-place attributes are not enough. A lot of
the complication of language comes from the need to express relations, and to say which
individuals bear which relation to which other individuals. Symbolic logic gives important
insights into how we think with relations and what the facts we express with language
are. The way these things are expressed in logic is rather unfamiliar to people used to
normal spoken languages, though. Relations will be just a small incidental complication
here at the beginning of the course, but they will become very important. So, beginning
in this chapter, the way logic treats relations will  be introduced bit by bit, so that it
gradually comes to seem natural. 
1:8 (of 11) relational grids
Information about relations can also be given in tables. Suppose that some of our six
dogs chase some others, on a particular day. We can represent this with a different kind
of table, with the same domain. (Watch out. This table looks like the object-attribute
tables we have been using, but it represents information in a different way.) 
   Chases1 alice brutus caspar doodles eloise flossie
alice YES YES YES YES YES YES
brutus YES NO YES YES NO NO
caspar NO NO YES NO NO NO
doodles NO NO YES NO NO YES
eloise NO YES YES YES NO NO
flossie YES NO YES NO NO NO
Call this a relational grid, or for short a grid. Note that in reading it order is important:
Alice chases Caspar but Caspar does not chase Alice. We start from the names listed
vertically and we use the YESs and NOs to relate them to the names listed horizontally.
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This is a reflection of another basic fact about language and the world: many relations
are intrinsically one way – they often hold between a and b but not between b and a. The
most famous such relation is “loves”: where would literature be, were it not for the fact
that often he loves her but she doesn’t love him? (A relation like this, where sometimes
one object  bears  it  to  another  but  the  other  does not  bear  it  to  the  first,  is  called
asymmetric. We live in an asymmetric universe: there are many such relations.) 
The cells of a relational grid say of two individuals whether or not they are connected by
the relation. We refer to, for example, the cell in the Chases grid at the meeting of the
Doodles row and the Eloise column, as Cde. It has a NO, so that the sentence “Doodles
chases Eloise” is false. Again we can save words just by saying “Cde is false” or “the
truth value of  Cde is False”. Or just “not Cde”. Note that the order is important: the
content of cell Ced is YES, Eloise chases Doodles, and the truth value of Ced is T.
>> this grid has a row consisting entirely of YESs, and a column consisting entirely of
YESs. what does this show about the relation?  can we have an all-YES row without an
all-YES column?
1:9 (of 11) questioning grids
We can get information out of a relational grid by asking questions, too. Given the table
above we can make the following queries:
1. Find the dogs who Alice chases.
2. Find the dogs who chase Alice.
3. Find the dogs who chase Caspar.
4. Find the dogs who are chased by Caspar (i.e. all the dogs who Caspar chases.)
5. Find the dogs who Brutus does not chase.
6. Find the dogs who do not chase Doodles.
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7. Find the dogs who are such that Brutus chases them and they chase Doodles.
8. Find the dogs who either chase Brutus or chase Flossie.
9. Find the dogs who either chase Brutus or are chased by Flossie. 
10. Find the dogs who chase themselves.
11. Find the pairs of dogs such that the first chases the second but the second does
not chase the first.
Though these are fairly simple questions, they can be confusing. Part of the confusion
comes from the English language, and we will soon introduce some notation to make
things clearer. The answers to these questions are:
1. dogs who Alice chases: a, b, c, d, e, f
2. dogs who chase Alice: a, b, f
3. dogs who chase Caspar: a, b, c, d, e, f
4. dogs who are chased by Caspar: c
5. dogs who Brutus does not chase: b, e, f
6. dogs who do not chase Doodles: c, d, f
7. dogs who Brutus chases and who chase Doodles. a
8. dogs who either chase Brutus or chase Flossie: a, d, e
9. dogs who either chase Brutus or are chased by Flossie: a, e, c
10. dogs who chase themselves: a, c 
11. pairs of dogs such that the first chases the second but the second does not
chase the first:  (a,c),  (a,d),  (a,e),  (b,c),  (b,d),  (d,c) ,  (d,f)  ,  (e,b),  (e,c),
(e,d), (f,c) 
(You may wonder  how Alice  and  Caspar  manage  to  chase  themselves.  Well,  in
Alice’s case, when all the others are hiding from her she gets bored and chases her
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own tail.  Caspar on the  other  hand is  a  rather  stupid  and frightened dog,  and
sometimes he gets a glimpse of his own shadow and runs away from it. So we
might say that Alice chases herself and Caspar is chased by himself.) 
Notice how to answer some of these questions we have to scan columns looking for
patterns of YES and NO, and to answer others we have to scan rows. To answer a few we
have to scan both. This is linked to the difference between “chases” and “is chased by”.
To find those who Alice chases – who are chased by Alice - you look along the Alice row;
to find those who chase Alice you look down the Alice column. 
>>  which of these questions are harder to answer?  why?
With databases in the form of relational grids we can search for truth values just as we
can when they are individual and attribute tables. For example given  Chases1 we can
search for the truth value of "Brutus chases Elose", and find the answer is False. And
given another grid as well, for example Chases2 below, we can ask which of them "Eloise
chases Brutus" holds in. The answer is that it does in both of them.
   chases2 alice brutus caspar doodles eloise flossie
alice NO NO NO NO NO NO
brutus NO NO YES YES NO NO
caspar YES NO YES NO NO NO
doodles YES NO YES NO NO YES
eloise YES YES YES YES NO NO
flossie NO NO YES NO NO NO
1:10 (of11) different ways of representing relations
This same information could be represented in different ways. We could use a somewhat
different table.
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Chases
alice alice
alice brutus
alice caspar
alice Eloise
alice doodles
alice flossie
brutus alice
brutus caspar
brutus doodles
caspar caspar
doodles caspar
doodles flossie
eloise brutus
eloise caspar
eloise doodles
flossie alice
flossie caspar
This is a more cumbersome way of presenting this particular information. But it is quite
standard in computer science, and has some advantages, for example with three and
more place relations (see below). Call this a list of tuples table. (Because in this case it is
a list of pairs of individuals. If the relation was three place we would have a list of triples
of objects. Pairs, triples, quadruples, … are often called n-tuples, or just tuples.) 
We could also present the same information as a set of sentences: 
alice chases alice
alice chases brutus
alice chases caspar
alice chases eloise
alice chases doodles
alice chases flossie
brutus chases alice
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brutus chases caspar
brutus chases doodles
caspar chases caspar
doodles chases caspar
doodles chases flossie
eloise chases brutus
eloise chases caspar
eloise chases doodles
flossie chases alice
flossie chases caspar 
You can see that this is not a very good way to present information, if we want to get
answers out of it  without much trouble. No wonder that we use graphs, tables,  and
diagrams. 
>>  are there situations where this would be a useful way to present information?
The tables we looked at earlier listed objects by their attributes, and these tables we
have seen in this section list objects by their relations to one another. Attributes and
relations are both expressed in language by predicates, sequences of words which can be
true of things. Thus “is human” is a one-place predicate true of Ada Lovelace (the first
computer programmer), Beethoven, and of you, and “is a dog” is a one-place predicate
true of Doodles and of Flossie, because, for example, “Ada is human” and “Flossie is a
dog” are is true sentences. “is to the north of” is a two place predicate, corresponding to
true sentences like “Toronto is to the north of New York City”. And “is between” is a three
place predicate, since there are true sentences like “Nanjing is between Hong Kong and
Beijing” 
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1:11 (of 11) graphical representations
Sometimes it is more intuitive to give data in the form of a picture. With a two place
relation we can draw a picture by using an arrow to connect  two objects  when the
relation connects them. For example the chasing relation between the six dogs could be
given by the picture below. 
I will call a picture like this an arrow diagram. There is an arrow for each pair (x,y) where
x has whatever relation we are describing to y. Sometimes an arrow will go from x to y
but not back from y to x. Then x has the relation to y, but y does not have the relation to
x,  as  when Xu sees Yang,  from his  hiding  place,  but  Yang does not  see  Xu.  Arrow
diagrams are going to be important in this course, so it  is worth taking the time to
become comfortable with them. 
The special roles of Caspar and of Alice are easy to see from this picture. (They’re not
hard to figure out from the relational grid table, either, but they do not exactly leap to
the eye from the list of tuples table. And you might never notice them when the data is a
set of sentences.) You can think of the darker arrows looping from each to itself as not
30
only showing that Alice chases Alice and that Caspar chases Caspar, but also as saying
“hey, notice these two: they’re special.” The arrow diagram has been laid out to show
this: the graphical arrangement of a diagram makes a big difference to what information
is easily got from it. 
Another way of putting the point about the roles of Caspar and Alice is that the diagram
makes it easy to see the results of some particular searches
“Find the dogs that chase all dogs” gets a
“Find the dogs that all dogs chase” gets c
“Find the dogs that Alice chases” gets everything
“Find the dogs that chase some dogs” gets everything.
(The question is not “...that chase all other dogs”: it asks for a dog that chases each one
of the dogs, and that will include chasing him or her self.) The interesting point now is
how finding the dogs who chase all dogs and who are chased by all dogs is easy given
the arrow diagram. Alice is at the centre of a star of arrows going to every dog, and
Caspar is the target of a flock of arrows coming from every dog. It’s not much harder to
see this information from the relational grid table: Alice is at the beginning of a full row
of YESs and Caspar is at the head of a full column of YESs. (But it takes a moment’s
thought to see why the row of YESs means that Alice chases all the dogs, or why the
column of YES means that Caspar is chased by all the dogs.) So this particular relation
has the special features that there is something that has the relation to everything, that
there is something that everything has the relation to, and everything has the relation to
something. There are exercises at the end of the chapter to make arrow diagrams more
familiar to you. 
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>>  think of an arrow diagram that is harder to work with than the corresponding grid
There are many ways of giving information visually, and different ones work best for
different purposes and different kinds of information. We use many different kinds of
tables,  graphs,  and diagrams.  We often  use  diagrams that  look like  arrow diagrams
without the arrows. And when we do include arrows or something serving the function of
an arrow we often do not indicate whether when the relation holds between two objects
in one order it hold in the reverse order, whether it holds between an object and itself,
and so on. For example, in the diagrams for possibility A and possibility B of the example
in section 2 I wrote P above R in possibility A, and so on, and R above G, without stating
that this means that the "lower dossier number" relation also holds between P and G.
This didn't  need stating because it  was clear from the meaning of  the words in  the
problem. But if the words had unusual meanings, as they often do in logic and math,
then it would have been necessary to state this.
Maps are a good example. Here is a map of the subway system of an imaginary city.
airport - stadium - happyGrove - businessDr - cityHall - trainstation - depressionville – richland
The relation sign "-", between a and s and so on, could be several relations. It could say
of  a and s, for example, that they are neighbouring stops, or that passengers can get
from one to the other, that the first is further out from the center than the second, or
that the first is to the west of the second. Since you are used to reading maps and know
how transit systems are laid out, you can get information about all of these from the
map.  (But  if  you were unfamiliar  with maps or  public  transit  it  would be much less
obvious to you.) 
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>>  “neighbouring stops”, or “can get from one to the other”, “first is further out from
the center than the second”,”first is to west of second”.  are all of these equally likely
interpretations of a map like this?  if we wanted to block one of these interpretations how
would we show this?
There are many examples of familiar types of diagrams. Family trees are another good
example. When they represent a two place relation between individuals in a definite set,
they can be translated into the arrow diagrams we will use throughout this book, though
the arrow diagram .will  sometimes  have  a  confusing  amount  of  "extra"  information.
There are exercises at the end of this chapter to make you more familiar with arrow
diagrams and their connections with maps, family trees, and other diagrams. In later
chapters we come to terms with relations that have more than two places. 
words used in this chapter that it would be a good idea to understand: argument, arrow
diagram, criterion of a query, deduction, database, domain of a database, object and
attribute table, query/search command, predicate, relation, relational grid.
If you are uncertain about any of these you should ask.
The index at the end of the book says where terms are explained or defined.
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And you thought I was making all this up ….
 
      
Alice Brutus Caspar
  
Doodles Eloise Flossie
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exercises for chapter 1
These, like the exercises for most chapters, are divided into three parts. Part A is 
questions you should be able to answer. Part B is more of the same, in case you want 
extra practice. And part C is harder questions needing more sophistication or more 
reflection. It would be a good idea to look at the C questions even if you find them 
challenging, and to ask about issues that they raise. You will also find a few questions 
where you think "Hey: he did not say how to do this". This is deliberate. It is meant to 
make you think, sometimes in a way that prepares you for an idea in a later chapter. 
(Many things are easiest if you have figured them out for yourself before they were 
explained to you.)
A – core 
1)  Exactly  six  guideposts,  numbered  1  through  6,  mark  a  mountain  trail.   Each
guidepost pictures a different one of six animals:   fox, grizzly, hare, lynx, moose, or
porcupine.  
The following conditions must apply:
The moose guidepost is numbered lower than the hare guidepost.
The lynx guidepost is numbered lower than the moose guidepost, but higher than the 
fox guidepost.  
Which of the following animals CANNOT be the one pictured on guidepost 3? 
fox, grizzly, lynx, moose, porcupine
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2)  (In the same situation) if guidepost 5 does not picture the moose, then which of the 
following must be true?
- the lynx is pictured on guidepost 2 
- the moose is pictured on guidepost 3
- the grizzly is pictured on guidepost 4 
- the porcupine is pictured on guidepost 5
- the hare is pictured on guidepost 6 
3)  Describe your thinking for questions 1 and 2 in terms of (a) a diagram and (b) your 
use of the word "if".
4)   
Subway Hockey French-speaking
montréal YES YES YES
toronto YES YES NO
new york YES YES NO
chicago YES YES NO
paris YES NO YES
trois rivières NO NO YES
a)  Find all the cities that do not have a subway.
b) Find all the cities that have a subway and do not have a hockey team.
c) Find all the French speaking cities that have a (NHL) hockey team.
d) Find all the French speaking cities that do not have a subway.
e) Find all the cities that are not French speaking and do have a subway) .
f) Find all the cities that either have a hockey team or are French speaking.
5)  a) State a query which when applied to the database above will get Montréal and 
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Paris. 
b) Write a query which will get Montréal, Toronto, and Chcago.
c) Write a query which will get all the cities to the east of Montréal. 
6)  Suppose you are searching for books on the library computer. (a) you enter “Morton”
for “author”, (b) you enter “Morton, Adam” for “author”.  Which request will give the
longer list of answers? (More hits.)  Why?  Suppose you are doing a Google search and
you enter  “sex”  and get  zillions  of  hits.   You add another  keyword  and enter  “sex,
chromosomes”.  Which will get you more hits?  Why?
7)   Fill in the blanks in the table below so that the question “I am rich and happy. who 
am I?” gets bo and mo, and “I am rich and not happy. who am I?” gets only jo.
Rich Happy
bo
jo
mo
8)   The database below has one blank cell. How must the cell be filled in so that “Find
everyone who is either guilty or a suspect” gets the answer “zorro, yannis, xeno”?  How
must it  be filled in so that “Find everyone who is  neither guilty nor a suspect” gets
“zorro”.  (“neither guilty nor a suspect” is a way of saying “not guilty and not a suspect.”)
Guilty Suspect
zorro NO
yannis NO YES
xeno NO YES
9)  The database below has two blank cells. Suppose we know that before the cells were
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blanked out someone did a search for “Find everyone who is either dangerous or not
crazy” and got Alfons, Casimir (and no one else). Can you fill in the blanks? 
Dangerous Crazy
alfons YES NO
bridget NO YES
casimir NO
dolores NO
10)    Which grid ((a), (b), (c), or (d)) describes the same relation as each of the arrow 
diagrams below? 
(a) l m n (b) l m n (c) l m n (d) l m n
l YES NO NO l NO YES YES l NO NO NO l NO YES NO
m NO YES NO m NO NO NO m YES NO NO m NO NO YES
n NO NO NO n NO NO NO n NO NO NO n YES NO NO
11)  a)  In the arrow diagram marked (ii)  in exercise 7,  add arrows (perhaps in a
different colour) to join all pairs that do not have the relation. That is, given any x and
any y such that x is not joined by an arrow in the original diagram, join them by a (new,
or additional) arrow.
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b) In diagram (iv) circle those individuals that do not have the relation to themselves.
c)  In diagram (ii) add arrows (perhaps in a different colour) to join all pairs such that
the relation holds in one direction but not in the other. (That is, such that the first has
the relation to the second but the second does not have the relation to the first.)  
(This question describes a kind of search, defined in terms of relations rather than 
attributes.  Do you see why?) 
12)   The table below has some blank cells.  All the same, you can know what the 
answers to some searches are, and whether some sentences are true in the database 
(that is, whether the search for “what is the truth value of the sentence” gets the answer
“True”.)
Cat Dog Animal
garfield YES
tabitha YES NO
macavity YES NO YES
alice NO YES YES
For each of the following queries, either give the answer, or state that there is not 
enough information in the database.
a) Find all the individuals that are either animals or cats.
b) Find all the individuals that are cats and not animals
c) Find all the individuals that are animals and not cats
d) Find all the individuals that are cats and animals 
e) Find the truth value of “some cats are animals”
(warning: the database does not require that all cats are animals.)
40
B – more
13)   In the table for exercise 9) for each of the sentences below fill in the blank cells 
one way so as to make it true (the answer to “what’s its  truth value” is True) and 
another way so as to make it false. 
all cats are animals. 
no dogs are cats 
all cats that are not dogs are animals
14)  In which of the databases below do the queries listed below them have the given 
answers?
a) Find the truth value of ‘some cats are fish’.     True
b) I am a curious cat: who might I be?        o
c) I am either a curious cat or a fish: who might I be?  m, l
d) Find the truth value of ‘all cats are fish’.     False
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15)  
          Beat leafs oilers ducks hurricanes
leafs NO NO NO NO
oilers YES NO YES NO
ducks YES NO NO YES
hurricanes YES YES NO NO
(These data are not meant to be accurate!)  
a) Find all the teams that the Oilers beat.
b) Find all the teams that beat the Oilers.
c) Find all the teams that beat some team that beat the Leafs.
d) Find all the teams that either beat the oilers or were beaten by the Ducks.
e) I beat a team that either beat some other team or that did not beat the Oilers: 
what might I be? 
f) Are there three teams such that the first beat the second and the second beat the
third, but the first did not beat the third?
16)  Find a query which will get the teams that beat some American team.  [This is a 
type of problem that requires taking some factual information from outside the database 
and translating it into the language of the database.  In case you need to know, the leafs 
are from Toronto, the Oilers from Edmonton, the Ducks from Anaheim California, and the
Hurricanes from Carolina.] 
17)  Draw an arrow diagram containing the same information as the table in 12 above.  
18)  a) Who has the relation below to at least one individual ?  b) Who to none ?
c) Who has the relation to an individual who has it to someone (is a grandparent)?  
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d) For which individuals are there two individuals that bear the relation to it (has two 
parents)?
e) find (pairs) x,y:  x is a parent of y & y has just one parent   (note that only this last 
question is asking for pairs) .
C  - harder
19)  Suppose that in the diagram of the subway in section 10 of this chapter the arrow 
had meant “you can get from the first station to the second station.”  What arrows would 
have to be added to make it an accurate map?
20)  In the grid below one cell is blank.  What answer does the query “Find everyone 
who admires Osman”  have to get in order for that cell to be YES?  Find a  query such 
that if it gets the answer  “Tom”  then that cell must be NO.  
  Admires sam tom osman
sam YES NO YES
tom NO YES
osman NO YES YES
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21)  In the database of question 18), which of the following get True, which False, and 
for which is there not enough information?   
a) Find the truth value of “everyone admires himself”. 
b) Find the truth value of “everyone has an admirer”. 
c) Find the truth value of “all Tom’s admirers are admirers of Osman”.
d) Find the truth value of “someone has no admirer”.  
(Note:  a person’s admirers are the people who admire her, which may not be the same 
as the people she admires.)  
22)  In the database of 20, how do we have to fill the blank cell in order to make “all 
Tom’s admirers admire Osman” true?  How do we have to fill it in order to make 
“everyone who does not admire Sam admires Osman” false?
23)  a)  Make an arrow diagram in which there are arrows joining all pairs which have 
the relation in (i) below and do not have the relation in (ii).  (So by combining the 
relations in this way we have got another relation.)  
b)  Make an arrow diagram with arrows joining all pairs which either have the relation in 
(ii) or do not have the relation in (i). 
(Before doing either part of this question you may want to think about exercise 11.)   
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24)  Some tables are  given in section 2 are special in that every set of individuals is the 
answer to a question.  When will this be the case? 
25)   Can you find a pictorial way of representing the “chases” information about the six 
dogs in section 8 of this chapter, that is not an arrow diagram? 
26)  Give examples of four and five place relations.  
27)  (indexed tables) I said that relations cannot be replaced with one-place attributes. 
That is true. But there is a way in which a set of object and attribute tables can represent
a relation. We can make a separate object and attribute table for each individual in the 
domain, showing what other individuals it has the relation to. So with the Chases 
database we could have six tables, of which the first two are as follows. 
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Alice-chaser
alice YES
brutus YES
caspar NO
doodles NO
eloise NO
flossie YES
Brutus-chaser 
alice YES
brutus NO
caspar NO
doodles NO
eloise YES
flossie NO
and so on. What would the other four tables look like? How could we extend this idea to 
represent a three-place relation in terms of two-dimensional grids? How could we use it 
to represent a three-place relation in terms of object and attribute tables?
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chapter two: queries and searches
2:1 (of 9) scope  
We get information out of  databases by asking questions.  But if  you ask the wrong
question you do not get the answer you wanted. In this chapter we discuss one aspect of
carefully-worded questions, or queries, which feature in Boolean searches, focussing on
the words “and”, “or”, “not” and “if”.  
Consider again the simple object and attribute table from chapter one.
Hungry Angry Sleepy
alice YES NO NO
brutus YES YES YES
caspar NO NO NO
doodles NO NO YES
eloise YES YES NO
flossie YES NO YES
Suppose we want to collect together the hungry dogs and the angry dogs. We want the
hungry ones and the angry ones, so we should say “find the dogs that are hungry and
angry”, right?  Wrong. That search will get us the dogs which are both hungry and angry
— Brutus and Eloise — while we want both the dogs that are hungry and the dogs that
are angry — Alice, Brutus, Eloise, and Flossie. What we should say is “find the dogs that
are either hungry or angry”. To put it another way: don’t confuse “if it is hungry include
it and if it is angry include it” with “if it is hungry and angry include it”. The first is the
one we want, and it is equivalent to “if it is hungry or angry include it”, as we will see
later. (Stop for a moment and feel the difference in meaning between “if hungry then
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include and if angry then include” and “if hungry and angry then include.”)
This confusion between “and” and “or” is very easy to make. It is not surprising that this
can be confusing, as the English language is not very helpful here. In fact, this is a
special case of a deep and general problem about English and other natural languages.
They are not very clear in the way they indicate the scope of important words. Scope is a
matter of the order in which words apply, which may not be the same as the order in
which they are said or written. Imagine a conversation where we are talking about a
would-be horror movie and I say "it is not very scary". You reply "that's under-stating it:
it  is  very  un-scary".  I  said  NOT  VERY  scary"  and  you  aid  something  different  and
stronger, VERY NOT SCARY. A movie at a scariness level of 5 on a 0-10 scale would be
not very scary, but a movie at a level of 0 would be very not scary (very unscary). We
will see examples contrasting not all with all not, not believe with believe not, don’t and
with and don’t, find both contrasted with both find. So scope is a matter of which words
would come first if you expressed yourself perfectly precisely. In the case we have just
been discussing we have to distinguish between 
Find all the dogs like this: each one is hungry and angry.
and 
Find all the dogs like this: each one is hungry. And Find all the dogs like this: each
one is angry (and then combine the two) 
The first of these says “find (hungry and angry)” while the second says “find angry and
find hungry”.  Or, to put it a third way, the first says  
Find all of the dogs with both attributes: hungry, angry
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while the second says.
Do both of the following: find all of the hungry dogs, find all of the angry dogs 
  
From this last way of putting it you can see why I said scope is a matter of what words
would come first if we were speaking absolutely precisely. In “Find all  with both” the
“both” follows the “find  all” — or as we say in logic “both” is within the scope of “find all”
— while in “Both: find all hungry, find all angry” the “both” comes before the two  “find
all”s, which are within its scope. So it is the second that we should use when want to
collect  together  the  hungry  with  the  angry.  (And,  as  we’ll  see  soon,  it  can  also  be
expressed with “or”.) There is scope in arithmetic too: half the square root of 9 is not the
same as the square root of half of 9.
Suppose that you are getting things for me from a drawer. It has three red wool socks,
two red polyester socks, two green wool socks, three blue silk socks, red shorts, and a
diamond ring. I say to you "Get all the socks that are not wool and red." You should ask
for more explanation before rummaging through the drawer. The request may mean. 
(a) Get all the socks that are not wool and are red = 
(NOT WOOL) & RED = the two red polyester socks
or it may mean 
(b) Get all the socks that are not wool-and-red = NOT (WOOL & RED) = the two 
red polyester socks, the two green wool socks, the three blue silk socks 
These are clearly different. 
50
English and other spoken languages are usually rather unclear about scope, leaving it up
to the common sense of hearer or reader rather than stating it explicitly. There are many
examples.  Suppose that you come home at 3 am and find a note saying 
“DON’T come home late and take out the garbage”. 
This  might  mean  two  things.(i)  Do  not  come  home  late,  and  also  do  take  out  the
garbage. (ii) Do not do this: come home late and take out the garbage. The first might
seem more likely but it is easy to imagine situations in which the second might be the
message. (They bug you to take out the garbage but you never do, except when you
come home in the middle of the night, singing, and decide to do it, clattering the garbage
cans and waking everyone up.) 
Or suppose one person says to another “I don’t believe that there is a god.” Is the person
saying “I believe that there is not a god” or “It is not true that I believe that there is a
god”? The second is what the person would mean if they thought there was not enough
evidence to decide either for or against the existence of a god. To tell which one the first
person means, whether they are an atheist or an agnostic, the second person may have
to ask her to be more explicit. 
>> which of these is the atheist's answer, and which the agnostic's?
Or suppose that one person says “all of my dates were not disasters”.  (Think of it as an
angry reply to someone teasing him: all your dates have been disasters.) He may be
saying “the following is not true: all of my dates were disasters” (that is, some of them
were non-disasters). Or he may be saying “this is true of all of my dates: they were non-
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disasters” (that is, none of them were disasters.) You can’t tell which if you take the
sentence in isolation. A Volvo advertisement says “the world’s first four-seat convertible
with a three-piece retractable hardtop.” When you first scan it you think “the world’s first
four-seat  convertible”  (and perhaps some part  of  your  mind thinks  “the  world’s  first
convertible with a retractable hardtop”). But all they are really claiming is to be the first
convertible to have both 4 seats and a 3-piece retractable hardtop.  
(A group of  philosophers  were planning a soccer  game while  I  was writing an early
version of this chapter. One sent an email to everyone saying “bring both light and dark
T-shirts”. The idea was that when we split into teams everyone could tell who was on
which team. One person came wearing a striped T-shirt. Only a philosopher.)  
These examples, and many more, show something that it helps to develop a feel for
when studying logic (And which sharpens your awareness of what we communicate with
language.) Soon we will develop a notation that makes it easier to be clear about these
things. But the notation goes hand in hand with sensing these ambiguities in ordinary
language: the notation makes it  easier to sense them, and having a sense for them
makes it easier to understand the notation1.  
I will sometimes use ways of writing sentences that are not regular English — and are
not the official notation of logic either — which are meant to make scope distinctions
easier to see. For example in English when we say “if you touch it, it will not break”, we
1 In logic one item (sentence, predicate, or whatever) either is or is not within the scope of 
another. No overlapping, no halfway. Analogues of scope elsewhere in life are not so definite. 
Musical phrasing, for example, which puts one sequence of notes within another, is rather more 
fluid.
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usually mean “it is not the case that if you touch it, it will break”.  That is to say, it is not
fragile. But we might also mean “If you touch it, that will make it fail to break”. That is,
touching it will make it cease to be fragile.  In the “Expanglish” ("English-ish", as I shall
say in places) I will sometimes use, these could be written as  
This is false. if you touch it, it will break  
Suppose you touch it. then it will not break 
And similarly we could say: 
This is forbidden. You come home late and you take out the garbage
You are forbidden to come home late. You are required to take out the garbage
You must bring a dark T shirt. You must bring a light T shirt
You must bring a T shirt. It must be light and dark
The idea is that it is sometimes easier to be clear with a linked series of mini-sentences
than with a single complex sentence.  I  will  use this  idea from time to time in later
chapters, often without remarking on it. (If your main language is not English please
note that this is funny Adam Morton language, and not regular English. Don’t give it to
other profs.)
>>  express the difference between "I am indifferent to onion-flavoured ice cream" and
"I  avoid  onion-flavoured  ice  cream"  using  the  words  "want"  and  "not"  but  without
"indifferent" or "avoid". 
>> "I must do it" and "I have to do it" mean (almost) the same, but "I mustn't do it" and
"I don't have to do it" have different meanings.   How can this be?
2 (of 9) Boolean connectives  
We can use and, or, not to combine attributes or relations or whole sentences. (If too: I’ll
get  to  that.)  The  meanings  of  these  words  are  clearest  when  we  are  dealing  with
individuals and attributes (one place predicates.) Consider a different object and attribute
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table (because you are probably getting bored with Alice and Caspar.) This is a table of
actors  
Glamorous Acts Expensive Male
philip NO YES YES YES
juliette YES YES NO NO
angelina YES NO YES NO
tom YES NO YES YES
natalie YES YES NO NO
dominic YES YES NO YES
cerris YES YES NO NO
Suppose  that  we  are  casting  for  a  film and  we  want  a  male  actor  who  is  not  too
expensive for our budget. So we consult our database of actors — in reality it will have
hundreds of names — and we look for the profile NO, YES in the Expensive and Male
columns. We have to give some instructions to the computer, or to an overworked clerical
assistant who is going through file cards. So we say “find all the actors who are not
expensive and male”. Now computers are very literal and clerical assistants can get very
tired, so we must be clear that what we want is “not-expensive and also male” rather
than “not (expensive and male)”. In the first case we get just Dominic, and in the second
we get Juliette,  Angelina,  Natalie,  Dominic,  and Cerris,  which is  surely  not  what  we
wanted.  
Consider some other simple searches. We might want to find all the actors who can act
and who are expensive. To do this we might first collect all those who can 
act — all the YESs in the  acts column — getting Philip, Juliette, Natalie, Dominic, and
Cerris. Then we could refine our search, selecting from these those who are expensive,
so we keep only those who also have a YES in the expensive column. The ones with a
YES in the expensive column are Philip, Angelina, and Tom. And so the ones we want, the
ones in both lists, consist of just Philip.    
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Or we might want to find all the actors who can either act or are expensive. So again we
work with the list of actors who can act — Philip, Juliette, Natalie, Dominic, Cerris — and
the list of actors who are expensive — Philip, Angelina, and Tom. But this time we want
to take all the actors who are on either list. So we get Philip, Juliette, Angelina, Tom,
Natalie, Dominic, Cerris: everyone.    
Or we might be making a very low budget film and all we want are actors who are not
expensive. So we start with the expensive list — Philip, Angelina, Tom — and we include
everyone who is not on this list — Juliette, Natalie, Dominic, Cerris. Notice that this is a
search that can be done in two stages: first search for the expensive individuals, and
then search for everyone who is not on this list.   
These are the three basic Boolean operators: AND, OR, NOT. In terms of tables, AND
collects together two areas of a table to give the individuals that are in both. OR collects
two areas and gives the individuals that are in either. NOT takes one area and gives
everything except the individuals who are in it. So when we ask
Get all who are A and B we want: YES , YES, that is  both of A, B columns. 
Get all who are A or B we want: YES on one of A, B columns  (doesn't matter which,
can be both).  
Get all who are not A we want: NO on the A column.  
Another way of putting this is in terms of Venn diagrams, such as the one below. 
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In  this  diagram  the  square  frame  represents  some  larger  set  of  individuals  (the
“universe” of the diagram), and each circle represents a set of individuals within that
larger set. The two circles have a region which is in both of them. That is called the
intersection of the two sets and corresponds to AND. (An individual is in the intersection
if it is in the first set and in the second set.) There is also a region which contains all the
individuals in either of them. That is called the union of the two sets and corresponds to
OR. (An individual is in the union if it is in the first set or in the second set.) There is also
for  each  of  the  two  sets  a  region  that  contains  everything  (in  the  universe  of  the
diagram) that is not in that set. It is called the complement of the set and corresponds to
NOT. (An individual is in the complement of a set if it is not in the set.)   
Some people find Venn diagrams very intuitive, and some are more comfortable with
tables. We can also draw Venn diagrams with three attributes.  (With more than three it
gets messy.)  For example  
You should be able to see for yourself in this diagram the intersection of expensive with
act, the union of act with male, the complement of male, and other similar regions. It is
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also clear from this diagram that if we start with some regions and define new ones by
taking unions, intersections, and complements then we can define yet further ones by
taking  unions,  intersections,  and complements  of  the  regions  we  have  just  got.  For
example  once  we  have  the  intersection  of  expensive  with  act we  can  take  the
complement of that set. And what is that? — the set of all  actors who are not both
expensive and capable of acting. And once we have the union of  act with  male we can
take the intersection of that set with the complement of expensive. What we get then is
the set of actors who both either can act or are male and are not expensive. (As you see
from this example, the words can get confusing.  It is easiest to think of this one with the
sets in a different order. It is the set of actors who are inexpensive and also either are
good actors or are male. The complexity is still  there, though; that is one reason for
inventing a special clear notation.) And so on, we can define extremely complex sets
using union, intersection, and complement repeatedly2.  
>>  on a Venn diagram for the combinations of two attributes mark the patterns of YES
and NO for each area.
>>  what can you do in terms of YES/NO patterns that you cannot do with a Venn
diagram?
These complex repeated Boolean operations can be easier to grasp if you think of them
in terms of search questions. So instead of “the intersection of the union of act and male
with the complement of expensive” we can think in terms of a three-stage search:
Find all actors who either can act or are male
Find all actors who are not expensive
2 Boolean operators or connectives are named after the English mathematician George Boole, 
1815-1864, who was influenced by Ada Lovelace, who wrote the first computer program, and who
himself influenced the English philosopher John Venn 1834-1923, the inventor of Venn diagrams.  
For an up-to-date take on the example of this section see
          http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/business/media/28steal.html?ref=technology  
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Find all actors who are in both of these two sets.
We can compress these three stages into one structured search as:
Find all actors who are both A and B:
A: they either can act or are male
B: they are not expensive
This  way  of  representing  complex  Boolean  combinations  in  terms  of  stage-by-stage
searches  is  related  to  scope  distinctions.  Remember  the  difference  between  “not-
expensive and also male” and “not (expensive and male)” earlier in this section. That is
the same as the difference between the two searches, 
Find all actors who are not expensive 
Find all actors who are male
Find all actors who are in both these sets.
and
Find all actors who are expensive 
Find all actors who are male
Find all actors who are not in both of these sets 
2:3 (of 9) mathematical mentality: thinking through searches
When you have a database and you are answering a "Find" instruction, one way of doing
it is to repeat the instruction for every cell of the database. This is time consuming and is
likely to  leave you confused; at  some point  you may forget what  it  is  that you are
supposed to be doing just because your mind is getting overloaded. A better way is to
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think first which cells are going to be relevant; perhaps you will need to consider only
one column or one row. Then you think what is going to guide your decision at each cell,
what will make you save a particular individual has one that the search has found, and
what will make you discard an individual. Then instead of thinking again about each case
you go through the relevant parts of the database, following the decisions you have just
made, and not thinking about each of them them as you carry it out. This way you do not
need to do a difficult thinking except at the very beginning, and you do not have to keep
much in mind except what you will need at the end.
In effect you are programming your mind to be a little automaton which can carry out
the task without detailed supervision. You can save your sophisticated thinking power for
programming your naïve thinking. A lot of mathematical thinking is like this: you think
conceptually about how to use your spatial or symbol manipulating skills, then you use
them automatically and then you reflect conceptually on what you have got3. (This last
stage is important also, as you may have made a mistake in the automatic part and your
answer may be absurd.) 
Here is an example from high school math. You have an algebraic equation to solve. You
think what your procedure is going to be: whether you are applying something like the
quadratic  formula  or  doing  the  same  thing  to  both  sides  of  the  equation  and  then
rearranging, or whatever. Then you carry out this procedure without thinking about what
it means. You certainly do not think, for example "I am looking for a number which when
3 There is a basic dispute about how to teach mathematics in early grades, between those who advocate
learning routines and those who advocate understanding what one is doing. Often parents are in the first
group and teachers in the second. But if children have to guide each step of routine by understanding they
get confused, and if they have no understanding they cannot tackle novel problems. I am suggesting a good
combination is a rough understanding of a precise procedure that is best done by rote.
59
multiplied by itself and added to three times itself gives a total of 12" and let this guide
you at each stage. Instead, you fix on a strategy, do it, and then check whether the
number you have got is such that when squared and added to three times itself adds up
to 12. The crucial thing is the mixture of conceptual and mechanical. You have to find the
mixture that works for you particular kind of task. (Exercise 14 of this chapter connects
with the topic.)
2:4 (of 9) sequential and branching searches, shortcuts, the structure of tasks
We can search using a particular criterion, and then search in the results of that search
using a different criterion. That is  like  pouring the data through one filter,  and then
pouring what you get through another. We can also search for individuals that satisfy
both criteria. That is like putting the filters together and pouring the data through the
combined filter. The two are equivalent: they both amount to searching with AND. The
first says:
Find all individuals satisfying F
    then among the results
Find all individuals satisfying G
The second says:
Find all individuals satisfying F
Find all individuals satisfying G
Take the intersection of the results of these searches 
Suppose we are looking in a domain of men for handsome unmarried individuals. If we
do it the first way then stage one will get all handsome men, and stage two will get all
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the handsome guys who are unmarried. If we do it the second way then we will get,
separately, all the handsome men and all the unmarried men, and then by taking the
intersection of these we will end up with all the handsome men who are unmarried: the
same set.  
In fact, we could do it a third way, searching first for unmarried men and then searching
among the  results  for  handsome ones.  Though  these  three  ways  will  get  the  same
results, one might be easier to perform than the others, especially if the domain is large.
Suppose that you have a list of two hundred people who match the criteria you have
entered on a dating site. You want to find a handsome unmarried man. (Assume for
simplicity that people tick a box if they are good-looking — and they do so honestly!) The
site will give you lists of those candidates who are male, of those who are married, and
those who are handsome. One way of finding what you want is to write out the names of
the married men: you find there are sixty. That allows you to write out the forty names
of  the  unmarried  (not-married)  men.  Looking  in  these  forty  we  find  five  who  are
handsome. That's a lot of work to come up with someone to have a drink with while
listening to his life story. On the other hand you could look first for handsome people:
you might find there are ten. If you write these out and check which ones are unmarried
we get the same five guys. That is a lot less trouble. 
>>  how do you deal with sites that give more search results than you can handle?  do
you sometimes move from automated search to manual search? 
This  was  an  ugly  bunch of  men.  If  the  proportions  had  been  different  the  opposite
procedure might have been the one that was easier. If we search mechanically, by brute
force, we will often do more work than we need to. A little thought in advance will save
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time.  
I have been illustrating searching in sequence, using one filter and then another. (I shall
also sometimes say searching in series.) We can also search in  parallel, applying each
filter independently of the other and then combining the results. (I shall sometimes call
this branching search.) This amounts to searching with OR. So in a different search we
could collect the unmarried men, and also collect the handsome men, and then combine
the two collections. We would be following the instructions:
Find all the individuals satisfying F
Find all the individuals satisfying G
Collect everything that results from either search
or equivalently
Find all the individuals satisfying F
Find all the individuals satisfying G
Take the union of the results
These two instructions do the same search, for F OR G. They are different from the
sequential search for F AND G described earlier.
The difference between filters in parallel and filters in sequence is important, and will
return in later chapters when we discuss search trees and derivations. Here are images
of the two kinds of filter.
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2:5 (of 9) and/or/comma
The contrast between searching in sequence (or series) and in parallel, and between AND
and  OR,  links  to  a  common  experience  when  searching  the  Internet.  Many  search
engines have as their primary mode of entering a query a list of search terms separated
by commas. "music, classical, cello", for example. Usually the comma functions — to a
first approximation only — as AND. Then we get an ordered set of Internet sites in which
all of the search terms occur. On some sites, though, the comma functions as OR. Then
we get sites in which one or another of the terms appear. This use of the comma is
becoming less common, since the Internet has grown so enormous that the set of sites
where any of a list of even quite rare terms is found will usually be unmanageably big.
(The rare word 'defenestration' means being thrown of a window, but once entering 'sex,
defenestration' into Google I got 528,000 results.  And Google claims that its comma
means AND. And entering  'axolotl, defenestration' I got 17,800 results. All those pages
about throwing amphibians out of windows!)  
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>>  how would you test whether comma, used in a search engine's entry box, is closer
to AND in its effect or to OR?  see also exercise 5.
Here too the AND/OR contrast is a series/parallel contrast. If a search engine interprets
comma as AND then each search opens a window in which items are listed which satisfy
the criterion "search_term1 & search_term2 & ...  ".  But often we want to do an OR
search instead. One reason could be that we are not sure which of two variants on a
criterion is more likely to have the result we are looking for. For example, we might be
torn between searching for "Louis the fourteenth", "Louis quatorze", or "Louis 14", for an
essay on French history. (Or between "Sun Yat Sen" and "Zhongshan" for an essay on the
influence  of  that  leader.  Or  between  Title,  pdf,  and  Title,  epub.  There  are  many
examples.) The solution is easy: open a separate window for each search, do it, and
paste  the  results  into  a  single  file.  Then  you  will  get  items  satisfying  the  criterion
"search_term1 OR search_term2 OR ... ". (You usually won't get all items satisfying this
criterion, especially if you only copy the first page of each window, but the results will
have what you want, a mixture of items containing the various search terms.)    
>>   give some examples from topics that interest you, where this parallel technique
would be useful
>> money-making idea: write an AND-to-OR program that automates this procedure.
see how studying logic can pay off.)
>>  how would you use this procedure to search for 
"(term1 AND term2) OR (term3 AND term4)"?  (see exercises 20, 21.) 
It is very useful to know whether a search site or program in which terms are separated
by commas interprets the comma as AND or OR. For example if you are looking for a free
download of a book and search with “TITLE, .epub, .pdf” on a site where the comma is
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AND, it will exclude many search results which have one but not the other. But if the
comma is OR, then this is an efficient way to survey the possibilities.  
Lists can often be interpreted conjunctively, that is, as AND, and also disjunctively, that
is, as OR. The OR interpretation usually includes more possibilities ("OR is MORE"). In
everyday life we often state a list without being clear whether we mean it as AND ("all of
the above") or as OR ("some of the above"). There is a very general reason why people
are often unclear, in fact often confused, about this. It would take us some way from the
topic, but see exercise 12 of chapter 7.  (See also exercise 3 for this chapter.) 
2:6 (of 9) but if it’s a …
Here is a kind of search that is often useful. Suppose that you are moving to a new
apartment, and you have decided to take along all your books, except for your science
fiction collection, of which you are going to keep only the books by Philip K Dick. You are
instructing a friend to put the books that are moving with you into boxes. You say “find
all the cookbooks, and all the books about logic, in fact all the books, but if it’s sci-fi it
has to be by Philip K Dick.” Your request is in the form of an  if (it’s a  conditional, as
logicians say): if a science fiction book gets included then it is by Dick. 
The effect of this if-condition is to refine the search we have already made. We cut “all
books” down to “all books except that if it is science fiction then it has to be by Philip K
Dick”. Consider the consequences for the choice of particular books. Your friend picks up
a Shakespeare play and includes it, picks up a detective novel and includes it, similarly
for a logic textbook, but when she picks up a science fiction book (instantly recognizable
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by their weird covers) she has to check who wrote it. What about books by Philip K Dick
that  are  not  science  fiction?  (For  example  his  Selected  literary  and  philosophical
writings.) They should be included, since the rule applies only to science fiction books,
whatever their authors. So we can find uses for a query that says “Find everything such
that  if it has attribute A then it has attribute B”. The effect of using this search is to
include everything, except things that have A but do not have B.  
Queries  involving  IF  make  most  intuitive  sense  when  they  are  combined  with  other
queries. Suppose I say: (a) get all the books from my apartment (b) if they are by Philip
K Dick then they must be sci-fi. Then you will know to get all books satisfying both the
criterion that they are in my apartment and the criterion that if they are by PKD then
they are SF. Books not by PKD but in my apartment get taken. But if I say “get me all
books such that if they are by PKD then they are SF”, not in conjunction with any larger
search, you are likely to respond with puzzlement. What about books not by PKD? In
logic we understand IF even when it is in isolation in a way that is more common in
everyday language when it is an extra proviso to another query or statement. So if a
logician tells you to get all books such that if they are SF then they are by PKD, you roam
the world picking up books by Shakespeare and Atwood and other authors, the Bible and
the Koran, texts on logic and history and other subject, PKD's SF works, leaving out only
the books — Asimov, Pratchett, Robinson, and others — that are SF but not by PKD. A
tall order. Some of the exercises for this chapter are meant to help you get used to IF
used in isolation like this.  
>>  suppose I say "if a book is by PKD then put it in the box", all alone, not joined to any
larger instruction, and then when you go to the bookshelf there are no books by PKD, but
lots by Tolstoy, Plato, Asimov and Stephenson.  what would you put in the box?
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Suppose I am telling you to get socks from a drawer. I say  “Get me the socks from the
drawer: but if they are wool they (must be) red.” The drawer has some red wool socks,
so you bring them. It also has some green polyester socks so you bring them. It also has
some blue wool socks and you do not bring them.   
Suppose I say “Bring me what's in that drawer, with a proviso: if it's a sock it will be red.”
The drawer has some red socks, so you bring them. It also has some green shorts so you
bring them. But you leave out the blue and yellow and black socks. You find a diamond
ring, and you bring that along too. (So a diamond ring satisfies "if it is a sock it is red"!) 
Suppose I say “Get everything such that if it is a sock it is red”. The query is GET: IF
SOCK THEN RED. So you get the three red wool socks, the two red polyester socks, the
shorts, the diamond ring. 
But suppose I say “Get everything such that if it is red it is a sock”. Then the query is
GET: IF RED THEN SOCK. So you get the three red wool socks, the two red polyester
socks, the two green wool socks, the three blue silk socks, the diamond ring. We can see
that these two queries are clearly different.  It makes a difference which way round we
take the if. 
These searches too can be pictured as physical filters. An if-filter “if it is A then it is B”
filters only A things. Anything that is not A gets through automatically. But A things are
tested; if they are B they get through, but if they are not B they are blocked. We can
picture it as below:  
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>>  anticipating a topic from later in the book: how can you do an IF search using AND,
OR and NOT?  does this suggest how to apply the "open another window" technique to IF
searches?
2:7 (of 9) the if of logic   
We mean many things  by  “if”  in  everyday  language.  In  logic  we fix  on  one  simple
meaning, as explained in the previous section. (If-sentences are called "conditionals".
The "if"  of logic is sometimes called the material  conditional.) To help make it  seem
natural consider the following.
Alice tells Bill and Carrie “if it’s raining tomorrow, be sure to wear a hat”. It is not raining
tomorrow.  Bill  wears  a  hat  and  Carrie  does  not.  Which  one  has  followed  Alice’s
instructions? Logicians say: both.
Aiko makes two predictions “if it rains tomorrow, Bojia will wear a hat” and “if it rains
tomorrow Cho will wear a hat”. It does not rain the next day. Bojia wears a hat, and Cho
does not. Which of her predictions was true? Logicians say: both.
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Artemisia says “Bring in stuff out of the trunk of the car, please. The only condition is
that if it’s a phone it must be a Samsung, since my sister’s iPhone should stay there.”
Bruno brings in a Samsung phone, and Carlo brings in a used bubble gum.  Which of
them has followed her instructions? Logicians say: both.
The last of these examples uses the search command “GET: if A then B” familiar from the
previous sections. (I could have said “Find” instead of “Get”.) The other examples show
that it fits with a general attitude to the word “if”. The two themes are (a) “if A then B” is
always true or false, never in between or neither, and (b) when A is false, count “if A
then B” as true.  
One feature of “if” understood this way, is that, as pointed out above, it is asymmetric:
“If A then B” is not the same as “if B then A”. If Artemisia had said, telling Bruno what to
bring, “but if it’s a Samsung then it must be a phone”, and Bruno had brought in the
iPhone, he would have been following her instructions, though when she says “if phone
then Samsung” this is just what she does not want.  This contrasts with both “and”, and
“or”, both of which are symmetrical. “Get me everything that is a Samsung and a phone”
is the same as “get me everything that is a phone and a Samsung”; “list all the days
where it is either raining or Bill is wearing a hat” is the same as “list all the days where
either Bill is wearing a hat or it is raining”. Because “if” is asymmetric, we sometimes
need a way of saying that we mean if B then A rather than if A then B. We use “only if”
for this. We say “I’ll be happy only if Robin comes to the party”, meaning that if Robin
does not come to the party then I will not be happy. We could also say “if I will be happy
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then Robin will have come to the party", but since this is awkward to say we prefer to
use the “only if” construction.  (There is definitely something confusing about if versus
only if.  Exercise  24 is meant to give more familiarity with this. Linguists tell me that
there are languages which have the same word for  if and  only if, so that one has to
consider the context in which the word is used to know which meaning it has.) 
>>  on a Venn diagram shade in the areas corresponding to "If A then B" and "IF B then
A".  where do they overlap, where do they differ?
2:8 (of 9) making new predicates  
When we search we get a collection of individuals, those that have (or satisfy, as we
often  say)  the  criterion  we used  in  the  search.  This  gives  us  another  attribute.  For
example if we search in the actors database for "Glamorous & NOT Male" we could write
the result with another column as follows:
Glam Male Glam & NOT Male
philip NO YES NO
juliette YES NO YES
angelina YES NO YES
tom YES YES NO
natalie YES NO YES
dominic YES YES NO
cerris YES NO YES
>>  don't take my word for it that this is the right column of YESs and NOs.  check it.
It is important to see that the result of a search can be a 1-place attribute even though
the search criteria are expressed in terms of a 2-place relation. And the result can be a
2-place relation even though the criteria are in terms of attributes.  (More generally,
searches  can  result  in  changes  either  to  a  greater  or  a  smaller  number  of  places,
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whatever we start with.) For example, we can search for all pairs such that the first is
glamorous and not male and the second is not glamorous and male, thus getting the
relation that holds between two individuals that we might informally state as "she looks
even better when she's compared to him".   
>>  other ways of putting this relation into loose language?
In the next chapter we will see a better way of stating these queries, so it would be a
waste to spend time finding the right terms to express them now. For now, and setting
us up for that, here are some visual representations of searches with relations.
Begin with a domain of four objects,  with two two-place relations, R and S between
them, as shown below, with the red arrows for R and the blue arrows for S.
Now we draw, in black, arrows to join individuals related by (a) either R or S (b) both R
and S and (c) R and not S. 
>>  there is a double arrow that turns into a single arrow.  why?
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What you have drawn is the arrow diagram of the results of these three searches. They
are  all  two  place  relations  got  by  combining  the  two  2-place  relations.  There  is  an
important point: the result of a search for individuals gives the set of individuals that fit
or satisfy the criterion — for example which are both large and angry, or which are either
large or angry but not pregnant — and this can define a new attribute. (We could invent
the word “langry” for individuals which are large and angry.) And the result for a search
for pairs of individuals can define a new relation. (We could invent the word “bangrier
than” for the relation between individuals when one is both bigger and angrier than the
other: bad news.) This process is important in the idea of mathematical structure, where
we find in the facts about one topic parallel the facts about another. For example if we
“lose” some of the details about the objects |, ||. |||, … and about a series of penny
coins, we find that the relations between each of these have a lot in common, thus
suggesting the idea of numbers and counting. (This is the idea of abstract structure.
When relations have the same abstract structure they can be studied using the same
mathematics.) Exercise 30 is meant to make this vivid for you. 
>>   why does losing some details from different databases bring out what they have in
common?  why does defining new attributes and relations help us to do this?
2:9 (of 9) many-place relations  
Not all relations are two place, like “loves” or “tangos with” or “is north west of”. There
are also three place relations (and four place, and three hundred place.) The two place
relation “… chases _” from the previous chapter,  can be extended to the three place
relation “… chases _ at time *” (Alice chases Caspar at noon). We also have the four
place relation “… chases _ at time * in place +”. Alice chases Caspar at noon in the yard).
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Often the individuals  in  a many-place relation are very  different  kinds of  things,  for
example  people,  places,  and  times,  which  makes  it  easier  to  think  about  them.  An
example is “Robin kissed Jo for 8 seconds in New York in 2002 near the intersection of
4th Street and 10th Avenue”, a seven place relation! (Who kissed whom for how long in
which city at the meeting of which latitude and which longitude.) Exercise 13 and 26 at
the end of the chapter involve many-place relations. As you might guess, this is to sneak
into your minds something that will be useful later.  
>>  how many places can a relation have before we can only understand it by thinking of
it as a combination of simpler relations?
>>  does it have to be true that  Robin kissed Jo for  8 seconds in  New York in  2002,
when Robin kissed Joe for 8 seconds (sometime), and Robin kissed Joe in New York in
2002 are true?   why did I ask this?
Often when we use a many place relation we simplify by not mentioning one or more of
the things we are searching for. For example if it is the year 2002 and we are at the
intersection of fourth Street and 10th Avenue we may just say "Robin kisses Joe for eight
seconds".  This  point  is  connected  to  the  difference  between  searching  for  individual
things and searching for databases in which sentences hold. A simple example of this is
given by attributes and times. We could say who was happy on two consecutive days
with a grid as follows:
Happytimes monday tuesday
albert YES NO
bertha NO YES
Or we could use a pair of tables:
happy-mon Happy
albert YES
bertha NO
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happy-tues Happy
albert NO
bertha YES
These  really  come  to  the  same.  But  this  shows  that  searching  for  databases  and
searching for individuals are closely related. For we can get the same information by
using the query "find days such that Albert is happy on those days" or by using the query
"in which table does 'Albert is happy' hold?"
The diagram below shows a way of making an arrow diagram for a 3-place relation, using
circles instead of dots for individuals, so that an arrow passes through three circles when
the three individuals have the relation.
There is also a way of depicting many-place relations that is not a generalization of arrow
diagrams for two-place relations. Suppose for example we have the four-place relation "x
smiled  at  y  at  time t  in  place  l"  (for  example  'Mo smiled  at  Bo on Monday on the
boardwalk", and we are using it to relate four people, three days, and three locations.
Then we line them up in columns and draw lines (arrow heads are not needed) to make a
diagram like the one below.  
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Smiler Smilee Time Location
mo mo mon aquarium
bo bo boardwalk
carol carol tues mirror
dmitri dmitri  wed seawall
>>  did Mo smile at Bo on Monday on the boardwalk?  did Carol smile at anyone?
>>  was there a mirror in the aquarium?
It is worth getting used to different ways of drawing many-place relations. Although the
number of ways you can do it makes it not a topic for easily graded test questions, this
does make it a useful skill when solving informal logic problems. They also make the idea
of a many-place relation familiar in a way that will pay off when you think about the
material in later chapters.
>>  what are the advantages and disadvantages of representing relations this way, as
opposed to using an arrow diagram? 
words used in this chapter that it would be a good idea to understand (and ask if you do
not) Boolean connective, Boolean search, complement, conditional, intersection, material
conditional, parallel (branching) and sequential (series) search, n-place relation, query,
scope, union, Venn diagram
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exercises for chapter two
A – core
1) Explain the different things each of the following could mean. (All real quotes.)
(a) Take one tablet twice a day. (The alternative meaning is weird.)
(b) Living snakes are found on every continent except Antarctica, in the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans, and on most smaller land masses
(c) Take 2 tablets once a day. 
2)  (i) An angel appears on a mountain and says “O people, brush your teeth”, then 
disappears forever. 
(ii) An angel appears on a mountain and says “O people, do not brush your teeth”, then 
disappears forever.
(iii) An angel appears on a mountain, says nothing, then disappears forever.
In which of these three cases has the angel told us to brush our teeth? 
In which of these three cases has the angel told us not to brush our teeth? 
In which of these three cases has the angel not told us to brush our teeth? 
In which of these three cases has the angel not told us not to brush our teeth?  
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3)  A notice from a car sharing company says: 
“A: You may park for FREE in any authorized parking location provided it is in a:
1. Dedicated parking location for our company
2. Permit only parking spot in a residential area
3. Resident only parking spot in a residential areas
4. Area with no parking signage and no restrictions
B: When ending your trip always be sure that:
1. You are parked in an authorized parking location (see above)
2. You shut all doors, roll up windows, and turn off lights
3. Scan out with your member card on the windshield reader
4. Wait for the reader to say Trip Completed    "
One of these lists is a conjunctive, AND, list and the other is a disjunctive, OR, list. Which
is which? 
4)  Here is a relational grid where the five individuals and the relation are given just by 
letters. (a) Give four things it could mean which would make sense of the patterns of 
YES and NO, two about people and two about numbers.
     R a b c d e
a YES YES YES YES NO
b YES YES YES NO NO
c YES YES NO NO NO
d YES NO NO NO NO
e NO NO NO NO NO
(b) What do you conclude from the fact that a database about people can also give facts 
about numbers?
(c) Which of these interpretations is likely to remain accurate when the domain (of 
people or numbers) contains many more than five individuals?
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5)  The comma separating the terms you enter in an internet search site sometimes 
makes an AND list (conjunctive), and sometimes an OR list (disjunctive). How could you 
test which it is on a particular site? 
Note 1: playful approach: think of search terms such that it is very unlikely that any 
document will contain both. 
Note 2: some search engines claim that their comma is always conjunctive. I doubt 
these claims. How would you test them?
6)  Facts:
- Martha is 152 cm tall (just under 5 ft), Jurgen is 205 cm tall (approx 6' 8"), Sumiko
is 180 cm, and Rosario is 165 cm. 
- Taller people eat more ice-cream than shorter people (in this sample). 
- The more ice-cream a person eats the less alcohol they drink.
- Evan is taller than Martha and shorter than Sumiko.   
- Bo is the same height as Sumiko.  
Questions: which of these people drinks the least? Do these facts determine which of 
Evan and Rosario is taller?
This is not a difficult problem. The point of it, though, is in this instruction: get the 
answer by using some of the facts to fill out a database from which the answer can be 
deduced. The database should be as economical as possible. That is, it should give the 
least amount of information possible while still being a complete database for the four 
individuals  and giving an answer to the question.  
Follow up: give a different interpretation, perhaps in terms of shapes or numbers, though
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it does not have to be, for the terms of the database and the answer. (Teaching 
suggestion: who can come up with the most interesting such interpretation?)
7)  The second sentence of this chapter said “If you ask the wrong question you do not 
get the answer you wanted.” Find two examples, from an internet search or from your 
library site, where careless use of “not” “and” and “or” can get a very different set of 
results from the one intended.
8)  We have a collection of rocks, which can be enormous (boulders), big (rocks), 
average (stones), small (pebbles) or tiny (grains). a)  In terms of these attributes define 
the 2-place relation “is bigger than”. (Suppose for simplicity that all the rocks of each 
kind are the same size.) What else besides rocks would this definition work for
b) In terms of these attributes define the relation “is at least as big as”. How is “at least 
as big as” different from “is bigger than”? Try to answer this in ways that will work with 
other series, such as metropolis/city/town/village/hamlet. It will help to draw arrow 
diagrams.
9)  In a junk store there are:
100 cheap plastic spoons, 10 valuable silver spoons, 1 valuable silver plate, 1 valuable 
plastic lamp [rare kitsch: collector's item], and 5 cheap silver ear rings.     Find: 
a) all the things that are either plastic or not valuable
b) all the things that are both plastic and cheap
c) all the things that are both plastic and cheap and also not spoons
d) all the things such that if they are cheap they are silver [more usual way of saying 
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this "everything, but if it is cheap it has to be silver." ]
e) all the things such that if they are silver they are cheap
f) all the things such that if they are silver they are either cheap or plates
g) all the things that are not such that if they are cheap they are silver
10)   You are searching a database for books satisfying various criteria.
Which of the commands (a) –(i) below would you use to search for each of (i) to (iv) 
below?  
(i)  the intersection of books by Tolstoy and books about bears         
(ii)  the complement of the union of books about bears and books about ducks          
.
(iii)  all books co-authored by Tolstoy and Shakespeare                       
(iv)  all books by Tolstoy or by Shakespeare that are not about bears
(v)  all books by Tolstoy about either Shakespeare or Tolstoy
(a)  author = Tolstoy AND author = Shakespeare  
(b)  NOT (topic = bears AND topic = ducks)  
(c)  author = Tolstoy AND topic = bears   
(d)  NOT (author = Tolstoy AND NOT topic = bears)  
(e)  NOT ( author = Tolstoy AND topic = bears)
(f)  NOT (topic = bears OR topic = ducks)   
(g)  (author = Tolstoy OR author = Shakespeare) AND NOT topic = bears  
(h)  author = Ducks AND topic = Shakespeare
(i)  (author = Tolstoy AND author = Shakespeare) AND NOT topic =bears
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(j)  (author = Tolstoy AND topic = Shakespeare ) OR (author = Tolstoy AND topic = 
Tolstoy)  
(k)  author = Tolstoy AND topic = Shakespeare OR topic = Tolstoy
11)  Which of these commands will get the same socks, however they are distributed 
between drawer A and drawer B? (There are only these two drawers, and all the socks 
are red, blue, or green.)
i) Get the red socks in A and the blue socks in B
ii) Get all the socks as long as they are not red socks in A
iii) Get the socks that are either red and in A or blue and in B
iv) Get the socks that are neither red nor in B
v) Get the socks that are both red and in A
vi) Get the socks that are both red and in A
vii) Get the socks that are (a) bue or green and (b) in B
viii) Get the socks that are neither blue nor green nor in B
ix) Get the socks that are either (a) blue or green or (b) in B
12)  Using the two arrow diagrams in section 8 of the chapter, draw new diagrams 
indicating (d) individuals that have R to at least one individual (an attribute) (e) pairs of 
individuals that have S either to i or to ii (a 2 place relation) (f) triples of individuals 
where the first has R to the second and the second has R to the third (a 3 place relation).
13)   In the 3-place relation below, which of the following triples have the relation 
81
(“stand in the relation to one another”):  (c, b, a), (a, b, b), (, b, c) , (a, b)? 
14)  The appendix to this chapter was about arithmetic, not logic. This is an exercise 
where following the strategy behind the suggestion in the appendix makes less mental 
strain in performing a complicated search. Consider the arrow diagram below for a 4-
place relation R. (Diagrams like this were discussed in section 9 of the chapter.)
The task is to find individuals (from a, b, c, d, e, f, h, i, j, k, l ) that occupy the first place
of R when the second place is occupied by an individual that also occupies the third-place
of  some four  individuals.  That is,  we are looking for  individuals  l such that there is
another,  m, where  Rlmxy and  Rzsmt —  x, y, z, s, t can be any individuals at all. This
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sounds confusing, and if you thought it out anew for every individual when considering
whether it fits the criterion you would get a headache. The idea is in fact simple, and
illustrates how familiar language is rather clumsy at expressing simple but precise ideas.
Instead of getting a headache, think first what you are looking for and fix that in your
mind. In the arrow diagram all arrows are part of four-link chains. We want individuals l
at the beginning of chains where the second stop of the chain — the individual that the
arrow from l leads to — is occupied by something that is the second to last member of
some chain. So you find beginnings of chains and check whether their first destination is
also touched by an arrow whose next destination is its last one. When you find such a
chain you write its first individual on your list. (Another way of describing it: you are
collecting beginning points of arrow chains whose second points are also the second last
of some other chain.)
>>  most of the chains of arrows connect four individuals, as you would expect.  but 
some of them go round in a triangle.  how can this be?
That is not hard to do. But the important thing is to understand it just once. You fix it in
your  mind  as  a  definite  procedure:  find  chains,  check  second destination,  check  for
contact with their destination, write or not. Do it now. (I have written the answer at the
end of these exercises. But do it yourself first. No one will know if you make a mistake.)
B - MORE
15)  “The cars in the lot are green and red or yellow.” Give unambiguous English ways of
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stating the two meanings of this sentence. 
16)  Explain the two meanings that “I don’t want to become an architect” can mean. 
Give short conversations in which the sentence takes each of these meanings. One 
person says “So you want to become an architect. The other replies “No. I … ” and the 
“…” can show two different things that might be meant by “No”.)
17)  Recent newspaper headline:
Sudan woman spared flogging for wearing trousers
What are the two meanings of this sentence?
Another headline:
Labrador and Newfoundland to boost number of moose hunting licences
What are the sane and the crazy readings of this sentence? (When I read the sentence it 
was the crazy meaning that came to me first, so I was puzzled.)
(Neither is a good English sentence.  Newspaperese is even more subject to scope 
ambiguities than spoken English.) 
18)   In a used car lot there are: 
Old Red Jeeps, New Black Saabs, New Black Toyotas, Old Red Saab, New Black 
Jeeps. 
Find all the cars that are  
Both Jeeps and black    
Either old or not Toyotas  
Both old and Saabs 
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Such that if they are red then they are Jeeps 
Such that if they are Jeeps then they are red  
Such that if they are red then they are not Jeeps 
(You can assume that no car is of two brands or two colours or two ages.) 
19)   The student list for a course lists students by name, major, and year. Compare 
these two search requests:
(i) Find the names of all the students who if they are math majors are seniors  
(ii) Find the names of all the students who if they are seniors are math majors
a) Which of these will get the names of senior history majors?
b) Which will get the names of junior math majors?
(Understanding “if” in the way explained in this chapter.) 
20)   You are searching for sources to use in a term paper on the ecology of Brazil. You 
have got a list by searching on the internet for “Brazil”. But it has thousands of items. 
And some of them are about brazil nuts instead of the country Brazil. Which of the 
following would give a smaller list?  
a) Brazil AND ecology    
   b) Brazil OR ecology   
   c) IF Brazil THEN NOT nuts  
   d)  Brazil AND NOT nuts      
   e) Brazil AND ecology AND NOT (IF Brazil THEN nuts)  
Which of these is the best choice for your paper? (This question assumes you are using a
search engine which can do complete perfect Boolean search. It also assumes some 
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common sense facts about files to be found on the internet.) 
21)  “Find everything that is green AND (round OR NOT smelly)”
Which of the following sequences of searches corresponds to the single query above? 
(i)  Find everything that is green AND round. Then find everything that is either 
among these or NOT smelly
(ii)  Find everything that is NOT smelly. Then find another collection: everything that 
is round OR among these. Then find everything that is green AND in that other 
collection.  
(iii)  Find everything that is green OR not smelly. Then find everything that is among 
these AND round.
22)  In the database given by the table below, which man attended on every day? On 
what day did no woman attend?
Man Woman attended on 
Mon
..Tues ..Wed ..Thurs ..Fri
abel YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
beth NO YES YES YES NO NO YES
charlie NO YES NO YES NO YES NP
des YES NO YES YES YES YES YES
What does this show about the meaning/ambiguity of the question “who attended every 
day?” and the statement “someone attended every day” ?
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C - HARDER 
23)  List the individuals in the arrow diagram below such that
a) if they have the relation to anything then they have it to themselves
b) if they have the relation to m then they have it to everything
c) if they have the relation to everything then they have it to m.
24)  In English sometimes when we say “if” we mean something symmetrical, namely,
“if and only if”.  “A if and only if B” (sometimes written “A iff B”) means “if A then B and if
B then A”. We often lazily say “if”  when we mean “if  and only if”.   (For example in
definitions: we say “a shape is a triangle if it has exactly three straight sides”, but we
really mean “if a shape is a triangle it has exactly three straight sides, and if a shape has
exactly three straight sides then it is a triangle.”) You’ll find, if you search, that I have
fallen into this sloppy way of  expressing myself  at places in these notes. There is a
Boolean operator that corresponds to “if and only if”. Draw the Venn diagram for it.  
25)  You can get another hold on the logic meaning of “if” by thinking in terms of Venn
diagrams (helpful for some people, but confusing for others.)  In the diagram below the
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whole square represents books that you own, and the two circles are science fiction
books and books by Philip K Dick.  The area that has been cross-hatched represents all
the books such that if they are science fiction then they are by Dick.  Notice that it
includes books that are not science fiction, books that are not by Dick, and books that
are by Dick but not science fiction. What it does is exclude books that are science fiction
but not by Dick.
The cross-hatched area is neither the union nor the intersection of the two areas it is
defined by.  Call it the eclipsky of the two: the eclipsky from one area to the other.  So in
this diagram it is the eclipsky from “science fiction” to “by Philip K Dick”.4    The eclipsky,
and the philosopher’s sense of if, is best thought of as a way of excluding some things:
the eclipsky from A to B includes everything except things that have A but do not have B.
(a) what area is the eclipsky from “by PKD” to “science fiction”?
(b) why is this area different from the area for “science fiction iff by PKD”?  (See question
19.) 
26)  Other ways of making graphical representations of 3-place relations are possible if
4The name “eclipsky” was invented by Susanna Braund in a moment of poetic inspiration, because
it looks like the sky around an eclipse of the sun. The sky, note, not the darkened segment of the 
sun. Pronounce it “eclipse-sky”.
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we allow diagrams to be three-dimensional. Make a way of graphing a 3-place relation in
three dimensions, so that for example it could be constructed out of Lego.
27)   Which of the following are equivalent to which others?
a) If it chases mice then it is a cat
b) If it is a cat then it chases mice
c) If I get a pay increase then I will be happy
d) If I will be happy then I will have had a pay increase
e) It chases mice only if it is a cat
f) It is a cat only if it chases mice
g) I will get a pay increase only if I will be happy
h) I will be happy only if I get a pay increase
i) I will only be happy if I get a pay increase
j) I will only get a pay increase if I will be happy
(These look simple, but are confusing.  I’m not sure why.) 
28)  How can we make Venn diagrams for four or more attributes?
29)  The professors of four small advanced courses at the University of Nowhere give
very different grades, as shown in the table below for the same 10 anonymous students.
You are writing a research paper on the relation between study habits and grades, and
you want to find A+ students and failing students in order to give them a questionnaire
about their study habits. You are torn between two considerations. (a) some professors
are very reluctant to let researchers see their grade lists — they give reasons about
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students’ privacy rights but you suspect they just cannot be bothered — and so you have
a reason to study only those courses which will provide a good pool of subjects. But (b)
your research will be taken more seriously if you pick your subjects at random, and so
you have a reason to take all four courses equally seriously, not choosing one in advance.
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Anthroposophy470 Bioluminescence610 Casuistry900 Embrydontics550
student1 C B C A+
student2 D B C B+
student3 B B+ B B
student4 A- C B B
student5 C A A+ A-
student6 D A+ F A+
student7 B F F B+
student8 B F B A
student9 B A+ B+ A+
student10 B+ B A+ A
Are there courses for which no data for the study can be found?
Does some course provide enough data to be used for your study?
Are there courses with A+s and courses with Fs but no course with A+s and Fs?
Does every course provide data of both kinds?
How would you formulate searches to answer these questions? (The point here is more
describing  the  searches  than  finding  the  answers.)  Which  answers  would  give  you
confidence that a strategy in accordance with (a) or with (b) was workable. 
The table above is not a standard relational grid as we have defined them. How could it
be rewritten as one? Are we dealing with a 1-place attribute, a 2-place relation, or a 3-
place relation, or something else?
30)  Each  of  these  four  arrow diagrams describes  two  relations,  drawn in  different
colours. By eliminating individuals from some of them we can make them have the same
structure as others. And by eliminating a relation from some of them we can make them
have the same structure as others have if  a relation is eliminated from them. Which
relations (in which colours) have the same structure when we eliminate individuals, and
which ones have the same structure when we eliminate a relation?
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The individuals that the query in question 14 finds are a, e, f, g, l. 
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Boolean signs
everything’s forbidden in Slovenia knives, hearts, and branches
no and yes nos and a yes
In all  of  these pictures  a sign has a generally  Boolean force.   That is,  you have to
understand it in terms of NOT or AND.   The bottom two say 
NOT A and NOT B and C.
I think “knives, hearts, branches” says NOT carving AND NOT breaking, but someone
might take it to mean  NOT (carving AND breaking)  .  
Note that the last two do not actually forbid dogs without leashes.  I think the sign-
maker wanted to say IF dog THEN leash, but all she actually said was 
OK: leashed dog. This is a topic for later chapters; see especially chapter 6 section 7
and chapter 8 sections 1 and 2.  
93
which is Philip K Dick, which is John Venn, and which is the window commemorating Venn
at the Cambridge college where he taught? 
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appendix to chapter 2: mental arithmetic as basic mathematical thinking
Here is a suggestion about one reason why children can find mental arithmetic difficult,
sometimes leading to a lifelong fear of anything mathematical. (Studying symbolic logic
sometimes shows people that although they are not comfortable with numbers they can
handle formal, symbolic, ways of thinking. This appendix is entirely about arithmetic, but
its themes are applied to logic in exercise 14.) In school we are taught to do arithmetic
on paper. But when we try to transfer the routines we use on paper to a purely mental
procedure,  we  find  that  we  cannot  hold  the  information  reliably  in  our  short-term
(working) memories. For example in multiplying 23 x 32 on paper we write down
  23
  32
  46
69 
736
but when we try doing this in our heads we find it hard to keep the vertical arrangement
fixed in our minds, jumbling which numbers are in which columns, and concentrating on
it makes us forget the partial products, 46 and 69, before we can do anything with them.
Keeping the spatial arrangement in mind gets in the way of doing the calculations. And
one  reason  is  trying  to  remember  several  multi-digit  numbers  as  visual  patterns  —
seeing them in your mind — at the same time as trying to keep the arrangement of the
calculation in your visual imagination.
The solution is to use a different routine, to avoid the collision of two or more images. So
think of 23×32 as (23 × 30) + (23 x 2). This is the "logical" aspect, so you want to keep it
in a separate place in your mind from the calculations. One way is to remember three
separate instructions (instructions, not images)
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first: multiply    23 x 30
second: multiply 23 x 2 
third: add these
Keep the three instructions separate in your thinking and do not do any calculations until
you have them firmly remembered. But then do them. So you go: 23 × 30 is 690, 23 x 2
is 46. So add 690 and 46 to get 736. (I chose the example so as to be not too easy to do
the traditional way and not too hard to do the variant way. Of course there are more
challenging examples.) 
You may find that even doing it this way the first product in particular has faded by the
time you get to the addition. That is because you are trying to hold that as a visual
image too, or the sound of the spoken number. Try thinking of it as the number it is. To
do this you have to give the numbers characters, things to remember them by. 365 days
in the year, 12×12 is 144, 4×4×4 is 64, 185 is a dollar and three quarters and a dime,
and so on. Develop a collection of these so that they appear without effort. Then in the
simple example above 690 is  10 less than 700,  or  3×2, 3×3, 0, 10 times a sexual
practice, or whatever else will stick in your mind. And 46 is three short of 7×7 or 8×8
backwards, or 1° more than halfway up. (Multiplication tables and the like are useful
here, not as helps to calculation but as ways of giving numbers familiar faces. Whatever
works for you.) This needs work in advance, over a period of time, but it is useful for
many things, for example remembering addresses and phone numbers. (Alternatively,
you might think of the numerals  as spoken sounds rather than as written. You have to
find what works for you.)
Mental arithmetic illustrates two related contrasts between mathematical procedures and
those of every day thinking and communication. The first is the way that even in an
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elementary mathematical context the mental resources needed to perform a procedure
and  the  resources  needed to  remember  what  it  is  that  needs  to  be  performed  can
interfere with one another. The second is the way that in every day understanding we can
absorb a whole sentence, phrase, or more, and then go back in memory or reading and
get clear about some details of. But in many presentations of mathematical ideas you
have to get each detail 100% right before proceeding to the next. Bringing the whole
thing slowly into focus is not an option. This second contrast sets up the first, because
the accumulation of early details swamps the working memory needed to figure out the
later ones. (This happens much less with spoken languages, for reasons that I would not
claim  to  understand.)  But  we  can  minimize  the  problem.  We  can  separate  general
descriptions from detailed instructions, to make it possible to digest the former slowly
with  successive  approximations  while  performing  the  latter  precisely  when  the  time
comes. And we can learn to understand mathematical statements so that we treat some
parts as we would a story or a description of a scene, to be slowly absorbed, and other
parts as instructions where we should snap to attention and follow them.
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chapter three: Boolean Search  
3: 1 (of 8) find x
A query has two parts: first an instruction to find individuals, and then the condition
(criterion) that they have to meet. Often the criterion is complex, and then we have to be
clear for example when we ask for people who are sad lovers whether we are looking for
people who are lovers who are also sad, or people who are lovers and people who are
sad, or pairs such that one loves the other and both are sad. In everyday language we
make this clear, when we need to, by saying things like "find people such that each is a
lover and each is sad" for the first, "find people such that each is a lover and people such
that each is sad" for the second, and "find pairs of people (couples) such that the first
loves the second and both are sad". (Of course since it is spoken language there are
more meanings besides these.)
There are two important devices here: the separation of the search command from the
criterion, and the use of variables — pronouns like 'they', 'each', 'it' in natural languages
— to connect the command to the criterion as well as to structure the criterion. In this
chapter and following ones we will express this by writing "Find" plus a variable — any
letter would do but we will stick to letters from the end of the alphabet such as x, y, z —
joined to a criterion in which the variables also appear. For example the three queries
from the previous paragraph could be written:
Find x: Lx & Sx
Find x: Lx and Find y: Sy
Find (x,y): Lxy & Sx & Sy
(It is the first and the third that are really of interest.)
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>>  express some of the other possible meanings of "find sad lovers" in notation like this
These are really  very close to  some forms of  everyday language.  The first  could be
rephrased as "Find for me any one, such that he/she is a lover and he/she is sad". The
"he/she"  and  the  "one"  are  really  the  same  variable,  which  English  makes  us  use
different words for in different places in a sentence. (In many people's spoken English we
could find "Find anyone who is a lover and they are sad. "One", "who" and "they" are all
doing the work of x.)  The third could be rephrased as "Find (me) couples, a first and a
second, where the first loves the second and that first is sad and the second is also sad."
In Sx the variable x is said to be "free": it is available for referring to anything. And in
Find x: Sx the x is said to be "bound", and bound by the "variable-binding operator" Find
x.  It  is  like  the  distinction  between  a  bare  pronoun  "she",  as  in  "she  works  with
computers", which could refer Ada Lovelace (first programmer) or Grace Hopper (wrote
the first compiler) or millions of others, and on the other hand pronouns in constructions
such as "if a person works in high tech then she may change job frequently", or "Find me
three female executives such that they earn more than a million a year." There are many
variable-binding operators, and we will meet others.
>>  what about pronouns that are linked to a particular name, as in “if Mary discovers
you did it she will be furious.”  how do they fit in?
In moving to this way of writing down queries we are beginning symbolic logic, where the
aim is to use symbols to express logical ideas as clearly as possible.  Sometimes this is
meant to replace our use of  natural spoken language, and sometimes it  is meant to
augment natural language when we need to make a point or a distinction very clearly5.
5The most important creators of symbolic logic were the philosophically-minded mathematician 
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Many philosophers and psychologists — but not all —   think that symbolic logic can give
insights into what happens in our minds when we think and use language.
In  natural  spoken languages pronouns,  and the operators  that  bind them, are  often
special-purpose. We use "he" and "she" only for people, forcing us to choose between
masculine and feminine, and we almost never use "it" for people.6. Instead of saying
"find all individual locations x such that there is a bus stop at x", we say "where are the
bus stops?". In logic we use the same variables and bind them with the same operators
whatever the topic.  Moreover search commands are not very sensitive to differences
between singular and plural: we can equally well say "find all the phones costing less
than $200" or "find each phone that costs less than $200". This gives advantages as we
can  state  general  patterns  that  apply  to  all  topics.  And  it  emphasizes  grammatical
features that vary less from one language to another.
The main aim of this chapter is to say carefully what results various queries will get. To
do this we have to state the queries precisely so it is clear what queries they are. This is
the point of using symbols. But we want to state the rules in general, not the rules for
any particular attributes and relations, referring to particular databases. I will use colours
for this: when I write a symbol for an attribute in red I will mean that this is the pattern
for any attribute symbol.) 
Gottlob Frege 1848-1925, and the mathematically-minded philosopher Bertrand Russell 1872-
1970. Programming languages, such as Prolog or C++, are descendants of symbolic logic. An 
early programming language was called Ada, after Ada Lovelace. There are also languages for 
managing computer databases, of which the most widely used is SQL, and these have many 
features taken from symbolic logic.
6If we introduce the pronoun xe with the x pronounced as in the pinyin spelling of Mandarin, then 
it sounds halfway between he and she.  Wouldn't that be a good idea? And it fits the use of x as a 
variable!  
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Of course we can search for fewer than all the individuals satisfying a criterion. We can
say “find one x such that ..”, or “find eight x such that ...”.  We are not going to study
these variant searches in any depth. (Searches for just one individual are discussed in
chapter 4.) One interesting such search command, though, occurs when we search for
individuals with some extreme characteristic, such as the maximum of a set of numbers,
or the best looking of a set of people. The search then is “Find x: MaxSx”, or “Find x: for
any y in S AsAtractivexy ”. I mention these not because we are going to use them at all,
but because they are related to ideas that will appear later. (So think about them for a
moment and then do not worry further about them.)
One  Find x search is of enormous importance in the history of mathematics: algebra.
Beginning  in  ancient  Babylon  mathematicians  developed  ways  of  solving  riddle-like
problems along the lines of "If my weight is added to three times my weight then it is
twice my weight plus fifty kilos. What do I weigh?" Beginning about 1500 these were
expressed as solutions to equations such as "x +3x = 2(x+50)". These solutions are
answers to Find x queries where the domain is numbers. (The domain kept expanding,
from positive integers to positive and negative, to real numbers, and then to complex
numbers, to decrease the range of queries that have a null outcome.) 
3:2 (of 8) Boolean queries
We can combine queries using the Boolean connectives AND, OR, NOT and IF. For the
sake  of  brevity,  and  because  it  is  traditional  in  logic,  we  abbreviate  these  with  the
symbol, v, ~s &, and . 7 I discuss each in turn. I shall use some slightly weird English, in
7There are other systems of notation, too many to list all of them. OR is always v, but the 
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italics,  which may help get the symbols to feel like language. (Don’t learn the weird
English: it’s just there for the helpful effect it may have.) 
negation: NOT
Find x: ~Px      Note the symbol ~ (called a tilde) used for “not”.  (You can think of ~ as
someone shaking their head to say No.) For P we can substitute any predicate that has
the variable x, for example Ax, or Bx, or as we will see Ax & Bx. (And similarly for, e.g.
Find y:~Qy . If we were being hyper-rigorous we would have used dummy variables as
well as dummy attributes.) 
Suppose we have a database with four individuals who may or may not be Smokers.
S
arthur YES
basil NO
cassandra NO
dilma YES
 
Then Find x: ~Sx  gets b, c.  All the NOs.  
Find every person x such that that it is not the case that x is a smoker.
Find certain people. they do not smoke   
>>  this database has only four individuals.  suppose it had thousands, and only two, as
in this one, had S.  what would the list for Find x: ~Sx look like?
  
conjunction: AND 
Find x: Px & Qx
Note the symbol & (called an ampersand) used for “and”.
Suppose we have a database with two attributes,  Smokes and  Famous, and the same
four individuals, as follows:
symbols for AND, NOT and IF (see below) can vary.
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S F
arthur YES YES
basil NO YES
cassandra NO YES
dilma YES NO
 
Find x: Sx & Fx asks for everyone who smokes and is famous, namely a.
Find everyone such that s/he is a smoker and s/he is famous
Find those who are smokers and are also famous
disjunction: OR 
Find x: Px v Q
Note the symbol v (called a “wedge”) used for “or”. (You can think of this as a fork in the
road — this  way  or that,  though you could take  both  — referring  back to filters  in
parallel, or anticipating the using a forking lines of argument that will appear in chapter
six.)  
Applied to the Smokers-Famous database the query  Find x: Sx v Fx  gets a, b, c, d, the
individuals with YES in the S column plus those with YES in the F column. (OR is more.) 
Find everyperson such that that person smokes or that person is famous.
Find the people, x, satisfying "xe smokes or xe is an athlete."
Parallel  things  can be  said  for  IF  queries,  but  I'll  give  them the  next  section  all  to
themselves. What we have said so far can be summed up in three rules 
Individuals  satisfy  a  negative  query  (   ~  )   when,  and  only  when,  they  do
not satisfy the negated criterion. ~ turns YES to NO and NO to YES.
Individuals  satisfy  a  conjunctive  query  (   &  )  when  and  only  when  they
satisfy both conjuncts. & needs YES for both criteria.
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Individuals  satisfy  a  disjunctive query (   v  )  as long as they satisfy at  least
one disjunct. v needs one YES among the two criteria. 
These may seem obvious, trivial even. But I have worded them so they apply to a large
range of cases. Consider a database with Smokers and Famous people, tables repeated
below, and also a relation: some of these people are Jealous of others. 
S F J a b c d
arthur YES YES a YES YES YES YES
basil NO YES b NO NO YES YES
cassandra NO YES c NO YES NO NO
dilma YES NO d NO NO NO NO
Then the following searches get the results shown.  
>> if you do not see why any of these is right, ASK.
Find x: Jbx xb   gets a, c
Find (x,y): Jxy gets  (a,a), (a,b), (a,c), (a, d), (b,c), (b,d), (c,b)
Find (x,y): Sx & Fy & Jxy gets (a,a), (a,b), (a,c)
(see the remark on & and parentheses below)
Find x:  Sx v ~Jxx gets  a, b, c, d
(notice how although Jxy is a 2 place relation, we can do a Find x search by making the
1-place attribute ~Jxx from it.)   gets  c, d 
Find x: J
>> so do we really need one place attributes? 
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3:3 (of 8) a remark on Find x 
This short section is meant to help you think in the symbolic terms that are used in
modern logic. And I hope it can be useful in helping you appreciate mathematical forms
of expression in general. There are similar sections scattered throughout the book. We
have used the variable-binding operator Find x to state queries that in English would use
the instruction “Find” (often “please find for me”, I hope) followed by a criterion picking
out the things that are sought, which will often use a pronoun as a free variable, as in
“can you get me news stories about the Mayor of Toronto: they should be less than two
years old and they must have eye-catching photos.” Here the repeated “they”, referring
back to “stories” is like a variable such as  x. Variables and pronouns link the search
command and its criterion while keeping them separate. We might want them linked but
separate if we were doing something more complex than just writing down their names.
For example the request “get all the striped shells out of the bucket, count them, and
transfer them to the bag” we have the criterion “striped shells in the bucket” which is the
target and the separate two instructions “count them” and “transfer them”.
A variable binding operator typically says to take the objects — or the objects in a given
domain — satisfying a criterion and do something with them, such as just list them or
put them in a bucket. In mathematics there are many such operators, asking us do such
things as find the greatest (maximum) object satisfying a criterion, or to add or multiply
the numbers satisfying a criterion. (I return to this theme in chapter 10, section 5.) One
advantage of keeping the operator and the criterion separate is that it may be easier to
think about one of them, typically the criterion, if it is distinct from the other. It can be
easy then to see that the criterion is really very simple. Suppose we are looking for the
individuals that are lazy and either friendly or not friendly —  Find x: Lx & (Fx v ~Fx) —
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in  the  table  below. A  cumbersome way  of  finding  them would  be  first  to  collect  the
individuals that are YES for L — b, c — then the individuals that are YES for F  — a, b —
and the individuals that are NO for F — c, d. Then we combine the last two of these and
take the intersection with the first. But if we consider the criterion as a whole we see that
a simpler way of finding individuals satisfying the criterion is to look for YES in the  L
column on the same rows as either YES or NO in the F column. But everything is either
YES or NO in any column, so this is just the individuals that are YES in the L column — b,
c. 
Lazy Friendly
arthur NO YES
baxter YES YES
cai YES NO
delilah NO NO
This also shows one of the advantages of writing the criterion using simple letters rather
than full words. It is much easier to see what to do and which details are irrelevant. This
is one of the reasons for mathematical notation in general. It is also related to what I will
call  the “outside in” method of  evaluation in chapter five. A comparison with mental
arithmetic may also help. It is like figuring out √(32)2  (the square root of 32 squared).
You could waste time starting with the 32, but if you start with the square root and the
square nullifying one another you see right away that the answer is 32. Think of it as
√x2, where x happens to be 32, or in the strange English this book sometimes uses “The
square root of the square of something. that something is 32”. Or, even more simply, it is
like adding 7+8. If (like me) you don’t memorize arithmetic tables but recalculate simple
sums every time, then the slow way — analogous to the first search method — is to go
“plus one more” eight times starting with seven: seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve,
thirteen,  fourteen, fifteen. It  takes a while,  and it  is  easy to get confused.  A better
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method — the method built into the traditional abacus — is to think in fives: 7+8 =
(5+2)+(5+3) = 10+5 =15. If you know the sums of numbers less than five and know
that two fives make ten, you can do this in an instant with no danger of confusion. The
moral: look at the whole expression, not just the smallest pieces8.
3:4 (of 8) the conditional: IF 
It is useful to have one more symbol, besides ~, &, v. The symbol  is used for “if”, with
the  meaning  that  was  explained  in  the  previous  chapter.  We  call  it  the  material
conditional; we will see a lot of it from now on. The query
find x: Sx   Fx  
Find every individual such that if  that individual smokes then that individual is
famous
takes the whole set of individuals and excludes everyone who smokes but is not famous.
So it gets the list {a, b, c}. This is the same as “either does not smoke or is an athlete”
or, equivalently “such that s/he does not both smoke and fail to be an athlete”. 
>>  do we need a special symbol for the material conditional, given that we can define it,
both in terms of ~ and v and in terms of ~ and & ?
It  is  worth  going  slowly  here.  The  rule  for      is  very  simple.   
Find x: Px   Qx gets all individuals which either do not satisfy P or do satisfy Q. Or what
is the same, all individuals that are not both P and not Q (everything except the things
that are P without being Q.) 
8 A story of the great mathematician Gauss, as a small child. His teacher asked the class to add 
up the integers from 1 to 100, hoping for a quiet hour, and was amazed when five minutes later 
little Gauss handed him this (in effect):
n = 1+...+100,   2n =  (1+...+100)+(100+...+1) = 101x100, so n = 10100/2= 50,500 .
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That seems simple enough. Confusion sets in, though, when we start thinking of    as
“if”. The    of logic does have a right to be thought of as a version of the subtle and
slippery English word “if”. After all, “if it’s a duck it goes quack” is pretty much the same
as any of the following “either it goes quack or it’s not a duck”, “either it’s not a duck, or
it is and goes quack”, or “it can’t be a duck without going quack”. And all of them amount
to “either not duck or quack” or “not both duck and not quack”. (Why are these the
same? Chapter five.) One difference is the amount of freedom or discretion, or open-ness
to other considerations, that informal if as opposed to  , allows. Suppose I give you a
big container of animals and say to go through it and for each thing if it is a duck, to kiss
it. (Think of kissing as a kind of finding: perhaps you are marking things with lipstick.)
You go through the container and when you find ducks then you, being a very obedient
follower of my instructions, kiss them. But what do you do with the things that are not
ducks, the frogs and slugs and puppies? If you are taking me to be speaking ordinary
English you'll think I haven't told you what to do so you may feel free to make your own
decision in each case. But if I give you a container and I say "kiss each thing satisfying (if
it is a duck then it is black)", meaning "if" as the material conditional of logic, that is
different. For each thing that you find in there you have to find out whether it satisfies
the if sentence, and when it does you must kiss it. You'll kiss the frogs and slugs, since
by not being ducks they qualify. You'll  kiss everything except the ducks that are not
black. No room for discretion.  
We are less used to this scope relation between IF and FIND in ordinary language. We
are  confused  by  "FIND  (IF  A  then  B)"  when  we  expect  "IF  A  then  FIND  B".  One
advantage of the first, wide-scope, version found in logic is that we can repeat the IF. We
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can say FIND (IF A then (IF B then C)), and other similar things, just as we can say
"FIND (A AND (B OR C))".  This  is  one reason why handling IF  in  the way that the
material  conditional,    ,  requires, encourages logic-style thinking: it  means having a
single rule that applies to all cases including complicated ones. This helps bring hidden
assumptions out in the open. The exercises and chapters that follow are sprinkled with .
It’s good for you, but you may sometimes have to pause and re-adjust. 
>>  what about conditional questions, predictions, and commands besides "find"?  how
do we normally interpret them?
Here are some conditional queries and their results. I'll repeat the database, so you can
check it easily.  
S F   J a b c d
arthur YES YES a YES YES YES YES
basil NO YES b NO NO YES YES
cassandra NO YES c NO YES NO NO
dilma YES NO d NO NO NO NO
Find x: Sx   Fx gets  a, b, c  (everything except what is S and not F)
Find x: Fx   Sx gets  a, d  (everything except what is F and not S)
Find x: Jdx  Sx  gets  a., b, c, d (since Jdx is false for all x)
Find (x,y): Jxy   Jyx  gets  (a,a), (b, a), (b. b), (b,c), (d,a), (d,b). (d,c), (d.d)
(all pairs except those where J holds in one order and not the reverse.)
Find x:  Fx   Jxx gets a  (everything except what is A and does not have J
to itself) 
Find x: (Sx     Fx)   (Fx   Sx)   gets  a, d 
(everything except those for which Sx   Fx and not Fx   Sx.) Notice how you 
can get these from the first two results.
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3:5 (of 8) clear scopes   
When a query is written in these terms there should be no scope ambiguity. As long as
we use brackets to make sure that &, v or  never connect more than two sentences and
~ never applies to more than one sentence, the scope is always clear. For example 
Find x: ~ (Ax & Sx) 
Find x: ~Ax & Sx 
are different.  The first gets everyone of whom it is false that they are both an athlete
and a smoker. (Find everyone such that it is not the case that that one is an athlete and
that one is a smoker.) The second gets everyone who is not an athlete and is a smoker.
(Find everyone such that that one is not an athlete and that one is a smoker.) In the
database in section 1 above, the first would get  h, t, w and the  second would get  t.
Contrast this with the English “find everyone who is not athletic and smokes”, which
could be interpreted either way.  
Similarly
Find x: (Ax & Bx) v Cx 
Is different from 
Find x: Ax & (Bx v Cx) 
Contrast this with the English “Find every thing that is A and B or C” which can be taken
either way.  (See exercise 9 for a search where these are different.)   
It is not hard to give exact rules for using Boolean connectives so that the result is an
unambiguous  query.  The  main  idea  is  that  there  should  never  be  any  doubt  what
sentences a connective is joining. (“Sentences” includes open sentences like “Sx”, with
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free variables, as well as closed sentences like “St”: both “he is a smoker” and “Toshiro is
a smoker.”) I will not give the rules here, though, as the idea is clear from examples, and
I do something closely related in the appendix to chapter 5. 
The following are good clear queries.  (“Well-formed” as logicians say.) 
Find x: (Ax & Bx) v (Ax  Bx)  
(get the things that are either both A and B or if A then B.)
Find x:  (Ax v Bx)   (Ax & Bx)  
(if its either then it has to be both)
Find (x,y): (Ax & By)   Rxy 
(get all pairs, provided that when the first is  A and the second is  B, the first has
relation R to the second)
And the following are not well-formed. (They are “ill-formed”.)
Find x: (Ax & Bx v (Ax Bx))   but  (Ax & Bx) v (Ax    Bx) would be ok 
Find x: (Ax & Bx v Ax   Bx)   but  (Ax & Bx) v (Ax    Bx)  would be ok 
Find x: (Ax & Bx v Ax)  Bx)) but (Ax & (Bx v Ax))  Bx)) would be ok
Find x:  (Ax v (Bx)   (Ax & Bx)   but (Ax v Bx)   (Ax & Bx)  would be ok   
Find (x,y): Ax & By    Rxy   but  (Ax & By)  Rxy  and 
Ax & (By  Rxy)  would both be ok  
>> "But some of these look well-formed."  famous examples of English sentences that at
first look grammatical, but which we find we cannot give meaning to, are Lewis Carroll's
"'Twas  brillig  and  the  slithy  toves,  did  gyre  and  gimble  in  the  wabe",  and  Noam
Chomsky's "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously".  compare these to each other and to
the  examples  above.   both  of  these  have  English  grammatical  structure,  unlike  say
“altogether elsewhere vast”9. 
9But this fragment can be continued to make an English sentence.  In fact it is from a poem by W 
H Auden, whose ending runs  “Altogether elsewhere vast  / Herds of reindeer move across  / Miles
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English is not quite as ambiguous as this may suggest. If you take care you can usually
say something that can have only one meaning. But sometimes you have to take a lot of
care, and the result is more complicated than what we normally say. One feature of
English  that  reduces  ambiguity  is  the  fact  that  we  not  only  have  the  single  word
connectives “and”, “or” and “if”, we also have the pairs of words “both …and”, “either …
or” and “if … then”. We can use these to get the effect of brackets. So instead of the
ambiguous “find everyone who is not athletic and smokes” we can say “find everyone
who is both not athletic and smokes” for one meaning, and “find everyone who is not
both athletic and smokes” for the other. And instead of “Find everything that is A and B
or C” we have a choice between “Find everything that is either both A and B, or C” and
“Find everything that is both A and either B or C”. We use “then” together with “if” when
leaving it out would make something impossible to understand. We never would say “Get
me something such that if it is A if it is B then it is C”. Instead we would say either “Get
me something such that if it is A then if it is B it is C” or “Get me something such that if,
if it is A then it is B, then it is C”. (Would you actually really ever say either of these?
Well, yes. “Get me a dessert, but if it is not in an insulated box then if it is melting it has
to have some ice with it.” “Get me a dessert, but if it melts if it doesn’t have an insulated
box then it has to have some ice with it.” Think hard enough and you’ll see that these are
different.) Moreover in spoken language we use pauses, speech rhythm, and intonation
to make our meanings clearer.  These are not available when we write,  which is  one
reason that written language tends to be more formal.
One last point before leaving these formal queries.  & and v (conjunction and disjunction)
and miles of golden moss  / Silently and very fast.”  That’s part of the appeal of poetry, the way it 
is often on the edge of nonsense.
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should strictly only join two terms. But “Find everything that is both sweet and both cold
and tasty” is the same query as “Find everything that is both sweet and cold and also
tasty”. So I shall allow us to write 
Find x: Ax & Bx & Cx  instead of 
Find x: Ax & (Bx & Cx)  or  Find x: (Ax & Bx) & Cx
And similarly I will allow 
Find x: Ax v Bx v Cx  
without any internal brackets. 
3:6 (of 8) automated Boolean search  
We can do a lot of precise searching using AND, OR, NOT. Searching using these is called
Boolean search. Many search programs available on the internet or elsewhere provide the
capacity to do at least some Boolean searches10. Very often this is part of an option
labelled “advanced search” or the like. (See exercise 21.) Sometimes then you can do full
Boolean search using AND, OR, NOT. (Warning: after you enter your search you often get
some “sponsored” hits before the ones that are responses to your search. Ignore these;
they are produced by money rather than logic.)  
Boolean search routines are also available on the databases of many university libraries.
But they are often kept somewhat hidden, and it can take some special knowledge to find
them.  
>>  students are often grateful for help with their library's search functions, which are
often presented more in order to give an impression that the library has a large collection
than to help students find useful books and articles.  naming no names.  (I have worked
10In Google, Boolean search is an option under "advanced search". To get it, search for "Google 
advanced search" using Google or any other search engine and on the resulting page way down 
on the lower left there is a "use operators" option.  
113
at one institution where many of the results of a naive search were not actually in the
library.)  so you may want to indicate to your professor that you would like a class
directed at
- finding the Boolean or otherwise advanced search options on your library's site
- making the site confess where the books actually are
- how to use the advanced search options to make a reading list for a term paper
Once you find the advanced search page, it often looks something like this
You 
You might for example fill in the boxes as follows.
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You might use this query in a large research library if you wanted to know if there were
any editions of the novel Middlemarch, which Mary-Ann Evans published under the name
of George Eliot, that appeared in her lifetime under her real name. (I’m sure the answer
would be No.  But see note 2 below.  
Note 1: NOT on these sites usually means "AND NOT": if you enter information A in a box
and  next  choose  NOT  before  entering  information  B  in  the  following  box,  you  get
(something like) A AND NOT B.
Note  2:  These  sites  are  becoming  more  and  more  idiot-tuned.  (Not,  I  suspect,  to
accommodate students but to accommodate librarians.) One consequence is that their
capacity to do real Boolean search is declining. Another is that the sites are becoming
more Googlish, in that items that do not fit your criteria but which the program thinks
might interest you tend to show up. 
>>  is real Boolean search more common where standards are higher?  the library sites
of most elite institutions are on the web.  check out the sites of higher and lower-status
institutions to see whether there is any correlation with the precision of the literature
searches  you  can  do.   (My  conjecture  is  that  the  answer  is  No.)
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Note 3: Repeated AND/OR/NOT choices open up scope problems.  How do we know that
the search above will get  "Middlemarch & (Eliot v Evans)" rather than "(Middlemarch &
Eliot) v Evans"? The only way to be sure is to try some queries where you know the
answers.
>>  how would you find out what the implicit bracketing conventions on a Boolean search
site are?  
A library computer is a good place to work on the difference between AND and OR in
searches. Suppose that you want to find all the books written by Margaret Atwood, and
also all the books written by Stephen King. Think what characteristics each of the books
you want to retrieve has. Is it written by Atwood and by King? No. Some of the books are
by the one author and some by the other.  So you want to search for all books which are
either written by Atwood OR by King. (Author = Atwood, Margaret OR Author = King,
Stephen.) 
Suppose you did search with “Author = Atwood, Margaret AND Author = King, Stephen”.
Then you would get books such that of each one of them it is true both that it is written
by Atwood and that it is written by King. That is, you would get books co-authored by
them. (The Handmaid’s Vampire, The Shining Assassin, The Edible Sematary?) 
There  are  many commercial  and academic  sites  with  advanced search  options.  (See
exercise 18.) "Advanced search" can mean just that one can enter queries in a more
structured way than just as a string of terms separated by commas. But in some of them
a degree of real Boolean search is possible.  The qualification ""a degree of" is there
because there are usually limitations. I list three.
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First, Boolean connectives are usually written in capital letters. AND, OR, NOT, though
sometimes "-" is used for NOT as well. Connectives need brackets, and there are usually
limits to how many brackets, and so how complicated a search, you are allowed.
Second, NOT presents difficulties. Most of the terms we will use for queries apply to a
fairly limited number of items, and NOT will pick out everything except the items in the
criterion it negates. So it will usually generate many hits: be satisfied by many items in
the database. And the internet is enormous. So if on the search box of a search engine
you enter, "-cat" or "NOT cat" it is likely to reply "not found".(Which doesn't mean that it
cannot find anything that fits your search. It means "get lost: too many responses".) On
the other hand "cat, -siamese" will get responses.  
Third, "IF" has a similar capacity to produce an overwhelming number of hits. Combine
this with the tendency of our minds to get confused by it, and the result is that many
search sites simply do not allow conditional searches, even though these are often what
we need to get nearest to the criteria we have in mind. Very few sites have an explicit IF
search  option,  and  there  are  usually  obstacles  to  indirect  ways  of  formulating  a
conditional search. (I have just entered "-cat OR siamese" into a search box and got the
response "Your search '-cat OR siamese' did not match any documents." A reasonable
refusal to search, expressed in misleading language.) 
>>  it may sound as if I am saying "search engines treat you like an idiot and prevent
you finding the documents you want".  that would be unfair.  give some reasons why the
procedures  of  search engines are in  the  interests  of  most  of  their  users.   do  these
reasons extend to university library sites?    
117
3:7 (of 8) search engines  
Most search facilities on the internet meant for the general public, including most search
engines,  do  not  support  full  Boolean  search11.  In  fact  they  usually  give  very  much
impoverished search capacities, compared to what one could find in a search program
meant for use by database professionals. One reason is that they want to be simple and
friendly-seeming.  Another,  perhaps  more  profound  reason,  is  that  there  is  such  an
enormous amount of material on the web that most simple searches will get more results
than users can handle. (This factor  is increased by the fact that web pages are not
organized in a way that makes it clear whether a page meets a criterion. Search for “cat”
and you get not just pages about cats but pages using the word “cat”. You’ll even get
pages which say “’cat’ has three letters”.) 
So the order in which the results are presented becomes crucial, and then it seems that a
program that presents results in a good order makes Boolean structure less essential.
There may be a very deep fact here, that the kinds of searching that stem from Boolean
logic, and in fact from systematic logical thinking as we traditionally think of it, work best
on comparatively small databases.  
>>   even  if  there  is  a  deep  fact  here,  my  formulation  is  likely  to  be  an  over-
simplification.  why?
A common strategy for search engines, is for the user to enter a series of search terms,
separated by commas. The program then searches and presents result in an ordering.
First come results which match all of the search terms, followed by results which match
11 Two useful Internet sites with information about Internet searches are:
http://www.virtualsalt.com/howlook.htm 
https://searchenginewatch.com/
on the latter, links to articles relevant to the issues in this chapter are mostly at
https://searchenginewatch.com/static/tips 
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some but not all of them, followed by results which match even fewer of them. So for
example if one enters terms A, B, C the first results are in the intersection of (items
matching) A, B, C, thus ones that would come from 
Find x: Ax & Bx & Cx. These are followed by results in the intersections of A with B, A
with C, and B with C, thus from Find x: Ax & Bx, Find x: Ax & Cx, and 
Find x: Bx & Cx. Lastly come results in the union of A, B, and C, thus from 
Find x: Ax v Bx v Cx. (Of course the ordering must also avoid duplication between these,
and any real search engine has many detailed tricks, some of them secret, to bring the
results of interest to the average user to the top.) 
So the rule is: first big conjunctions, then smaller conjunctions, then disjunctions.  
>>  search engines will sometimes claim that the comma is interpreted as AND alone.
(this  does  not  deny  that  the  order  the  results  are  presented  is  independent  of  the
Boolean interpretation of the comma.)  how would you test whether this was true?  (See
also exercise 22.)  
(Note  that  search  engines  will  sometimes  present  results  in  a  different  order  if  one
searches for "A, B" then they will with "B, A", although Find x: Ax & Bx should get the
same results as Find x: Ax & Bx. I suspect this is the result of the commercial motives
behind the details of the search algorithms.)
We can use these facts to get the effect of Boolean search on search engines directed at
the general public. After all, we are more sophisticated people than the target clientele of
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most search engines, and we know a little logic. But it will help to know just a bit more
logic  than  we  do  at  this  stage.  I  return  to  the  question  after  we  have  discussed
propositional logic, a topic that might seem to have little connection with search.  
A basic reason for wanting to use a precise search criterion on the Internet rather than a
vague and general one is that a too-general criterion will produce a very large number of
results. The item you are looking for will probably be among these results but finding it
will  require  another  search.  (This  is  the  topic  of  the  following  section.)  On  most
commercial  sites,  including  Google  and  Amazon,  the  order  in  which  the  results  is
presented  depends  not  only  on  the  criterion  you  have  used  but  also  on  payments
between interested parties and the owners of the sites. As a result, if your further search
is only among the items that are presented first, what you find will be influenced not only
by  the  criterion  and  your  searching  technique  but  also  by  other  people's  financial
interests. So careful searching, sophisticated logical thinking, can save you money and
give some freedom as a consumer.
3:8 (of 8) extra: iterated searches   
This is not a topic that we must cover at this stage. But it introduces ideas that will be
useful later. So read it trying to get as much of the point as you can, but not worrying too
much about the details.
Starting with a two place relation R we can describe a search as Find x: Rxy . This binds
the variable x, leaving the variable y free. So we can put on another Find, binding the y
to get  Find x: Find y: Rxy. Our language for queries allows these: but how are we to
understand them, what should they mean? We can give them a meaning that lines them
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up with central ideas of this course. Suppose for example Rxy is "x is to the north of y"
and the domain is  glasgow, london, montreal, boston, new york. Then Find y: Rxy asks
for a different search for  each  x  in  the domain.  For  g it  asks for  all  the cities that
Glasgow is to the north of, and so on for l, m, b, n. It describes five different searches,
for cities that g, l, m, b, and n are north of. Write their results as (g: l ), (m: b, n), and
(b: n), where the first name shows which search in the range of x we are describing, and
the following are names of the results of that search. Note that there are no entries for l,
and  n. That is because the  l and  n searches get no results. So Find y: Rxy gives five
searches, and then Find x: Find y: Rxy asks for individuals x that are what we get when
we do these searches. "Find those x for which you find y such that Rxy". It therefore has
the result g, m, b.   
It is important to see that this query, Find x: Find y: Rxy , gives a different result to the
query with the search operators in the opposite order:
Find y: Find x: Rxy. The first asks us to find x for which we find y such that Rxy, cities
with cities they are north of, and that gives g,  m, b. The second asks us to find y for
which we find x such that  Rxy, that is, cities for which we find cities (in the domain)
north of them, and that gives n, b, l. The only city on both lists is Boston, because it is
the only city that is both north of cities and has cities north of it. Seeing that these two
queries give different results is the main reason for defining them in this way. (We could
have defined them differently.) It begins an idea that will be useful in the final chapters
of this book, so although we will not use it at this stage you should think about it until
you understand it.  
>>  how could we have defined them differently?
>>  could someone argue that Find x Find y Rxy does not make sense as a query?
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A different, more mathematical, way of thinking about the contrast between  
Find x: Find y: Rxy and  Find y: Find x: Rxy may be helpful to some. It is simplest now to
use a domain of numbers and a relation between them. So let the domain be the integers
0, 1, 2, ... and let R be "2x + y < 5". R corresponds to a region in the plane, of all points
(x,y) where 2x + y < 5. See the diagram. We want to search to find out what points are
in this region. So we perform a series of searches for various x from 0 and up, in each
case finding y such that Rxy for the x we have chosen.  (It's like using sonar to locate
fish.)  This reveals that,ofor positiveo x,mm 0 ≤y <5 . So Find y: Find x: Rxy gets y from
0 to 5.  This is exploring  R "from below", with searches that vary along the horizontal
axis. We can also search "from the side", asking for y such that searches for x find x for
which — for that choice of y —  Rxy. This reveals that, for positive y, 0≤x<2.5. So Find
x: Find y: Rxy gets x from 0 to 2.5. The two results are not the same. 
>>  this example depends on the choice of domain.  find a domain for which Find x: Find
y: Rxy and Find y: Find x: Rxy  are the same, using the same relation as in the example. 
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words used in chapter three that it would be a good idea to understand:
&,  v,  ~,   Boolean connective, Boolean search, conditional, conjunction, criterion of a
query,  disjunction, Find  x, material  conditional,  negation,  query,  variable-binding
operator.
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exercises for chapter three
A – core
1) 
Conservative Progressive corrUpt
ralph YES NO NO
stephen YES YES NO
terri NO NO YES
ulrich YES YES YES
a) Find x: Cx
b) Find x: Cx & Px (see remark below)
c) Find x: Px & ~Ux  
d) Find x: (Cx v Ux) & ~Ux  (see remark below)
e) Find x: ~(Cx & Ux)
f) Find x: Ux  Cx
g) Find x,y: (Ux   Uy) & (Uy  Ux)
(This wants pairs (x,y) meeting the criterion. Ask yourself what the criterion is: what is 
the relation between x and y?)
Say in plain English what this query is looking for.
h) Find a search that gives {r}
i) Find a search that gives {r,u}
REMARK: section 3 of the chapter is relevant to b) and d).
2)   
   is Richer than Ralph stephen terri ulrich
ralph NO YES YES NO
stephen NO NO YES NO
Terri NO NO NO NO
ulrich YES YES YES NO
a) Find x: Rxr
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b) Find x: Rrx
c) Find x, y: ~Rxy
d) Find x: Rxu v Rux (note that u  is ulr ich here, not a variable) 
e) Find one triple x, y, z: Rxy & Ryz & ~Rxz 
f) Find x: Rxr  Rxu 
g) Find (all pairs) x,y: Rxy & ~Ux & Uy  (For this one you have to combine the table above 
with the one in 1).
[hint: this question is made easier if you arrange the individuals in order from the richest
to the least rich. We can do this because it is a ‘transitive’ relation, discussed in a later 
chapter.]
3) a) You are in a dispute about what is the highest mountain on earth, not in terms of 
the altitude of the summit but in terms of the height difference between base and 
summit. How would you search for an answer?
b) You want information about diseases that are incurable but not fatal. What search 
terms could you use. 
c) You want to learn all you can about musical keys, and want to avoid information about
keys for locks, etc. What queries can help? 
d) You want to learn about explanations for UFO appearances, but do not want to waste 
time with craziness. How do you search? 
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4)  Take this family tree
Kim Il-sung -- Kim Jong-sook
|
Kim Jong-il –- Ko Yong-hui
        |
Kim Jong-un -- Ri Sol-ju
| 
Kim Ju-ae
as a diagram of the three place relation x and y are parents of z . (a) Write a query in
our formal notation which will capture the two place relation x is a child of y. (b) Write
a query which in this database will capture the two place relation x and y are spouses.
Why is its application specific to this database.  (c) do the same for x is a grandparent
of y. What does the database-specificity of (b) and (c) suggest about the limitations of
Boolean search?  (d) write a query which will capture the 2 place relation (“is a blood
relative of”), assuming absence of inbreeding. 
5)  You are searching on the internet for kings of England who were also kings of 
Denmark. You enter these search terms: king of England, king of Denmark. The search 
contains some names of people satisfying both criteria, but you also get annoyingly many
hits where one person is king of England and another is king of Denmark. (You find the 
same problem searching with [“king of England”, “king of Denmark”] and with [king, 
England, Denmark] .) Say as clearly as you can what is going wrong. Suggest some ways
of handling the problem, and state some of their disadvantages. Will wild-card symbols 
(*, +) help? Would the seriousness of these disadvantages depend on the purpose of 
your search?  
6)  Facts: Outlands is one stop due west of Supershop on the light rail system. 
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Suburparidise is one stop due East of Supershop on the LRS. Supershop is one stop due 
west of City Hall, which is one stop due west of Concert Place, Bad News is two stops due
East of City Hall. There is also a north-south line which meets the east-west line at City 
Hall, and which goes one stop north, to Cañada Valley, and two stops south, first to 
Texada and then to Rio Grande. There are only these two lines.
a) Name two stations that are five stops apart.
b) Name four pairs of stations which are exactly two stops apart, but such that you 
cannot get from one to the other except by changing lines.
These are not difficult with a suitable diagram. Draw the diagram. 
c) Does Cañada Valley have to be nearer to City Hall than Outlands is?  What does your
answer reveal about the diagram?
Follow up: give a different interpretation, perhaps in terms of shapes or numbers, though
it does not have to be, for the terms of the database and the answer. (Teaching 
suggestion: who can come up with the most interesting such interpretation?) How are 
the relations in this interpretation similar to those in the light transit interpretation? 
d) Draw the relations “one stop due east”. “one stop north”, and “two stops south” as 
arrow diagrams. Draw the relations “is east of” and “is south of” as arrow diagrams. How
are these different? If you were drawing a diagram of the light rail system to solve a 
problem how would you keep it simple?
What about the relations “is at least as far east as” and “is at least as far north as”? How 
would their arrow diagrams differ from the others? What about “is one stop west of”? 
State informally how “is east of” is different from “is west of”and how “is one stop east 
of” is different from “is east of”. How is “is one stop east of” different from “is the same 
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or one stop east of”? (We come back to this in a later chapter.)
7)  Given these tables 
 in North America In Europe
edmonton YES NO
glasgow NO YES
juneau YES NO
oslo NO YES
petersburg NO YES 
 
    is to the North of edmonton glasgow juneau oslo petersburg
edmonton NO NO NO NO NO
glasgow YES NO NO NO NO
juneau YES YES NO NO NO
oslo YES YES YES NO YES
petersburg YES YES YES NO NO
a) Find x: Ax & Nxe
b) Find x: Ex v Nex
c) Find x: Ex v Nxe
d) Find x: Ax  Ex  
e) Find x: Ax & ~Nxe
f) Find x: ~ (Ax & ~Nxe)
g)  Find x, y: Nxy & Nyj 
h) Find all the cities that are to the north of some city in North America
i) Find all the cities that are to the north of all cities in North America 
j) Write a query that in the tables above will get the set {e}
k) Write a query that in the tables above will get the set {p,j}
[the hint for question 3 may help here too.] 
l) Find a x in North America such that x is north of all other cities in North America. 
Find a y such that y is to the north of all other cities in Europe. Find a z such that it is 
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to the north of y and not to the north of x. 
8)  “Get me all the socks that are green and wool or polyester” is an 
ambiguous instruction. Using G for “green” and W for “wool” and P for “polyester” write 
in the Find x notation the two instructions it can mean.  
Do the same for “get me all the socks that are not polyester and green”. 
9)  In the database 
A B C
a NO NO YES
b YES YES NO
c NO NO YES
what is the difference in search results between 
Find x: (Ax & Bx) v Cx 
and
Find x: Ax & (Bx v Cx) ?
10)  We can throw together the symbols for defining queries in crazy ways, so that they 
don’t describe any search that could be attempted. Logicians call a string of symbols that
has a meaning “well formed”, or a “well formed formula” (otherwise it is “ill-formed”). I 
have not given any rules for well-formedness, but you should be able to tell which 
combinations of symbols make sense. (Comparison: “There are three mice in the bread-
basket.” is a well-formed English sentence, while “Mice there are-bread basket.” , 
“.-.basket mice”, and “mice basket bread” are not.) Most ways of throwing words 
randomly together don’t make sense. But note that many good English sentences are 
ambiguous, while a well-formed formula is meant to have only one meaning.
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Which of the following are well-formed queries? 
Find x: (Ax   Bx) & Cx
Find x: Ax  Bx & Cx
Find x: (Ax   ~&Bx) & Cx)
Find x: (Ax   Bx v Cx & Dx)
Find x: ~(Ax  Bx) & Cx
Find x: (~Ax  Bx) & Cx
Find x: ((Ax  Bx) &) Cx
Find x,y: (Ax   Bx) & Cx
11)  You are searching on your library advanced search page, for a book on ethics by a
contemporary Australian philosopher called Smith. But you can’t remember his full name
or the title of the book. So you try with Author “Smith” and Subject “Ethics”. How many
books  does  this  get?  Too  many.  You  can’t  see  how  to  search  for  contemporary
Australians, but you realise this rules out the great 18th century Scottish writer on ethics
and economics, Adam Smith. How can you work this into the search? Try it. How much
have you reduced the list? Then you remember that one word in the title was “problem”.
How do you include this? What do you get? 
12)  We can use “maximum” or “best looking”, and similar ideas, in searches with a
relation. Given a domain of people we can ask, for example “Find the best looking x such
that for the best looking y, x is taller than y”. To find this x, we must first for each x in
the domain find the best looking y such that x is taller than y, and then we must choose
the best looking of these. Describe a set of people such that “The best looking x such
that for the best looking y, x is taller than y”, understood this way, is not the same as
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“the best looking y such that for the best looking x, x is taller than y.” Here as often,
when we get precise we find that the order in which we say things makes a difference.
(Suppose someone says “find the best looking pair such that one is taller than the other.”
Give several things they could mean. What about “find the best looking person who is 
taller than a best looking person”.
13)  This is a continuation of exercise 14 of the previous chapter. So if you did not do
that one it would help to look back at it, mostly to get the purpose and spirit of this kind
of exercise. One purpose of a formal notation for queries is to bring out the common
structure of many searches that use different vocabulary. Both "find all the cats that are
either black or not sick" and "catch the black cats cats and while you are at it those that
are  not  sick"  invoke  the  query Find  x:  Cx  &(Bx  v~Sx)  .  So  if  you  find  an  efficient
procedure for either it will apply to the other. A good way to find such a procedure is to
consider a very simple database and find an easy routine for applying the query to it. So
consider this database
C B S
a YES YES YES
b NO YES YES
c YES YES NO
d YES NO YES
Apply the query to this database. (What does it get?) If you think about how you decided
whether individuals satisfied the condition you will arrive at something like the following
rule. "If C is NO stop and go to the next. If C is YES look for YES under B and NO under
S: if you see one include the individual and go to the next, otherwise stop and go to the
next." Do you see why this gets the right answers? Once you have formulated the rule
you can apply it to more complicated databases. You proceed in this intellectual matter
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as  you  would  in  many  practical  matters:  you  think  what  to  do,  then  you  do  it
automatically, then if need be you think again. Try the quick searching routine with the
following two databases. It is important to keep yourself moving through them quickly.
#1 C B S #2 C B S
q YES NO NO l YES NO NO
w NO YES YES k YES YES NO
e NO NO NO j YES NO YES
r YES NO YES h NO YES NO
t YES NO NO g NO NO NO
y YES YES NO f YES NO YES
u YES NO YES d YES NO NO
i YES NO NO s YES YES NO
o NO NO NO a YES YES YES
p NO YES NO p YES NO NO
a YES NO NO o NO YES NO
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B – more
14)  You want a book co-authored by Zeno Vendler and Aristotle Chan on flu and polio 
viruses, but not their book on computer viruses. Which of the following commands is 
most likely to produce a small list containing the book? 
a) author = Vendler, Zeno OR author = Chan, Aristotle AND topic = viruses AND NOT 
topic = computers
b) author = Vendler Zeno AND author = Chan, Aristotle AND topic = viruses OR NOT 
topic = computers
c) author = Vendler Zeno AND author = Chan, Aristotle AND topic = viruses AND NOT 
topic = computers
d) author = Vendler Zeno AND author = Chan, Aristotle AND topic = viruses AND topic 
= not computers
15)  Which of these commands in English (i to vi) is the same as which query in symbols
(a to f)?
(i) Find all individuals that are C and D and not E
(ii) Find all individuals that are not both C and D 
(iii) Find all individuals that are both not C and not D
(iv) Find all individuals, but if they are C they have to be D
(v) Find all pairs of individuals, the first member of the pair being C and the second D
(vi) Find all pairs of a C individual and an individual that is not D
Find y: ~(Cy & Dy) b) Find x: Cx   Dx
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Find x: Cx & Dx & ~Ex  d) Find y: ~Cy & ~Dy  
Find xy: Cx & ~Dy   f) Find xy: Cx & Dy  
16)  Facts: Alirio is the father of Elizabetta. Marta is the mother of Alirio. Wei is the uncle
of Elizabetta. Li is married to Wei. Wei is the father of Qiang. 
a) Name two people who are cousins. Name one person who is a grandmother of 
Elizabetta. Name two people who are siblings. 
b) Do the facts require that Li is the mother of Qiang? Do they require that Wei is the 
brother of Alirio? Do they require that Li and Elizabetta are not siblings?
In answering these draw a diagram of the relations between these people. What about 
the diagram has to be left unspecified so as not to say more than follows from the facts?
What definitions of relationship words do you need in order to use the diagram? 
Follow up: give a different interpretation, perhaps in terms of shapes or numbers, though
it does not have to be, for the terms of the database and the answer. (Teaching 
suggestion: who can come up with the most interesting such interpretation?)
17) 
Cynical Depraved
mauricio YES YES
nessa NO NO
opheia NO YES
Find x, y such that x is Cynical and y is not Depraved 
(all pairs where the first member is C and the second is not D) 
Find x, y such that x is not Cynical and y is not Depraved 
Find x, y: (Cx & Dy) v (~Cx & ~Dy) 
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Find all x for which there is a y such that: if y is Depraved, x is Cynical
(this last is meant to be a tricky one, though the answer is simple and there is a quick 
way to get it) 
18)  Go to the second hand book seller Abe-books (from Victoria BC – every student 
should know about them) at www.abebooks.com . Go to the “more search options page” 
and click to turn on the Boolean search option. Suppose you have seen a book by Helen 
Exley on paintings by cats. (Yes! It’s hilarious.) You want to know if there are other books
on cats painting. How do you use the search program to find out? You wonder if there are
books on this not by Exley. Are there? Since cats paint, perhaps they dance. Are there 
books about cats dancing? Are there books about cats dancing and cats painting? What 
about cats and music? Books about cats and dancing and music? Cats and music and 
painting? In each case write down the search terms. For some of them, for example cats 
dancing and cats painting, there are two ways of phrasing the search.
19)  Using the arrow diagram below, answer the following questions
(a) there are two individuals, x, such that Rabx. Which are they?
(b) there is one individual, y, such that Rayb. Which is it?
(c) there is one individual, z, such that Rzxx for some x. Which is it? 
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C – harder 
20)  Google claims that the comma “,” in Google searches, is an AND. So “X, Y” should 
get just items satisfying both X and Y. I suspect this is not true, and that there is an OR 
element in Google’s treatment of the comma. How would one investigate this? What 
searches would provide relevant evidence? 
21)   Not long ago search engines doing general searches of the web (as opposed to
search functions on particular web sites) allowed explicit  use of Boolean operators in
searches,  so  one  could  search  for  expressions  with  forms  like  “(X  AND  Y)  OR  Z”.
Sometimes one could even embed one operator within the scope of another, so that there
were searches such as “X AND (Y OR Z)” or “X OR NOT (Y AND Z)”. These have become
increasingly rare, and web sites such as “search engine watch” that give comparative
information  about  search  engines  give  a  confusing  picture.  Can  you  find  out  where
Boolean search survives, and whether embedded searches are possible on any search
engine now? (Search engines can have un-obvious ways of doing such searches, and
they often have more options available under ‘advanced search” or the like.) 
22)  Many search programs on particular web sites (as opposed to the all-purpose search
engines  of  the  previous  question)  use  a  “list  with  commas”  format,  and  then,  as
discussed in section 6 of this chapter, the query “X,Y” will get items satisfying both X and
Y, and also items just satifying one of them, usually with the former listed first. There are
differences of balance, though. Sometimes there will be only a few AND results before
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the OR results begin. How can one test a particular program to see what its balance is?
How, in fact, can one test to see whether the comma is AND, OR, or a combination? 
23)  Can you find a better way of making arrow-diagrams for 3-place relations?
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chapter 4:  searching for models
4:1. (of 5) models 
We can search in a database for individuals satisfying some criterion. That has been the
main focus in the preceding chapters. We can also search for databases that make some
sentence true. When we do this we usually do not call them databases but models. For
our purposes the two terms mean the same: models are just databases under a different
name. But in this chapter we begin the transition to issues about logical consequence —
the topic of chapter 6 and important from then on — where "model" is the standard
term.  The main  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  get  you to  see  that  the  issues  about
searching  in  databases  for  individuals,  which  we  will  now  start  calling  models,  are
fundamentally the same as the issues about searching for models (databases) where
sentences  are  true.  Seeing  this  continuity  in  the  topic  is  at  least  as  important  as
understanding any of the details of this chapter.
The individual and attribute tables we saw in chapter 1, relational grids, and arrow 
diagrams are all ways of describing models. Any sentence is true in many models, 
infinitely many in fact. So finding all the models that make a sentence true would be 
asking a lot. 
>>  do you see why any sentence is true in infinitely many models?  take a very simple
model for "Flossie is angry" and make it a little bit more complicated.  then make that
one a little bit more complicated.  do you see how you could go on doing this forever?
Nearly  all  the  searches  we  have  seen  so  far  try  to  find  all  the  individuals  in  a
database/model satisfying some criterion. But we can also search for just one  individual
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satisfying a criterion. We can look in the model and stop when we find something that
fits. This is an easier task than finding everything that fits, and we will never have to find
infinitely many things. But it is still  sometimes difficult, especially with a complicated
model or a complicated criterion. For a simple example, consider the model and the
criterion below. We want to find some individual in the domain of the model satisfying the
criterion of the query. To vary the terminology slightly, we can also say that we want to
find an individual that the criterion is true of.
Criterion: Ax  Bx
Model:  
A B
a YES YES
b YES NO
c NO YES
d NO NO
Remember that Ax   Bx is satisfied by all individuals except that when they are A they
must be B. So if we go through the individuals looking for just one which satisfies the
search the search, which by analogy we could write Find some x Ax   Bx , we will see
that the first one,  a, satisfies the criterion. We can stop after the very first step. This
model was special in that it had all combinations of YES and NO individuals or its two
attributes. We will see more models like this in section 3 below and in the next chapter.
That example was deliberately simple, to give the idea. But I was saying that when the
criterion is complicated finding just one individual can be difficult enough. So here is an
example of that
Criterion: ~((Ax v Bx)   (Bx & Cx))
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Model:
A B C
a YES YES YES
b YES NO YES
c NO NO YES
d NO YES YES
e YES NO NO
Going through the individuals in the model, we see that a satisfies  Ax v Bx and also
satisfies  Bx & Cx. So it satisfies  ((Ax v Bx)   (Bx & Cx))).  And therefore it does not
satisfy the criterion. b satisfies neither Ax v Bx  nor  Bx & Cx, so it does not satisfy 
((Ax v Bx)   (Bx & Cx)). (Remember that Ax   Bx applies to everything except things
satisfying A that do not satisfy B.) So it does satisfy the criterion. We have found the one
individual we needed that satisfies this criterion in this model. But finding it was quite a
lot of work. You would not want to go through these considerations for all five individuals,
let alone apply the criterion to a larger model in this way. Luckily, when it is models that
we are looking for there is a simple way of  making them, which will provide a model
when one exists, and will show that there are none when no models exist.
>>  we can say that an individual satisfies a criterion or that the criterion is true of the
individual.   these mean the same.  "true of"  is  like" true":  a criterion is  true of  an
individual  when  the  sentence  you  get  by  putting  the  name  of  the  individual  in  the
criterion is true.  for example the criterion “is a fast horse" is true of Secretariat because
"Secretariat is a fast horse" is true.  what happens if we use two names for the same
individual?   are  there  individuals  without  names,  and  if  so  how can  we  modify  the
definition of "true of" for them?
Some  terminology.  I  shall  use  "sentence"  both  to  refer  to  queries,  which  ask  what
individuals there are satisfying a criterion, and to refer to assertions, which ask what
models (informally,  situations or circumstances) make them true. You can think of  a
query as saying "what is like this?" And you can think of an assertion as saying "how can
this be?".  As we have been writing queries,  they separate the Find x: part from the
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criterion specifying what is to be found. Assertions are not usually presented in terms like
this. But we could state queries using just a question mark, so that instead of 
Find x: Red x & Sock x we wrote something like "Red socks: are there any?", though this
would be less clear in some situations. And we could write assertions with something like
a Find prefix, so that instead of saying "Alvin is wearing red socks" we would say "find
situations in which Alvin is wearing red socks. (We can turn a criterion into a sentence by
inserting a name. We can also do it by using a quantifier, which is rather like the Find x:
prefix of a query. We will see quantifiers in chapters 9 to 11.) 
(I shall also use the word "proposition" in later chapters, to mean the things that get
joined by Boolean connectives in propositional logic. That will be explained when we get
to it, but to avoid confusion I should say that "proposition" is used in a broader sense in
some other books.) 
Assertions are true or false in models. I will also say that models make assertions true or
false. The criteria of queries are true or false  of individuals in models (or pairs triples,
etc. of individuals if the criteria have relations) I will also say that individuals satisfy the
criteria of queries. (All this terminology has been used in earlier chapters, but it is as well
to make it explicit here where it matters.) Truth and satisfaction are closely related: if a
criterion is satisfied by an individual then the assertion you get by inserting a name of
the individual into the criterion is true. For example, if Alvin satisfies "x is wearing red
socks" then "Alvin is wearing red socks" is true. So we can slide between truth and
satisfaction very easily. 
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In chapter 1 I pointed out that if  we name databases after individuals then the line
between  searching  for  individuals  and  searching  for  databases  becomes  even  more
vague. The example there was a set of models, as we will call them from now on, each of
which describes the attributes of the dogs of that chapter on a particular day of the
week. Then instead of asking for models which for example make "Flossie is angry" true,
we  can  search  for  days  d  which  satisfy  "Flossie  is  angry  on  day  d".  (What  are  we
searching in? That could get complicated if we want to be precise: a larger model got by
putting the individual models for each day together. We will not go down that route.) 
>>  suppose "the sun is shining" is said on Monday and is true.  is "the sun is shining" 
true of Monday?
4:2 (of 5). making models  
We want to make models where individuals satisfy the criteria of queries and where the
sentences using names of these individuals are true. The very simplest criterion would be
simply a single attribute, say P, which would be satisfied by an individual a when Pa is
true. P is an atomic criterion, and Pa is an atomic sentence. It is true in a model if the
individual a is in the domain of the model and the model attributes P up to it; in an
individual and attribute table this will be when the cell Pa has YES. ~Pa is also an atomic
sentence, true in a model when the corresponding cell has NO. (But more complicated
sentences, involving Boolean connectives resides ~ ae not atomic.) To see how we can
make models, begin with an atomic sentence Pa, consisting of just one attribute applied
one individual. There is always a model for such a sentence, given by the table with one
row for a and one column for P, with YES in the cell where they meet. It is just as simple
to make a model for ~Pa. Again it will have one row for a and one column for P, but this
time it will have NO in the cell. 
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We can build sentences by combining atomic sentences with the Boolean connectives &,
v,  , and ~. For each of these there is a way of finding a model for it if one exists. (Or,
what really comes to the same, of finding a model with individuals satisfying the criterion
that is made by combining atomic criteria in the same way, but to keep it simple I will
talk about sentences.) Consider first the conjunction A & B. (A might be for example Pa
and B might be Qb , so that A & B would be Pa & Qb. But A and B might also be more
complicated combinations of atomic sentences. I shall use  red letters when I want to
show something that applies to all sentences, however they are constructed.) A model
for this sentence is given by a table with two rows, one for a and one for  b, and two
columns, one for P and one for  Q. Write these one above the other, below the sentence we
want a model for, as follows:
the conjunction rule  A  &  B  
    A
    B
This tells us that to make a model for A & B we take a model for A and a model for B and
combine them into a single model. This may not be possible, for example if A is Pa and B
is ~Pa. But the procedure as a whole will tell us whether it is possible, so just wait. If the
sentence is an assertion then A & B is true in the model. If the sentence is the criterion
of a query then A & B  is true of some individual or individuals in the model. (I am
suppressing a detail, since the aim of this chapter is to make the link between finding
and assertion. See exercise 16. In the rest of this chapter I will ignore the difference
between truth and satisfaction, except for the occasional hint that both are in the picture.
>>  why is the & not in red?
>>   why can models for Pa and for ~Pa not be combined a single model making their 
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conjunction true? 
A model for the disjunction A v B gives us two possibilities. The sentence is true if the
model makes A true, and also if it makes B true. We have more flexibility if we keep both
possibilities open. To show that both are possible models, we write this as follows:
The disjunction rule  A   v   B  
  /   \
A B
This tells us that there are two models that we can use to make A v B true. One is a
model for A and the other is a model for B.) 
>>  the "OR" of logic is inclusive: it applies as long as one of the disjuncts applies,
including when both disjuncts apply.  why does this rule not make disjunction exclusive?
A model for the conditional A  B also gives us two possibilities. The sentence is true if
the model makes  A false, and also if it makes  B true. (Remember what the material
conditional means.) Again we have more flexibility if we keep them both open. We write
this as follows:
The  rule A  B
  /   \
        ~A      B
This tells us that there are two models that we can use to make A  B true. One is a
model for ~A and the other is a model for B.) 
The story I told for ~Pa, turning YES into NO, applies only to the negation of an atomic 
sentence such as Pa. In general we need three rules, one for each of the Boolean 
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connectives &, v, .
The negation rules 
 ~ (A  &   B)  ~ (A  v   B)  ~ (A     B) 
 /   \      ~A A
  ~A   ~B      ~B         ~B
These rules make intuitive sense. For a conjunction to be false both of the conjuncts
must be false; for a disjunction to be false it is enough that one of the disjuncts be false;
a material conditional is false only when the antecedent is true and the consequent is
false. There will be more background for these in the next chapter. 
We apply these rules to a sentence over and over again until it cannot be broken into any
smaller parts. The result is a branching structure, in which each branch is a mixture of
complex sentences and the atomic sentences they are made from. The structure looks
like an upside-down tree, where one or more branches are connected to what I shall call 
the base of the tree, indicated by being underlined, which has the sentence we start
with. For example, if we begin with P & (Q v R) we get the following tree.
 Pa & (Qb v ~Pa)   
      Pa (applying the conjunction rule)
  Qb v ~Pa
      /  \
    Qb    ~Pa (applying the disjunction rule)
     X
Note several things about this tree.
– It begins by applying the appropriate rule to the whole sentence at the base of the
tree, in this case Pa & (Qb v ~Pa). If the sentence is a conjunction as in this case we
use the conjunction rule, if a conditional we use the conditional rule, and so on. The
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rule we use corresponds to what in the next chapter is called the central connective, so
there will be more about it there. Then we apply the rules that apply to the sentences
that result, and so on. This gives us the branches, in this case  Pa, Qb v ~Pa, Qb and
Pa, Qb v ~Pa, ~Pa.
– We cannot extend it by applying the rules (at any rate the rules we have seen so far)
any further, since we have broken a sentence down into its atomic parts.
– It has two branches. Each of them has a combination of atomic propositions: Pa and 
Qb on the left branch, and Pa and ~Pa on the right branch.
– The right branch is marked with a red X. It does not describe a model because it has
a contradiction — Pa, ~Pa — on it.
– The left branch does not contain any such contradictions. If we make a model for Pa 
and a model for Qb and then combine them, we get a model for the compound 
sentence at the base of the tree.
The simplest models for Pa and Qb are
model for Pa   P model for 
Qb   
  Q
  a   YES   b   YES
We can combine these into a model for the complex sentence just by sticking them 
together, to get
P Q
a YES YES/NO
b YES/NO YES
(I have marked some cells YES/NO because it does not matter whether they are YES or
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NO: the sentence is true in the model whichever way we fill in the cells.)
This is what always happens when we apply the rules to a complex sentence. We get
branches (sometimes as few as one, and often far more than two). If a branch has an
atomic sentence and also its negation then it does not describe a model. We say that the
branch  closes  in  this  case. But if  it  does not close — it  does not contain an atomic
sentence and also its negation — then we can construct a model for the sentence we
started with.
The general recipe for making models for a sentence gives us a model for every unclosed
branch  of  the  tree.  For  every  (a)   atomic  proposition  or  (b)  negation  of  an  atomic
proposition on a branch we make a cell with (a) YES or (b) NO and we then put them
together to make the model. The cells are independent of one another so that this is not
difficult. I have not proved that we always get a model this way, if there are any models
for the sentence we start with. You can either trust me on this point, or you can do
exercise 18. 
>>  it seems so simple.  what might go wrong?
4:3 (of 5)  general patterns of truth and falsity
The abstract patterns of searches for individuals and searches for models are the same,
where Boolean connectives are concerned. So we could have used trees like the ones we
have  been  discussing  to  construct  models/databases  where  there  are  individuals
satisfying the criteria of queries. But we will concentrate on the abstract patterns, as
summed up in the six rules, the ones that I have been writing using RED capitals. These
show the patterns that connect whole classes of sentences and queries to classes of
models. 
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An important concept, at this level of generality, is that of a truth table. Remember that
in section 1 above I used a model that had all  combinations of YES and NO for the
sentences involved. We can always use such models,  and when we are dealing with
sentences in general we can ignore the details of the cells that make a sentence true, or
a criterion be satisfied by individuals, in a particular model. All that matters for many
purposes is the pattern of truth and falsity.
These  patterns  are  often  presented  in  terms  of truth  tables,  which  are  most  easily
explained taking the Boolean connectives one by one. They are closely related to the tree
rules above. (But we need only one rule for  ~,  rather than the three  ~ rules.) The
simplest is the truth table for ~. A standard way of writing it is as the table below (This is
quite different from an object and attribute table. Do not think of them as the same sort
of thing.)
P ~P
T F
F T
This truth table says that a sentence ~P is true in a model if and only if P is not true of it.
(If P is true then ~P is not, and if P is not true then ~P is true.) This must be understood
so that it applies both to sentences and queries. This also means that a sentence is false
in a model, or the criterion of a query is false of an individual in a model, if and only if its
negation is true, or is not satisfied by that same individual. 
Now the truth table for v:
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P Q P v Q
T F T
F T T
F F F
This truth table says that a disjunction is true (of an individual in a model) if and only if
at least one of the disjuncts is true. In other words, the disjunction is false only when
both disjuncts are false. The connection with the tree rule for disjunction is easy: the
disjunction is true in two cases, the case where the first disjunct is true and the case
where the second disjunct is true. Provided that one or the other of these applies , then
the disjunction is true.
The truth table for conjunction is
P Q P & Q
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F F
This truth table says that a conjunction is true (of an individual in a model) if and only if
both of the conjuncts are true. It is false in all  other cases. The connection with the
conjunction rule is that a model fits a conjunction under only one condition, when both
conjuncts fit it. And when both conjuncts do fit the model then the conjunction fits it. 
One last Boolean connective is left: the material conditional. Its truth table is
P Q P  Q
T T T
T F F
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F T T
F F T
This truth table says that a conditional is true (of an individual in a model) in all cases
except when its antecedent is true and its consequence is false. The connection with the
conditional rule is that in all the cases where the conditional is true either the antecedent
is  false  or  the  consequent  is  true.  And  the  other  way  around  when  either  of  these
conditions is met in a model the model makes the whole conditional true.
Truth tables will return in the next chapter. For now, the point is how much sentences
and  queries  have  in  common.  We  can  make  truth  tables  explaining  the  Boolean
connectives for both of them; we can define search trees for both of them; and we can
construct models for both in parallel ways. The resemblances go deep, and in fact the
differences are superficial. 
>>   do truth  tables  really  explain  what  Boolean  connectives  mean?   suppose  that
someone  did  not  understand  a  connective:  would  the  truth  table  allow  them  to
understand it?  is there more of a problem with some connectives than others?
4:4 (of 5)  models for multiples
Search trees as defined in section 2 constructed models for single sentences. But it is
easy to adapt them to make models for collections of sentences. The same rules apply,
and we can apply them to any sentences above a sentence on a branch, writing the
result beneath it. For a very simple example consider the tree that begins with the two
propositions P and P  Q.
  P
  P   Q  
  /  \
~P  Q
 X
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The second line is got from the conditional P  Q using the conditional rule. We do not
need to use a rule for P since it is as simple as it can get. But the result is that the left
branch closes, since it contains both ~P and P. That means that the only models for the
collection {P, P  Q} are models that make Q true. Interpreted in terms of sentences this
means that all models for this pair of sentences are models for Q. In chapter 6 we will
describe this by saying that Q is a logical consequence of the pair of premises P, P  Q.
Interpreted in terms of  queries it  means that any successful  search using these two
queries will find results which satisfy Q. For example, if we search with both Find x: Cat x
and Find x: Cat x   Black x we will get black cats, and thus only black things (not all
black  things,  of  course.).  This  makes  sense  as  we  can  think  of  the  first  query  as
gathering everything with the proviso that if it is a cat it has to be black, and think of the
second query as adding to this the requirement that we only collect cats. The result is
black cats.
For a slightly more complicated example consider the tree that starts from the pair 
P & Q, P v Q. Here it is, in two versions
 P & Q   P & Q 
 P v Q    P v Q 
  /  \    P ( &
P     Q (v rule)    Q rule)
P      P (&   /  \
Q      Q rule) P     Q (v rule)
The  differences  between  these  two  are  not  important.  In  the  tree  on  the  left  the
disjunction rule is applied before the conjunction rule, and in the tree on the right the
conjunction rule is applied before the disjunction rule. But it really does not matter in
which order the rules are applied. The result is the same: the tree has two branches and
on each of them both P and Q are found. Interpreted in terms of sentences, this means
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that both P and Q have to be true in any models that make both P & Q and P v Q true.
Interpreted in terms of queries, this means that if we search with both together we will
get models/databases where both P and Q are satisfied.
4:5 (of 5)  width
We can use trees beginning with several  sentences to make an important point that
concerns both when sentences are true and what the results of a search will be. Call one
search wider than another in a particular model/database when it will find more than the
other. Everything that the second search, the narrower one, finds is also found by the
wider search. Wider searches are not always more useful, as they may find many things
besides what you are looking for. You want information about feline leukemia and so you
search on the internet with "cats" or "cat diseases": searching with "cats" is obviously too
wide, since you will get millions of results and nearly all of them will be irrelevant, but
searching with "cat diseases" will also swamp you with unwanted information. More is not
always better. So there is an art to wording a search so that it is wide enough to give the
information you want but not so wide that you have so much information that you cannot
separate out the items that you really need. (The ideal, of course, would be to use a
query that finds exactly what you want, not too much and not too little,  but that is
usually not possible.)
Some searches are intrinsically wider than others: they will get at least as many results
in any model. For example Find x Cat x is intrinsically wider than Find x (Catx & Blackx).
Even if you are applying these queries to a model where there are only black cats the
wider search will never gets fewer than the narrower one. In exactly the same way some
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sentences are wider (or logically weaker, philosophers sometimes say) than others. The
models where "Nero is a cat" is true will never be fewer (never be a proper subclass of)
those where "Nero is a black cat" is true. The width of sentences will return in chapter 6
in terms of logical consequence.
Trees enter  here.  A tree breaks down the sentence or  criterion it  starts  with  into  a
number of branches. Each of these is, taken alone, wider than the starting sentence. For
a simple example consider black cats again. We have the tree
 C  at &  B  lack  
     Cat
     Black
(where Cat & Black could be Find x (Cat x & Black x) or “Nero is a black cat”, Cat could be
Find x Cat x or “Nero is a cat”, and Black could be Find x Black x or “Nero is a cat”.)
Notice that both C and B are wider than C & B. The models for C (or for B) always include
the models for C & B, and usually more. So the entries on the one branch of this tree are
wider  than  the  starting  point.  We  get  another  perspective  on  this  by  considering  a
branching tree. For example
 C  at    B  lack  
      /  \
~Cat    Black
Now the items on the branches are less wide than what we began with. Models for 
Cat  Black include models for ~Cat, and also include models for Black, but not necessarily
the other way around. But there is not really any tension between this and what I said
about the C & B tree. Items that are found on all branches of a search tree are wider than
the sentence at its base.  The C & B tree had only one branch, so the two items on it are
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wider than C & B. The C & B tree has two branches, so this is not true of it. (There is a
relation between each branch and the sentence at the base, but it will not concern us
until chapter 6.)
Width takes an interesting form when we begin a search tree with several sentences. A
very simple example is
A v B
 ~A  
 /   \
A     B
X
The only item on the only unclosed branch is B. But B is wider than neither ~A nor A v B .
It is less wide than A v B, and it is neither wider nor less wide than ~A .This may seem
puzzling, given what was said just above. But the puzzle is easily resolved. B is wider
than A v B and ~A taken together. When a tree begins with a collection of sentences,
then items that occur on all branches are wider than the intersection of all them: if all of
the  sentences  at  the  base  are  true  in  a  model  then   anything  that  is  found  on  all
branches is also true in it.
This  is  an important fact.  It  is  one reason why logical  thinking is  powerful.  And the
example above shows how. Two instances of the tree are (a) "it is either in the basement
or the storage room. But it is not in the storage room. So it must be (somewhere) in the
basement." and (b) "find everything that is in the basement or in the storage room. But
do not look in the storage room. So look in the basement." (a) and (b) are clearly very
similar, which illustrates how close reasoning with statements and reasoning with queries
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are to each other. In this case they both fit a pattern of reasoning where we begin with
something that applies in many cases (A and B) and use further information to narrow
down the facts or the target for our search into something manageably small.
Here is an example of this process. Three investigators working for three intelligence
agencies  are  trying  to  track  down  a  hacker  who  they  have  identified  on  the  web.
Investigator A knows that he is somewhere in Europe, so he could search with 
Find x: Europe x. But that is millions of places and people. Investigator B knows that the
only place in Europe the hacker could be is Spain, so B can formulate the query 
Find x: Europe x  Spain x. But that is also an enormous search: it includes everyone and
everywhere on the planet except people and places in European locations that are not in
Spain. Investigator C has intercepted an email saying that his safe house in Spain is
1492b Avenida Boabdil in Grenada, apartamento 28. When he is in Spain, which you may
or may not be at the moment as far as C alone knows, that is where he will hang out. So
C can formulate 
Find x: Spain x  1492b-28 Boabdil x. Note that this too is satisfied by millions of people.
>>  why do millions satisfy this last query? 
Finally the superiors of A, B, and C allow them to compare notes and they can jointly 
formulate the search
Europe x
Europe  Spain
 Spain  1492b-28 Boabdil
And taking all three together they can narrow down the search to 1492b-28 Boabdil,
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which  will  allow them to  go and arrest  their  quarry.  The  combination  of  three  wide
searches gives a very narrow one. 
>>  make an appropriate  search tree and show that this address is on all unclosed 
branches.
This  illustrates  how  we  can  get  narrow  searches  by  combining  queries  that  are
individually  wide.  In  this  case  the  combination  happened  by  accident,  though  the
investigators may have been hoping for something along these lines. But making narrow
searches by combining wide queries is a feature of intelligent thinking. We will see a
parallel feature of axiom systems in chapter six.  
words used in this chapter that it would be a good idea to understand: conjunction rule,
conditional rule, disjunction rule, model, negation rule, search tree, truth table
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exercises for chapter four
A core
1) Here are six search patterns, which could be found either in searches for individuals or
in searches for models. Which of them conform to the rules for search trees described in
the chapter, and which do not? When they do not, say why they do not.
A v (B & C) P  Q ~(A & B)
  /   \  / \      ~A
A B & C P ~Q      ~B
   B
   C
A v (~A & B) (P     Q) & R ~(A v B) & C
    /     \     /    \   ~(A V B)
  A   ~A & B ~P     Q        C
~A R R       ~(A V B)
  B ~A
  X ~B
2) a) What are the search trees for each of the queries below? (Remember that you 
ignore the Find x: and work just with the criterion.)
i)  Find x: Catx & (Malex v Toughx) ii)  Find y: Smally   Blacky
iii)  Find z: Ax   (Bx v Cx) iv)  Find w: (Bx & Cx)  ~Ax
b) What individuals will iii) get that iv) will not? What individuals will iv) get that iii) will 
not?
c) For each of i) –iv) use the search tree to produce a model in the form of a table where
the query will have a non-null result.
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3)  Given the model described by the table below, what truth values do  Pa,  ~Qb,
Pa v Qb, Qa   ~Pc have?
P Q
a NO NO
b YES
c YES YES
4)  You are faced with  an enormous model  (database)  with hundreds of  individuals
classified under six categories, A ,B, C,D ,E ,F. You are supposed to find an individual —
just one will do — such that if it is F then it is not A. Your boss says to do this by starting
with the first individual and then working through all of them working out the truth value
of Fx  ~Ax for each of them. This will take hours, so you suggest a shortcut. What is the
shortcut?
5) a)You want to catch all the Feral cats in a park and some Coyotes too, but only those 
that have had a rabies Vaccination. Which of these queries describes your aim?
Find x: Fx & Cx & (Cx   Vx)
Find x: (Fx v Cx) & (Cx   Vx)
Find x: Fx v (Cx   Vx)
b) Write search trees for each of these, and verify with a sample of cats, coyotes, and 
vaccinated animals that your answer to a) is right.
Pay attention to the difference between AND and OR in this question, and to what an IF
query asks for. What is the difference between the second and third queries?
What will the third search get, as well as cats and vaccinated coyotes?
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6)  For an essay assignment on Japanese literature, you have to get books on Murasaki
Shikibu (Lady Murasaki). At the same time you have an assignment in a different course
on the history of  cities,  and you decide to make the reading of  the two coincide by
getting  books  on  10’th  century  Kyoto.  You  would  like  to  combine  the  two  searches
“Murasaki Shikibu, poetry, novel” and “Kyoto, history, pre-modern”.  Describe several (at
least three) searches that will get all the books that either of these two will get.  What
more will they get?  Which one is best?  
7) a)  Compare these searches in terms of width:
i)  oil & pipelines & pollution
ii)  oil v pipelines v pollution
iii)  oil & (pipelines v pollution)
iv)  (oil & pipelines) v pollution
b)  Construct search trees for i) –iv). How do they compare to your answers to a)?
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B MORE
8)  Annotate each of the trees below to show which rule is used for each step. I have 
provided the annotations for (i), to demonstrate what should be done.
(i)  A & ~(B      C)  (ii)    A & ~(A     B)  
A ) &   A   
~(B  C) ) rule ~(A  B)
B )mistake ~A
~C ) with ~ rule   B
     X
(iii)  A v (B & C) (iv) A & (B v C)
 /     \   /   \
A    (B & C) A (B v C)
B     B
C     C
(v)    A  B (vi)   A  B
   A        B       
   /    \   /  \
~A B A   ~B
9)  This  chapter  has  focused on structures that  are  found both when searching for
individuals with queries and when searching for models with sentences. The trees in the
previous  question,  8),  can  be  understood  as  describing  both  kinds  of  search.  (In
accordance with their application to searching for models, they reappear in later chapters
in the guise of patterns of deductive reasoning.) For (v) in 8), give a model where the
unclosed branch describes all the individuals that satisfy the criteria of a pair of searches,
and also give a pair of models where the atomic sentence on the unclosed branch is true
on the model which makes the two sentences at the base of the tree true, but is false in
the other model, which does not make both of the sentences at the base true. 
10) For each unclosed branch of each of the trees below construct a model which makes 
all the sentences on that branch true
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(Pa & Qa) v ~Pb (Am     Bn ) & ~Bn  
        /  \ (Am  Bn )
Pa & Qa  ~Pb      ~Bn
Pa       /  \
Qa ~Am    Bn
X
(Pm & Qn) v ~Ps (Aa  Bb) & Ba
/ \ (Aa  Bb )
Pm & Qn ~Ps      Ba
Pm     /    \
Qn ~Aa    Bb
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11)  below are some searches and for each of them a simpler but potentially wider search. In
each case say whether the increased width would make the simpler search less useful, and why.
longer search simpler but wider search
Find x: livingonEarthx v livingOnVenusx Find x: livingOnVenusx
Find x: Flyingx & Animalx Find x: Animalx
Find x: Dogx v Catx
Find x: ~Catx 
Find x: Dogx
Find_x: 
Live-young-bearingx v Mammalx
Find x: ~Mammalx
Find x: 
Live-young-bearingx v Mammalx
Find x: Drugdealex  dAngerousx
Find x: Drugdealerx
Find x: Dangerousx
Find x: Bookstorex
Find x: Canadax  BCx
Find x: BCx  Vancouverx
Find x: Bookstorex
Find x: Canadax   Vancouverx  
12)  Two queries can be complementary, in that one gets a result if and only if the other
does not, or they can be non-overlapping in that no result is ever got by both. Which of
the following pairs of queries are complementary and which are non-overlapping? (When
in English we say “opposite” sometimes we mean complementary and sometimes non-
overlapping.)  
a)   Find x: Green x   ,  Find x: Red x 
b)  Find x: Green x   ,  Find x: ~Green x
c)  Find x:  Green x  Bird x  ,  Find x: Green x & ~Bird x
d)  Find x: Green  Bird x  ,  Find x: Bird x  Green x
13)  You are searching in a database with full Boolean search, for people who have won
the Nobel prize, but in Literature you are only interested in French authors.  Which of the
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queries below gets what you want?  Back up your answers with search trees.  
a)  Nobel prize & (French  Literature) 
b)  Nobel prize & (literature  French) 
c)  (Nobel prize & ~ literature) v (Nobel prize & literature & French)
d)  Nobel prize & French & Literature
e)  (Nobel prize & ~French) v (Nobel prize & literature  & French)
14)  You are searching on the internet for non-human intelligence. If you enter the
search terms  intelligence, -human , you know you will get too many hits, and most of
them will be irrelevant. But you think that on earth intelligent life is likely to be among
whales, dolphins, apes, corvids (crows, jays, and ravens), and parrots. How do you
take account of these assumptions to make a manageable search?
15)  We are interested in information about the Turkish author Orhan Pamuk, but we
do not want interviews with him except for the one in which he discussed Turkey’s
refusal to acknowledge the Armenian genocide.  So we want  “Pamuk and if interview
then genocide”.  Find x: Px & (Ix  Gx). But we are using a search engine that does
not do conditionals, so we consider various substitutes.
(a)  Find x: Px & Ix (Pamuk, interview in Google terms)
(b)  Find x: Px & ~Ix  (Pamuk, -interview )
(c)  Find x: Px & Ix & ~Gx)  (Pamuk, Interview, -genocide)
For each of these say if it is too broad, in comparison with the conditional search, or too 
narrow, or both.
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C: harder
16)  Chapter 4 ignored queries with more than one variable such as
Find (x,y): Rxy, and models for sentences such as Rab. Discuss the complications of
considering these and sketch a modification of section to handle them.
17)  Here is a model presented as an arrow diagram to represent the relation M  “is More
popular than” plus a closed region to represent the attribute “is Nasty”.
(a) Verify that the search in this model (i)  Find x: Mxb  Nx  is wider than both (ii)
Find x: Mxb and (iii) Find x: Nx. 
(b) Modify the model so that (ii) is wider than (iii), and so that (iii) is wider than (ii). 
(c) What does this show about whether either of (ii), and (iii)  is intrinsically wider than
the other, as discussed in section 5 of the chapter)? What about (iii) and (i)?
(The purpose of  this  exercise is  to make you familiar  with diagrams like this,  which
combine relations and attributes, and also to make you familiar with diagrams in which a
relation puts the domain in an order.  The order in this  case leaves some individuals
unordered with respect to one another. 
(d) What general features would a relation have to have if every individual was ordered
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with respect to every other?)
18)  (for mathematicians) prove that every unclosed branch of a tree with one sentence
at its base determines a model for that sentence. (Hint: show that (a) if a rule generates
a  branch when  it  is  applied  to  a  sentence  S   then  the  models  which  make all  the
sentences introduced onto that branch by the rule also make S true, and (b) the atomic
sentences on any unclosed branch determine a model.)
19)  (for eager mathematicians) prove the same result for trees with a finite number of 
sentences at their base.
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chapter five: truth assignments
In this chapter and the next two we study the way whole sentences can be combined using the
Boolean connectives to make other sentences, when the result  is  true or false, and how this
affects some important logical concepts. This is what is called propositional logic. We have already
met the Boolean connectives AND, OR, IF, and NOT in their role of making complex queries from
simpler ones. As a result much of what we see will  look familiar. There is a basic difference,
though. Queries are not true or false: they are instructions that can be carried out and which
collect  or  get  individuals  from  a  domain.  Their  results  are  collections  of  these  individuals.
Sentences of natural languages such as English and propositions of artificial languages such as
those we will discuss in the rest of this book are true or false, once their words are interpreted in
a domain; they have truth values. We can describe the ways that Boolean connectives influence
the truth values of propositions in very simple ways, which have consequences for issues about
the logical relations between them. This is what is called propositional logic. It has a particularly
simple notation and structure. It allows a simple way of writing down logical facts so they are easy
to remember.
>>  how fundamental is the line between statements and instructions?  how is "find the green 
parrots" related to "I want the green parrots" and to "which are the green parrots?"  how is "grass
is green" related to "believe that grass is green" and to "is grass green or does 2+2=9?"
5:1 (of 9) sentences, propositions, and models 
Statements such as "grass is green", "2+3=7", and "Earth is not the only planet with life" are true
or false. The last of these is either true or false, but we do not know which. There are borderline
cases, such as "yes, sure", or "she's the one", where we need to know what the words are being
used to mean on a particular occasion in order to know whether they have a chance of truth or
falsity.  Statements  contrast  with  commands,  such as  "Find all  the  citizens  who have  spoken
against the government" or "Touch your nose and make a funny face". They also contrast with
questions, such as "Who are the citizens who have dared to have their own opinions?" or "How
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many  toes  has  the  average  platypus?"  All  three  kinds  of  sentence  have  to  have  the  right
grammatical structure, and this can include Boolean connectives such as AND, OR, IF, and NOT.
>>  does "earth is not the only planet with life" have some of the problems of "she's the one"?  
what about "2+3=7"?
We have been studying one particular kind of command, expressed by the Find x notation. It
gives a simple and intuitive insight into some aspects of Boolean structure, and complex
searches  are  of  obvious  practical  interest.  The  interest  in  complicated  searches  will
continue  here  and  in  future  chapters.  But  the  complications  of  search  commands,
queries, make it harder to describe some simple aspects of Boolean structure. 
We will sidestep these problems by working with formal languages like those we have
used for search commands. A clue to how to do this is given by a central fact of the
previous  chapter  (Chapter  4).  Search  trees  show  that  finding  models  that  make
sentences true is very similar to finding models with individuals which the criteria of
queries are true of. So if we can focus on the structures, and to searches for models
making sentences true and models in which we can find individuals, some things will be
much simpler. Then instead of writing atomic propositions in the form Pa, representing
cells in databases, we will denote them with the letters p, q, r, s, t, p1, p2,... . In practice
we will not need p1, p2,... , but including them makes it clear that there are infinitely
many  atomic  propositions,  thus  infinitely  many  propositions  in  all.  All  Boolean
combinations of atomic propositions are molecular propositions of propositional calculus.
So p & q, p v q, r  ~s, ~(p  (q & ~r)) are typical molecular propositions. Since there are
infinitely many atomic propositions and many ways of joining them, there are infinitely
many  molecular  propositions.  The  artificial  language  that  uses  these  atomic  and
molecular propositions — so it is entirely made up of atomic propositions and Boolean
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combinations of them — is the language of propositional logic12. Its sentences are called
propositions. I give a slightly more careful description of what counts as the language of
propositional logic in section 3 below, and a precise definition in the appendix to this
chapter..
 
5:2 (of 9) truth assignments and truth tables
The  basic  properties  of  propositional  logic  can  be  described  in  terms  of  truth
assignments. A truth assignment is an assignment of a truth value,  True or  False, to
every atomic proposition in the language. These truth values can then be applied to
molecular propositions in accordance with the truth tables for their connectives. Truth
tables  were  introduced  in  the  previous  chapter  and  are  also  discussed  below.  The
previous chapter  (Chapter  4)  showed how we can construct  truth  assignments  from
models and how we can construct models from truth assignments. So talking about truth
assignments is a simple way of talking about models, when only the structure given by
Boolean  connectives  matters.  In  this  way  propositional  logic  is  useful  for  discussing
features  that  queries,  simple  object  and  attribute  or  relational  sentences,  and  the
quantified sentences that we will study later, have in common.
An  important  fact  about  Boolean  connectives  is  that  the  truth  value  of  a  Boolean
combination of propositions, one got from by joining them with Boolean connectives, is
determined by truth values of its parts, as specified by a truth assignment. We say that
molecular propositions that are Boolean combinations of atomic propositions are  truth
12 It  is  sometimes  called  the  propositional  calculus.  This  can  be  confusing  because  people  think  that
"calculus"  must  involve  integrals  and  derivatives.  But  “calculus”  is  an old-fashioned word  for  a  way of
calculating, and comes from the Latin for a pebble. You can do arithmetic with pebbles, but you can also
calculate truth values of complex propositions from truth values from truth values of simple ones. The old-
fashioned phrase for what we now call calculus was "infinitesimal calculus", calculating with tiny quantities,
as if sand instead of pebbles.
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functions of  them.  This  is  important  because  it  means  that  to  tell  what  molecular
propositions are true in a model we only need to know what atomic propositions are true
in it. This does not mean that it is always obvious whether there is a truth assignment
makes a molecular proposition true. This is also important, and we will return to it in
chapter 7.)
Each of the Boolean connectives has a meaning in logic, which is slightly simpler than the
meaning  it  has  in  everyday  English.  The  special  feature  of  the  meanings  of  the
connectives in logic is that they are truth functions. For example an AND sentence is true
when (and only when) both of the sentences it joins are true. There is a simple principle
like this for each of the connectives. Here they are:
  A & B  is true if and only if  both A and B are true  
  A v B  is true if and only if  one of A, B is true
  A     B   is true if and only if  A is false or B is true   
  ~A      is true if and only if  A is not true
These are important. Learn them. They give the meanings in logic of AND, OR, IF, and
NOT, written as &, v, , ~. These four words, either expressed in English or in symbols,
are the basic connectives of logic. Their meanings as given by the truth tables are more
focused than their meanings in ordinary English. They can be summed up with truth
tables. (Some people find truth tables easier to work with and some people are more
comfortable with rules like those in red in the box above. I find the rules less confusing
when  dealing  with  molecular  propositions.  Constructing  a  truth  table  for  a  complex
proposition gives many opportunities for mistakes.) The truth tables for the connectives
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were given in the previous chapter (4), but I shall give them again.
AND/&
With  AND  the  thing  to  remember  is  that  it  leaves  out  everything  about  time  and
causation. It just says that a conjunction —  got by joining two conjuncts by & — is true
when both of the conjuncts are true, and in no other cases. (In ordinary English “he
robbed a bank and got sent to jail” is not surprising, while “he got sent to jail and robbed
a bank” is rather puzzling. It’s as if we often hear “and” as “and then” or “and so”. But in
logic if either of A & B and B & A is true the other is.)  
The basic facts about conjunction, that a conjunction is true only when both contracts are
true, is summed up in the truth table:
P Q   P & Q
T T     T
T F     F
F T     F
F F     F
OR/v
With OR the thing to remember is that it is the  inclusive meaning of “or”. That is, a
disjunction — made by joining two disjuncts by “or” — is true whenever at least one of
the disjuncts is true (and in no other cases.) According to this a disjunction is true when
both disjuncts are true. So “you can write the exam or you can write a paper” does not
rule out the possibility that you can do both, on this meaning of “or”. (I think that most
uses of “or” in English are actually inclusive, but people usually find this a surprising
claim, since they think of exclusive uses of “or” as in “for five dollars you can have soup
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or salad”, mentioned in chapter one. It can be hard to persuade them that these are the
exceptions.) At any rate the truth table is:
P Q   P v Q
T T     T
T F     T
F T     T
F F     F
IF/  
With IF there are many differences between the meaning given by the truth table above
and various things it can mean in everyday language. This is a big topic on which a lot
has been written13. For our purposes it is enough to say that the material conditional, the
meaning of “if” or  given by the truth table, is often a simple and manageable substitute
for the very subtle and puzzling English word. An “if” sentence, or conditional, is made
from joining an antecedent and a consequent: if A then B. (If it rains then the sidewalks
will be wet; if she comes to the party then I’ll leave.) To repeat, the first component(“it
rains”, “she comes to the party”) is called the antecedent, and the second (“the sidewalks
will be wet”, “I’ll leave”) is called the consequent. According to the meaning given by the
truth table for  a conditional is true in all cases in which the antecedent is false and in
all cases in which the consequent is true. What it does is just to exclude the cases in
which the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Like the meaning of AND this
differs from the English meaning by ignoring all considerations about time and causation.
13For some psychology on the topic see J.Evans & D. Over If, Oxford University Press 2004. The definitive 
philosophical book is J Bennett , A Philosophical a Guide to Conditionals. Oxford University Press 2003. 
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The truth table for this material conditional is
P Q   P  Q
T T     T
T F     F
F T     T
F F     T
>>  this meaning of IF fits perfectly with the meaning we used in Boolean search,
in Find x: Ax  Ax .  say why. 
NOT/~
This is the closest in meaning to the English. To a first approximation the truth table
gives the meaning of the English “not” as well as the logician’s ~ . ~A is true when A is
false, and vice versa. This is summed up in the truth table for ~: 
P  ~P
T   F
F   T
>>  why did I say "to a first approximation?"  can you think of ways we use "not" in 
English that do not fit easily with the truth table?
We can also give truth table definitions of connectives besides AND, OR, IF, and NOT. 
Here is a truth table that defines two more connectives.
P Q P « Q P | Q
T T T F
T F F T
F T F T
F F T T
>> «  has a familiar expression in English, “if and only if” (in mathematics iff).  what 
about |?
Are these all the truth functions now? See exercise 36.   
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5:3 (of 9) the language of propositional logic
Given atomic propositions  p, q, r, s,. .  we can make molecular propositions such as  
p & q, p  q,  or ~(p & ~q)  (r v s).  The p, q, r  and so on can be any propositions at
all.  The  simplest  way  to  think  of  them  is  as  cells  in  models-as-tables,  that  is,
combinations  of  attributes  or  relations  with  individuals.  So ~p  r might  be  an
abbreviation for “~Ab  Rcd”, if  p is the cell where A meets b and r is the cell where R
meets c and d. On another occasion the same proposition might be an abbreviation for
the same truth function of different cells in a different table. But the point of writing it in
this notation is to focus on the way the truth value of the whole proposition depends the
values of the parts.
The symbols of propositional logic are less like a real language than those of Boolean
search are, or those of quantifier logic, which we study in part III of this book, are. We
can use the language of search commands and that of quantifiers to communicate. I
have said to a class “Find x: on your desk x and pen x” and after a moment everyone has
reached out to wave a pen at me. The same is only true in a much more limited way for
propositional logic. But to communicate with propositional logic we would have to explain
the meaning of every atomic proposition (presumably in terms of individuals, attributes,
and relations, though propositional logic does not specify them) one by one. Then we
could join them together to say more complex things. But propositional logic is often
used as an easy example of how one can state a language’s grammatical structure simply
and precisely. This is ironical given that propositional logic is not a very good candidate
for  language status,  but  it  makes sense given that  there are easily  stated rules for
combining Boolean connectives in a well-formed way. It is also true that these rules are a
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core part of the well-formedness rules for better candidates, such as Boolean queries and
the propositions of quantifier logic.        
>>  it would be a foolhardy thinker who stated “something is a language if and only if 
it ... ”.  but describe some ways in which search commands are more like spoken 
languages than the symbolism of propositional logic is.  (you may want to come back to 
this question when you have seen more about propositional logic.) 
 
In  any  case,  we  can  state  simple  rules  for  what  is  a  well-formed  proposition  of
propositional  logic.  These  describe  how simple  proposition-letters  p,  q,  r,  ...  can  be
combined in allowable ways by ~, &, v, and  to make more complex propositions. I am
not going to state the rules here. I do in an appendix to this chapter. For now, here is a
list of well-formed formulas. The patterns will be familiar to you because of your practice
with search commands. 
p ~r ~~s p & q
q & q q v p ~p v q
~(p & q) ~p v q ~(p & ~q) (p & q) v u
p  q  p & q & u (u  p) v u (p v q) & (p v q) 
p v q v u p v q v u v q (((p  q)  q) q)
On the other hand the following are not formulas. They are ill-formed.
p & q v u  needs brackets 
(p & q))    orphan bracket
& p      & has to join two propositions
p ~ q  ~ applies to just one proposition
(It’s like when you’re writing a program and the compiler says “syntax error”; very 
annoying. Compilers were invented by Grace Hopper.)     
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5:4 (of 9) central connectives and outside-in
Every  proposition  has  a  central  connective.  For  example  in  p   (q  v  r) the  central
connective is  . It is a conditional that has a disjunction as its consequent. In p v (q & r)
the central  connective is  v : it  is  a disjunction that has a conjunction as its  second
conjunct. On the other hand the central connective of p & (q v r) is & : it is a conjunction
that has a disjunction as its second disjunct. Because there is always a central connective
there is never any scope ambiguity in formulas of propositional logic. We always know
whether the formula is a negation, a conjunction, a disjunction, or a conditional. And we
know it for each of the formula’s subformulas: the negated formula, conjuncts, disjuncts,
antecedent  or  consequent,  right  down to  atomic  propositions.  So (p &  ~r)   q is  a
conditional whose antecedent is a conjunct whose second conjunct is a negation.
When you see a roposition you should first of all identify the central connective, and then
the central connectives of its parts. In chapter 3, section 3, I gave a moral “look at the
whole expression, not just the smallest pieces”. We often do the opposite in everyday life,
when understanding ordinary language. Someone says “There is a black cow in the field,
and it has a brown spot, or perhaps there is a tree in the way” and we first think “cow,
field, spot, tree: now what is being said about them?” This is beginning from the inside,
and mathematical expressions are usually best understood from the outside. When we do
this, many shortcuts to understanding and evaluating the expression often appear. Often
we do not need to  think about its  the full  content,  down to the smallest  parts.  For
example (p  p )  q is a conditional whose antecedent is another conditional (p  p ),
and this antecedent says something that is always true. So with suitable content for  p
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and q the whole thing might express “Suppose that when Mo is happy Mo is happy. Then
Jo is sad.” And when we think of it as a conditional with a trivial antecedent, it is not
surprising that, as we will see later in this chapter, this is equivalent to “Jo is sad.” We
don’t  have  to  wonder  when  Mo  is  happy.  In  all  the  equivalencies  between formulas
discussed in section 6 of this chapter it will help to read them in an outside-in way. It will
help with exercises 3, 4, 5 ,21, too. 
>>  but in ~(p & (q  r)) the ~ is not in the middle, so how can it be central? 
>>  in (x+y)2 what is the central algebraic operation? 
>>  in  (p & (q   (r  v s)) the conjunction is the central connective.  but its second
conjunct itself has a central connective, the conditional. does that make the conditional in
some way central?
How do we tell what the central connective is? In the way we are writing our formulas
there  is  only  one  way of  putting  a  formula  together  in  the  way  just  described.  For
example the structure of ~((p v q) & (r v s)) can be given in any of the four equivalent
ways below.
         ~
A B
v v
     p     q     r     s
NEGATION
CONJUNCTION
 DISJUNCTION DISJUNCTION
    p         q   r         s
~((p v q) & (r v s))    ~   p v q  &  r v s    |    _____|____
|_____________
So to tell what the central connective is, try to reconstruct the sentence according to any
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of these three ways: the central connective is the top or outermost connective in the
reconstruction that works.
>>  give one or another of these analyses for each of the five formulas in the second last
column of the well formed formulas above.
>>  these analyses suggest ways that in everyday speech we resolve scope ambiguities
by pauses and intonation patterns.  try saying the example out loud, perhaps substituting
English sentences for p, q, r, s to see if you can make this fit the way you speak.
>>  if you know some linguistics: what does this remind you of?
5:5 (of 9) evaluating complex propositions
We return to central connectives below. The rules for applying the Boolean connectives
given by the truth tables determine the truth value of complex formulas in terms of the
truth values of their parts. This can be done mechanically using truth tables or, more
easily, the rules summarized in the box in the previous section, which I will repeat them
now, in a slightly different formulation.  
A  conjunction  (   &  )  is  true  only  when  both  conjuncts  are  true.  It  is  false
except when both conjuncts are true .
A disjunction (   v  )  is true as long as at least one disjunct is true. It is true 
except when both disjuncts are false .  
A conditional () is true when the antecedent is false and when the 
consequent is true. It is true except when the antecedent is true and
the consequent is false.
Negation (~) turns true to false and false to true . 
The underlined versions are good for quick mental evaluations of truth values, rather like
177
automatic Boolean search routines or quick mental arithmetic.
Calculating truth values is a little like algebra. Suppose x is 2 and y is 3, what is (x+y)2 ?
Well, given these numbers (x+y)2 = (2+3)2 = 52= 25. Similarly, suppose that p is True
and q is False, what is the truth value of p  (q v p) ?  Well, given these truth values we
can calculate:
 p   (q v p) = T  (F v T) = T  T [by the rule for v]  = T  [by the rule for   ].  (I am
writing T for the truth value True and F for False, as we do in truth tables.)
  
q is true and r is false.  Is (q  r) v r  true or false?  
(q  r) v r  =(T  F) v F = F v F = F   
q is false, and r and s are true.  What is the truth value of (r & s)  ~s ?
(r & s)  ~s  = (F & T)  ~T = F  F = T  
>>  put “[by the rule for ..]” notes in these calculations.
Working out the truth values of molecular formulas given the truth values of their atomic
components is a good way of getting familiar with the Boolean connectives.  There are
questions in the exercises for this chapter giving more practice.  
These  calculations  are  made possible  by the  fact  that  every  Boolean  formula  has  a
central  connective,  with  the  other  connectives  in  its  scope.  For  example  the  central
connective of  p   (q v p) is  .  p   (q v p)  is a conditional with antecedent  p and
consequent q v p , so its truth value in the example above is the value of a conditional
with a True antecedent and a consequent that has the value of (F v T) = T.  The central
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connective in  p & (q  r) is &. It is a conjunction of p and the conditional q  r. And the
central connective of ~(p & (q  r)) is ~: the whole formula tells us “it is not true that both
p and the conditional from q to r”. 
The calculation of the truth value of a complex expression in terms of truth values of its
atomic parts can be done fairly automatically. You should not have to think too much,
and in fact you are likely to make more mistakes and find the process more confusing if
you are too verbal about it. The pattern of central connectives should tell you what kind
of a calculation you should set yourself to do without too much deliberate oversight. This
is like the way that I advised carrying out certain commands in the first three chapters.
And in fact it is a general characteristic of mathematical thinking: the verbal part of your
mind tells some nonverbal part what to do and then lets it get on with the job. (I make
some more remarks about this in chapter 9 section 7.)
5:6 (of 9) equivalent propositions, contradictions, tautologies 
Sometimes two propositions have the same values on all lines of a truth table. Exactly
the same truth assignments make them true. We then say that they are  equivalent.
Remember that A, B, and so on are placeholders that can represent any proposition.   
For example, here is a basic connection between the conditional, disjunction, and 
negation: between v and  : 
A v B  is equivalent to ~A  B
To show that this is right we make a truth table for ~A  B .  
truth table for ~A  B
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A B ~A ~A   B
T T F      T
T F F      T 
F T T      T
F F T      F
We get this truth table as follows. The column for ~A follows the principle for negation
just above: negation flips T to F and F to T. So it is just the column for A with T and F
reversed. To get the column for ~A  B we think as follows: this is a conditional, so it is
true except when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. So it will have Ts
except when we have T for its antecedent, ~A, and F for its consequent, B. That is the
last row of the table, so we get the truth table for ~A  B as above, all Ts except for the
last row. 
Now compare this truth table to the truth table for v.  To repeat:
A B   A v B
T T     T
T F     T
F T     T
F F     F
The conditions under which ~A  B and A v B are true and false are exactly the same. If
either is true so is the other; if either is false so is the other. A and B were standing for
any propositions so for example  ~p  q is equivalent to p v q , and ~(q & r)  (r v s) is
equivalent to  (q & r) v (r v s) .
Here is another equivalence: 
A v B is equivalent to ~(~A & ~B) 
To show that this is right we write out the truth table for ~(~A & ~B)
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A B ~A ~B ~A & ~B ~(~A & ~B) 
T T   F   F      F         T
T F   F   T      F         T
F T   T   F      F         T
F F   T   T      T         F
The  ~A and  ~B columns are got by flipping the truth values in the A and B columns.
Then the ~A & ~B column is got by the rule that as a conjunction it is true only when
both of its conjuncts, in this case ~A and ~B, are true. Then the ~(~A & ~B) column is
got by flipping the truth values of the ~A & ~B column.  
The column for ~(~A & ~B) on the resulting truth table, above, is identical to the column
for  A  v  B  in  its  truth  table.  So  any  formula   ~(~  A  &  ~B)  is  equivalent  to  the
corresponding A v B .  
There are many such equivalences. Here is a list of some of them, including the two we 
have just seen. 
A v B   is equivalent to  ~(~A & ~B)  ü
| (de Morgan’s laws)
A & B   is equivalent to  ~(~A v ~B) þ
A v B   is equivalent to  ~A  B (definition of v in terms of )
~~ A   is equivalent to  A (law of double negation)
A  B   is equivalent to  ~ (A & ~B) (definition of  in terms of ~ and & )
A  B  is equivalent to  ~A v B (definition of  in terms of ~ and v )
A  B  is equivalent to  ~B  ~A (contraposition)
A & (B v C) is equivalent to (A&B) v (A & C) (distribution of & over v)
A v (B & C) is equivalent to (A v B) & (A v C) (distribution of v over &)
The first two of these relate AND and OR by means of NOT. They are collectively known
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as de Morgan’s laws. All nine equivalences are worth learning. (And they all have names,
if that helps.) Memorize them if you have to, but in fact they each make sense: a few
moments reflection on each of them should convince you that it is true. While you are at
it you might you might as well get into your heads variants on de Morgan’s laws, which
are sometimes useful. 
~A v ~B   is equivalent to  ~(A & B) 
~A & ~B   is equivalent to  ~(A v B)  
(Note that in English we have a special word for ~A & ~B, or equivalently, ~(A v B) .  We
say “neither A nor B”.  Although circuit designers use the term “nand”, we do not have a 
short word in regular use in English for ~A v ~B or equivalently ~(A & B)  .)
>>  is there a word for ~A v ~B in some language you know?
Propositions are equivalent when they have identical truth tables. Two particularly simple
truth table patterns that propositions can share are when they are all T and when they
are all F. Propositions of the first kind are called tautologies, and they are all equivalent.
The following are among the many tautologies:
p v ~p ,  q   q , (p & q)  (p v q) ,  ~(p v q)  (~p & ~q) ,  (~p & ~q)  ~(p v q)
the very simplest is p v ~p. Its truth table is 
 p   p v ~p
 T      T
 F      T
As you can see by applying the rules for v and ~. All the others are similar.
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Propositions of the second kind are called contradictions. They also are all equivalent. 
The following are among the many contradictions:
p & ~p ,  p & q & ~(p v q) ,  ~(q v ~q) ,  (p  q)  ~(p & ~p) ,  (p v ~p)  (q & ~q)
The very simplest is p & ~p. Its truth table is
 p   p & ~p.
 T       T
 F       T
As you can see by applying the rules for & and ~. All the others are similar.
Intuitively, tautologies are propositions that assert something trivial: they cannot fail to
be true. And contradictions are propositions that assert something completely impossible,
there is no way that they can be true.  In spite of the equivalence to something trivial
tautologies can be complicated, because it can be far from obvious that a proposition is a
tautology.  For example it would take some effort to see that  (r  (s  p))  (s  (r  p))
is true on all lines of its truth table.  (And it would take some effort to see that 
((p  (q&~q))  ((r v~r)  p) is false on all lines of its truth table.)
>>  so since p v ~p and (q & r)  q are both tautologies, they are equivalent.  but does
"either it is raining or it is not" really say the same as "if Sam is happy and Mary is sad 
then Sam is happy”?
5:7 (of 9) more on de Morgan’s laws  
“The negation of a conjunction is the disjunction of the conjuncts”, “the negation of a
disjunction is the conjunction of the disjuncts”. These should feel intuitively right to you.
If A & B is false, then they’re not both true, so one of them is false. at least one of A, B is
183
false. And if A v B is false, then not even one is true, so they’re both false. Think about
these until they click. Somehow when we handle the symbols we get confused, though.
We think ~(A & B) must be ~A & ~B, but this is wrong.  (And similarly for ~(A v B) .)
Another reason to be clear about the scopes of negations.  
de Morgan’s laws can make sense visually, if we picture filters the right way. Remember
how AND amounts to filters in series while OR amounts to filters in parallel (pictures in
chapter 2 section 3.) So what gets through the filter goes on down and what is blocked
goes off to the side. Now think of negation as taking what gets through a filter and
throwing it away, while letting through (collecting) what the filter blocks (throws away).
Picture this as rotating the whole filter, so what had gone done now goes out, and what
had  gone  out  goes  down.  This  puts  parallel  component  filters  in  series  and  series
component filters in parallel, and when we rotate these filters — negating them — we get
the right effect. This can be pictured as follows:
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Think about de Morgan’s laws till they make sense, or use the pictures: whatever works
for you. You you will have a good sense of the scope of negation: eventually they will
seem simple and natural, and you cannot understand why they were once confusing. 
5:8 (of 9) disjunctive normal form
One general way of finding equivalent formulas has many applications. It will allow us,
for example, to design complex internet searches. Think about why the following two
equivalences are true.
A  B is equivalent to  (A & B) v (~A & B) v (~A & ~B)
A & (B v C) is equivalent to  (A & B & C) v (A & B & ~C) v (A & ~B & C) 
We can see that these are equivalent by considering the lines of the truth tables for the
formulas on the left. The first is simpler and we can see the equivalence by considering
its truth table, which by now is familiar:
 A  B A  B
 T  T    T
 T  F    F
 F  T    T
 F  F    T
Think of this as saying that for A  B to be true we have to have T on the first, third, or
fourth line of the truth table. That is, either A is T and B is T, or A is F and B is T, or A is F
and B is F.  And when any one of these is T, so is A  B. But that is the same as saying
that A  B is equivalent to (A & B) v (~A & B) v (~A & ~B) . The longer proposition just
spells out which lines of the truth table make A  B true.
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The same reasoning applies to A & (B v C) . The truth table is big, because it involves 
three propositions, so it takes 8 lines to give all the possibilities14. 
A B C A & (B v C)
T T T    T
T T F    T
T F T    T
T F F    F
F T T    F
F T F    F
F F T    F
F F F    F
A & (B v C) is true on the first three lines, and only on them. That means that it is true if
A is true and one of B, C is too. (Check the truth table to see that this is so.)  And that
means that it is equivalent to (A & B & C) v (A & B & ~C) v (A & ~B & C) .  
>>  we saw in section 4 that A & (B v C) is equivalent to 
(A & B) v (A & C).  so (A & B) v (A & C)  must be equivalent to 
(A & B & C) v (A & B & ~C) v (A & ~B & C) , since they are both equivalent to
A & (B v C).  check this with a truth table.
This  line  of  thought  is  very  general.  It  can  be  summed  up  as:  any  proposition  is
equivalent to the disjunction of a set of conjunctions describing all the truth table lines
which  make  it  true.  Since  these  conjunctions  consist  of  atomic  letters  and  their
negations, we can state the disjunctive normal form theorem: every Boolean formula is
equivalent to a disjunction of conjunctions of atomic formulas and their negations. 
>>  (for mathematicians) I said “we can state” rather than “we have shown (or proved)”.
what more details need to be added to fill this out to a full proof? (See exercise36.)
The disjunctive normal form theorem should not be very surprising. It says essentially
that every Boolean formula states “I am true if this is the case, or if this is the case, or ..”
14 This is not a trivial matter. It is part of the reason that although the idea of a truth table is 
simple, and small ones are easy to handle, the task of doing them for arbitrarily large sentences is
too demanding for efficient computer programs.
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where the list runs through all the situations in which the formula is true. It is like saying
that “C is a country in North America” is equivalent to “C is Canada or C is the USA or C
is Mexico.”
5:9 (of 9) Boogle
The disjunctive normal form theorem gives us a systematic way of doing Boolean 
search on many internet search engines. I’ll end this chapter by explaining.  
Begin by supposing, unrealistically, that our search engine can handle disjunctions
and negations. Suppose,  to give a semblance of reality,  that we enter search
terms separated by commas representing conjunction, optionally prefixed by -, or
some  other  symbol  representing  negation,  and  with  brackets  separating  OR
strings.  So  “(cat,  -white)  OR (dog,  -pitbull)”  would  be  an  instruction  for  the
search  
Find x: (Catx & ~Whitex) v (Dogx & ~Pitbullx). 
This might be the search of someone looking for a pet to adopt, wanting a dog or a cat,
with a phobia of white cats and a terror of pitbulls.  You would have to have a very
particular aim to do this search, but whatever your as long as what you want can be
described using a Boolean combination of search terms, you can express it as a search
using these terms. The disjunctive normal theorem of the previous section guarantees it:
given a query Search x: Cx, where C is a Boolean combination of terms we can rewrite
the  C part as a disjunction of all the conjunctions of search terms and their negations
which would by themselves find subsets of what we want. The “cats but not white or
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dogs but not pitbulls” search is an example.  
>>  “a disjunction of all the conjunctions of search terms and their negations which 
would by themselves find subsets of what we want.”  why is this an accurate wording?
>>  why does “ A is equivalent to B” tell us that Find x: Ax gets the same results a
Find x: Bx ?
 
We can also do conditionals. Suppose we are doing research for a term paper in English
and want  16th century plays but if they are in English they must not be by Shakespeare.
The search we want is 
Find x: Playx & Sixteenthcenturyx & (Englishx  ~Shakespearex)     
The difficult part is the last conjunction, with its conditional. But we know now that it is equivalent
to 
Find x:  
(English x & ~Shakespeare x) v (~English x & ~Shakespeare x) v (~English x &
Shakespeare x) 
This is not yet quite what we want. We want a query where all the conjunctions are in the
scope of disjunctions, and this has a disjunction as a member of a conjoined list. But by 
applying the equivalence that
A & (B v C) is equivalent to  (A&B) v (A&C)
or by applying the disjunctive normal form theorem to the whole query rather than its 
conditional part, we see that the whole query is equivalent to
Find x:
(Playx & Sixteenthcentury x & Englishx & ~Shakespeare x)
v  ( Playx & Sixteenthcentury x  & ~English x  & ~Shakespeare x )
v  ( Play x & Sixteenthcentury x & ~English x & Shakespeare x )  
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This is not a very complicated search. But we can simplify it by using our knowledge that 
Shakespeare wrote all his plays in English (and we are not interested in translations, say)
so that the last disjunction will add nothing. So we have 
Find x:
(Play x & Sixteenthcentury x & English x  & ~Shakespeare x)
v  ( Play x & Sixteenthcentury x  & ~English x  & ~Shakespeare x )
And we can go to our imaginary search engine and enter
(Play , “Sixteenth century” , English , -Shakespeare)
OR  ( Play , “Sixteenth century” , -English , -Shakespeare )
or even more simply and without much loss
(Play , “Sixteenth century” , English , -Shakespeare)
OR  ( Play , “Sixteenth century” , -English )
The  search  engine  was  imaginary  in  two  ways:  it  allows  disjunctions  and  it  allows
negations.  Search  programs  that  are  more  specialized  than  general  internet  search
engines will  often do these, but our aim is to enable Boolean search on the big all-
purpose  sites.  The  disjunction  problem  is  not  severe.  The  recipe  we  have  gives
disjunctions a wider scope than conjunctions — we have (A AND B) OR (C AND D)  but
not  (A OR B) AND (C OR D) — and that suggests an easy fix. We run each disjunction in
a separate window. So to carry out the search for 16th century plays we open the search
engine in two windows (or tabs). In one we enter  
Play , “Sixteenth century” , English , -Shakespeare
and in the other we enter 
Play , “Sixteenth century” ,-English , -Shakespeare 
189
And then we combine the results. We are likely to do this by pasting, say, the first two
screens of each into a single document. 
Now for negation. As I explained in chapter three section 6, search engines often balk at
negations because of the very wide searches they produce. The solution that usually
works is not to search for NOT A, when there are many things that are not A, but to
search for B & NOT A, where B is relatively small (on the scale of the internet) and most
Bs are A. (The smaller the size of B, the larger the proportion of Bs in it one can safely
search for.) The plays search already satisfies this to some extent, but we could improve
it by replacing “NOT English by French OR Dutch OR German OR Spanish OR Italian”  say
(depending on the topic one is researching.) Then — skipping a few steps in a way that
by  now  should  be  clear  —  we  would  open  six  windows  and  perform  the  following
searches before combining them.
Play , “Sixteenth century” , English , -Shakespeare 
Play , “Sixteenth century” , French 
Play , “Sixteenth century” , Dutch, 
Play , “Sixteenth century” , German
Play , “Sixteenth century” , Spanish 
Play , “Sixteenth century” , Italian 
>>  can you fill in the skipped steps?
Different search engines will reject different negations, so one may have to experiment
to find the combination of  general  category and negated sub-category (the A and B
above) that works. But the general recipe is clear: (a) write the query as a disjunction of
190
conjunctions  and negations  (b)  reword  the negations,  introducing  wider  categories  if
necessary, so that they do not produce too many results, (c) run each disjunction in a
separate search window, (d) combine the results.
>>  using a regular search engine there is also the problem that e.g. “Shakespeare” will 
retrieve documents that contain the word “Shakespeare” even when they are not really 
about Shakespeare.  describe ways of wording queries thatlessen this problem.
>>  for sophisticated people like you these procedures are manageable. but the average 
Internet user is not going to be comfortable with them.  describe extensions to familiar 
browsers and search engines that would make the process and easy. are there 
commercial possibilities here?
words  used  in  this  chapter  which  it  would  be  a  good  idea  to  understand:   atomic
proposition, central connective, contradiction, de Morgan's laws, disjunctive normal form,
equivalent propositions, model, molecular proposition, proposition, sentence,  tautology,
truth assignment, truth table, well-formed.
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Appendix to chapter five: defining propositions of propositional logic
There are only eight rules.
1)  p, q, r, s, t are atomic propositionss.
2)  pn for any numeral n written in standard decimal notation is an atomic proposition.
(This allows us infinitely many atomic propositions. p1, p2, p3, ...  We will never run out, 
though in practice we never use more than a few. The clause about numerals in standard
decimal notation is to prevent p||| or pVIX from being atomic propositions.)
3) If X is a proposition then ~X is a proposition.
4) If X and Y are propositions then (X & Y), (X v Y), (X  Y) are propositions.
5) If (X) is a proposition and is not part of any longer proposition then X is a proposition.
(So both p & q and (p & q) are propositions.  But p & q v r is not, though p & (q v r) is.)
6) If (X & Y) & Z is a proposition then (X & Y & Z) is a proposition.
7) If (X v Y) v Z is a proposition then (X v Y v Z) is a proposition.
8) These are all the propositions.
This is a recursive definition. It stipulates some simple cases and then defines more and 
more complex cases in terms of them. A recursive definition of "even number" might run:
a)  0 is an even number
b) if n is an even number then n+2 is an even number.
Applying b) to a) we get that 2 is even. Applying b) to this we get that 4 is even, and so 
on for 4, 6, 8, ...
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Augustus de Morgan  Frege as a young man  Russell as an old man  Grace Hopper, 
Augustus de Morgan, 1806-1871, was a British mathematician. He was one of the founders of
what  is  now  the  University  of  London,  as  an  alternative  to  the  universities  of  Oxford  and
Cambridge, which required that all their teachers be members of the Church of England.
Gottlob Frege (1848 – 1925) was one of the first to represent logical ideas in an artificial language.
Bertrand Russell  ](1872 – 1970)  was one of the first to see the philosophical importance of ideas
such as Frege’s.
Grace Hopper  (1906– 1992) pioneered ways of transforming sentences of an artificial language
into instructions for a computer. 
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exercises for chapter five
The A and B exercises for this chapter are divided into two parts, for sections 1 – 5 and 6
– 9 of the chapter, so that a course has the option of covering the chapter in two weeks. 
The C exercises are for the whole chapter. 
PART I, secs 1 - 4
A – core 
1)  Which of the following are acceptable propositions of propositional logic (well-formed 
formulas)? 
a)  (p & q)  r b)  q v ~q & r 
c)  r & q  p d)  p & ~q~
e)  (p & r) & ~(q & s) f)  p & q & (r
g)  ~~(q  p) h)  q ~ r
2)  What is the central connective in each of these?
a)  (p & q)  r b)  ~ (r v ~s)  
c)  r & (q  p) d)  p & ~q
e)  (r & q) & ~(r & p) f)  (q & p) v r 
g)  ~( p  r) h)  p  (~q & s)
3)  Suppose that p and q are true, and r is false.  What are the truth values of the 
following?  
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a)  p  p b)  p & q & r c)  (q vp)  p
d)  (q v p)  r e)  ~(p v q) f )  ~p v q  
g)  p   (q   p) h)   ~p  (p  q)   
4)  Assume that r, s are true and p, q  are false. Which of these are true, which false and
which ill-formed (and therefore neither true nor false)? 
a)  r & s b)  r & ~r  c)  r & p v q
d)  r  s e)  q  r f)  p v (r & s)
g)  p & (r v s) h)  p  (q & r) i)  (r & (r v s))
j)  p  (q  ~r) k)  p  q & s
5)  Write out the truth tables for  
a)  p  ~q b)  ~p  q c)  ~(p  q).  
d)  ~p  ( p  q) e)  (p v q) & ~(p & q) 
f)  (p & q) v (~p & ~q) g)  p  q) & (q  p)  
Notice how the first three differ.  How do the last two compare?  
6)  a) In the following English sentences, the comma or connective could be replaced 
with a Boolean connective: AND, OR, IF, NOT. Which one is appropriate in each case? 
it's a cat, it's a dog: I don't care
a step closer and I'll shoot
if he's a genius then I'm the Queen of Romania
no shoes, no shirt, no entry
there were many animals in the shelter: alligators, penguins, marmosets
either he pays his tab or we throw him out
use it or lose it
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8)  A Latin square is a grid of letters where each letter occurs exactly once in each row 
and once in each column. Sudoku are a special kind of Latin square. For example 
C B A
A C B
B A C
is a Latin square. Often when some cells are left blank there are only a few ways of 
completing the square. If we had left the bottom row of the square above blank, there 
would have been only one way of completing it. For a slightly more difficult case consider
C B A
1 2 3
4 C 6
7 A 9
I have identified the blank cells with their "phone pad" numbering. How can this be 
completed? For our purposes the point is not finding the answer but describing the 
reasoning involved. That is emphasized by asking how many ways of completing it there 
are. Consider blank cell 4. It cannot be a C so it must be an A or a B.  
(a) write out all the restrictions on cells 4, 5, 7, 9 using the notation "N_L" for "cell N has
letter L", and symbols for Boolean connectives. These are of two kinds. There are those 
like the restriction of 4 to B or A just mentioned. There are also conditions that depend 
on the choices we make for filling in the blanks. For example
if 4 is A then 6 has to be B. (Why?) Write out both kinds. 
This is more information than we need to solve the problem. In practice one would start 
with one condition and not think of others until they were needed. For example consider 
one of the two possibilities for 4, A. Putting A in 4 means putting B in 6, and thus putting
C in 9, and B in 7. (Why?) If we instead put B in 4 then 6 would have to be A, since the 
row already has a B and a C. But it cannot be an A since its column already has an A. So 
that option is ruled out and we only have one way of completing the square.
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(b) How many ways of completing 
1 A 3
4 B 6
7 C 9
are there?
(c) (harder) Find a 3x3 Latin square with exactly 6 blank cells that can be completed in 4
ways.
9)  Which of the three truth assignments below does this model give for p, q, r, when p is
Aa, q is Bb, and r is Cc?l
A B C
a YES NO YES
b YES NO NO
c YES NO NO
the truth assignments:
T1:  p is true, q is true, r is false
T2:  p is true, q is false, r is false
T3: 0 is true, q is false, q is false
10)  In each of the four cases below give a truth assignment that makes all of the 
propositions in the left column true and the proposition in the right column false.
make these true while making this false
p  q q  p
p v (q & r), q r & (p v q)
~ (p & q),  r r  p
p  (q  r), ~p ~p  (q  r)
11)  Facts: Three friends have seen the weather forecast on TV, but they give different
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reports. Alfie says the forecast was for snow (and nothing else). Betty says the forecast
was for fine weather (and nothing else). Gemma says the forecast was for rain (and
nothing else). At least one of them is correct, and at least one of them is lying. Moreover,
we know that if Gemma is lying then the forecast is for snow. (Her only motive for lying
is to go skiing without you.) We know that if the forecast was for fine weather then it is
not for rain. (Snow can be fine for skiing.) And if Gemma is not lying then Alfie is telling
the truth. (Alfie only dares to lie when Gemma is in it too.) 
What  can  we  conclude  about  the  weather  forecast?  Draw  as  many  conclusions  as
possible, but express them as concisely as possible, ideally as a single sentence. 
This is an exercise in two skills. The first is simplification, reducing the number of terms
in which the facts and the conclusions we draw from them are expressed.  The second is
listing all  the possibilities and eliminating those that do not fit  the stated facts.  This
amounts  to  formulating  the  disjunctive  normal  form for  these  facts.   So  to  do  the
exercise  you  must  think  first  “how can  I  express  it  in  terms of  a  small  number  of
propositions”, then “which combinations of these can be true given the facts”, and then
express these in the original terms. 
12) Below are arrow diagrams for two relations. Both arrange the individuals a, b, c, d in
an order, and, using R as a symbol for both relations both give a truth-assignment for 
atomic propositions relating individuals with R. 
(a) Which of the following are true in neither model, which true in both, and which
in one but not the other?
Rab v Rba Rbb (Rab & Rbd)  Rad 
(Rac & Rcd)  Rad Rad Rab  Rba
Rcd  ~Rdc Raa & Rbb & Rcc & Rdd
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(b) State informally (not in symbols) what the general differences between model 
A and model B are. 
B – more
13)  fill in the following truth tables 
p q ~p ~q p v q p  q ~p & ~q p v ~q
T T
T F
F T
F F
14)  ~(p & q & ~(s  r) ) is equivalent to which ones of the following
a)  ~p & ~ q & ~~(s  r)
b)  ~p & ~q & (s  r)
c)  ~p v ~ q v (s  r)
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d)  ~p v ~ q v ~~(s  r)
e)  ~p v ~ q v ~s v r 
15)  Fill in these truth tables  
p q ~p & q ~(p v ~q) ~p v q
T T
T F
F T
F F
a) what does this tell us about the relation between ~p & q and ~(p v ~q) ?
b) what does this tell us about the relation between ~p & q and ~p v q ? 
16) a)  Suppose p and q  s are true, and r is false: which of 
~(p & r) , q  r , q & s , s  q
are true, which are false, and which cannot be decided on this information?
b) Suppose p and q  s are false, and r is true: which of 
~(p & r) , q  r , q & s , s  q
are true, which are false, and which cannot be decided on this information? 
c)  Why is it that the falsity of a conditional such as q  s gives us more 
information than its truth? (Does this hold for the normal English IF as well as for 
the  of logic?)
17)  Find truth assignments that make
i)  p and p v q true and p & q false
ii)  q and p  q true and p false
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iii)  p  q true and ~p  ~q false 
iv)  “if you pay you’ll be admitted” true and “if you are admitted then you paid” false.
(Add a story to make it intuitively clear with the English IF that the one is true and 
the other false.)
18) The truth assignment T makes p and q true and r false. Consider the model below
A B
a T F
b F T
What atomic propositions in this model can p, q, and r be in order that the model gives 
the same truth values as T? (For example, p cannot be Ab, because that would make p 
false.) 
19)  Using the arrow diagram below to give truth values to atomic propositions of the 
form Rxy, such as Raa, Rab, Rbb, choose atomic propositions to show that we can (a) 
make ~(A & B) true and ~A V ~B false, (b) make A  B true and B  A false, (c) make 
A  B true and ~A  ~B false.
PART II, sections 6 – 9.
A- core
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20)  For each in the left column say which on its row it is equivalent to. 
p & q ~(~p & ~q) ~p  q ~q  p ~p v q ~(~p v ~q) ~(p & ~q)
p v q ~(~p & ~q) ~p  q ~q  p ~p v q ~(~p v ~q) ~(p & ~q)
p  q ~(~p & ~q) ~p  q ~q  p ~p v q ~(~p v ~q) ~(p & ~q)
21)  Here are some English sentences.  Which are equivalent?  
a)  Mo is sad and Bo is not sad.
b)  Mo is not sad and Bo is not sad.
c)  One of these is true: Mo is sad, Bo is sad.
d)  One of these is false: Mo is sad, Bo is sad.
e)  These are both false: Mo is sad, Bo is sad. 
f)  These are both true: Mo is sad, Bo is sad. 
g)  Mo but not Bo is sad. 
h)  Mo is sad and Bo is sad. 
i)  Mo is sad or Bo is sad. 
j)  Neither Mo nor Bo is sad. 
22)  Which of the following propositions is equivalent to which others?  (Much of this is
just reproducing what is in the chapter. But it is important to get these equivalences
drilled into your head. It really helps not just to know them but to see how each makes
sense. Some of them are new, not mentioned in the chapter, and may be surprising to
you. Learn them, if they don’t seem obvious.)
a)  p v q b)  ~(p v q) c)  p  q
d)  ~(p & q) e)  ~p  q f)  p & q
g)  (~p & ~q) h)  ~(~p v ~q) i)  ~q  p
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j)  ~(p & ~q) k)  ~p v q l)  ~~p
m)  p n)  ~p & ~q o)  ~p v ~q
23)  Which of the propositions in A below are equivalent to which in B?
A  
~p & q ~p v q
~(~p & ~q) ~p v (q & r)
~p & ~q &~r ~p & (~q v ~r)
~(p & ~q) ~(p & q) & ~(r & ~s)
B  
p & q ~(p & ~q)
~p v q ~ (p v q v r)
~(p & (~q v ~r) ~( A v (B & C))
~(p v (q & r) ~ ((p & q) v (r & ~s))
p v q ~(p v ~q)
24) (a) give truth tables for the following.
(i)   p  (q  p) (ii)   p  (p  q)   (iii)   (p  p)  q
(iv)   (p  q) & (q q) (v)    (p p)  (q q)   (vi)   (p v ~p)  q
(vii)   p & (p  q) & ~q (viii)   (p q) v ~(q p)   (ix)   ~q  q
(x)   p & (p  q) & ~p (xi)   p  ~p  (xiii)   (q & ~q) p 
(b) which are equivalent to which others?
(c) which are tautologies?
(d ) which are contradictions?
(e) if we took    to be the “if” of everyday English some of these might seem rather
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implausible. That is, it would be far from obvious that the tautologies were always true,
the contradictions always false, or that the equivalent propositions always had the same
truth value. Which of these seem to you in this way implausible?
25)  For each sentence in the left-most column say which sentences on its row it is 
equivalent to.   
~(p & q) ~p & ~q p & ~q p ~p v ~q
~(p v q) ~p & ~q p & ~q p ~p v ~q
~(p  q) ~p & ~q p & ~q p ~p v ~q
~~p ~p & ~q p & ~q p ~p v ~q
25)  There are other cases analogous to de Morgan’s laws. Show with truth tables that  
~p  ~q is not equivalent to ~(p  q) but is equivalent to q  r .
On the other hand, show with truth tables that p « q is equivalent to ~p « ~q  .
26)  Although ~(p & q) is NOT equivalent to ~p & ~q, and ~(p v q) is NOT equivalent to
~p v ~q , when ~p & ~q is true then ~(p & q) is true, and when ~(p v q) is true then
 ~p v ~q is true. 
a) Mark on a truth table all the rows where ~p & ~q is true and check that 
~(p & q) is also true on them. 
b) Mark on the truth table rows where ~(p & q) is true but ~p & ~q is not true. 
c) Mark on a truth table all the rows where ~(p v q) is true and check that 
~p v ~q is true on them, and 
d) mark on the truth table rows where ~p v ~q is true but ~(p v q) is false.  
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(This question anticipates the idea of logical consequence, which is the topic of chapter 
six.)
 
26)  What are the disjunctive normal forms for
p « q  ,  p & (q v r)  ,  p & (q v (r & s))  ,  ((p   q)  r)  p  ?
(I am using A « B as an abbreviation for (A  B) & (B  A). )
(Some of these are chosen because they have formulas within the scope of formulas 
within the scope of formulas, but the DNF theorem shows that we can always find an 
equivalent formula with just conjunctions within the scope of disjunctions. Put this way, it
is somewhat surprising.)
27)  How would you rephrase these searches so that they are manageable on the 
internet? 
(a)  you want data on animals that are not cats, and their viral diseases
(b) you want data on cat viruses, except those associated with the flu
(c)  you want data on viruses, but for viruses affecting cats you only want information on flu 
viruses
(d)  you want data on flu viruses, but not on those affecting cats. 
(e)  you want data on viruses but not data that is both on cats and flu
28)  (a) Which of the following are true in neither, both, or one of models A and B below.
(If just one say which.)
Rab v Rba Rbb (Rab & Rbd)  Rad 
(Rac & Rcd)  Rad Rad Rab  Rba
Rcd  ~Rdc (Rab v Rba) & (Rbc v Rcb) & (Rcd v Rdc)
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(b) State informally (not in symbols) what the general differences between model A and 
model B are.
(This is a development of question 11, but the models are more complicated.)
29)  You are searching for a tablet on the internet, using a search engine that will not 
allow you to put an AND or OR within the scope of another AND or OR. And it will not 
allow you to use IF at all. So all of the following are not allowed. 
(LongBattery OR QuickCharge) AND (MovieCam OR ManyApps)
IF (NOT FreeData) THEN BigMemory
(IF NO USB THEN SDcard) AND EITHER Pretty OR Tough
Either (I-pad AND OnSale) OR (NOT Kindle AND Android) 
Reword the queries so you can do them.
30)  In which of the two models below is “Either Jo or Fred was married to both Thelma 
and Louise” true (taking it on its usual meaning)?  In which is “Both Jo and Fred were 
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married to either Thelma or Louise”?  
(a)
was Married to thelma louise
jo T F
fred F T
b)
Married to thelma louise
jo F T
fred T T
Can you make a model in which both are true?
C- harder
31)  a)  Show that A & B and C v D  can be defined in terms of     and v, using 
equivalences like those of section 6 of this chapter. Show the same for   and & in terms 
of  v and ~. And    and v in terms of  & and ~. ) So given any of the pairs of connectives
 and v ,  v and ~,  or & and ~ we can define all of ~, &, v, and .  
b)  Show that using any of these we can define any connective that can be given by a 
truth table.
c)  Show that using the connective | mentioned in section 2, and defined by
A B A | B
T T F
T F T
F T T
F F T
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We can define both members of each of these pairs, and therefore all truth functional 
connectives. 
d) What Boolean connectives, definable by truth tables, are there that have not been 
mentioned? (So besides ~, &, v, , |, and «)  
32)  Here are two equivalences that most people do not find obvious
(p & q)  r   is equivalent to   (p  r ) v (q  r)
(p v q)  r   is equivalent to   (p  r ) & (q  r) 
Give a couple of examples to make them not so surprising.
How might these relate to the and/or confusions that are common in everyday speech?   
(They are a more general form of de Morgan’s laws, in that  ~A is equivalent to  A  (A &
~A)  .)
33)  In this book as in all introductory logic, we assume that there are just two truth 
values, True and False.  As an old Latin tag has it “tertium non datur” — there is no third 
truth value.  This can seem wrong.  Consider “He is an adult”, said of a 17 year old.  He 
is on the borderline between childhood and adulthood, so “yes and no” or maybe “not yes
and not no” are possible, though confusing, answers.  What would truth tables for a third
truth value look like?  How could one fill in the blanks for
A ~A
T
F
N
where N is a third truth value, distinct from both truth and falsity, but “between” 
them, and ~ is plausible as “not”?
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34)  Prove by mathematical induction on the number of lines of the truth table that 
every formula is equivalent to one in disjunctive normal form.
35)  Besides disjunctive normal form there is also conjunctive normal form, where a 
formula consists in a series of conjunctions, each of which is a disjunction of an atomic 
proposition or its negation. Prove that every formula is equivalent to one in conjunctive 
normal form. (This result seems to me less intuitively plausible than the disjunctive 
normal form theorem, though it is certainly true in propositional logic.)  
(Hint: it follows from the disjunctive normal form theorem using the fact that 
(A & B) v C is equivalent to (A v C) & (B v C).) 
36)  Prove by mathematical induction on the number of lines of the truth table that 
every formula is equivalent to one in disjunctive normal form.
37)  p v (q v ~p)  is a tautology, true on all lines of its truth table, and p & (q & ~p) is a
contradiction, true on none of them.  p v q is true on three of the four, and p & q on one 
of them. Is there some sense in which this determines which is more likely to be true 
than which? Is there some idea of probability where facts such as these determine which 
propositions are more probable than which others?
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chapter six:  logical consequence
6:1 (of 8) logical consequence 
The related concepts of  logical consequence, deduction, and valid argument are central
to logic. They are also very easy to misunderstand. Section 4 below discusses why it is
easy to misunderstand them and how they are related. We have already discussed the
analog of logical consequence for queries in the form of the width of a query. One query
is  intrinsically  wider  than  another  when  it  will  get  at  least  as  many  results  in  any
model/database. The discussion of search trees showed that this is in basic respects like
the relation of width between sentences. Width between sentences, taken as searches for
models, is called logical consequence: one (true or false assertive) sentence S is a logical
consequence of a set of sentences S1,…,Sn, when S is true in all models which make all of
S1,…, Sn true. For example, “there is a mouse in the bathroom” is a logical consequence
of the set {if there are mouse-droppings in the bathroom then there is a mouse in the
bathroom, there are mouse droppings in the bathroom}. If a model makes both these
premises true then it will have to make the conclusion true. 
In this chapter all the examples will work with logical consequence that depends just on
the  Boolean  connectives,  so  we  can  simplify  models  by  taking  them  to  be  truth
assignments. Some of the examples will use the propositions of propositional logic, and
others will be English sentences with a loose indication of their truth  assignments.
The mouse in the bathroom argument can be represented as a search tree like those we
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have already seen. 
      droppings
 droppings    mouse 
  droppings
    /       \
~droppings       mouse
X
The only unblocked branch has droppings and mouse. So, speaking intuitively and in a
preliminary way, if we are searching for ways to make both the premises true then any
model we find that does this will also make "there is a mouse in the bathroom" true. It is
a logical consequence of them, parallel to the fact that if you searched for rooms with
droppings with the constraint that you were only interested in mouse droppings, then you
would only find rooms with mouse droppings.
Logical  consequence has an intuitive connection with good reasoning. (But there are
warnings later in this chapter about taking the connection to hastily.) We can see why it
is appealing to make the connection with the same example. Assume that a person at
any time knows some facts and there are many others that they do not know. So there is
a range of possibilities — models of reality — that they think possible, and they would
like to narrow this down to a smaller range. Suppose that someone has observed mouse
droppings. So they can eliminate all the models which do not represent the kitchen as
having mouse droppings. They also know that where there are parts droppings there are
mice, so they can also eliminate models where there are droppings but no mouse. Put
the two eliminations together and the only models that are left are models with mice. So
reasoning in accordance with logical consequence in this case fits well with a sensible
pattern of thinking.
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S1,…, Sn are the assumptions or premises, and S is the conclusion. I have written this to
allow  for  any  number  of  premises,  but  usually  we  will  consider  just  one,  two,  or
sometimes three premises. The transition from the premises to the conclusion is called
an argument, and if S really is a logical consequence of S1,…, Sn  then the argument is
called  logically  valid.  This  vocabulary  of  assumptions  and  valid  argument  can  be
misleading, as I will explain. So think in terms of the exact definition with models, or in
terms of  the  looser  thought  that  an  argument  is  logically  valid  when its  conclusion,
thought of as as a query, will find all the models that its premises, taken together, will
find. 
>>  describe cases where someone can use an argument, in this sense, although they
are not  having an argument with anyone, and cases where an argument can be valid
although what is being argued is ridiculous.
In this chapter and the following two we investigate the relation of logical consequence in
propositional logic, so we are interested in when one proposition is true under all truth
assignments that make the propositions in a set of assumptions true. Sometimes two
propositions  will  be  logical  consequences  of  each  other,  and  then  they  are  logically
equivalent. We saw this already with logically equivalent propositions which are true on
the same lines of truth tables, such as p & q and ~(~p v ~q), or with the equivalence of
any proposition to its disjunctive normal form. 
So remember these two basic definitions (which can apply to all sentences capable of 
being true or false, and not only to propositions of propositional logic.)
One sentence is a logical consequence of others when it is true in all 
models in which all of them are true.
Two sentences are logically equivalent when they are true in all the same 
models.
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6:2 (of 8) hidden information games 
There are many games in which one has to deduce what a situation is, given clues. In a
typical game the player has to make a choice given partial information. If the player is
lucky she can go on to make further choices, eventually either arriving at a winning or a
losing  situation.  So  the  important  question  for  the  player  is  which  situations  are
consistent with the information given. One example is  Minesweeper, standard on most
PCs (and available for Macintosh computers). In Minesweeper the player has to click on
blank cells: if there is a mine present the player loses, but if the player can click on all
the cells that do not have mines the player wins. Clues are provided in the form of
numbers indicating how many mines there are in cells neighbouring a particular cell. So
the agent’s problem is to deduce the location of mines from these cells — to see when
“mine in cell C” is a logical consequence of the available information — and to avoid
those cells, while choosing from the possibilities consistent with the information that do
not involve mines. Standard Minesweeper works on a two-dimensional array. (There is a
three-dimensional version.) The important points can be illustrated with a 1-D version.
The player is given an array, for example
1 1
She knows that the second cell from the left has to have a mine, because there is 1 mine
in a cell neighbouring the leftmost. So two arrays consistent with that 1 on the left are. 
1 * 1
1 * 1 *
We have not used all the information yet, though. In the original array there is a 1 in the
second cell from the right, but this makes the second of these two models impossible. So
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the player is left  with the first model. She can safely click on the blank cell  without
revealing a mine.
When we first play a game like this we reason by forming and eliminating models as I
have been describing. This is slow, though. So as we get practice with one we make the
thinking more automatic, taking advantage of the spatial presentation of the information
to develop quick routines for getting to the same conclusions. It would be impossible to
play quickly without doing this, and a good player develops a large range of short-cut
routines.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  in  one’s  own  case  the  play  between  explicitly
eliminating models and taking spatial short-cuts. I think it gives one some insight into
one’s own thinking. 
>>  granted that we search for models in these games, using available information, what
should we consider as the premises of the arguments?
>>  give examples from grade school arithmetic where you learn a procedure by thinking
and later perform it  in a quicker and less thoughtful  way.  when do you go back to
thinking about it?
6:3 (of 8) counter-models 
It might seem to be very hard to tell if one sentence is a logical consequence of some
other sentences. After all, we have to tell if it is true in absolutely all models which make
them true, and there is an enormous variety of such possible models. And in logic in
general  it  can indeed be very hard. But in the special  case where the sentences are
constructed with Boolean connectives there are shortcuts. One is truth tables, as we have
seen.  The  other  is  formal  deductions,  which  we  study  in  chapter  7  in  the  form of
derivations.  Truth  tables  are  instances  of  the  semantic  approach,  building  on  the
connection  between logical  consequence  and models.  Deductions  and derivations  are
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instances  of  the  syntactic  approach,  using  considerations  about  how  formulas  are
structured  to  get  rules  for  making  convincing  arguments  leading  from  premises  to
conclusions. Logicians are most satisfied when they can back up what they say about
logical consequence with considerations of with both kinds. 
We can often avoid considering all  possible models, though, when we ask whether a
sentence is not a logical consequence of some others. To show this all we have to do is to
find just one model that makes the premises true and the conclusion false. When we do
this we are looking for a counter-model, a model that shows that one sentence is not a
logical consequence of some others. Finding counter models is a more intuitive business
than proving logical consequence, and getting a feel for finding them is very useful in
evaluating the validity of arguments. For one thing, we are searching for just one model,
which is to make the premises true while making the conclusion force. This is simpler
than considering  all  the  models  for  the  premises,  and does not  involve  us  in  tricky
thinking along the lines of "if the conclusion is true in all models from this particular set
when  the  premises  are  true  in  them then  we  do  not  need  to  consider  any  further
models." To see how it works, consider some examples. 
Suppose we have the following premises: 
Prue is rich or Quinn is lying
If Prue is rich then Quinn is lying
If Quinn is lying then Rick is happy
Write these as:
p v q
p  q
q  ~r
We have the following candidate conclusions; which ones really are logical consequences 
of the three premises?
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Rick is happy 
Prue is not rich
Rick is not happy 
Write these as: r, ~p, ~r 
Think about these for a while, until you feel clear about the question. Are any of these
such that you can be sure of their truth just on the basis of the information found in the
premises? 
(Think, think, think, ….  Pause right here before going on.)
Well, what about the first one? Could it be that one? One way to think this through is to
tell yourself a story involving Prue and Quinn, trying to make it come out so that these
premises are true but Rick is not happy. That isn’t hard: tell the story so that Prue is not
rich and Quinn, who says she is, is lying, so if Prue is rich Quinn is lying. Moreover the
only way to make Rick happy would be for his aunt Prue to get a lot of money. But Prue
stays poor, so Rick never gets to be happy. The premises are true — check that each of
them is — but it is not true that Rick is happy. So it is not a logical consequence of these
premises: they can be true in ways that do not make it true. On this story, moreover,
Prue is not rich, so we also have a case where the premises are true and the "conclusion"
that Prue is rich is false. So that is not a logical consequence either.
We would have a harder time telling a story in which the premises are true and the third
candidate conclusion, that Rick is not happy is false. This might make us suspect that it
cannot be done, and this conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises. In fact, it
is.  But  trying  to show this  by exploring  many stories  would  be time-consuming and
inconclusive.  But  there  is  a  better  way,  when  we  are  dealing  with  sentences  of
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propositional logic, to use truth tables. For three atomic propositions,  p,  q,  r the truth
table is:
p q r p v q p  q q  ~r ~p ~r
T T T T T F F F
T T F T T T F T *
T F T T F T F F
T F F T F T F T
F T T T T F T F
F T F T T T T T
F F T F T T T F
F F F F T T T T
The only column of this truth table that you may need to think about is the one for 
q   ~r   . The truth values in this column arise because the conditional is true except
when the antecedent is true and the conclusion is false, and that is when q is T and r is
also T, so just those two cells are F. Looking at the table we can identify the two rows
where all the premises are true. (I have highlighted them.) On one of them (*), both r
and p are false, so neither of these is a logical consequence of the premises. But on both
of them ~r is true, so it is a logical consequence of these premises.
Using truth tables as a mechanical  way of presenting the truth assignments that are
generated by models, we see that for sentences of propositional logic, where we can
ignore  some  features  of  models,  we  have  an  automatic  way  of  testing  whether  a
conclusion is a logical consequence of a set of premises. It has probably struck you that
this truth table involves quite a lot of writing to come up with just two rows where all the
premises are true. These arguments involved just three atomic propositions, and thus
eight rows to capture all their possible combinations. If we had four atomic propositions
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there would be 16 rows, and if five then 32 rows. (if n then2n.) Truth tables can become
too large to be practical ways of testing arguments. The tree method of the next two
chapters, which is a development of the search trees of chapter 4, can be seen as giving
a shortcut. But truth tables do illustrate a pair of basic points: to show that a conclusion
is not a logical consequence of some premises we find a way that the premises can be
true but the conclusion false, and to show that a conclusion is a logical consequence of
some premises we have to survey all the ways that the premises can be true and make
sure that the conclusion is true on all of them.
>>  what are the advantages and disadvantages of the storytelling method and the truth
table method compared to each other?
There  are  two  general  ways  of  showing  that  a  conclusion  is  or  is  not  a  logical
consequence of some premises. One is what we call semantic, involving concepts such as
truth and models. When we use truth tables we are thinking in semantic terms. The
other is what we call  syntactic, involving definite patterns of valid argument to make
careful deductions of conclusions from premises. It is best when these two fit together.
We want to know that our deductions never give us conclusions that are not true in all
models of the premises. And we would like to have patterns of deduction to serve as
backups or confirmation of considerations about models. It is much easier to see how the
two sides fit together when we are dealing with a formal logical language than with every
day spoken language. It is best to keep both the semantic and syntactic approach —
models and careful argument — in mind, and to use each as a check on the other. It is
important to get used to finding counter-models to claims that one sentence is a logical
consequence of some premises. And it is important to begin getting a sense of when
there is no counter-model because the sentence really is a logical consequence. Some of
the exercises at the end of this chapter are there to give you more practice in this. 
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6:4 (of 8) consequence, deduction, and argument 
When we reason we often move from premises, which we either believe or have assumed
in order to see what follows from them, to conclusions, trying to use only information
that is contained in the premises. Much of mathematics, philosophy, and law, consists of
such reasoning. In practice we nearly always make use of more information than we
explicitly state as premises, but the aim is still to stick as closely as we can to our stated
assumptions. We state such reasoning in the form of arguments, in which we state our
premises and then go from them to conclusions and then on to further conclusions, so
that eventually we can say “Therefore P” where P may be “eπi = -1” or “God exists” or
“my client is not guilty”. An argument whose conclusion is a logical consequence of its
premises is known as a logically valid argument. And studying logic is supposed to make
people into sharp reasoners and persuasive arguers. 
It is often not obvious whether a conclusion is a logical consequence of some premises,
whether the argument from the premises to the conclusion is logically valid. In fact, it is
often very far from obvious. So not seeing that a conclusion is a logical consequence, or
as we often say that it follows, is not a sign of stupidity. It sometimes takes centuries for
thinkers to see that something follows. Going beyond propositional logic, for example to
the logic of quantifiers in part three, this is often because things get very subtle and
complicated.  But  even  in  propositional  logic  consequence  is  often  not  obvious.  For
example, is (pvq)  r a consequence of (p  r) v (q  r)? I doubt that it is obvious to you,
although in fact it is a consequence. In response, logicians have developed systems of
deduction, which are step-by-step rules guaranteed to give only logical consequences.
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Following the rules, we deduce conclusions from premises. The derivations of subsequent
chapters have their origin in traditional systems of deduction. So if you stick to the rules
you are safe. The technical term for this property of the rules is that they are  sound.
Rules can also be complete, meaning that they capture all the logical consequences can
be described in their vocabulary. Completeness is a sophisticated topic and I shall barely
discuss it. But it grapples with a very profound problem, that logical consequence is a
richer and more complicated matter than we can easily grasp.
A logically valid argument does not have to have a true conclusion. Consider “the earth is
flat, therefore the earth is flat”, or “the earth is flat & fish swim, therefore the earth is
flat”, or “if grass is green then the earth is flat, grass is green, therefore the earth is flat”.
In each of these the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premise or premises: if
the premises are true the conclusion has to be true. But the premises are not all true and
neither is the conclusion. 
A logically invalid argument, one where the conclusion is not a logical consequence of the
premises, does not have to have a false conclusion. Consider “cats chase mice, therefore
eagles fly”, or “cats can fly, therefore eagles fly”.  In neither case is the conclusion a
logical consequence of the premise, but in both of them the conclusion is true. So if you
show that someone’s argument for a conclusion is invalid you are not showing that the
conclusion is false. The most you can be showing is that they have not given a good
reason for believing it. There are exercises at the end of this chapter to reinforce this
point.
It is important to realise that the conclusion of an argument that is not logically valid can
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be true. One reason is that the fact that though the premises may not show that a
conclusion must be true, they can be evidence that it is true. For example if a common
disease D has symptoms A, B, C and a very rare disease has the same symptoms, then
though the argument "If D then A & B & C , A & B & C, therefore D" is not logically valid,
A & B & C may give you reasons for expecting D. If  you reason from symptoms of
common diseases to diagnoses of the diseases you will sometimes get a false conclusion,
but you will often be right.
>>  (for philosophy students) relate this to Hume's problem about induction.
Be wary of the word “valid” here. We often use “valid” in conversation to mean “true”.
(“You have a valid point there” = “What you say is true.”) But in logic we apply “valid”
not to statements that can be true or false but to  arguments, which are sequences of
sentences. They cannot be true or false; they can just join sentences in a way that
follows logical consequence or does not. Logicians also talk of “sound” arguments, which
are  valid  arguments  that  have  true  premises.  A  sound  argument  will  have  a  true
conclusion,  since  the  conclusion  has  to  be  true  given  that  the  premises  are.  The
connections  between  truth,  logical  consequence,  and  good  reasons  for  believing
conclusions are pretty tricky. 
This  a  very  confusing  topic.  There  is  no  clear  evidence  that  learning  about  logical
consequence makes people better at reasoning in general or at persuading others. In fact
there is disturbing evidence that teaching students logic has very little impact on them,
not even on their recognition of which arguments are deductively valid and which are
invalid. Students learn to do well on the material used as examples, and then if they are
tested with even slightly varied examples they often seem to be answering at random.
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Psychologists are puzzled by this, and logic teachers find it too depressing to think about.
 
Here is my explanation of what is going on. When we reason or persuade we normally do
so against a background of an enormous amount of information that we are taking for
granted,  or  which  both  parties  in  a  discussion  accept.  You  and  I  may  have  deep
disagreements about religion and politics and movies, but when we discuss these or any
other topics we each assume, and assume that the other assumes, that Alberta is to the
north of Texas, that grass is green in springtime, that the English language originated in
England, that X is a terrible actor, and all sorts of other obvious information. And when
you reason all  by yourself  you also assume all  these things. We have discussions to
persuade  one  another  of  little  gaps  in  our  shared  assumptions,  and  we  reason
individually to fill in gaps in our individual knowledge. There are many such gaps: anyone
can immediately produce a long list of questions to which their honest answer would be
"I don't know". But they are much smaller than the amount of information that we take
for granted. (We may not appreciate the amount of information that is taken for granted,
because we usually  do not bother to mention it,  and we are usually  not consciously
aware that we are assuming it in our reasoning.) Given all this assumed information, we
can reason from it to new conclusions and we usually do so carefully, sensibly, in ways
that we would describe as reasonable and logical, and in ways that will be clear to the
people we want to persuade. 
 
But that's where the trouble begins. Since we think of this familiar business — filling in
gaps in terms of an enormous assumed background — as logical reasoning, when we are
asked if something is a logical consequence of some assumptions, or whether it follows
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logically, or whether an argument is logically valid, we answer in terms of what we would
count as  reasonable  and systematic  gap-filling reasoning.  That  is  a  natural  reaction,
given what is  familiar  and the way we normally  speak.  But  that  is  not what logical
consequence, or a logically valid argument, is. It is in a way the opposite. Not filling in
gaps against a large assumed background, but given a small amount of information filling
in a few of the remaining blank spaces assuming no background at all. That is  not a
familiar intellectual activity, for most of us. I think that the least confusing way to learn it
is  to  treat  it  as  something  unfamiliar  and  unnatural,  to  be  approached  slowly  and
carefully, like some strange monster that has washed up on the shore. 
I am skeptical of the idea that studying logic gives one an inside track to good reasoning
or persuasive argument. That is one reason that I do not begin a logic course with a
discussion of  valid  argument,  but instead first  explain  basic  ideas of  logical  form, in
particular the ideas of Boolean connectives, and the relation between a sentence and a
model/database. These ideas can be motivated well enough by their connections with
searching, and by how they help us understand how complex language works, without
needing to justify them with dubious psychology. And the very unnaturalness of thinking
in terms of logical consequence is one of the reasons for studying it: it helps to acquire
the skill of thinking not in terms of loose connections between large bodies of information
but in terms of precise connections between small bodies of information. 
>>  what is your impression, from this point in the course, of the relation between the
study of logic and the everyday quality that we describe as “being logical”.
All the same, there are connections between logical consequence and effective argument.
One connection is that when one sentence is a logical consequence of some premises it is
safe to argue from the premises to the conclusion: given that the premises are true you
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can be sure that the conclusion will be. Another connection is that some fallacies, some
patterns of argument where the conclusion is not a logical consequence of the premises,
can interfere with good reasoning and effective argument. 
6:5 (of 8) an example: inferring disjunctions 
This is a logically valid argument: A therefore A or B. (So is B therefore A or B.) So the 
following are, surprisingly, logically valid
It is raining. Therefore either it is raining or there is life on Mars.
Cats can fly. Therefore either I am living in the 21st century or cats can fly.
But these seem like very puzzling arguments, to many people. They do not seem like
good ways of reasoning. The first seems to introduce something completely irrelevant to
the premise,  that  may well  be false.  And the second seems to  go from an obvious
falsehood to something that is weird and silly but on reflection true. In fact, they are
both logically valid and they are silly ways of reasoning. Some valid arguments are silly.
No  one  would  waste  their  time  and  mental  energy  thinking  along  these  lines.  BUT
suppose that it is raining: then it is true that either it is raining or there is life on Mars. If
there is life on Mars then “either rain here or life on Mars” is true because it is raining,
and if there is no life on Mars then “either rain here or life on Mars” is true because it is
raining. And suppose that hidden in a valley in the Andes there are flying cats. Then it is
true that either I am living in the 21st century or there are flying cats (since both of the
disjuncts  are  true).  So  both  of  these  arguments  meet  the  definition  of  logical
consequence: if the premise is true then the conclusion is. 
But there are arguments of the form A therefore A or B that it does make sense to use.
Suppose we assume that if you live in Canada or the US then your greatest danger of flu
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is in the winter. Assume also that Bo lives in Canada. Then we can reason
Bo lives in Canada. Therefore Bo lives in Canada or Bo lives in the US. If he lives in
Canada or the US then his greatest danger of flu is in the winter. Therefore Bo’s
greatest danger of flu is in the winter
Or consider the following argument
If an animal is a rabbit or a squirrel the vet will only see it on Thursday
Smartie is a squirrel.                                                                           
(Therefore) Smartie is a rabbit or a squirrel 
Therefore: the vet will only see Smartie on Thursday.
So we do sometimes reason from A to A or B. In fact we do often. But although all such
arguments are valid, many would be unhelpful time-wasting ways to reason. We do not
try to formulate rules of logic so as to catch only the worthwhile arguments. That would
make logic very complicated. But the price we pay for keeping it simple is that we have
to include some arguments that at first sight seem silly, in fact, some that are just plain
silly.
The validity of A therefore A or B makes sense when we see sentences as searches for
models. To find all the models in which “it is raining” is true, you can instead use the
wider search for all the models in which “either it is raining or there is life on Mars” is
true. It is a search which will get you all the models you wanted, plus some more. This is
often too many more to make it a practical way of searching, but we cannot know that
just  from  logic.  Similarly,  reasoning  from  "A"  to  "A  or  B”  will  always  give  a  true
conclusion  when  the  premise  is  true,  but  it  is  often  not  a  useful  or  helpful  true
conclusion15.  
15 There is a branch of advanced logic called "relevance logic", which tries to describe patterns of 
deduction where there are always definite connections between premises and conclusions. It is 
formally interesting and philosophically controversial..
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6:6 (of 8) five examples of valid argument 
Here are five among the many patterns of valid argument. We will  see more in later
chapters. They are not always sensible ways to reason, as noted. Note how we write the
patterns with the assumptions above a horizontal line and the conclusion below it. This is
standard. The patterns have standard names, which I have written below them.
 A & B    A     A v B  
    A A v B  ~A     
  B
and-elimination    or-introduction elimination of alternatives
 A  A  B  
 A    B  ~B   . 
 B  ~A
modus ponens modus tollens
These should become as familiar to you as facts of simple arithmetic. And they are as
simple and obvious, really. Consider the last two. Modus ponens16  is valid because A  B
is true only in three cases: when A and B are both true, when A is false and B is true, and
when A and B are both false. (This is what the truth table for  says.) Of these A is true
only in the first, when B is also true.  Modus tollens is valid because the only one of these
truth assignments making true in which B is false (so ~B is true) is the last, when A and
B are both false.   
There are also frequently occurring patterns of invalid argument, mistakes people often
make, and some of them have names. But I am not going to give them or their names.
Years later you would just remember that you had been taught them, and think that they
16 The names modus ponens and modus tollens go back a long way, to Latin phrases meaning the
way of laying down an argument and the way of refuting it.
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were valid. When an invalid pattern appears, you are going to have to think about it and
search for a counterexample. For example the argument “A v B therefore A” is invalid,
because by making  A false and  B true we can make its premise,  A v B, true while its
conclusion, A is false. And this should make sense, since A v B just says that one of {A,
B} is true, without telling which. There are exercises at the end of this chapter to help
you recognise invalid arguments, as well  as valid ones. They are all confined to very
simple cases, because for more complicated cases it helps to have the resources of later
chapters.
>>  is it always a mistake to use an argument that is not valid?
>>  is there a way in which these are facts of simple arithmetic?
6:7 (of 8) consequence for conditionals
We can make quite complicated chains of deduction using just  and ~. Moreover these
correspond well to reasoning that we often find convincing with ordinary English IF and
NOT.  They are  useful  for  getting  the idea of  a  deductive argument  and prepare  the
ground for the discussion of derivations in the following two chapters. 
We can do a lot with just the two principles of modus ponens and modus tollens. Each
has  a  search  tree.  (Search  trees  will  be  magically  transformed  and  renamed  as
derivations in the following two chapters.) The two trees are:.
  A    ~B
  A    B  A    B 
   /   \    /   \
~A    B ~A    B
  X          X
   (modus ponens) (modus tollens)
These are search trees with several sentences at their base, as described in  chapter 4,
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section 4. Notice how similar they are: one associates a contradiction with A, and the
other with B. And this makes sense: intuitively only the possibility involving A's truth is
compatible with the assumptions of modus ponens, and only the possibility involving A's
falsity is compatible with the assumptions of modus tollens. Moreover each can be turned
into a very natural argument in ordinary English. Modus ponens can be taken as saying
"A is true and moreover if A is true then B is true, which leaves only two possibilities:
either A is false or B is true. The first of these is ruled out because we are assuming that
A is true, so that leaves only the second possibility, B."  Modus tollens can be taken as
saying  "B  is  false  and  moreover  if  A  is  true  then B  is  true,  which  leaves  only  two
possibilities: either A is false or B is true. The second of these is ruled out because we
are assuming that B is false, so that leaves only the second possibility, that A is false."
I have stated these two patterns of logical consequence in the abstract, using letters
instead of sentences, to make it easier to see their general form. But it is also important
to be able to recognize and construct examples in ordinary English where sooner or later
you will have to make and evaluate arguments. Begin with "it will rain" for A and "the
dam will burst" for B. We then get as premises "it will rain. If it will rain then the dam will
burst", leading to what I hope is the obvious conclusion "the dam will burst", by notice
ponens. In the same way, "the dam will not burst" and "if it will rain then the dam will
burst" lead to the conclusion "it will not rain". (Because if it did rain the dam burst and
we are assuming that the dam will not burst.)
Somewhat less obvious conclusions and come by putting the patterns together in chains.
The  simplest  chain  is  just  two  instances  of  notice  ponens  stuck  together.  Putting  it
abstractly, and providing a tree, the pattern is:
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   A
   A  B
   B    C   
    /    \
~A   B
  X /   \
     ~B     C  (*)
      X
Notice how the branch at (*) is got by using the premise B  C. Extended chains of logical
consequence like this will require us to "bring down" premises from the base of the tree.
An instance of an argument with this pattern might be "It will rain. If it will rain then the
dam will burst. If the dam will burst the village will be flooded. Therefore the village will
be flooded.”
>>  supply reasoning as in the rain/dam burst examples above, to show how this is
intuitively correct.
>>  I have worded these examples so that the English sentences best fit the versions
with letters.  but this does not make the English completely natural.  improve it.  it is
also stimulating to ask what this suggests about features of English that are ignored in
logic as we have studied it.
We  can  get  more  complicated  arguments  if  we  augment  modus  ponens  and  modus
tollens with another principle, contraposition. Contraposition takes as premise the single
sentence A  B and has the conclusion ~B  ~A. Assuming that if A is true then B is also
true, then if B is not true, A cannot be true. If we assume that if it rains the dam bursts
then we also know that if the dam does not burst there is no rain.
>>  contraposition is similar to modus tollens. (how?)  but if you try to make a tree for it
as we did for the previous three principles, you will run into a problem.  what  is the
problem?  (this problem will be resolved in chapter 7.)
Very often when we can get a conclusion from a set of premises by using contraposition
we can also get it by using modus tollens. But not always. Here is an example where
contraposition is needed. I give a tree to make it clear that the conclusion is a logical
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consequence of the premises.
  (~p  ~q)  r
     q  p
  ~ p ~q (by contraposition)
     r (by modus ponens)
Notice how in this one we apply the general principle of modus ponens to the particular
case where A is ~p  ~q and B is r.
An example of this case in ordinary English would be  “if he will not work unless we have
given him a raise then we should fire him; if he works then we have given him a raise.
Therefore we should fire him.” Notice how we use "A unless B" to say "if not B then not
A".  There  are  many  quite  complicated  logical  consequences  involving  the  material
conditional. In fact, we seem to use the conditional quite a lot to express complicated
patterns of consequence. (This is a little surprising given how many meanings the English
word "if" can express.) But to state the full range of them we will need the resources of
the next two chapters.  
6:8 (of 8) extra: AND inside OR, OR inside AND  
We often express a conjunction where each conjunct is a disjunction, or a disjunction
where each disjunct is  a conjunction.  This  is  not surprising given the significance of
disjunctive and conjunctive normal forms, which we met in the previous chapter and will
meet again. The idea we are expressing then has the form
(A v B) & (C v D), or (A & B) v (C & D). 
Often the words we use hide this somewhat, though it  is an example of the kind of
symbol-like idiom I am encouraging. For example we say “Both Bo and Mo ski at either
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Whistler or Vail”, or “Either Bo or Mo skis at both Whistler and Vail.” Or talking of these
people and these places we might say “Both people ski at one of these places”, or “One
of them skis at both”. The both/either one says “(Mo at W v Mo at B) & (Bo at W v Bo at
B)”: the central connective is AND. The either/both one says “(Mo at W & Mo at B) v (Bo
at W & Bo at  B)”:  the central  connective is  OR. (How can you tell?  It's a semantic
consideration.  Ask  yourself  under  what  conditions  it  would  be  true,  and  then  which
central connective fits them best. That may sound vague and unhelpful, but there are
rarely many choices and the differences between them are usually clear. When they are
not the English sentence is usually vague or ambiguous.)
These are different. Suppose that Mo skis at Whistler and Bo skis at Vail. Then it is true
that both of them ski at one of these places, but not true that either of them skis at both.
This is worth getting clear in your mind — think about it for a moment— because while it
is not vital at this stage it can prepare an idea that will be important in part III. 
These idioms need a warning, though. I said that “Both Bo and Mo ski at either Whistler
or Vail” means “Bo skis at either Whistler or Vail and Mo skis at either Whistler or Vail.”
And  most  often  this  is  what  these  words  will  mean.  But  English  is  a  subtle  and
unpredictable beast, and they could be used to express other things as well. On occasion
they could mean “Bo skis at Whistler and Bo skis at Vail and Mo skis at Whistler and Mo
skis at Vail”, even though it might make more sense to express this with “Both Bo and Mo
ski at both Whistler and Vail”. We can even use “Both Bo and Mo ski at either Whistler or
Vail” to mean “Either Bo skis at Whistler and Mo skis at Whistler or Bo skis at Vail and Mo
skis at Vail.” AND in the scope of OR rather than OR in the scope of AND. Imagine a
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conversation in which someone says “Sally and Sam both ski at the same one of those
places. I wonder who else is like that?” And someone else replies “Bo and Mo both ski at
Whistler or Vail”. Then we understand it as saying “Bo and Mo at Whistler or Bo and Mo
at Vail”. (Rather than Bo at Whistler or Vail and Mo at Whistler or Vail.)
This can seem confusing just because one tries to let the English stand on its own. That’s
not the best approach, though. Think directly in terms of the logic. You think semantically
— what  models  would  make the  sentence  true?  — and when you meet  the  English
sentences you take them as crude suggestions which have to be explained in clearer and
more explicit terms. Then everything will fall into place. 
>>  can you think of variants on the “both/either” and “either/both” idioms that resist
these ambiguities?
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words used in this chapter that it would be a good idea to understand: 
and-elimination, assumption, contraposition, counter model, deduction, elimination of 
alternatives, logical consequence, modus ponens, modus tollens, or-introduction,  
premise, semantic, syntactic, valid argument
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exercises for chapter six
1)  a) Make a model, in the form of a table, to show that “Bo is happy” is not a logical 
consequence of the premise set {Mo is rich or Mo is lying , If Mo is rich then Bo is 
happy}.
b) Make a truth table showing the same thing, and say how it is related to the model.
2)  The arguments in (I) are all invalid. The "conclusions" are not logical consequences of
the premises. The situations in (II) describe countermodels to them: they show how the 
premises can be true while the conclusions are false.
a)   Which situations are countermodels to which invalid arguments?
(I)
(a) Mo is a student                        . 
Mo is a student and a musician
(b) Mo is a student or a musician 
Mo is a student and a musician  
(c) Mo is a student or a musician
Mo is a student
d) If Mo is a student then Mo is a musician
If Mo is a musician then Mo is a student 
e) If Mo is a student then Mo is a musician
Mo is a musician
(II)
(i)  Mo is a non-student non-musician
(ii)  Mo is a non-student musician
(iii)  Mo is a student non-musician.
b) symbolize the atomic sentences in the arguments above with letters and construct a 
truth table showing the combinations of truth and falsity that make the premises 
through and the conclusions false..
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3)  a) Given the table below, fill in the missing cells.  
playsChess playsViolin lovesPhilosophy Human C v V P  H
lindsey NO YES NO YES
paris NO YES YES YES YES
britney NO YES YES YES
avril NO NO YES NO
b)   Why is this a question about logical consequence?
4)   Which of the arguments below are instances of modus ponens, which are instances 
of modus tollens, and which are instances of contraposition?  
if Mo came the party Mary left
if Mary did not leave the party, Mo did not come
Mo is going to the party
If Mo goes the party, there will be a fight
There will be a fight
If Mo was at the party, there was a fight
There was no fight                                  
Mo was not at the party    
If no one comes to the party, Liu will feel awful
Liu will not feel awful                                          
Someone will come to the party
if no one came to the party, Liu felt either awful or relieved              .
If Liu felt neither awful nor relieved then someone came to the party 
If any of Mary’s friends come to the party, Mo will start a fight
Some of Mary’s friends will come to the party                         
Mo will start a fight
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5)  Two of the sentences a) – d) below link the assumptions 1, 2, 3  to the conclusion 6. 
Put them in the right order, by writing their letters in the appropriate places.  (Warning: 
two of them are distracters, that should be left out.)  
1  if the Oilers lost Murray got drunk 
2  if the Oilers did not lose Murray proposed to Sarah
3  Murray did not propose to Sarah
4  
5  
6  Murray got drunk 
a)  if Murray did not get drunk then the Oilers did not lose
b)  If Murray did not propose to Sarah then Murray got drunk
c)  if Murray did not get drunk then Murray proposed to Sarah
d)  If Murray proposed to Sarah then Murray did not get drunk 
6)  Which of these are true?  (They have not all been explicitly discussed in the text.  
Some may take a bit of thought.)  
a)  A sentence is a logical consequence of a set of sentences if it is true in all models 
that make all sentences in the set true. 
b)  A sentence is a logical consequence of a set of sentences if it is true in all models 
that make some sentences in the set true. 
c)  A sentence is a logical consequence of a set of sentences if it is true in some models
that make all sentences in the set true. 
d)  The conclusion of a logically valid argument is true. 
e)  If the premises of a logically valid argument are true, the conclusion is true. 
f)  If an argument is not logically valid its conclusion is false. 
g)  One query Q1 is broader than another Q2 when any answer to Q1 is an answer to 
Q2.
h)  One query Q1 is broader than another Q2 when any answer to Q2 is an answer to 
Q1
i)  the negation of a conjunction is a conjunction of negations
j)  the negation of a conjunction is a disjunction of negations
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B - more
7)  a) Fill in the empty cells in the model below to make the sentences in the A list true 
and the sentences in the B list false.
wears a Hat wears a Dress wears Pants 
albert
bertie
charlotte
A: true 
Find x: Hx & Px has the answer {c}
the people wearing a hat and a dress are Charlotte and Albert  
either Albert wears a hat or Bertie wears a dress
if Bertie wears a dress then Charlotte does not wear a hat 
B: false 
if Bertie wears a hat then Albert wears pants  (treat this as Hb  Pa)  
Either Charlotte does not wear a dress or Bertie wears pants but Albert does not.
(~Dc v (Pb & ~Pa)  )  remember: this is to come out False]
b) Why is this also a question about logical consequence?
8)   Why not? Explain what is wrong with taking the conclusions of these arguments as 
logical consequences of the premises. (I have put in?'s to emphasize that the conclusion 
does not really follow logically.)
If she took the four pm ferry she arrived in time.  She arrived in time.  Therefore she 
took the four pm ferry?  
He has a fever, purple spots, and sore joints.  If he has awfularia he will have fever, 
purple spots, and sore joints.  Therefore he has awfularia?  
If the theory of evolution is true then when the environment changes animals will 
eventually adapt to those changes.  When the environment changes animals do 
eventually adapt.  Therefore the theory of evolution is true?  
9)   Which of these candidate conclusions are logical consequences of these premises?  
Premises: 
if there is a god, sinners will be punished
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if there is a god, there will be prophets 
if there is no god, all things are in space and time 
sinners will be punished
there will be prophets
all things are in space and time
if there is only a devil, sinners and non-sinners will be punished
if there are delusions, there will be prophets 
candidate conclusions:  
there is a god 
there is no god
there is only a devil
if there is something not in space and time, there is a god
10)  Which of these candidate conclusions are logical consequences of these premises?  
premises: 
if Joe has driven all night he will be tired tomorrow
if Joe is tired tomorrow he will have an accident
Joe will be tired tomorrow
If Joe has been drinking all night he will be tired tomorrow
If Joe has been drinking all night he will have an accident 
candidate conclusions:  
Joe has driven all night
Joe is tired tomorrow
Joe will have an accident 
Joe has been drinking all night 
Joe has neither driven all night nor been drinking all night
11)  What additional premises could be added to 9 to make the conclusion “there is a 
god” a logical consequence?  
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12)  For which of the following arguments is the conclusion a logical
consequence of the premises?  
If you drink this poison you will die                
If you don’t drink this poison you will not die  
If you take this medicine you will be saved                 
If you don’t take this medicine you will not be saved 
If we leave Afghanistan the Taliban will win              
If we don’t leave Afghanistan the Taliban will not win 
If your muscles don’t ache then you don’t have the flu
If you have the flu then you will have a fever                
If your muscles don’t ache then you don’t have a fever
If he took the medicine then he survived
He did not survive                                      
He did not take the medicine 
If he takes this medicine then if he stays in bed he will recover  
He will stay in bed
He will not recover                                                             
He will not take the medicine  
13) Here  are  three  invalid  arguments.   Below  are  situations  that  may  be  counter-
examples  to  them.  Which  are  counterexamples  to  which  arguments?  Remember:  a
counterexample is a situation that makes the premise(s) true and the conclusion false
i) If   you do not   have a ticket then  you will have to pay  
If you have to pay then you do not have a ticket
ii) If you do not have a ticket then you will have to pay
You will  not   have to pay                                          
You do not have a ticket
iii) If   you have a ticket then   you will not  have to pay  
If you not have a ticket then you will have to pay  
Situations
a)  Everyone has to pay. b) No one has to pay.
c)  Two kinds of tickets for this special event: A – special ticket, enough to get in, B – 
regular ticket, needs a surcharge.  You have B.  Those with neither pay.  
d)  Two kinds of tickets: A and B as above.  You have A.  Those with neither pay.  
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14)  Fill in the gaps in the argument below, so that it is logically valid and uses only the 
rules modus ponens, and modus tollens .  
1 If it Rained the Dam broke
2 If the Sluice was opened the Dam did not break
3 if there was a Hurricane it Rained 
4      the  S  luice was opened                                     
5 [4,2 modus ponens]
6 [5,1,modus tollens]
7 there was no Hurricane [6,3, modus tollens]
15)  Which of the following are True, and which False?
a)  the conclusion of a valid argument is always true 
b)  the conclusion of a valid argument is always false 
c)  the conclusion of an invalid argument is always false 
d)  the conclusion of an invalid argument is sometimes true 
d)  the conclusion of a valid argument with true premises is always true 
e)  the conclusion of a valid argument with false premises is sometimes true 
16)  Write S for 'Mo is a student',  M for 'Mo is a musician', and A for '2+2=8'.  Assume 
that S is true and M and A are false.  Give an example of 
a)  a valid argument with true premises and a true conclusion
b)  a valid argument with false premises and a false conclusion
c)  a valid argument with false premises and a true conclusion
17)  Facts: 
- either Albert or Bertie or Charlotte drives a Toyota.
- either Albert drives a Porsche or Albert drives a Toyota or Albert drives a bicycle.
- either Albert or Bertie or Charlotte drives a Porsche and a Toyota and a bicycle
( (Pa & Ta & Ba) v (Pb & Tb & Bb) v (Pc & Tc & Bc) ) 
- either Bertie does not drive a Porsche or Bertie does not drive a Toyota or Bertie 
does not drive a bicycle 
- either Albert or Bertie or Charlotte drives neither a Porsche nor a Toyota nor a 
bicycle.  
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( (~Pa & ~Ta & ~Ba) v (~Pb & ~Tb & ~Bb) v (~Pc & ~Tc & ~Bc) )
- Albert does not drive a Porsche and Charlotte does drive a bicycle. 
- Only one person drives a Toyota
Who drives a Porsche, who drives a Toyota, and who drives a bicycle?  That is, fill in the 
empty cells in the model below to fit the facts.
drives a Porsche drives a Toyota drives a Bicycle 
albert
bertie
charlotte
Hint:  Which individual(s) drive all the vehicles? Which one(s) drive none of them?   
Remark: this is a traditional logic puzzle, but one where, unusually, it can be tackled by 
looking directly for logical consequences of the given facts.
18) Given the stated facts of question 17) which of the following are true?
 Bertie drives a Porsche and Charlotte does not drive a bicycle. 
 Albert drives a Toyota and Albert drives a bicycle. 
 Albert drives a Toyota or Albert drives a bicycle.
19)   Below are twelve arguments.  Which of them is a
(a) valid argument with true premise(s) and true conclusion
(b) valid argument with true premise(s) and false conclusion
(c) valid argument with false premise(s) and true conclusion
(d) valid argument with false premise(s) and false conclusion
(e) invalid argument with true premise(s) and true conclusion
(f) invalid argument with true premise(s) and false conclusion
(g) invalid argument with false premise(s) and false conclusion
(h) invalid argument with false premise(s) and true conclusion
(note: not all of these combinations may be possible, so some may apply to none of 
the arguments) 
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p =Paris is in France q = Paris is in China t = Toronto is in Canada (the 
real cities and countries) 
s = Stephen Hawking is a man h = Stephen Hakwing is human
(Suggestion: first think “is it valid?” then consider the truth values of the premise(s) 
and conclusion.  By “false premise(s)” I mean that one or more is false. True and false 
in the real world.) 
  s     h  
  h s
   p    . 
p v q
p v q  
   p
 p& q   . 
   p
p & q   . 
   q
p & t   . 
   t
  h     s  
  s h
 pv q   . 
   q
  t v ~q   . 
   t
 t v ~q   . 
   ~q
p,  ~p v q  . 
     q  
~q, q v t  . 
    t
C – harder 
20)   Explain why modus tollens gives arguments that are deductively valid. 
21)  Explain why contraposition gives arguments that are deductively valid. 
22)  Describe a way of using disjunctive normal forms to show that one formula is a 
logical consequence of another. (How could you extend it to showing that a formula is a 
consequence of a set of formulas?)
23)  There are infinitely many models. So how can we ever know that a conclusion is 
true in all models that make all of a set of premises true? 
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24)  Give examples of situations where reasoning by modus ponens, and reasoning from
A & B to A, are unhelpful ways to think.  
25)   Consider the assumption that there is a single enormous model such that a 
sentence of English is true if and only if some version of it in the vocabulary of logic is 
true in that model.
(a) Why should we take a long hard breath before making this assumption?
(b) Explain why if we accept the assumption then all the facts about the relation 
between logical consequence and truth are verified, in particular consequences of true 
premises are true, and false premises can have both true and false consequences.
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chapter seven: Boolean derivations
7:1 (of 5) what is a derivation?  
A derivation is a mechanical way of extracting — deriving — from a proposition its logical
content, to determine various of its logical properties such as which other propositions
are its consequences, whether it is consistent, whether it is a tautology, and so on. (See
the next chapter, 8, for explanations of consistency, tautology, and contradiction.) There
will not always be a mechanical procedure for determining any of these. But in the very
special case of Boolean propositions where we are determining these properties in terms
of  truth  assignments,  they  exist.  This  chapter  explains  one  way  of  making  such
derivations,  which is closely related to the search trees of  chapter four.  Traditionally,
derivations have been explained as a kind of deduction, a mechanical way of deriving a
proposition’s  consequences,  and  other  logical  properties  of  propositions  have  been
discussed in terms of this. (Tautology and contradiction are discussed in the previous
chapter, Chapter 6, and consistency is discussed in the next chapter, Chapter 8.) We will
respect this tradition, to some extent, but we will also emphasize that there are other
things that a derivation can tell us about a proposition17. 
We have a sentence of propositional logic, in short a proposition, and we are searching
for truth assignments, lines of its truth table, which make it true. The search is will take
the form of search trees, familiar from the past two chapters. It is worth being explicit,
though, about the way we must carry out these searches if our object is to discover
17 Don’t call them derivatives! That is from calculus, has no relation, and will annoy your prof.
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logical consequences. So in this chapter the rules will  be stated in clear and definite
terms, important aspects will be noted, and the connection with logical consequence will
be central. Suppose the proposition is of the form A & B. (Both of the conjuncts may be
complex, but the central connective is &. For example ~(p & q) & (q  r) is of the form
A & B.) Then we know that all truth assignments that make it true make A true, and also
that all truth assignments that make it true make  B true. So both A and  B are logical
consequences of A & B. Searching for truth assignments that make A true will always get
at least as many as searching for assignments that make A & B true. The same for B.
This motivates the first rule of making a derivation:
[ & rule (conjunction)] When you have a sentence A & B, you can write either A
or  B beneath it. When the derivation begins with  A & B we put a horizontal line
beneath it and then A, B. 
 A & B
  A
  B 
Note that I said that you may write A or write B beneath. Writing either, both, or none 
are all allowed. We will later see situations where this may changes to must. The options 
you have in making a derivation can be confusing, and even dismaying. Usually there are
several derivations you can make for a given purpose, and it is not important which one 
you make. This is a topic to keep in mind in what follows.
For the second case suppose the sentence is  A v B .Then the truth assignments that
make it true break into two classes. There are those that make  A true and those that
make B true. Neither of these has to include all the assignments that make 
A v B true, but searching in parallel for A assignments and B assignments will get them
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all.
With a derivation using the & rule there is no new branch: the two conjuncts are listed on
a continuation  of  the  branch that  has  their  conjunction.  Branches  of  derivations  are
intended to represent general classes of truth assignments making the propositions at
the base of the tree true. When there is only one branch the propositions on it are logical
consequences of those above it, as in this case conjuncts are logical consequences of
their conjunction.
We also have a rule for disjunction, which again is familiar from search trees.
[ v rule (disjunction)] When you have a sentence A v B , you may write both A
and B beneath it in the form of two separate branches. When the derivation begins
with A v B we put a horizontal line beneath it and then the A, B branches. 
   A v B 
  /   \  
A    B
Since there is more than one branch, the intention is not to represent propositions on
either branch as logical consequences of those above them. And clearly neither A nor B is
a logical consequence of A v B. Each branch is meant to represent one class of truth
assignments for the propositions at the base of the tree, and taken altogether they are
meant to represent all those propositions truth assignments. We will return to what more
precisely this means.
For the third case suppose the formula is A  B. Then again the truth assignments that
make it true break into two classes. There are the assignments that make A false, and
thus  ~A true. And there are the assignments that make B true. Between them they
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include all the assignments that make A  B true though neither class gets them all by
itself. So we are again dealing with a branching rule. (And a parallel search: if you want to
catch all the truth assignments for the conditional you will explore both branches.)    
  
[  rule (conditional)] When you have a sentence A  B, you may write both ~A
and B beneath it in the form of two separate branches. When the derivation begins
with A  B we put a horizontal line beneath it and then the ~A, B branches. 
    A    B 
   /      \  
~A        B
Now we have a rule for each of the Boolean connectives we are using except for ~ .
Instead of  a  single  rule  for  ~  we have  three,  depending  on the  proposition  that  is
negated. The reason that we need three rooms instead of one is that there is not really
anything much that all the truth assignments that make a proposition force, and thus its
negation true, have in common. Instead, the patterns are different for each Boolean
connective. For conjunction and disjunction amount to de Morgan's law, as the rules ~&
and  ~v suggest. For the conditional they amount to the important feature of its truth
table, that conditional is true except when the antecedent is true and the conclusion is
false. (There is room for a fourth rule saying what happens when we apply negation to
negation. But it turns out that this is not needed given the other three.). The three rules
are below. I will just state them in terms of the diagrams that you should understand by
now.
[ ~& rule]  ~(A & B)
  / \
~A ~B
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[ ~v rule] ~(A v B)
  ~A
    ~B 
[ ~ rule] ~(A     B 
    A
    ~B 
>>  give the motivation for each of these three, in terms of searching for truth 
assignments
7:2 (of 5) examples  
These rules break sentences of propositional logic down into their parts. This will give us
a manageable way of answering a number of important semantic questions about them.
That  is,  questions  about  the  conditions  under  which  they  are  true  and  false.  These
questions  could  also  be  answered  by  using  truth  tables,  but  truth  tables  get  very
unwieldy  as  the  sentences  become  larger,  while  derivations  can  handle  quite  large
sentences. Derivations appeal to  syntactic properties of sentences, that is, features of
their grammatical structure rather than what they mean. In principle, one could answer
syntactic questions about a sentence without knowing that & means AND, v means OR,
and  so  on,  though  for  normal  human  beings  this  would  not  be  a  natural  way  of
proceeding.
>>  “semantic” originally meant “about signs”.  what is the connection with the present 
use of the word, which is standard in logic, philosophy and linguistics?
>> can we answer grammatical questions about English sentences without knowing what
they mean?  consider “Horton hatches a who.”
  
To see how this works we need some practice. Here are some examples, with a couple of
further ideas.  First a short and simple one, followed by some comments.
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(a) 1   ~(p v q)           
2   ~p & ~q        (1: ~v) 
3    ~p               (2: &)
First comment: I have put line numbers on the left and explanations on the right of
which rules are used. Derivations do not need to have these, but sometimes they make it
clearer what is going on. (Like a REM note in a program.)
Second: The rules apply because ~(p v q) is an instance of the general pattern ~(A v B) and
~p & ~q is an instance of the general pattern A & B. A sentence can be an instance
of several patterns. For example,  ~(p v q) is also an instance of ~A.
Third: We could have made other derivations starting with  ~(p v q).  For example we
could have had ~q at line 3. One reason for doing the derivation this way would be if you
had been asked to show that ~p is a logical consequence of ~(p v q). The derivation does
show this because the only truth assignments that make ~(p v q) true are those that
make the lines that follow it true. This is because the derivation does not branch. 
Now another derivation that is very similar. We are asked to show that
~((pvq) v r) |= ~p . One answer is this  
(b) 1   ~((p v q) v r)      
2    ~(p v q) & ~r  (1: ~v)
3   ~(p v q) (2: &)
4   ~p & ~q (3: ~v)
5        ~p (4: &) 
This time we have applied the rule ~v twice. The first time ~(A v B) is ~((p v q) v r  —so 
A is (p v q) and B is r — and the second time ~(A v B) is  ~p v ~q — so A is p and B is q. 
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Time for a branching derivation. Suppose we are asked to show that p, p  q |= q . We can
respond with this:
(c) 1 p
 2 p     q   
 3   p 
         /      \
 4      ~p     5   q (2: )
      X  
There  are  three  new features  here:  there  is  more  than one premise,  the  derivation
branches and one has an X . (I have also repeated the  p on line 3. This is not really
necessary.) The branching at line 3 follows the   rule. Because of the branch, we should
hesitate to consider the propositions on each branch as consequences of the premises.
(Together  the  branches  will  catch  the  truth  assignments  for  the  premises  they  are
derived from, but each branch need not catch all of them.) BUT on the left branch we
have both a  p and a  ~p. As with search trees, a branch that has any formula and its
negation — both on the same branch, so here on the left branch but not on the right one
— is said to close, and we mark it with an X. No truth assignment can make the formulas
on such a branch true: it would have to make both the formula and its negation true,
which is impossible. So the only truth assignments that make 1 and 2 true are ones that
make the formulas on the right branch true. And that shows that p, p  q  |=  q.  
7:3 (of 5) derivations and logical consequence
We write “~p is a logical consequence of ~(p v q)” as “~(p v q) |= ~p ”. ( |=  is often called
a turnstile. The point of putting |= in colour is so you don’t think it is part of a sentence of
propositional logic. It is a relation between such sentences.) A proposition P is a logical
consequence of a set of assumptions of propositional logic, {A1,...,An}, {A1,...,An}  |= P ,
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when there is a derivation with A1,...,An at its base where A occurs on every branch that
does not close (has no atomic proposition and its  negation,  so no  X).  A is  a logical
consequence  of A1,...,An under  these  conditions  because  every  truth  assignment  that
makes  all  these  assumptions  true  is  described  by  one  branch  or  another  of  the
derivation. So if A is on every branch it is made true by every such truth assignment, so
it  is  a  logical  consequence  of  the  assumptions.  I  have  not  presented  a  formal
mathematical proof of this fact, but you can persuade yourself that is true by noticing
that for each of our rules every truth assignment that makes all the assumptions true
makes one branch or another of the resulting tree true, so sentences that are found on
every branch are made true by all  those assignments.  And when the derivation has
broken  the  molecular  proposition  down  into  its  smallest  atomic  components,  the
branches give truth assignments to those atomic propositions and thus to the molecular
proposition.  (The  derivation  may  reveal  the  conclusion  on  every  branch  before  the
premises are fully broken down into their parts. But then we could continue the branches
until they were fully broken down. This is the idea behind C-derivations, discussed in
section 5 of this chapter.) In systems of logic beyond propositional logic things are not
this simple.
There  are  usually  many  derivations  that  will  show  that  one  sentence  is  a  logical
consequence of some premises.othe These questions often have many right answers.
When you make a derivation you should first be clear about what it is meant to show. At
this stage we are showing that a formula is a logical consequence of given others, so we
need to be clear about what consequence we are aiming at. Later we will show other
facts with derivations. This is an inescapable fact about argument and proof. There are
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many ways of getting from premises to any of their consequences. Every mathematical
theorem has in principle infinitely many proofs, though in fact we get bored with proving
the same result in yet another way.18 And when asked to give an argument or proof from
given premises to a given conclusion it is often not at all obvious what to do, as every
student of mathematics or philosophy, and every lawyer whose client has a very weak
case,  knows.  In  this  course  we  are  more  interested  in  understanding  what  logical
consequence is, and how we show it, than we are in making un-obvious arguments. So it
will  always be possible to make the derivation that is asked for by blundering ahead
blindly and mechanically, though the result may be longer than necessary. Later in the
chapter I explain how to do this. But it is important to see that in the rest of life this is
usually not so. 
>>  what is the difference between a valid argument and a proof?  "proof" is not 
such a very precise term, so think of several things we often mean when we say 
we have proved something.
There is an important principle here: to show that a conclusion is a logical consequence
of  some  premises,  we  can  make  a  derivation  from  those  premises  where  the
consequence is found on all branches of the derivation except those that close.
 
It  is  worth  repeating  here  that  not  all  the  formulas  that  appear  on  a  branch  are
consequences of the premises. But the derivation as a whole can show that a formula is a
consequence, when it is found on all the branches that do not close. This is evident from
the v rule. Neither p nor q is a consequence of p v q, but p is a consequence of p v q, ~q
since the q branch closes. The best way to think of a derivation is as going through all
the  possibilities  given  the  premises.  (Often  when  we  think  we  are  not  trying  to
18 Elisha Loomis’ The Pythagorean Proposition, published by the National Council of Teachers of 
Mathematics contains 370 proofs of the Pythagorean theorem on right angled triangles.
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demonstrate something we think is true, but are exploring what we do not yet know to
be false.)
The consequence can appear on branches that do close, as long as it is found on all un-
closed branches. For example we could show that p v (p & ~p)  |=  p with this derivation
(d) 1  p v (p & ~p)  
  /   \
2 p 5  p & ~p [1: v]
3 6     p
4 7    ~p
       X
In this derivation p is found on the only branch that does not close, and is also found on
a branch that  does close.  The derivation still  shows that p is  a  consequence of  the
premise. And this makes sense as it is like "either it will rain (as the reliable forecast
says)  or  it  will  simultaneously  rain  and  not  rain  (as  crazy  Joe  says).  If  the  first
alternative, then it will rain. And we can ignore the second alternative as it contradicts
itself."
>>  we could also have stopped the derivation at line 6.  it would still have shown that p 
follows from the premise.  and it would still have made sense in a familiar way.  modify 
the crazy Joe argument so that it fits this shorter derivation.
Suppose we are asked to show that  f  t, ~f  t  |=  t . We make this derivation
(e) 1      f  t
2    ~f     t 
  /   \
3 ~f 4  t (1: )
5 /   \
6  ~~f       t (2: )
        X
>>  this derivation corresponds to reasoning we use very frequently.  describe it in 
everyday language.
 
This was a simple derivation, but it raises an important issue. The    rule was used to
branch ~f  t into a ~~f branch and a t branch, the first of which was inconsistent with a
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~f on the same branch that we had already derived. That left us with only branches with
t, so we can conclude that t is a logical consequence of our premises: it is true any way
we try to make the premises true. But, students often worry, why didn’t we also apply
the  rule to premise 2 on the branch with the t as well as the branch with the ~f? Part of
the answer is that we could have, but that it would have made no difference. We would
have got the tree below. 
(f) 1        f  t
2      ~f     t  
   /      \
3 ~f         t    (1:  )
/  \      / \ 
4    ~~f      t   ~~f     t   (2:  )
          X 
Again all the branches without Xs have t. (The branches on the right had t even before
their last branching.) So this tree shows exactly the same logical relationships as the
simpler one.  They are both acceptable derivations, though not every derivation from
these two premises will show t to be a consequence of them. (Keep reading, if you want
a mechanical way of finding the ones that do.) But you may still worry, how do we know
that if we keep applying the rules to an unclosed branch (no X — yet) we will not find a
contradiction? Isn’t there a natural stopping point?
The answer is that we can often go on deriving manically, if we want, making the tree
bigger and bigger. (This becomes even more of a possibility when we introduce the rule
EM below. But there is a natural stopping point, as we will see.) And there is always the
possibility that a hidden contradiction will turn up. But if it does it does, and this does not
deny the fact that  t is on all the unclosed branches. All models for the premises still
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make t true. One way of seeing this is to consider explicitly contradictory premises. First
a one-step derivation
(g)  1  p & ~p   
     p  (&: 1) 
In this derivation the only un-closed branch has p on it. And that is reasonable: if 
p & ~p is true then p is true, because whenever A & B is true, A is true. (But p & ~p isn’t
true, ever.) We can continue the derivation with another line.
1      p & ~p   
  p (&: 1) 
~p (&: 1)
  X
Now the only branch has closed.  So the two-step derivation does not show that p
& ~p  |= p.  But the one-step derivation does.  
>>  “whenever A & B is true, A is true. (But p & ~p isn’t true, ever.)”  isn’t this a
bit puzzling? 
Two more.
(h) ~(h v s), m  s  |=  ~m
1  ~(h v s)
2     m      s       . 
3   ~h & ~s (1: ~v)
      ~s (3: &)
    /     \
~m    s (2:  ) 
   X
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(i) (p v q)   (r v s) , p, ~s  |=  r
 
1    (p v q)  (r v s)  
2    p
3                        ~s                 
    /  \
4 ~(pvq) 5    r v s (1:   ) 
6 ~p & ~q (4:~v)   7  /     \
8 ~p (6: &) r s (5: v)
 X X   
Making short tidy derivations is a knack that comes with practice. But making formally
correct derivations is a completely mechanical business, once you know the rules. The
exercises following this section and at the end of the chapter are meant to give you more
practice and to make the rules automatic. 
Making derivations is a quasi-mathematical activity in this way: there is a purpose and
meaning to the activity but a lot of it is best done automatically though with intelligent
oversight.  What  you  do  is  think  generally  about  the  reasons  why  the  conclusion  is
plausibly taken as a consequence of the premises, and then you let this guide you in
making a formerly correct derivation, which you do just by reflectively following the rules
but choosing them so they fit your general idea. Then after you have done this you check
with a more conscious kind of care that you have really followed the rules. If you have,
then the derivation backs up your earlier intuition that the consequence does follow and
that you have understood why it does. You need both a feeling for why the rules are as
they are and a facility with applying them automatically. Examples (b) (d), (h), (i) are
good for imagining how you would mobilize the skills. Many of the exercises at the end of
the chapter are meant to develop a little more awareness of this process.
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AS YOU GO EXERCISES 1
You could continue reading the next section. But I strongly urge you to wait until you
have  worked  through  this  short  exercise  section.  It  will  convince  you  that  making
derivations  to  show  simple  cases  of  logical  consequence  is  not  hard,  and  that  the
strategic thinking involved is familiar. There are more and more varied exercises at the
end of the chapter.  
1)  Begin with one that we have seen before: a derivation to show that  
f  t,  ~f  t  |=  t   . Since t is the conclusion we are aiming at, we want to make a tree
starting from the two premises where all branches close except ones with t. In the main
text this was done by applying the   rule to the first premise first, but now we are going
to do it by first applying the   rule to the second premise. So we begin
1   f   t
2  ~f   t
and we get our next line from line 2. First, what is its central connective? (Yes, we have
to be clear about these.) 2 is a conditional whose antecedent is a negation. So we need
the   rule, which means branching. So we get this 
1   f   t
2   ~f    t 
/  \
3  __ 4 __ (2:  )  ??  
What goes on lines 3 and 4 in accordance with the   rule? Write it in.
Remember that we want unclosed branches with t: branches with t where there is no ~t,
or any other A and ~A on the same branch. Do we have any now? Yes. And so leave them
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as they are and apply a rule using premise 1 to the remaining branch. (What is the
central connective of 1? So that’s the rule we need.) So we get this  
1   f   t
2  ~f     t          . 
/ \
3  __    4  ___ (2: )  you’ve filled in these two blanks
         /   \
5  __  ___           now fill in these two and add an X to any branch that closes.
Compare the derivation you have made to the one in the answers following the exercises 
at the end of the chapter.
2)  Now one needing a bit of strategy. The problem is to show that
(p & q) v (r & ~q) , q  |=  p   So you want to make a tree starting with these premises and with
p on one or more branches, which you hope will not be closed. How are you going to get to
this p? Which of the premises has a chance of providing it? [Pause and think before going
on.]
Now begin the derivation with that premise. It’s (p & q) v (r & ~q) , because the other
does not even contain p.  Since it is a disjunction there is going to be a branching, and
one of the branches should close and the other should have p.  Which are they?  You will
get this
1  (p & q) v (r & ~q)
2   q                            .  
/ \
3 ____ 4  ____ [v: 1]    - the move that gives you a chance
 of p while the other branch closes.
5   p 6 _____   - something you can get from 4
 that negates the unused premise.
       X 
Compare the derivation you have made to the one in the answers following the exercises 
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at the end of the chapter.
One more, but it asks for two derivations. The  premises (p v q) &( ~p  s) ,  ~p have 
both q and s as consequences. Make derivations showing 
(a) (p v q) &(~p   s),  ~p  |=  q    and 
(b) (p v q) &(~p  s),  ~p  |=  s
The complication is that the strategy is different for (a) and (b).
(a)  (p v q) & (~p  s)
 ~p                             - we want a branch with q, and all others to close.
which premise offers the best chance of this? Central
connective?  use the rule for that.
                    - the result is this. Central connective? Use the rule for
/ \ that.
___  q    
X
(b) 
   (p v q) & (~p  s)
     ~p                   w- we want a branch with s, and all others to close. Which premise
       offers the best chance of this? Central connective? Use the rule for that.
_________ The result is this. Central connective? Use the rule for that.
/ \
   ____   s  What rule do we use now to get s on the right and an X on the left? 
     X  
4)  Now do these two without any hints.
a)  ~(p  q) , q v r |= r
b)  p  (q  r) , p & q  |=  r 
7:4 (of 5) the rule of excluded middle 
We need one more rule. (There is a way of avoiding it, though, for showing  |=  , as 
explained in section 4.)  The rule is “Excluded Middle” 
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    A    (EM).
  /     \
B   ~B   
At first this rule may seem rather puzzling. What has B got to do with A? But note that it
is a branching rule. It does not say that when you have  A you have B, but that the
models for  A can be divided into two kinds, those which satisfy B, and those which do
not. (This is a version of what is called “the law of excluded middle”— there’s nothing in
the middle between truth and falsehood19.)  
>>  what is the connection between the rule EM and the idea that there is nothing
between truth and falsehood?
We need EM because the rules stated so far only allow us to show that conclusions are
logical consequences of premises when they are simpler than them. The derivation works
by taking the premises into pieces. But often a conclusion is got by putting pieces of the
premises together again. For example we might want to show that p, q |= p & q , or that 
p |= p v q . We could make rules that stick pieces of the premises together, but instead we
can do everything with EM.  Consider some examples. 
p, q  |=  p & q 
1   p 
2                      q                   
/ \
3 ~(p & q) 4  p & q (EM)
5 ~p v ~q    (3:~&)
/ \
7   ~p    9  ~q (5: v)
11   p  (1)  13    q (2)
      X  X 
At lines 11 and 13 I have repeated lines 1 and 2. This is not really necessary, but makes
it easier to see why the branches close. To get the feel of this derivation think of it as
saying “ p is true, and so is q. Either p & q is true or it isn’t. If we suppose it is not then
19 There was a tax collecting procedure in 15th century England, involving questions from which 
there was no escape, called "Morton's Fork". Personally, I think of the rule of excluded middle as 
Morton's Fork.
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we get an impossible situation. So it must be true.”  
The rule of EM gets around the problem about complex conclusions because we do not
have to find a way of building up to more complex propositions using rules whose nature
is  to  break down to  simpler  ones.  Instead,  we can break down the negation of  the
conclusion,  and  show  that  its  simpler  parts  contradict  the  premises.  This  will  work
because the truth assignments break into two classes, those that make the conclusion
true and those that make its negation true: if all of the ones that make the negation true
are  ruled  out  by  the  premises,  then  all  the  remaining  truth  assignments  make  the
conclusion true. Thus it is a logical consequence of the premises.
p  |=  pvq  
1           p                    
/ \
2  pvq 3 ~(pvq) (EM)
4 ~p&~q (3: ~v)
5 ~p (4: &)
6 p (1)
X
p  |=  ~~p
1           p           
/   \
2   ~p 4  ~~p (EM)
3   p    (1)
X
Note how in all of these we make a branching using EM and then show how one of these
branches  closes,  leaving  only  the  other  one.  Thinking  which  branches  to  create  can
involve some careful plotting of how you intend to get to your intended result. Note also
how in the first of these two we have a branching within a branching. So both of the sub-
branches have to close for that whole branch to close, leaving the remaining unclosed
branch as the conclusion. To repeat, we will see an automatic way of doing this. But logic
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teachers hope that learning to do it by thinking ahead may make people better at the
strategies of real-life thinking. At any rate, it is practice in thinking of a series of steps
that leads to an end, like playing chess, writing programs, or playing games like Tetris.
>>  why might someone hope that derivations give better practice than these 
alternatives?  might they be wrong?  
As a last example let us prove ~p v ~q |=   ~(p & q) the reverse of the rule (~&). This is
another  part  of  de  Morgan’s  laws:  the  negation  of  a  conjunction  is  a  disjunction  of
negations, and the negation of a disjunction is a conjunction of negations.
1           ~p v ~q                           
/ \
    ~p  ~q (1:v)
/    \   / \
p & q ~(p & q)   (EM) p & q ~(p&q) (EM)
  p     q   
  X   X
Note how this derivation involves two branches, both of which have sub-branches, and 
the conclusion is found on all the non-closed sub-branches. Note too that in it EM is 
applied after the v rule. It is tidier this way, but we could have applied them in the other 
order (see exercise 7.)
Most of the content of this course is easy once you get used to it. This is especially true
of the content of this chapter and the next. But it is essential that you do the exercises
and check the answers, and discuss any difficulties you have in class. 
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AS YOU GO EXERCISES 2
Convince yourself that the material in this chapter is not difficult by doing the following
derivations. They all need EM, because the conclusion is as complex as the premise.
5)  a) ~p v q   |=     p  q
Given that we need EM, the easiest (not the only) way to start is as follows
1  ~p v q   
       /        \
2 p  q   3  ~(p  q) (EM)
(Either the conclusion is true or it isn’t. If it isn’t, we expect some contradiction, given the premise.)
You do not need to do any work on the left branch. If all branches on the right close, then we have 
succeeded. Central connective on the right? What rule?
4____  Write in what you get using this rule. No contradiction yet, but we haven’t 
/    \ used the premise. It’s a disjunction, so the v rule gives branches.
   ___    ___  Write in what the v-rule gives from the premise.
Now we need a contradiction on each of these branches. Look at line 4. Use the rule for its central 
connective, once for each branch.
   ___    ____  Write in the results of this rule, so that there is an X on each branch.
Note: it would have been neater to look ahead at line 4, and put in two lines anticipating
the need for contradictions further down, but this requires more strategic sense. I will
give both solutions in the answers.
b)  p    q  |=   ~p v q
The technique is the same as in a). Make an EM branch at the beginning, into 
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~p v q and ~(~p v q), use the only rule that applies to the latter, use the premise to 
make two branches, and find a contradiction in each.
c) p  |=  ~~p
This  looks  simple  but  there’s  a  trick  to  it.  We want  to  branch to  a  formula  and its
negation, where one is ~~p and the other contradicts p. The naïve way is to do an EM
branch with ~~p and ~~~p and get a contradiction from the latter. But branching to p
and ~p is simpler, shorter, and satisfies the EM rule. Write it out.
7:5 (of 5) other things you can show with a derivation  
Suppose that the task is not to show that one formula is a logical consequence of others,
but just to make derivations, the bigger the better. But there are two restrictions. You
begin the derivations with just one formula, and the next line of a branch must always be
a  part  of  that  beginning  formula.  (This  sounds  like  it  opens  up  confusingly  many
possibilities. But just wait: soon it leads to something mechanical.)
>> how can a derivation use atomic formulas that are not there at the start?
So for example p & (q  (r & p))
p
    (q  (r & p)
 /     \
       ~q r & p
is good, but  p & (q     (r & p)) 
p
   (q  (r & p)
     /     \
(r v p)   ~(r v p) (EM)
is not even part of one, since things start getting bigger again on the last line.
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And this one is not what we are trying to make either:
p & (q     (r & p)) 
p
   (q  (r & p)  
    /  \
   s   ~s (EM)
for although the last line contains formulas that are smaller than the one above it, they 
are not parts of any previous formulas.
If  we make derivations along these lines, they will  always break the starting formula
down into parts, and ultimately into its atomic parts. These can’t be broken down any
further, so the process will stop. Some atomic formulas may get overlooked though, so
now add one more requirement: each branch that does not close must contain every
atomic formula found in the starting formula or its negation. So now our derivations
- begin with just one proposition
- end when we have a derivation tree where each branch that does not close
contains every atomic formula found in the starting proposition, or its negation
Call derivations that satisfy these conditions C-derivations (C for complete). They have
some interesting features. Consider some examples, and what they show about their
starting formulas. A very simple example will suggest a short-cut that helps with more
complicated ones.
          p    q       . 
   /  \
1 ~p    q 
/    \  /    \      
2       q    ~q p    ~p   (EM)    
Notice how EM is used on line 2 to make every branch contain one of p or ~p and one of
q or ~q. But  the  vital  thing  to  notice  is  the  four  branches: ~p—q ,  ~p—~q,
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p—q , and ~p—q . These represent all the combinations of p, q, and their negations
that make  p  q   true. (The combination of ~p and q occurs twice: this method will often
lead to duplicates like this.)  In the previous chapter (ch 6) we discussed disjunctive
normal forms, and C-derivations give a simple way of getting them: p  q is equivalent
to (~p & q) v (~p & ~q) v (p & q) . This is simply the disjunction of the branches of the
derivation, conjoining the atomic formulas and their negations on each and leaving out
the repeated disjunct. The equivalence makes sense given that the formulas on each
branch are true in all truth-assignments that make the formulas above them on the same
branch true and that when a branch splits into two all truth assignments that make the
formula before the split true also make one of the formulas on the two splits true. (This
is just a hint how you might prove the equivalence carefully, a large part of what is
known as the completeness of propositional logic, but it should be intuitively plausible.
Exercise 13 at the end of the chapter asks for a real proof.) 
We can now say how to make C-derivations mindlessly, no strategy needed. These can be
unwieldy monsters, though, and while you can do them without looking ahead it can be
easy to get lost in the details half way through. (There is a basic trade-off in our thinking
here.) Start with the premise proposition, and use the &, V,  , and ~ rules whenever
they apply. When you have done this as much as you can, apply EM for any atomic
proposition appearing in that premise on any branch on which that atomic proposition
does not appear. The result will often be a large ugly mess, but it will have an unclosed
branch for every truth assignment that makes the premise true. It will be a truth table in
disguise. By the end of the next chapter you should understand how these mechanical
derivations  can  show  many  things  about  Boolean  propositions  and  the  connections
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between them. But I recommend trying to make derivations by thinking ahead. It will
teach you more about reasoning.    
Now  for  some  more  interesting  examples.  I  discuss  three,  which  illustrate  some
important points.
A           p     (q    r)      .      
/     \ 
    ~p    q  r  
  / \ /     \
q  ~q      ~q       r
        /  \       /  \  /     \   /  \
      r    ~r     r   ~r p     ~p  p   ~p
        /  \    /  \       /  \   /  \
       r   ~r  r   ~r    q  ~q     q   ~q
This  shows  that  the  truth-assignments  that  make p   (q   r) true  are  ~p—q—r,  
~p—q—~r  ,  p—~q—r  ,  ~p—~q—~r  ,p—~q—r, p—~q—~r,  p—q—r, and  p—~q—r  . (I am
using the "—" as a way of picturing the branch while giving the atomic propositions that
the truth assignment makes true.)  
>> what truth-assignment is not on this list?  check that p   (q  r) is false on it.
>>  when would we use an English sentence corresponding to p  (q  r) ?  what 
words would we be likely actually to use? 
B p  (r  q )    .
/      \ 
    ~p            r  q  
/       \    /   \  
       q ~q   ~r     q
     /  \ /  \ /   \ /       \
    r   ~r       r    ~r          p      ~p          p        ~p
        / \     / \       / \      / \
       q  ~q   q  ~q   r  ~r   r  ~r
This shows that the truth-assignments that make p  (r  q) true are ~p—q—r ,
~p—q—~r , ~p—~q—r, ~p—~q—~r , p—q—~r, ~p—q—~r, p—q—r, and p—q—~r. If we 
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compare this to A we find some overlap: both p  (q  r) and  p  (r  q)are true on the 
assignments p—q—r , p—~q—r , p—~q~r ,~p—q—r, ~p—q—~r, and ~p—~q—r. But the 
assignment  p—q—~r   makes p  (r   q) is true while p  (q  r) is false, and p—r—~q makes
p  (q   r )  true while  p  (r  q)  false.
>> find corresponding English sentences for which p  ( r   q ) is true while 
p   ( q  r ) is false, and for which p   ( q   r ) is true while p  ( r  q )  is false. 
Propositions like p  (q  r) (from A) and p  (r  q) (from B) are said to be logically
independent: either can be true while the other is false. Contrast this with the relation
between  p  (q  r), and (p v q )  r . Here is a C-derivation for (p v q )  r:
        (  p   v q)    r  
    /       \
~(p v q)        r
~p & ~q     /     \
~p    p     ~p (EM)
~q    /  \      /  \
/  \  q  ~q   q  ~q (EM)
         r    ~r (EM)
(p v q)  r is true in ~p—~q—r, ~p—~q—~r, p—q—r, p—~q—r, and ~p—q—r. This list is
included in the list for  p  (q r). That means that if p (q  r)  is true under a truth
assignment then (p v q)  r is also true. In other words  p  (q  r)  |=  (p v q)  r . This
gives us another way to show that A |= B : we can give C-derivations of A and of B and
note that the branches of A are among those of B . In the next chapter we will see other
ways of showing  |= ; there are many. (If you find it surprising that 
p  (q  r)  |=  (p v q)  r it may help to know that p  (q  r) is equivalent to (p & q) r).
See also exercise 10 of this chapter. 
Now compare (p v q)  r to  p & ~r  .  Here is a C-derivation for p & ~r.
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C  p & ~r
   p
  ~r
 /  \
q   ~q
So the  truth-assignments  for  p  &  ~r  ,  using  the  atomic  formulas p,  q,  r and  their
negations, are p—q—~r and p—~q—~r. These do not overlap with the truth assignments
for (p v q)  r , but they do not include all the truth assignments that make (p v q)  r
false. As a result they cannot both be true, but they can both be false, for example when
p is false  q is true and r is false. Pairs like this are called contraries (think of lions and
camels: nothing can be both a lion and a camel, but many things are neither.) Contraries
are different from contradictories, where one is true if and only if the other is false (lions
and non-lions).  
>>  what was the point of the proviso “using the atomic formulas p, q, r and their 
negations”?
We can show other  things using  C-derivations.  When the  branches for  a proposition
include all the truth-assignments for its atomic propositions and their negations, it is a
tautology, true on all lines of its truth table. When all branches close, it is a contradiction.
(In everyday English “tautology” means “triviality”,  but philosophers are interested in
propositions that are true in all  models because they can safely be assumed in  any
context.)  There  are  exercises  at  the  end  of  this  chapter  on  telling  contraries  from
contradictories,  recognising  tautologies  and  contradictions,  and  in  general  on  getting
familiar with derivations and what they can show.
words used in this chapter that it would be a good idea to understand:
branch,  C-derivation, closed branch, conditional rule (  ), consistent, 
contradiction, deduction, conjunction rule (&), derivation, disjunction rule (v),  
excluded middle(EM), negation rules, tautology, turnstile ( |= ).
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exercises for chapter seven
Because of the as-you-go exercises in the chapter, there is no division into Core and
More. However there is repetition between the exercises. 6 covers the same ground as 5,
and if either of 1 or 2 is no problem, the other is unlikely to be. But there is a section of
harder exercises at the end.
1)  Below are four derivations.  Mark each as follows:  
- whenever a branch closes with an X indicate (e.g. by drawing lines) what two 
previous lines on that branch contradict one another
- at each line write in the rule that is used to get it and the lines it is got from
-  if the derivation shows that a conclusion follows from the premises circle the 
conclusion.  
  p   q (p v q)    (r  v s)  
  p v r   p
  ~r                   ~s                      
  / \ /  \
~p  q      ~(pvq) r v s
/   \  /   \     ~p & ~q /     \
p  r p   r        ~p       r       s
    X      X         X       X
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~( p & (q  r) ) p  q
~p     q             q  r
~p v ~( q r) p & s
  /    \   p 
  ~p   ~( q  r)   s
   /   \    q & ~ r          / \
~~p   q q    ~p   q
   X     X /   \
   ~q   r
X
2)     Fill in the gaps in the derivations below
A 
1  p v q
2  ~(r v p)
3  ~r & ~p   [       ]
[3,. &]
                    [3, &]
     /     \  
   p               [1, v]
   X        
B
1 ~ p  ~q
2    q       .
/   \
               [1, ]
          X
C
1     p v q
2     r v  s
3  ~(p & r)
4    ~ q       .
5                    [3, ~&]
     /         \      
                        [1, v]
   /  \         X
             [5, v]
  X   /  \
               [2, v]
      X    
D
1  p  q
2  ~((p & r )     q ) 
3  (p&r) & ~q     [2, ~ ]
4                         [3, &]
5                         [3, &]
                           [4, &]
                           [ 4, &]
/    \
                          [1, ]
   X      X
E
1    p    . 
    /    \  
~~p  [EM]
   X       
F
1         p    q   . 
             /   \     
p  (q v r)  ~( p  (q v r))  [EM]
                 2                        [~ ]
                 3                        [2, &]
                 4    ~(q v r)        [2, &]
                 5                         [4, ~v]
[5, &]
                          /   \
                                            [ 1, ]
                        X      X
3)  Make derivations to show the following.  None of them need the rule EM.   
(a)  (p v q) v r , ~p, ~q  |=  r 
(b) p v (q v r) , ~(q v r)   |=  ~p
There are two natural ways of doing this derivation: try to find both. 
Give an interpretation of this in terms of an everyday argument that someone might
actually make. In fact, do this for all of these.
(c) p   q, q  r, p   |=  r
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(d)  p v q , p  (s&~s)  |=  q
Think of this as a version of "one of these two things is true, but if the second were 
true, we'd have a contradiction, so .... ".
(e)  p  q,  q  ~p  |=  ~p 
This won't seem surprising to you once you've thought of an everyday example.
(f)  p  q,  p  ~q  |=  ~p 
Very similar to (e).
5)  Derivations that need the rule EM. They go from the simple to the moderately 
complicated. 
a) ~p v q |=  p  q
b)  p  q |=  p v q
c)  ~(p  q) |=  q  p
(this and the next three are properties of  that can seem surprising, if you are 
thinking in terms of the English "if".)
d)  p |=  ~p  p
e)  p |=  ~p  q
f) ~( p q) |= q  p
g) p  (q  r)  |=  q (p  r)
h) p  (q  r)  |=  (p & q )  r
i) (p v q)  r  |=  (p  r) v (q  r)
j)  (p v q) & r  |=  (p & r) v (q & r)
k) (p & q) & (p  (q  r))  |=  r 
6)    make derivations to show the following: 
p & q, ~( p & r) |= ~r 
p v q , p  r , q  r  |=  r
p  q , q  r , ~r  |=  ~p  
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7)  Make a derivation to show ~p v ~q  |=   ~(p & q)  in which, unlike the one in the 
chapter the v rule is used before EM.
8)  Facts: one of three roads, A, B, C leads to the treasure. If you take A you will pass a
pit of cobras and giant spiders. If you take B you will go through a forest of wolves and
bears. If you take C you will either get to a mansion inhabited by enraged zombies or you
will be stopped by a choir of angels singing songs of warning. If you do not meet any
spiders then you have been cursed by your mother. If you do not meet any bears then
you have been cursed by your father. If you do not meet any angels then you will have
been cursed by our true love. You will not find the treasure if you have not been cursed.
Which  road  leads  to  the  treasure?  Solve  this  problem  by  representing  the  linked
possibilities  with  letters,  representing  the  facts  as  Boolean  formulas,  and  making
derivations to show which are really possible. The method is as important as the answer  
9)  a) make C-derivations for the following. (They all have just two atomic propositions,
so they will not get very big.) 
i)  (p   (q   p )) ii)  (p  q ) & (p & ~q) iii)  (p  q ) v (q   p )
iv)  (p &~p)  q v)  (p  q ) & (q  p )
(b) these C-derivations show that some of the formulas in (a) are tautologies, some 
contradictions, and some neither.  Which is which?
10)  Here are four pairs of formulas. One pair are contradictories (if either is true the
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other is false), one pair are contraries (they cannot both be true, but they could both be
false), one pair are logically equivalent, and one is a logical consequence of the other.
Show, with C-derivations, which is which.
(i)  p & q , p & ~q  
(ii) p & q , p  q
(iii) p & q , p  q
(iv) p  ( q  r ) , (p & q)  r
11)  We call attributes contrary and contradictory, too: contrary when they cannot both
apply to something, and contradictory when if one applies the other does not. Which of
the following pairs are contraries, and which contradictories?
(a)  green, red (b)  even, odd (c)  vertebrate, invertebrate
(d) vegetarian, carnivorous (e)  democracy, dictatorship
Harder
12)  (a) make derivations showing that
(i) (p & q)  r is equivalent to (p  r) v (q  r)
(ii). (p v q)  r  is equivalent to  (p  r) & (q   r) 
(b) one of these is intuitively rather surprising. Which and why? 
(c)  do  these  equivalences  suggest  an  explanation  of  why  people  often  confuse
conjunction and disjunction, and a very small change in context makes one rather than
the other more natural?
13)  Describe how to make a derivation that goes on forever.
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14)  (for mathematicians) Prove by induction on the construction of well-formed 
propositions that the branches of a C-derivation for any proposition give its disjunctive 
normal form.
15)  (for philosophers) Show with a derivation that   p & ~p |= q .  Anything is a logical
consequence of a contradiction. (Do you see why can be given this interpretation?) In
what ways is this believable and in what ways implausible? Does it help to distinguish
between logical consequence and reasonable ways of arguing?
SOLUTIONS TO THE AS YOU GO EXERCISES
All of these have other solutions, too. If you are unsure whether your solution is correct, 
ask.
1)
1   f   t
2  ~f    t 
/ \
3   ~ ~f    4     t (2:  ) 
   /    \
~f     t
  X
2) 
1   (p & q) v (r & ~q)
2 q                           . 
/ \
3 p & q 4  r & ~q____ [v: 1] 
5    p 6  ~q  
     X 
3)
(a)
1 (p v q) & (~p  s)
2  ~p                 .
p v q [1: &]
/ \
       p q    
X 
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(b) 1 (p v q) & (~p  s)
  2           ~p                  
    ~p  s  [1: &]
/      \
    ~~p s
      X   
4) a)  1  ~(p  q) 
  2   q v r     
p & ~q   [1: ~  ]
~q       
/   \
         q       r [2: v]
        X
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b) . one way another way
1 p  (q  r) 1 p  (q  r)
2   p & q                     2   p & q 
   p [2: &] / \
   q [2: &]      ~p q  r [1: ]
/ \         p  [2: &] / \
    ~p q  r [1: ]          X  ~q   r
     X /  \    q [2: &]
      ~q      r    X
       X
5) a) 1  ~p v q   
    /    \
        p  q ~(p  q) (EM)
p & ~q
p
q
      /     \
  ~p      q
    X      X
b) 1 p  q 
/ \
~p vq ~(~p v q) (EM)
~~p & ~q [~v]
~~p [&]
~q [&]
/   \
      ~p       q [1:   ] 
        X X
c)      p  . 
/ \
~p ~~p [EM]
 X
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chapter eight: direct and indirect argument 
8:1 (of 5) getting arguments from other arguments
The main topic of this chapter is how we can simplify arguments, the discovery that a 
conclusion is a logical consequence of premises, by including our information the fact 
that a type of argument is valid. There will be many examples of this. A related topic is 
the contrast between arguments that branch, as many of the derivations do, and 
arguments that proceed in a step-by-step linear fashion. 
First to rehearse the rules consider or reconsider the four basic consequence relations
centering  on  IF.  I  give  derivations  showing  that  the  rules  do  produce  logical
consequences. Parts of these derivations are marked in blue; this will be relevant soon.
  p
  p  q  .
  /   \
~p         q
X
p, p  q  |=  q 
(modus ponens) 
  ~q
  p  q  .
  / \  
~p  q
  X   
~q, p  q  |=  ~p
(modus tollens)   
   p  q
   q   r     . 
   / \
p  r    ~(p  r)     (EM)
 p & ~r
  p
  ~r
/     \
~p    q
X    /  \
   ~q    r
     X    X
p  q , q  r  |=  p  r
(transitivity of IF)
       p   q           .. 
  / \
~q  ~p    ~(~q  ~p)
   ~q & ~~p
   ~q
  /     \
~p q
X X   
p  q |= ~q  ~p
(contraposition)
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These are basic uses of the derivation rules. If you are even a little bit uncertain of them
you should ask a question in class. You should be able to say which rule is used on every
line. They all have two premises and the branches that lead to their conclusion are short.
If we used them as basic rules instead of the rules that we stated in the previous chapter
we could have had a system where derivations do not branch. But that would have
brought other complications. One small complication is that any such rule will need two
premises to derive one conclusion, while the rules in the previous chapter each had a
single premise as input. 
>>  give examples of persuasive everyday arguments fitting the patterns of modus 
ponens, modus tollens, transitivity of IF, and contraposition
>>  one of these rules can be got from the others.  which?
>>  give an example of a valid rule involving two premises and v, but no branching
>>  these derivations involve branching.  so why could the rules be part of a system 
where derivations do not branch?  (if you do not see why, you should ask.)
Of these, the derivation of the transitivity of IF was the longest. Here is another approach
to it, with a C-derivation but one that uses three premises. Note that the part in blue is
the same as in the earlier derivation.
  p  q
  q  r    .
~(p    r)      
 p & ~r
    p      
  ~r  
 / \
     ~p q
 X /    \
        q        r
      X         X
All the branches close. That means that there are no truth assignments that make all
three premises t rue. Now — this is a subtle piece of reasoning of a kind that occurs
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several times in this chapter — consider a truth assignment that makes the first two
premises true, call it T. There is no truth assignment that makes all three premises true,
as the derivation shows. So  T in particular does not make all three true, but it does
make the first two true. Therefore it must make the third premise false. But to make that
first premise, ~(p   r) , false, it must make p   r  true. So any truth assignment that
makes p  q and q  r  true must also make p  r true.
The conclusion of this reasoning is not very surprising. But it illustrates an important 
principle: 
If there is no truth assignment making all of a set of propositions true, then the 
negation of any one of them is a logical consequence of the others. 
>>  but what if the "others" are inconsistent all by themselves?  does this make a 
problem? 
Compare  the  derivation  from the  three  premises  in  which  all  branches  close  to  the
derivation of the negation of the third premise from the other two. You'll see that the
biggest sub-tree is the same in both of them. You can transform either derivation into the
other just by shifting this part of the three-premise derivation to the EM part of the two-
premise one. This illustrates another important principle:
A derivation with premises A1, A2, ..., An  in which all branches close can be 
transformed mechanically into a derivation with premises A1, A2, ..., An-1 in which 
only branches with ~An do not close.  
.>>  take some particular everyday argument that assuming some things are true, some
other proposition has to be false.  turn it into an argument that if we made those 
assumptions and also that this proposition is true, then we would get contradictory 
conclusions.
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8:2 (of 5)  linear and branching arguments
The examples in the previous section focused on reasoning with conditionals to prepare
for a contrast between linear arguments, that go straight from premises to conclusions,
and branching or indirect arguments that go from premises to several possibilities, some
of which are then ruled out by other premises. In the history of philosophy and logic,
most attention has been paid to linear reasoning. In fact it has often been assumed that
all reasoning has to be like this. (Mathematical proofs are usually presented as linear
sequences, and of course when we speak one sentence follows another, even if in making
sense of it we reconstructed as a branching structure. I suspect that some philosophers
have liked the image of the domineering intellectual, who forces you to a destination
prepared in advance along a carefully mapped-out path. No deviations permitted.) Begin
with some examples of linear arguments, and derivations that correspond to them.
LINEAR VERSION BRANCHING VERSION
1)  if it rains the dam will burst
2)  if the dam bursts the village will flood
3)  if the village floods people will drown
4)  (just seen the forecast)  it will rain     
5) the dam will burst (3, 1: modus ponens)
6) the village will flood (5, 2: modus ponens)
7) people will drown (6, 3: modus ponens)
  r  b
  b  f
  f  d 
  r    
   / \
~r      b
 X   /     \
 ~b       f
  X  /  \
~f    d
 X
>>  make a shorter argument from these premises to this conclusion using transitivity of
IF together with modus ponens 
LINEAR VERSION BRANCHING 
VERSION
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1)  if it rained the dam burst
2)  if the dam burst the village flooded
3)  if the village flooded people drowned
4)  (just read the news) no one drowned
5) the village did not flood   (4, 3: modus tollens)
6) the dam did not burst   (5, 2: modus tollens )
7) it did not rain
r  b
b  f
f  d
          ~d         
         / \ 
   ~f  d
  / \ X   
~b f
  /    \   X  
~r  b
         X      
From these examples we can see that arguments that proceed directly without branching
from premises to conclusions can be transformed into branching arguments, as long as
enough of the branches can be eliminated (closed). And we can see a tendency for linear
arguments to use rules that draw on more than one premise.
>>  why just "a tendency"?  are there exceptions?
These transformations make sense of some patterns of argument that we frequently use.
In the previous section we saw how we can transform an argument that some premises 
have no model into an argument that the negation of one of them follows from the 
others. These were both branching derivations in the examples, but note how the basic 
principle applies to examples such as the following.
1)  if it rained the dam burst
2)  if the dam burst the village flooded
3)  if the village flooded people drowned
4)  no one drowned
5)  (suppose for the sake of argument that) it rained
6)  the village did not flood (4, 3: modus tollens)
7)  the dam did not burst (5, 2: modus tollens )
8)  it did not rain
but (8) contradicts (5) therefore
9)  it did not rain 
This  argument  has  two  parts.  In  the  first  part  we  show  that  1)—5)  lead  to  a
contradiction, and then in the second part we build on this to show that 1)—4) lead to
the negation of 5), that is, 8). But why is this a good way of arguing? Why does it give
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true conclusions when the premises are true? The reason is given by the principle above:
when a set of premises has no model, any one of them is a consequence of the others.
This  is  called  an  argument  (or  proof)  by  contradiction,  or  sometimes  a  reductio  ad
absurdum. (There are a lot of Latin phrases in logic. Logic has changed enormously in
the past hundred years, but it has a long history and so some of the terminology goes
way back.) We often use arguments like this. One reason is that we can often describe
the features some individual or situation would have to have if some assumption were
true, so if we can then show that these features are impossible we can conclude that the
assumption is false. This is a particularly appealing move in mathematics, where we can
say “suppose there is an x such that ... ” and then derive a contradiction, proving that
there is no such x. The most famous such argument is the proof that there is no greatest
prime number, which begins by supposing that there is a n such that n is prime and no
number greater than n is also prime. We then prove that n!+1 must also be prime,
contradicting  the  assumption.  A  simpler  argument  shows  that  there  is  no  greatest
integer. Suppose that numbers got no bigger than some n. But then n+1 (or 2n, or n!)
would all be bigger than n, so we would have both p (n is the biggest) and ~p (some
numbers are bigger than n.)
>>  but the contradiction cannot follow from that greatest number assumption alone.  we
have to assume also that, for example, 2n is always greater that n.  does this open up a 
loophole in the proof, so there could be a greatest integer after all?
Arguments by contradiction are  indirect arguments. They show that a conclusion is a
consequence of some premises not by deriving it directly from them but by showing that
a different argument leads from related premises to a related conclusion. We use indirect
arguments a lot. Sometimes they make it easier for us to get an intuitive grip on what is
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being argued for  and how the argument supports it.  And sometimes they make the
argument simpler, for example by avoiding too many branchings. They can allow a linear
step-by-step argument to do the work of a more confusing branching argument.     
8:3 (of 5)  other indirect arguments
Argument by contradiction is not the only form of indirect argument. In this section I
describe three more. As it happens, we can associate each with a Boolean connective:
argument by contradiction with NOT, and the argument forms described below with NOT,
AND, OR, and IF, each one working because of an important feature of the relation of
logical consequence. 
With IF we can use the method of  conditional argument (sometimes called  conditional
proof.) Informal conditional arguments like the following are very common.
Suppose that the earth's population continues to increase and that we manage to
feed everyone for the next century. Each kg of meat needs 16 kg of animal feed,
so it will not be efficient, or even possible, to do this by feeding everyone meat. So
supposing that there is not mass starvation, we won't be eating much meat.
The “supposing” in the conclusion is a disguised conditional: if not starvation then not
meat. The argument is an argument, not a proof: its assumptions could be challenged.
But  now the  important  point  is  that  it  starts  with  some  assumptions,  including  the
assumption that there is not going to be starvation, gets to a temporary conclusion that
we will consume little meat, and then moves to the weaker conclusion that IF there is no
starvation  there  will  not  be  much  meat.  This  final  conclusion  does  not  need  the
assumption that there will not be starvation, for it just asserts that assuming, rightly or
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wrongly, that there will  be no starvation then we should not expect much meat. The
conditional conclusion might be what we mean to persuade the audience of. But it might
also be that we intended to argue for the stronger, non-conditional conclusion, but the
audience would not accept the assumption of non-starvation. Then we can back-track
and say “well, at any rate you’ll accept that if there is no starvation then we’ll be eating a
lot less meat.”
As with an argument by contradiction, conditional argument links both to a fact about
logical consequence and a way in which derivations can be transformed. The fact is this:
If a conclusion C is a logical consequence of some premises then the conditional
with one of them as antecedent and C as consequent is a logical consequence of
the remaining premises.
 If  A1, A2, ..., An   |=  C , then A1, A2, ..., An-1  |=  An  C 
To see that this fact is so, suppose that C is true in all truth assignments in which A1,
A2, ..., An   are true. Now consider a truth assignment in which A1, A2, ..., An-1 are true.
Either An is true in this truth assignment or it is not. If it is then all of A1, A2, ..., An are
true in the truth assignment and so An   C is also true. If it is not then An   C is true
since An  is false. Either way, An   C  is true in the truth assignment.   
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To see the transformation, consider an example. Here is a derivation of r from p & q and 
p  (q  r)   .
   p & q
p     (q   r)  
     p
     q
  / \ 
~p  q  r 
 X   /  \
~q r
X
And here is a derivation of (p & q)  r from p  (q  r ) alone. 
   p    (q   r )   
/ \ 
(p & q)  r ~((p & q)  r) (EM)
   (p & q)& ~r
p & q
p
q
~r
/       \ 
   ~p      q  r 
       X      /    \
 ~q    r
    X    X
Notice how the second derivation adapts the first one by using EM so that all further
branches close from the negation of the conditional we want to derive. We can always do
this to get a derivation of a conditional conclusion from one fewer premise. Exercises 4)
and 5) give more examples of this transformation, and after doing them you should be
able to write out the transformed derivation whenever the technique applies.  
>> this transformation suggests that conditional arguments can be seen as a special 
case of argument by contradiction.  say more about this.
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The  next  form  of  indirect  argument  is  associated  with  OR.  I  will  call  it  disjunctive
argument.  Like  conditional  argument  it  allows  us  to  weaken  the  premises  of  an
argument, so we can back off a bit, not assuming so much. But unlike both argument by
contradiction and conditional argument it builds on two arguments and combines them
into one. The general fact is this.
disjunctive argument:
If C is a logical consequence of some premises plus the additional premise A, and 
C is also a logical consequence of the same premises plus B, then C is a logical 
consequence of these premises plus A v B .
If  A1, A2, ..., An , A  |=  C  and  A1, A2, ..., An , B |=  C 
then A1, A2, ..., An, A v B  |=  C 
One time we use this style of indirect argument is when we know we can get a conclusion
from either of  two assumptions,  but we are not sure which of  these assumptions is
correct.  So we retreat  to  “one of  them must  be right,  and as long as  either  is  the
conclusion holds.” For example
Bea plans to come to campus tomorrow, and if she does then she will drop by and
tell you what she thinks of your plan. So be prepared to be roundly criticised by a
fierce lady. There has been a lot of flu around lately, which would keep her at
home. But supposing she is ill and stays home, she will still have internet access,
so a blistering email is sure to find you. Either way, you are going to be the target
of sharp criticism.
Disjunctive  argument  can  also  be  described  in  terms  of  a  way  derivations  can  be
transformed. And again I  am going to give an example that should let  you see the
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general pattern. We start with two derivations.
p  r
q  r
r  s  
      p     .
       /   \
 ~p r
   X      /  \
        ~r    s
          X 
p  r, q  r, r  s, p  |=  s
p  r
q  r
r  s  
    q     .
    /   \
~q   r
  X /    \
      ~r         s
        X
p  r, q  r, r  s, q  |=  s
We can combine these two into a single derivation, combining the two third premises p 
and q into a single  premise p v q.  
  p  r
  q  r
  r  s  
  p v q    .
/ \
        p     q
  /     \   / \
~p  r ~q    r
  X     /  \  X /    \
      ~r      s          r   s
       X         X     
p  r, q  r, r  s, p v q  |=  s
It is clear what we have done. In the combined derivation we have used the disjunction p
v q with the OR rule to branch into two sub-trees, each of which is the same as one of
the two original derivations and each of which has s on all its non-closed branches. (All
the same, you should make sure that you see how each step of all three is in accord with
the derivation rules.) 
>>  disjunctive argument can, in a way, do the work of our original branching OR rule, 
without branching.  explain.
One more indirect argument form, again one that takes two logical consequences and
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combines  them.  I  shall  call  it  conjunctive  argument.  The  idea  is  that  when  we can
conclude C from some premises and also conclude D from the same premises, then we
can conclude C & D from them. (This is hardly surprising.) For example we might argue
I’m sure you are going to lose your job. You took the boss’s car keys away from 
him when he was too drunk to drive. He hates people seeing his failings and while 
he cannot fire you for that there are many other reasons he can invent. I expect 
your house is going to be repossessed, too. The boss is a director of the bank that 
holds the mortgage, and his vindictiveness knows no bounds. So this time next 
month you will be jobless and homeless.
Stating the principle more formally, it is 
conjunctive argument:
If  A1, A2, ..., An   |=  C  and  A1, A2, ..., An   |=  D 
then A1, A2, ..., An    |=  C & D 
For an example of how to combine two derivations in accordance with the principle, 
consider these two
    ~ p   
    /    \
p   q      ~(p   q) (EM)
    p & ~q
       p
       X
~p  |=  p   q
~
    ~ p   
    /    \
r  p      ~(r   ~p) (EM)
      r & ~~p
~ ~p
   X
~p  |= r   ~p
These can be combined to get ~p |= ( p   q) & (r   ~p)
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             ~p             
/ \
( p   q) & (r   ~p ) ~((p   q) & (r   ~p ))
~(p   q) v ~(r   ~p )
     / \
~(p  q) ~(r  ~p )
 p & ~q    r & ~~p
    p     ~~p
  X     X
As with the others, comparing the parts with the same colors should show you how the
combining works. And as with the others there are relevant exercises at the end of the
chapter. Note that conjunctive argument and conditional argument give ways of getting
conclusions that are not atomic. And note that argument by contradiction, conjunctive
argument,  and  conditional  argument  introduce  a  more  complicated  conclusion,  while
disjunctive argument introduces a more complicated premise.)
Indirect arguments are got by combining direct arguments. All my examples have been
of combining complete and correct derivations. It is worth pointing out, though, that we
often  combine  direct  arguments  that  are  much less  formal  and  precise  into  indirect
arguments. For example we can reason very informally that an assumption leads to a
ridiculous conclusion, and then say "so it has to be wrong". Or we can have loose non-
deductive reasons for believing that each of two assumptions would support a conclusion,
and then say "so if we assume just that one of these is right, we can get this answer. We
don’t have to decide which one it is.”
8:4 (of 5) consistency and independence  
We have seen how to use derivations to show that a conclusion is a logical consequence
of a set of sentences, and how to show that a set of sentences is inconsistent, having no
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model. These are closely related, since a conclusion is a logical consequence of premises
if the set of the premises and the negation of the consequence, is inconsistent.
>>  why the negation of the conclusion?
>>  the discussion has been in terms of truth assignments.  but it is full models rather 
than truth assignments that are most relevant to whether a real English sentence is true 
or false.  would the considerations of this chapter transferred smoothly to a vocabulary of
models?
There  are  other  logical  properties  of  sets  of  sentences,  and  derivations  can give  us
information about them. The most basic is consistency, sharing a truth assignment. For
example the set {p  q, p  ~q } is, perhaps surprisingly, consistent. If we make a C-
derivation for it we find this
1    p  q
2              p    ~  q            
        /   \
   ~p        q (1: )
       / \    /    \
  ~p ~q   ~p     ~q (2: )      
  /   \ /   \ /    \     /     \  
q    ~q q   ~q       q    ~q    p   ~p (EM)
X X     X
The unclosed branches give three truth-distributions, one in which  p is false and  q is
true, and one in which p is false and q is false, and one in which both are false. Both
formulas are true in all three of these.
>>  but there are four unclosed branches.  so why are there only three truth 
distributions? 
Surprising combinations of sentences can be logically consistent, especially when there is
an improbable but logically possible situation in which they are all true. So, sticking with
the same example, “If  I like someone I’ll  always give them a present” and “If I like
someone I’ll never give them a present” can both be true as long as I don’t like anyone.
There are many examples in the history of science and philosophy where combinations
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that were thought to be too unlikely to consider, or even contradictory, turned out to be
possible  or  even  true.  Examples  are  curved  space,  time  with  no  beginning,  voting
situations where everyone’s preference is weighted the same but no one gets what they
want, or mental decisions that always accompany action but do not cause it. 
Another property of sets of sentences is independence. One sentence is independent of
others when there is at least one model which makes both it and the others true and  at
least one model which makes it false and the others true. The truth value of the sentence
is independent of them. An example that is important in the history of mathematics is
the independence of the parallel postulate (that through any point there is exactly one
line parallel to a given line) from the other axioms of Euclidean geometry. Geometers
spent a lot of time trying to prove that the parallel postulate was a logical consequence of
the others, until they found models in which all the other axioms are true and there are
many or no lines through some points parallel to some lines. This led to the study of non-
Euclidean geometries, which according to Einstein’s theory of General Relativity describe
the true structure of space-time. (A simple example of such a model is the surface of the
earth, where all the longitudes going through the poles are parallel. This gives a model in
three dimensions of a two dimensional non-Euclidean geometry.) 
The example of non-Euclidean geometry made the strategy of showing that one sentence
is independent of others, by giving a model for them in which it is not true, important in
mathematics and elsewhere in science. And it stimulated the related ideas of a model
and of formal derivation in logic. Independence and consistency are closely related ideas,
since consistency, the existence of a model, is associated with not being able to derive a
contradiction from the sentences, and independence is associated with not being able to
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derive one sentence from the others. A different way of putting it is that one sentence S*
is independent of others S1, ..., Sn when the sets  {S1, ..., Sn, S*} and {S1, ..., Sn, ~S*}
are  both  consistent.  You  can  assert  or  deny  S*  while  asserting  the  others  without
contradicting yourself. 
>>  why are these different ways of saying the same thing?
Here are two examples that show the independence of one Boolean proposition from
others. First, trivially to get the idea across, p is independent of the disjunction p v q.
The two truth distributions that (a) assign T to both p and q , (b) assign F to p and T to q
both make the disjunction  true, but one makes p true and the other makes p false. For a
more interesting example consider the independence of r v q from {p  q, r   p}. (It is
more  interesting  because  all  the  propositions  are  molecular,  and  there  are  atomic
propositions  in  common  between  the  independent  proposition  and  the  set  it  is
independent of.) Independence here can be shown with a pair of  C-derivations.
For one direction of independence:
 r v q
p  q
                    r      p               
/ \
     r       q
  / \ / \
~p   q      ~p  q
        /     \     /   \     /   \ /   \
      ~r      p   ~r    p   ~r      p     p      ~ p
       X      X     X   X  X     /  \    /   \
       r    ~r   r   ~r
This gives us three truth distributions, p— q—r, p—q—~r, and ~ p—q—~r, where all three
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propositions are true.
In the other direction:     
~(r v q)
p  q
          r      p       
~r & ~q
   ~r
   ~q
 / \
    ~p   q
/ \    X
      ~r   p
   X  
This gives us just one truth distribution,  ~p—~q—~r,  where the disjunction is false and 
the other two are true. But one in each direction is all you need to show independence.
8:5 (of 5) consistency and problem-solving 
With truth-distributions for Boolean propositions, there is a simple connection between
derivations  and  truth  distributions.  Propositional  logic  is complete,  meaning  that
whenever one sentence is a logical consequence of a set of others there is a derivation
showing this fact. Moreover all the models that are needed to show consequence and
independence can be represented as truth-distributions over finite numbers of atomic
propositions. In fact, Boolean logic would be unchanged if all models had finite domains
of individuals. As we move beyond Boolean logic to more complex logical systems this
tidy situation becomes steadily more tangled. quantifier logic, the topic of the final three
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chapters, is also complete, though it forces us to consider infinite models, and showing
that one formula follows from others is far from automatic. In this book we cannot go far
enough really to engage with these issues, but I shall try to show how even Boolean logic
hints at them.   
The central point, though we do not have the resources to state it carefully here, is that
consistency (and thus independence) is a more difficult topic than logical consequence. It
is often harder to show. And we can learn more interesting things about a proposition by
knowing what others it is consistent with than by knowing what it follows from. Boolean
logic gives the barest hint of this fact.
The hint goes like this20. Often we can show that one proposition is a logical consequence
of another without showing that either is consistent. But finding a model for either takes
more work. Here is an example. It deliberately uses complicated-looking propositions,
but they are not quite as horrible as they seem. Consider the set of propositions A
A:  p ,  p  (q v ~r) ,  q  (t v s) , ~r  (t v s) ,  t  ~p , s  ~t , 
    ~s  (~q & r) ,  ~t  (~r & q)
or the single proposition a that is the conjunction of all eight of these. It is trivial that p
is a logical consequence of the set A. After all, it is the first member (or the first conjunct
of a.) But it is not so trivial that A or a is consistent. It has a whiff of inconsistency in
that it resembles the set {p , p  q , q  r ,r  ~p}, which is definitely inconsistent, since
in three steps of modus ponens we can deduce q, r, ~p from it, contradicting p. To check
with a truth table would need a table with 32 rows, and a C-derivation would have many
20 This is a simplification. The full situation is very complicated, and not everything about it is 
understood, even though propositional logic is a very simple system. There is a big literature, 
mostly in computer science. My aim is just to give you a flavour of distinctions that are starker in 
more complicated logical systems.
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branches. In fact A is consistent. It is made true by the truth assignment in which p, q,
and s are true and t, r are false. Once we try this truth assignment it is easy to see that
it makes A and a true, but working through all the truth assignments for the five atomic
propositions would be a lot more work. In general,  checking whether a derivation is
correct  is  easy,  knowing  whether  one  formula  follows  from  another  is  harder,  and
knowing whether one formula does  not  follow from another is hardest of all. In more
complex systems of  logic  these  comparisons become even more  stark.  (I  chose  the
particular set  A because it is trivial that  p is a consequence, confusing-looking enough
that you would be unsure whether it is consistent, and easy to see that it is verified by
the truth assignment. It is not very special; there are many other possible examples.)  
A metaphor may help. It is as if we were trying to push complicated shapes through a
complicated hole. (A kind of filtering.) The hole is the outline of the Americas, say. We
consider shapes to see if they will fit. Some obviously will or will not, and sometimes we
can see a reason why the shape will not fit through the hole. (The  indentations of the
Gulf of California or the Bay of Fundy, get in the way perhaps.) But to know that a shape
definitely will fit through the hole you will have to check  many details. (Perhaps there is
a clever way of tilting it so one of its bumps fits through Cape Breton, though it looks like
it gets blocked.) This is a lot harder than noticing one mis-match that will prevent the
shapes from fitting. Knowing that a shape will not fit is like knowing that a proposition is
inconsistent or that a conclusion follows. Knowing that a shape will fit is like knowing that
a proposition is consistent or that one proposition does not follow from others: typically
more difficult. 
>>  why is knowing that a proposition is inconsistent like knowing that a conclusion does
not follow?
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There is  a  connection with issues about  direct  and indirect  arguments  that  is  worth
mentioning.  The theme is  that  it  is  in  general  harder  to  show that  a  proposition  is
consistent than that it has a logical consequence. (Though showing that a consequence
follows can be hard, and showing consistency can sometimes be easy.) How are we to
measure and compare complexity of derivations? When derivations do not have many or
very  long  branches,  simple  length  makes  sense  as  a  measure.  But  when  as  in  the
derivations we are studying there are many branches, things are more complicated. A C-
derivation that showed consistency might do so with a very short branch although other
branches were long. (A proposition can have simple models and also complicated ones.)
The appropriate measure might be the total length of all branches down to the point
where one ends and defines a truth assignment. A derivation system in which derivations
do not branch will not usually give information about whether propositions are consistent.
If a proposition is not consistent one can sometimes go on deriving consequences from it
for a long time without deriving an explicit contradiction of the form P & ~P. In richer
logical  systems  than  Boolean  logic,  where  models  can  be  infinite,  there  is  a
correspondingly  greater  danger  that  one’s  assumptions  are  inconsistent  but  one  has
never  come  across  a  contradiction.  Notice  that  we  cannot  always  show  that A is
consistent by showing that  ~A is inconsistent, since often we have a sentence, A, for
which neither A nor ~A is inconsistent. Examples are p,  q,  p & q,  p v q,  ~(p & q),  and
many others: all of these have models, but their negations also have models. 
>>  in what areas of philosophy, or elsewhere, do you think it most likely that there are
hidden contradictions in our assumptions that we have not yet discovered?
This is one reason why many intellectual and practical problems are hard. We are often
faced with a set of conditions (assumptions, facts, constraints) that have many solutions,
so we cannot get an answer by deducing from them that some particular solution must
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be right. Instead we want to know whether some possible solutions are consistent with
the assumptions. We want to know whether some suspect could have committed the
crime, or whether some configuration of space-time is compatible with general relativity.
But even when we have found a candidate solution, knowing for sure that it is consistent
with the given conditions is often very hard.  
words  used  in  this  chapter  that  it  would  be  a  good  idea  to  understand:  branching
argument,  argument  by  contradiction,  conditional  argument  (proof),  conjunctive
argument, disjunctive argument, independent propositions, linear argument, reductio ad
absurdum.
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exercises for chapter eight
A- core 
1)  Which of the arguments below is an instance of disjunctive argument , which 
conditional argument, and which argument by contradiction?
(i) Suppose someone was taking pictures when we had that nude swim. They will be
all over the Internet next week. Then your father will never offer you that public 
relations job. We will need another source of income. So if someone was taking 
pictures we will be on the job market soon.
(ii) There is a rumour that the barn was made of paper painted to look like wood. 
We saw the barn last week standing a quarter-mile from the farmhouse. It certainly 
seemed solid. And in fact there had been a tornado right there a month before our 
visit. A paper barn would have been blown to smithereens. So it could not have 
been a painted paper barn.
(iii) That might have been Sciocchezzo Corleone disguised as a nun who just walked
by. The only other possibility is that it was a real nun. But if it was the question still 
arises how she got past the police line. So we had better ask the supposedly alert 
and honest officers down there some probing questions.
2) Make your own examples of disjunctive argument, and-introduction, condition 
argument, and argument by contradiction, on topics as different as you can from 
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question 1).
3) Are there typical situations where we use these forms of argument? Think of 
reasoning from uncertain information and dealing with situations where the existence of 
particular kinds of objects cannot be directly verified. Be as specific as you can about 
how particular situations encourage particular forms of argument. If there are such 
correlations, are they consistent with reformulating indirect arguments in direct form?
4) (a) make two derivations showing that p & r |= r and that ~t, t v r |=  r, and combine 
them to make a derivation showing that  (p & r), ~t, t v r |=  r
(b) Make a derivation showing that  ~q, p & ~p |= q, and modify it into a derivation 
showing that ~q  |= (p & ~p)   q .
(c) Make a derivation showing that {p, p  q, q  ~p } is contradictory, and modify it into 
a derivation showing that p, ~q p |= ~(p   q). 
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5)  Each of these derivations can be used to show several things. Below each derivation 
are some possibilities. Say which ones are shown by each derivation.
1 p v (q v r)
2 ~p
3                     ~q      
 / \
       p (q v r)
       X         / \
      q    r 
     X
p v (q v r) , ~p, ~q |= r  
{ p v (q v r) , ~p, ~q , r } is inconsistent 
1           p     q  .    
/   \
~q  ~p ~(~q ~p) (EM) 
 ~q & ~~p
   ~q
 ~~p
  /  \
        ~p    q
X    X
 p  q is a tautology
p  q |= ~q  ~p 
~q  ~p is a contradiction
1       p
2 ~(p & q)
3 p     (q v r)  .  
~p v ~ q
 /     \
~p      ~q 
 X      /    \
        ~p   q v r   
X  / \ 
 q   r 
X
~(p & q) , p  (q v r) |= p  r
p, ~(p & q) , p  (q v r) |= r
1 ~((p  (q & r ))
2           q & r                    
   p & ~(q & r) 
   ~(q & r)
   ~q v ~r
       /     \ 
   ~q     ~r 
      X      X
{ ~( (p  (q & r ) ), q & r } is inconsistent
~( (p  (q & r ) ), q & r |= ~q v ~r
~( (p  (q & r ) ) |= ~(q & r) 
1 ~(p     q ) & ~p 
2 ~(p  q) 
3 ~p
4 p & ~q
5    p 
   X
~(p  q ) & ~p |= p
~(p  q ) & ~p is a contradiction
~~(p  q ) & ~p is a tautology
{ ~(p  q ) & ~p } is inconsistent
(p  r) & (q  r) (p  r) & (q  r)
p     q
 p  r  q  r
  / \  /    \
~p   r  ~q r
 X X 
(p  r) & (q  r) |= r
(p  r) & (q  r), p v q |= r
6)  Show that the following sets of sentences are inconsistent
i) {p &q, ~p & r }
ii) { p  r, q  s, p v q, ~(r v s) } 
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iii) { ~(p&(q v r)), s, s  p, s  r }
B-more
7)  a) Show that the following formulas are tautologies, either by constructing a C-
derivation  where  it  is  true  on  all  branches,  or  by  constructing  a  derivation  from its
negation on which all branches close.
i) p  p ii) ~(p & ~p) 
iii) p  ( ~p  q ) iv)  ~(p v q)  ~p 
v) ~(p & ~q)  (p  q)
vi) (~p v q)  (p  q) 
vii)  (p  q)  (~p v q)
b) Why are these two equivalent: (i) constructing a C-derivation where a formula is true 
on all branches, and (ii) constructing a derivation from its negation on which all branches
close.
8)  (a) Show that each of these sets of formulas is consistent, by finding a truth 
assignment that makes all of its members true.
i) { p  q, p  q , ~p }
ii) { p  q , ~(q  p) }  
iii) { p & q , p v ~q }
iv) { ~( p & ~q ) }  
v) {(p v ~q) & (q   p) } 
(b) iv) and v) consist of just one proposition. Show that its negation is also consistent.
9)  Here are four informal arguments in ordinary language: 
A  It may rain next week, or it may Snow. And it may stay warm, or it may get cold. Or
it may even be warm and then cold later in the week. Great-Aunt Sophia will have to
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leave her apartment some time, and she may use her walker or she may try to walk
unaided.  Consider  this  possibility:  Snow followed  by  warming  and  then  cold.  That
means ice, and without her walker her balance is very bad. Assume now that she does
go out unaided under those conditions. She will surely end up in hospital. So if we have
that  weather  pattern  and  she  ignores  her  walker  you  will  have  an  aunt  in  the
emergency room.
B  It may rain next week, or it may snow. And it may stay warm, or it may get cold, or
it may even be warm and then cold later in the week. Great-Aunt Sophia will have to
leave her apartment some time, and she may use her walker or she may try to walk
unaided. Consider this possibility: Bow followed by warming and then cold. That means
ice, and without her walker her balance is very bad. Of course, she knows that, and
she will not do anything that will land her in hospital. Suppose she did go to the store
on ice without her walker. There would inevitably be a fall. But we know she won’t
allow that to happen. So she will  not even try to leave her apartment under those
conditions without her walker.
C It may rain next week, or it may Bow. And it may stay warm, or it may get cold, or it
may even be warm and then cold later in the week. Great-Aunt Sophia will have to
leave her apartment some time, and she may use her walker or she may try to walk
unaided. Actually the forecast is for Bow followed by warming and then cold. Suppose
it’s the walker. She will take so long to get to the store that she’ll be frozen. Suppose
it’s on foot. She will  fall. Either way you’ll have a sick Aunt to take care of. So be
prepared to visit her next week.
D It may rain next week, or it may snow. And it may stay warm, or it may get cold, or
it may even be warm and then cold later in the week. Great-Aunt Sophia will have to
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leave her apartment some time, and she may use her walker or she may try to walk
unaided. Or she may take a taxi, even though she is very careful with money. The
walker option means slow progress and cold feet, which she dislikes even more than
spending money. The on foot option means a great risk of falling, and she won’t take
that risk. So I guess for once we’ll find Sophia in a taxi.
One of these arguments is an elimination of alternatives, one is a conditional argument 
(conditional proof), one a disjunctive argument, and one is a proof by contradiction 
(reductio ad absurdum). Which is which?   
15)  Using the following lettering of the sentences
h = it is warm early in the week c = it is cold later in the week
w = Sophia uses her walker  f = she goes unaided on foot  
t = she takes a taxi r = she is frozen 
a = she has a falling accident 
i = she is ill, for example in hospital 
consider these four representations of crucial parts of the arguments in 9). For each, 
state which argument it fits best.
 h & c , w v f, (w & c )  r , (f & h & c)  a , r  i , a  i  therefore i
ii)  w v f v t , w  r , f  i, ~r, ~i therefore t 
iii)  (h & c & ~ w) |=  i therefore (h & c & ~ w)  i  
iv) ~w  f , f  i, ~i therefore w
16)  Below are three everyday arguments in ordinary English. Which is a reductio (proof 
by contradiction), which an elimination of alternatives, and which a conditional proof? 
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i) I wonder if Heidi is in town. If she is in town she’s staying with Lee. This is confusing,
so let’s suppose she is in town. If she’s staying with Lee they will  have gone to the
hardware grill.  So, supposing she’s in town, they’ve gone to the hardware grill.  They
haven’t been seen there. But they’re not invisible, so that’s impossible. The guess must
have been wrong: she is not in town.
ii) Haven’t seen Luke for days. I guess he is either in the bar or in jail. It’s a pretty vile
brew they serve down there; you can be sure that if he is in the bar we won’t see him
tomorrow. And you don’t get out of jail easy in this town, so if he is in jail we won’t see
him tomorrow. Sure sounds like we’re not gonna see Luke tomorrow.
iii) He won’t get an A in this course by acing the exam. In fact the only way he can get
an A is by joining the Prof’s weird little church: no join, no A. Perhaps he won’t join. But
suppose we learn that he got an A. That will mean he joined. So if he gets that A he
must have joined the church.
7)  (a) make a C-derivation showing that  ~(p  q) & ~(q  p))  is a contradiction, and 
then turn it into a derivation showing that  (p  q) v (q  p)  is a tautology.
(b) These are truths about the material  conditional,  ,that are intuitively wrong for
many meanings of the English word "if". Can you give examples of situations where we
would deny both "if A then B" and "if B then A". 
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(b) can you formulate a general principle that includes (a)  as a special case?
C – harder
20)  Consider strengthened versions of the principles linking indirect and direct 
argument. 
P1,…, and  Pn-1 , Pn  |=  X  (where X is a contradiction) if and only if P1,… ,Pn-1 |= ~Pn  
P1,…, Pn-1 ,Pn  |=  C  if and only if P1,…, Pn-1 |=  Pn  C 
A |= CB  |=  C if and only if A v B |=  C
Show that all three of these are true.
21)  A  B and A |= B are similar, though they are different in that the first says that if A 
is true then B is true while the second says that if A is true then by logic alone B must 
also be true. Which of the following, which are correct for all A and B, are no longer 
correct if we replace  with |= ?
A  (A v B) , (A  B) v (B  A ) , (A & ~A)  B , A  (~A  B ) , 
A  B is true whenever A is false
(Philosophers and logicians have often confused    and   |=.)
22)  Express the disjunctive normal form theorem as follows
DNF: Every Boolean formula F generates a C-derivation in which F is true on all and 
only the branches of the derivation.
And express the completeness of propositional logic as follows
C: There is a mechanical procedure which shows when one Boolean formula is a 
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logical consequence of another. 
Show that C follows from DNF.
23)  We can use some indirect arguments as substitutes for others. Instead of using 
argument by contradiction we could use the equivalence between A  (B & ~B) and ~A
together with conditional argument. Instead of using conditional argument we can use 
the equivalence between ~(A  B) and A & ~B together with argument by contradiction. 
Say how this can be done.
24) (for philosophers and mathematicians) Read an article on non-constructive existence
proofs  (such as https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence_theorem, or most textbooks on 
the philosophy of mathematics). What is the connection with arguments by 
contradiction? Does the fact that these proofs have attracted some controversy suggest 
that there is something dubious about arguments by contradiction? (This is relevant to a 
full answer to question 3. But a completely full answer would take a book.)
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chapter nine: quantifiers and variables
9:1 (of 8) quantifiers
From now on this book focuses on a new topic, another core area of logic, quantifiers.
Many of the ideas are similar to ideas we have already seen, and a lot of what we have
already done should have prepared you for them. The really striking difference between
the logic of quantifiers and the logic of Boolean connectives that we have studied so far
concerns the difference between logical symbols and everyday language. The logic of
quantifiers can only be explained in terms of language that is very different from the
language we use in everyday communication, at least on the surface. This makes the
topic harder: the use of symbols is not just for abbreviation but to express a deeply
different approach to language.
Quantifiers are used to say how many individuals in a domain have an attribute or enter
into a relation. Logic has traditionally focused on the extreme cases of all, none, or at
least  one  individual,  but  when  we  say  that  for  example  precisely  thirty  six  of  the
ostriches have laid eggs we are using a quantifier. The contrast between the way these
are handled  in  logic  and in  every  day language can be illustrated by saying  that  in
languages such as English "all the ostriches laid eggs" is like "Olga and Olivia laid eggs"
referring to these two individuals as we would to a single one in "Olivia laid an egg". But
in logic we express the same thing with language along the lines of "Take any one of the
animals. If she is an Ostrich then she laid an egg." The use of a variable, "she" in this
example, is essential. Logic usually uses symbols for the variables and the operators that
bind them, similar to our use of variables such as x and y and the Find operator. But the
contrast  is  the  same whether  we  use  variables  as  in  mathematics  or  more  familiar
pronouns, and the main purpose of this chapter is to make this contrast clear and explain
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its significance.
The most-studied quantifiers are the words "all" and "some", though many other words,
such as  a few,  six,  many,  at  least  three,  no,  and many others have closely related
grammatical and logical features. Words such as everything, and something, are closely
related, as we shall see.
>>  think: what do all these have in common?
It is important to see that there are very different ways of expressing similar ideas to 
these. Consider, for example, the word always.  Suppose we say “Monkeys always have 
tails (but apes usually do not).” The most usual meaning for this would be the same as 
"All monkeys have tails (and most apes do not)". Then, the word "always" is very similar 
to "all" (and "usually" is similar to "most"). But it also might mean "at all times monkeys 
have tails (but at many times apes do not)", or even "at all times all monkeys have tails 
(but at many times some apes do not)". It does have the advantage, though, that 
"always" does not seem to name some individual or individual with a tail, as "all 
monkeys" can. This also illustrates a point that we will see often in this chapter and the 
following ones: quantifier words in ordinary language usually have many meanings. They
can mean different things individually, as when "always" can mean "all instances of what 
we are discussing" and can mean "at all times". And they can have different effects when
combined, as when we mix "all" and "some" in "all the ostriches chased some monkey" 
which, as we will see in the next chapter, can mean that each ostrich had a monkey that 
it chased or that some unfortunate monkey was the target for all the ostriches. We can 
make similar points about sometimes, often, invariably, occasionally, and other such 
words.
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"All" and "always", in these sentence, are both expressing a quantifier in that they are
both describing something that is true of the whole domain in question. They are saying
how many individuals satisfy a predicate or are connected by a relation. There is a link
here with the Boolean connectives and and or. Suppose that we are discussing a domain
of three monkeys, alf, brigitte, and caspar, and we say "all these monkeys have tails", or
"monkeys of this kind always have tails". Then we are saying something very similar to
"Alf has a tail & Brigitte has a tail & Caspar has a tail". Similarly, "some of the monkeys
have tails" or "these monkeys sometimes have tails" is similar to "Alf has a tail v Brigitte
has a tail v Caspar has a tail". This close connection with conjunction and disjunction is
one reason that logicians have paid more attention to "all" and "some" than to other
quantifiers. (There are languages that use the same word for "all" and "and", as if for "Alf
and Brigitte have tails" we said "Alf and Brigitte: they all have tails.")
(I  was being  careful  in  saying  that  the  meanings of  "all"  and "some" are  similar  to
conjunction  and  disjunction,  respectively,  not  that  they  were  the  same.  There  are
important differences, which we will return to.)
>>  what about "every cat occasionally sleeps".  how do you think the words "every" and
"occasionally" fit together? 
 
>>  in the sentence "monkeys always hide when it rains" the word "always" is much less 
close to the word "all".  why is this?
There are three ways of representing quantifiers in most of the world's languages. Many
languages use all  three to some extent. The first two have already been mentioned:
quantifier words that tend to crop up where names do, such as "everything", "some", "a
few", and so on, and adverbs such as "usually", "sometimes", and so on. The third way is
to use a pronoun with a general meaning. For example, we might say "when one goes to
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a party one should bring a present", where the word "one" refers to anyone going to a
party. Or we might say "if they're friendly to me, I'll be friendly to them", where the
context is such that this means that I'll be friendly to anyone who is friendly to me. Or,
"who dares wins". (This use of "who" is not very common in English but it is often used in
other languages, for example Chinese.) Often we mix these together for the sake of
clarity, as when we say "if they're friendly to me, I'll be friendly to them, whoever they
are" or "if they're friendly to me, I'll always be friendly to them". I shall use all three
ways when trying to explain how quantifiers work in logic.
>>  suppose there is a movie called "all the stars".  how would you explain the two
meanings that "we can see all the stars tonight" can have?
A central aim of quantifier logic is to find a way of expressing quantifiers that is less tied
to  context  than  the  ways  we  have in  ordinary  language.  We want  the  meanings  of
quantifiers in logic to be more fixed and constant than those in spoken languages, and
this leads us to novel ways of expressing ourselves. To get a sense of quite how slippery
quantifier words are in spoken languages, consider the word "a", one of the most slippery
of them all, and consider what we have to say to make its meaning clear in different
contexts.
The indefinite article "a", has one of the widest range of meanings of all words in English.
"Some"  and  "all"  are  very  clear  and  regular  in  comparison.   Contrast  two  English
sentences: "a frightened cat is a dangerous animal", and "a cat is in the garden." "a" is
saying something different in the two sentences. In the first, it is saying something about
any or all cats, that if they are frightened they are dangerous. In the second, it is saying
something about the garden, that it contains at least one cat. The difference can be seen
in models with, say, four individuals. Consider a model with four individuals, where three
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of them have the attribute of being cats, and all of them may have attributes of being
frightened, being dangerous, and being in the garden. To see if the first sentence is true
— the frightened cats one — we have to check all three cats and see that each of them is
dangerous.  We cannot stop after finding one dangerous cat. We have to check all three
cats. But to see if the second is true we can stop as soon as we find just one cat that is
in the garden. Or to put it in terms that link to earlier ideas, and bring out the general
pattern, the first one requires that a search, 
Find x: IF Catx THEN Dangerousx
( Find x: Cx  Dx )
get all four objects in the domain, which we can check by considering just the three cats,
while the second one requires that a search, 
Find x: Catx  AND Gardenx  
( Find x: Cx & Gx ) 
get just one object. These are different searches and we are considering different things 
about them.
>>  why can we just consider the three cats, to see that the IF search gets all four 
objects?
>>  can you think of a situation where someone might say "a cat is in the garden" and 
be discussing all the cats?
This introduces a central theme: the language of quantifiers aims to describe what it is
about  a  model  that  makes some sentences true  in  it  and other  sentences false.  To
continue with this theme, consider the difference between "Mo hates all butterflies" and
"Mo hates only butterflies" (Or "Mo only hates butterflies".) These are clear sentences,
though someone could get confused about the difference between them. But if we take a
step back we can bring out the contrast by saying that a model makes "Mo hates all
butterflies" when for any object o in the domain if o is a butterfly then Mo hates o. The
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search Find x: IF Butterflyx THEN Hatemx gets the whole domain. But a model makes "Mo
hates only butterflies" true when for any object o in the domain if Mo hates o then o is a
butterfly.  The search  Find x:  IF  Hatemx THEN Butterflyx gets the whole domain. The
contrast comes out when we treat the two sentences as requiring conditionals to be true,
and they are  conditionals  that  are  backwards  from one another.  It  is  similar  to  the
contrast between "he'll come if you pay him", and "he'll come only if you pay him". The
first says  IF Pay THEN Come  — when you've paid him he is sure to come, while the
second says IF Come THEN Pay — when he comes you can be sure that he's been paid.
(Think about this contrast for a moment.) Quantifiers are variable-binding operators, like
Find x: or the summation operator.
>>  what about "Mo hates butterflies", without the "all" or the "only".  does it usually 
mean he hates butterflies or he hates only butterflies?  can you think of a situation in 
which it is used to communicate the other, less usual, meaning?
>>  why did I use the longer phrase "used to communicate the other meaning" instead 
of just "means"?
>>  I described "he'll come only if you pay him" in terms of 
IF Come THEN Pay. But "if he comes then you pay" seems a strange way of saying the 
same thing.  can you change it just a little so that it is more natural?  what does this 
suggest about the English if/then? (there are languages which do not have separate 
words for "all" and "only", so hearers have to figure out which makes most sense in the 
circumstances.)
9:2 (of 8) complexity considerations
Quantifier logic just is a lot more complicated than Boolean logic. (The complexity is not
really apparent until we consider multiple quantifiers, which appear in the next chapter.)
One sign is that simple truth assignments are no longer adequate and we must consider
fully specified models. Another sign is that the rules for getting the consequences of a
sentence are more subtle and allow much more complicated derivations. Quantifiers open
up a great range of expressive power.
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This makes quantifier logic a challenge to understand fully. It looks fairly simple but it
can express very complicated thoughts. Among the things it can express are axioms for
set theory, which can describe the most complicated structures we can imagine.
I conjecture that this is one of the reasons why quantifiers in spoken languages are so
sensitive  to  context.  Context-free  language  for  them  would  be  very  hard  to  learn.
Perhaps children would not completely acquire their native languages until  they were
teenagers. Yet many quantified expressions are essential for everyday communication.
Instead, we allow quantifier expressions to take many meanings, and we trust ourselves
to figure out what exactly is being communicated depending to a large part on the details
of the situation surrounding the speaker and the hearer.
9:3 (of 8) two tasks for pronouns
Quantifiers can be used to join simple attributes and relations into complex ones. They
allow  us  to  construct  much  more  complicated  attributes  and  relations  than  Boolean
connectives do. This is the main topic of the rest of this chapter. However, there is also
another very important feature of quantifiers that is also connected with the variety of
meanings that quantifiers can have in everyday language.
We do not need the word “only” if we have the word “all”. To express “only” with “all”, we
need to use IF plus pronouns such as “he”, “she”, “it”. ("Only fools eat raw pufferfish" =
"if it is a raw pufferfish and you eat it then you are a fool.") But the pronouns are doing a
very special job, that is particularly important when the topic is quantifiers. For example
we can explain the difference between "Mo likes all cats" and "Mo only likes cats" by
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rephrasing the first as "if it is a cat then Mo likes it" and the second as "if Mo likes it then
it is a cat". To do this we need the pronoun "it". The pronoun is not just saving us breath,
as it would in "Finny was a goldfish. It lived in a silver bowl", where we could replace it
with a repeated use of the name: "Finny was a goldfish. Finny lived in a silver bowl."
Instead, it is doing two things. It is representing the claim as general "whatever it is, if it
is a cat ...". And it is carrying this generality from one part of the claim to another "..
then  Mo  likes  it."  This  is  clearest  when  we  separate  the  two  functions.  "Consider
anything. If  it  is a cat then Mo likes it▪" If  there were only three individuals in our
domain, a, b, c, this would amount to "if a is a cat then Mo likes a & if b is a cat then Mo
likes b & if c is a cat then Mo likes c" . So the "it" is not substituting for any one name
but referring to all the individuals in the domain.
9:4 (of 8) universal and existential quantifiers 1: simple attributes
Suppose we have a model with a domain of individuals D, to which an attribute P applies.
Then we can define the universal quantifier, " and the existential quantifier $ by 
"x Px  is true in the model if and only if every individual in D has P.
$x Px is true in the model if and only if at least one individual in D has P.
The  same  definitions  apply  when  we  use  any  other  variable,  so  that "y  Py  , 
"z Pz , and so on, are true when every member of D has P, that is, when the search Find
x: Px gets every member of D, as do the searches Find y: Py, Find z: Pz, and so on. And
$y Py, $z Pz, and so on, are true when one or more members of D have P, that is, when
these searches do not fail by getting the empty set. 
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Another way of linking these two quantifiers with queries is to say that "x Px is true in a
model when the search Find x: Px gets the same results as the search Find x: Px v ~Px,
and  $x Px is true in a model when there is something,  a, in the domain of the model
such that {a} is a subset of the results of Find x: Px. These are trivial variants on what I
said  earlier,  but they prepare something that will  be useful  later.  A mangled English
version of them would be for "x Px “whatever you pick it will be among the Ps”, and for
$x Px “you can choose something so that it is among the Ps”, or “if you choose suitably it
will be among the Ps”.     
These definitions can be stated more precisely, but the best way to understand these
quantifiers is to consider a number of examples. In the rest of this section we consider
progressively more complicated examples. By the end of this chapter you will have a
good-enough sense of what is and is not a sentence of quantifier logic. Rough rules go as
follows: we take open sentences made with atomic attributes or relation symbols and
then either join them with Boolean connectives, following the rules for propositional logic,
or precede them with quantifiers. This allows some sentences that we don’t really have
much use for, such as  $x Aa  (“there is someone such that Albert is angry”), but then
similar things happen in propositional logic, where we can write things like p v p v p v p.
(“Smoking is forbidden, or smoking is forbidden, but then perhaps smoking is forbidden,
or  even  smoking  is  forbidden”.  I  had  a  teacher  who  used  to  say  things  like  this.
Strangely, he was a very good teacher.)   
The following are examples of well-formed sentences of quantifier logic
"x (Dx  Lxx ) $x (Dx & Lxx ) "x $y (Cy & Hyx)
"x ( (Dx & Lxa)  Lax ) $x (Dx & "y ((Dy & Lyy)    Lxy))
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The following are examples of ill-formed (badly-formed) sentences
"x  &(Dx  Lxx ) The "x is not before a well-formed sentence according to
propositional logic
$x (Dx )& Lxx ) brackets problem
"x (Dx & Lxa)  The  whole  sentence  is  not  well-formed  according  to
propositional logic, since there is no consequent for the conditional
And the following are well-formed sentences that we will have no use for, but it would be
too much trouble to rule them out.
"x Fx & Rxy Pa & $a Pa "x (Fx  $x Gx) 
>>  do you think you can state, fully and completely, what is and is not a sentence of
English, or any other spoken language?
This formal (artificial) language is what we will study as quantifier logic. All its sentences
are  used  to  make  assertions  about  the  world  or  describing  particular  models.  But
quantifiers can also be used to express questions, as in "are all the children in bed?" or
to give commands, as in "put a few of the bigger cakes away for tomorrow". In particular,
quantifiers can be used in search commands, just as Boolean connectives can be. We can
say "find all  the prisoners who have been arrested exactly  3 times",  or "find all  the
numbers less than 100 that have three prime factors". As with Boolean connectives, this
allows  a  greater  range  of  helpful  examples.  So I  shall  sometimes  mention  searches
involving quantifiers in what follows.
9:5 (of 8) examples
Begin to get a feel for " and $ by considering sentences of logic using them one at a time
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with attributes (not relations in this section, except for some of the examples involving
search) and relating them to natural and mangled English sentences. One purpose of the
mangled English  is  to  help  you see the point  of  repeating the variable  between the
quantifier and the following criterion. Another purpose is to prevent you thinking that
there is a mechanical way of translating between English and quantifier logic. In fact, you
have to take each English sentence and ask "what is it really saying?" and then say the
same in terms of logic. The mangled English is meant to help you do this. Which mangled
English  versions  seem to  you  ok,  and  which  ones  seem weird  and  un-natural,  may
depend in part on your native language and how quantification is handled in it. 
To give the examples a kind of unity, I will use predicates naming kinds of animals, in an
obvious kind of code. In giving the examples I do not often refer explicitly to models with
domains of whose individuals the attributes are true or false. You can supply these if you
want.  
$x (Bx & Ax)  
There is a bear that is an aardvark. 
Some bear is an aardvark 
There is something such that it is a bear and it is an aardvark
There is something, let’s call it Xeno.  Xeno is a bear and Xeno is an aardvark·
(Why do the bear and aardvark signs overlap?  Because of that one in the middle cage.  
We call him Xeno.  Xeno is a bear and Xeno is an aardvark.) 
You can search for "both bear and aardvark" and find one
$x Bx & $x Ax
Something is a bear and something is an aardvark
There are bears and there are aardvarks
You can search for bears and find one, and you can search for aardvarks and find one
The contrast between this last sentence and the previous one is important. The rewriting
in terms of search makes it clear: in the one case you are told that one search for a
conjunction will succeed, and in the second case you are told that a conjunction of two
searches will succeed. If you then try to say this without talking of searches you will find
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you need some version of quantifiers plus variables. 
>>  describe a model —  a domain with an attribute — in which 
$x (Bx & Ax) is true and $x Bx & $x Ax is false.  can you do it the other way round?  
why?
A simple example of a quantified query may also help here. We have a model consisting
of three birds in a row. The only relation in the domain is L, Lxy holds when x is to the
left of y. The query Find x: $y Lxy & $y Lyx gets one individual, the middle bird. But the
query Find x: $y (Lxy & Lyx) gets nothing, since no bird is both to the right and to the
left of any other.
"x ~Ux  
Everything is not a unicorn
Take anything, whatever it may be. it is not a unicorn·
We can say of anything: that thing is not a unicorn.  
"x (Bx  Mx)
Everything is such that if it is a bear then it is a mammal
All bears are mammals
For everything: if that thing is a bear then that thing is a mammal
Take anything. suppose it is a bear. then it is a mammal·
Bears are always mammals
What things are mammals? Bears, among others, all of them·
If it's a bear then it's always a mammal
>>  describe this in terms of search
Note how we use the conditional  to say that all things of one kind are of another kind.
The universal quantifier " and the conditional  fit together very well to do this. Bx  Mx
will be true unless Bx is true and Mx is false. So if we say that for everything in a model
Bx  Mx, we are saying that for no individual x in the model Bx and not Mx, which is just
to say that everything that is a B is an M. The last English paraphrase above, which uses
both the pronoun and the adverb devices, is really a lot like the logic. It is just a matter
of slight rearrangement:
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If it's a bear then it's always a mammal
If it is a bear then it is a mammal, always
Always: if it is a bear then it is a mammal
Universally: if it is a bear then it is a mammal
Whatever it is: if it is a bear then it is a mammal
For all x: if x is a B then x is a M
"x (Bx  Mx)  
By itself this is quite straightforward, but it can seem surprising that “All As are Bs” is "x
(Ax   Bx)  while “Some As are Bs” is  $x (Ax & Bx). “All” needs a conditional where
“some” needs a conjunction. There are two ways you can deal with this. 
(a) You can just learn something that will often be useful, as it is absolutely basic in
relating symbolic logic to English: 
“All As are Bs”is "x (Ax  Bx) while “Some As are Bs” is  
$x (Ax & Bx) .   
(b) Alternatively, you can see that this difference between “all” and “some” makes sense.
When we say, for example, “all bears are mammals” we are saying “ignore everything
that is not a bear, and everything you have left is a mammal”. And that is just what the 
in the middle of  "x (Bx    Mx) does: together with the  " it says “everything has the
property that ignoring non-Bs, when something is a B it is an M”. If you make a picture of
a typical  model in which all  bears are mammals,  this  will  be clear right away.  Even
without this way of putting it, it probably makes sense to you that all bears are mammals
if and only if anything you choose is, if a bear, a mammal.  On the other hand, when we
say “some bear is a mammal” we are saying “you can find one thing — more are not
needed — which is both a bear and a mammal.” And that is just what the & in the middle
of  $x (Bx & Mx) does: together with the  $ it  says “you can find something with the
property that it is both a B and a M”.  Even without this way of putting, it probably makes
sense to you that some bears are mammals if and only if you can choose something that
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is a bear and also a mammal.  
Note that although it is not very natural English, we could express the thought that some
Albanians  are  geniuses  as  "sometimes  she  is  Albanian  and  she  is  a  genius",  which
parallels the sequence of versions of "if it's a bear then it is always a mammal" above. It
would take a very particular context to make this the natural way to express the thought,
though.
>>  find such a context  
An important consequence of thinking of “all” this way is that it makes, for example, “all
the messages are spam” true if there are only two messages, and they are spam, though
we might instead say in normal English “both messages are spam”. And if there is just
one message, and it is spam, “all the messages are spam” will be true. In fact, if there
are no messages then “all the messages are spam” will be true. For take any individual i.
Since “i is a message” is false, given the meaning of “if” in logic, “if i is a message then i
is spam” is true. So, to vary the example, in logic “all unicorns can fly” is true, since
there are no unicorns. (More carefully: in any model that does not include unicorns, and
this includes models whose domain is a subset of the real world and where there are
attributes corresponding to the English words “unicorn” and “fly”, the logic version of “all
unicorns fly” is true.)   
>>  this is one of several ways in which "all" and "some" are unusual quantifiers.  "Most
cats are black" is not true in exactly the same models as "for most individuals x: if x is a
cat then x is black".  do you see why?  (see exercises 13 and 14 of ch 11.)  does this
show that we should not be misled by the special features of these quantifiers, or that we
should value them for being better behaved than others? 
>>  why might the cautious formulation in the parenthesis at the end of the paragraph
above be needed?
>>  most non-logicians would not think that "all unicorns can fly" is true just because
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there are no unicorns.  might this be because most people do not understand IF as  or
because  they understand ALL differently  (or  both)?  (or  because they are  confused,
perhaps.)
Now some more examples. In each case I give the symbolic logic and then a series of 
paraphrases into various kinds of English.  
$x (Bx & ~(Sx v Ax) )
Some bears are not seals or aardvarks 
There is something that is a bear and it is not the case that it is a seal or it is an 
aardvark
It can be found: true that it is a bear. false that it is a seal or it is an aardvark▪
$x (Bx & ~Sx & ~Ax) 
Some bears are neither seals nor aardvarks
There is something that is a bear and is not a seal and is not an aardvark
You can find at least one individual: that one is a bear and that one is not a seal and 
that one is not an aardvark▪
It can happen that a bear is neither a seal nor an aardvark
$x (Px & Mx)
Some penguins are mammals
There is something that is a penguin and is a mammal
It's a penguin and it's a mammal.  yes, you can find such things
(This example is here to contrast with the next one. But note how in the 'it' version the
part expressing existence, "you can find.." comes at the end, while in logic it comes at
the beginning.) 
>>  why is the sentence easier to understand this way?
>>  don't learn your biology from logic books!   
$x Px & $x Mx
Something is a penguin and something is a mammal
There is something that is a penguin and there is something that is a mammal
NOTE that this sentence is different from the previous sentence. It is true in the real 
world, and the previous one is false. The difference is one of scope: in this sentence the 
quantifiers are within the scope of the conjunction, and in the previous one the 
322
conjunction is within the scope of the quantifier.
>>  find a similar example using the scope of OR rather than AND
"x Px  "x Mx 
If everything is a penguin then everything is a mammal
If whatever you choose, it’s a penguin, then whatever you choose, it’s a mammal. 
Suppose that everything is a penguin. then everything is a mammal▪
This sentence is true in the real world. The reason is the definition of . Since  "x Px is
false, the conditional is true. Contrast this true sentence with the following false one. The
difference between them is another scope distinction.  
"x (Px  Mx) 
Everything that is a penguin is a mammal
All penguins are mammals
Choose anything: if it turns out to be a penguin then it will turn out to be a mammal
This is universally true: if it's a penguin then it's a mammal
6 (of 8) relations and variables
When we quantify relations we have to be careful that our use of variables does not
make unintended claims. For example, if we want to say that there is something that
Respects  something,  we  should  not  write  it  in  logic  as   
$x$x Rxx, because that would seem to say that there is something, represented by the
variable x, that respects itself. We want to leave it open whether thing giving respect is
the same as the thing receiving respect.  So what we should write is  $x$y Rxy.  It  is
important to see that this does not require that the two things are different. There are
models for  $x$y Rxy  where one thing respects itself. But  $x$y Rxy leaves the question
open.
We  have  the  same  problem  in  everyday  language.  If  we  say  "something  respects
something" it could at least suggest that something respects itself. We sometimes deal
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with  this  by  saying  "something  respects  something  else".  But  this  has  the  opposite
problem: it seems to suggest that the two are distinct, when we simply want to leave the
issue open. We can say "something respects something, which may or may not be the
same thing".  But  that  is  pretty  cumbersome.  Another  thing  we can say is  "there  is
something that respects and something that it has respect for". There are in fact many
ways, many of them using abstract nouns such as "respect" and "the bearer of respect"
as distinguished from "the object of respect".
We can stick with something a bit like spoken language and use something analogous to
the distinct variables that would do the job in logic. Suppose we want to make clear what
is going on with "Mo is looking at twins: one is a boy and one is a girl". We cannot say
"Mo is looking at something: it is twins and it is a boy and it is a girl”. That is absurd. We
have to say something like "There are two things. The first is a boy and the second is a
girl and the first is a twin of the second.” Along these lines, we could say  
Consider anything-one, any thing-two. If one and two are twins and one is a boy 
and two is a girl then Mo is looking at one and Mo is looking at two.
And we can make variations on this such as these:
Consider anything-one, anything-two. If one is an ant and two is an ant and one 
smells two then one follows two▪
Consider any pair of numbers, numbera, numberb . if numbera is bigger than 
numberb  then numberb  is smaller than numbera▪
In the yard there is person one, person two. One has betrayed two▪
(When lawyers are writing a contract and they want to be really clear, sometimes instead
of writing “she” or “he” they write “the party of the first part”, “the party of the second
part”, and so on.) 
>>  why is the version with subscripts better when the domain is numbers?
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>>  “take any three people: if all pairs of them are friends, then one of them will hate 
one of them.”  how would you say this without using the words “one” , “two” or "three" 
or "pair"?
Consider  the  ant sentence  above.  Suppose  that  an  ant  smells  itself  (perhaps it  has
walked in a circle and come on its own trail.) Then, to repeat the main point of this
section, it is important to see that saying that when an ant smells an ant it follows it,
does not mean that when an ant smells another ant it follows it. If the sentence is true
then when an ant smells itself it follows itself. With variables as we use them in logic
there is no assumption that different variables have to apply to different things. So in a
model in which there is only one individual, and a relation  R which that one individual
bears to itself, all three of the following sentences are true.
$x Rxx there is something that has R to itself 
$x $y Rxy there is a first individual and a second individual, 
where the first has R to the second   
$y $x Ryx something has R to something
>>  when might "everyone hates anyone who remembers their crimes" be true, but 
"everyone hates anyone else who remembers their crimes" be false?
>> is there some way it might be better if different variables could never refer to the 
same thing? 
Sentences of logic will have to allow many quantifiers and many variables, even though
beyond a point they become too complicated for us to understand. Exercise 14 at the end
of this chapter discusses how to state the rules for a logical language that has infinitely
many variables. Sentences beginning with two existentials or two universals — $x $y or
"x "y— are not hard to understand, though, since $x $y means simply “there is a pair of
individuals” and "x "y means simply “for all pairs of individuals.”
>>  why might we want to have sentences that are so complicated no one can 
understand them?
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>>  are there English sentences which are too complicated for anyone to understand?
9:7 (of 8) accumulating details
Often a complex English sentence is made by adding details to a simpler one. Then we
can make a version of it in logic by adding the same details. This often gives a procedure
that you can follow to represent the thought expressed by an English sentence with one
in quantifier logic. The idea is to begin with a very simple core, such as this.
"x (Bx  Dx)
All bears are dangerous
Bears are invariably dangerous
What's a bear, is dangerous
Then we add qualifications to the attributes. In simpler cases we can take one attribute
as central, dangerousness for example, and then we can ask "what is dangerous? Bears,
which bears? Bears when they are pregnant."  And then we get the following. 
"x ((Bx & Px)  Dx)
All bears that are pregnant are dangerous 
All pregnant bears are dangerous 
When it is a bear and it is pregnant then it is dangerous
Take anything: if that thing is a bear and pregnant then that thing is dangerous
Consider a pregnant bear: they are always dangerous
>> we could also say "all pregnant individuals that are bears are dangerous".  this
is rather un-natural English.  why? 
Note that when we add the qualifying conditions we have to insert some brackets, to
keep it well-formed and unambiguous. This is like adding commas or pauses in natural
language. 
We can also take a different attribute as central. We could ask "what kinds of things are 
bears? Well, they're dangerous omnivores."
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"x (Bx  (Dx & Ox))  
All bears are dangerous omnivores
If it's a bear then, whatever else, it's a dangerous omnivore
And we can do the same when the quantifier is existential rather than universal. We can
start with "There is a bear/bears exist/something is a bear", which would be done in logic
as "$x Bx”,  and qualify it via a what-question, to get "There's a bear: what kind? A
pregnant grizzly".
$x (Bx & Px & Gx)  
There is something that is a bear and pregnant and a grizzly
A bear, also pregnant and of the grizzly kind: such things exist
"x ((Bx & ~Mx)  Ax)
All bears that are not mammals are aardvarks 
Take anything: if it is a bear and not a mammal then it is an ardvark.
Whatever it is. suppose it is a bear and it is not a mammal. then it is an 
aardvark▪
(This one is, perhaps surprisingly, true, in the real world. For since Bx & ~Mx is false for
all x, the conditional is always true. See the remark above about “all unicorns can fly”.) 
$x ((Sx &Mx) & ~Bx)
Some seals that are mammals are not bears
There is something that is a seal and mammal and it is not a bear.
You can find one, where that one is a seal and a mammal, and it is not a bear. 
There is more practice with English and logic along these lines in the exercises at the end
of the chapter. 
The “which ones?” strategy applies also to sentences with relations. We can start with
core  constructions  like  "something  terrifies  something"  Or  "everything  terrifies
everything". Which are easily rendered as 
$x $y Txy and "x"y Txy
But these are so general that we are unlikely to use them. We can get more specific by
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asking  “what”  questions: what  terrifies  something?  something  terrifies  what?  what
terrifies everything? everything terrifies what? what terrifies what? Then we can fill in the
details  with  answers  to  these  questions,  as  follows,  giving  suitable  meanings to  the
attribute and relation symbols.
$x $y (Px & My & Rxy)  
a pig terrifies a man
something that is a pig terrifies something that is a man
I’m discussing two things. the first is a pig and the second is a man and the first 
terrifies the second▪
"x "y ((Px & My)  Txy ) 
pigs terrify men
take a pair of individuals. if the first is a pig and the second is a man then the first 
terrifies the second▪
all pigs terrify all men
Note how we treat universal and existential differently when we make the content more
specific:   versus  &.  This  is  just  like  what we saw above,  discussing the analogous
process with attributes rather than relations.
We can specify more by further qualifying “pig” or “man” (“speckled pig”, “man with a
beard”) but more details emerge if we specify in terms of another relation.
>> just to be sure you are following, how would you represent in logic “all men with 
beards terrify all speckled pigs”? 
"x "y ((Px & "z (Cz  Fxz))  Txy ) 
Pigs that fear carrots terrify all dogs
Consider any pair where the first is a pig and the second is a dog. Suppose 
moreover that the first is frightened by something whenever that something is a 
carrot. Then the first terrifies the second▪
One thing will terrify another under certain conditions. this will be true whenever 
the first is a pig and all carrots frighten it, and the second is a dog 
Note that the last of these mangled English sentences is again expressed in the opposite
order to the logic sentence, with the central relation at the beginning rather than the
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end. This does fit with the idea of taking a simple sentence and progressively qualifying
it.  (So  the  Terrifies  relation  in  these  examples  is  slightly  analogous  to  the  central
connective in a purely Boolean sentence. You can only push the analogy so far, though.)
This can be seen as a two-dimensional branching construction. Let me show how, for the
English and the quantificational logic side-by-side.  
the English
a thing terrifies a thing
what? what?
anything that is some kind of Pig anything that is a Dog ..   .....c
what kind of pig?
     pigs that fear carrots 
So:  all pigs that fear carrots terrify all dogs
the logic
"x "y Txy
   | Px     & Dy  Txy
                                   |              Px &   "  z (Cz     Fxz)    &  Dy                     T  x  y  
So bb    "x "y  ((Px & "z (Cz  Fxz))   & Dy )    Txy)  
I suggested earlier in this book that thoughts were not best seen as having a linear
structure,  and  these  considerations  might  be  taken  as  another,  far  from conclusive,
reason  for  thinking  this.  You  will  notice  that  in  the  English  it  is  the  attributes  and
relations that we follow to get from the core sentence to the elaborations, while in the
logic version it is the quantified variables (the x and y.) The English pattern does have
definite disadvantages, though, which emerge in the next chapter.  
A  similar  contrast  between  the  strategy  for  putting  something  into  logic  and  the
corresponding strategy in a natural language such as English also applies when we are
understanding rather than formulating expressions in either form. In natural language we
typically first grasp what is being spoken about and then add detail about what is being
said of it. In logic, on the other hand, we typically first grasp what the logical form of the
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assertion is, and then add detail about what is being described with an assertion of this
form. It may not be until the very end of the process that we understand what individuals
are being discussed. The result is a less immediate understanding of the topic but a more
immediate understanding of what kind of thing is being said of it.
Mathematical forms of expression and everyday language often contrast in roughly this
way. Even in arithmetic we would understand (√636/√318)4  as the fourth power of a
quotient of square roots, before we figured out the values of these expressions. This
would often be a more efficient way of proceeding; in this example we would then be
able to see this as the square of 636/318 which is 4. If you calculated the roots by hand
to start with you would be calculating all day, and even if you use a calculator you would
be more likely to make a mistake. This applies with greater force in more advanced
mathematics, so that for example  dx2sinx/dx is understood first as the derivative of a
product, so that the product rule can be applied. Only then are the components of the
product evaluated. You would not attempt to think of x2sinx as a single function. (Ignore
this second example if it means nothing to you.) 
The point is just that in mathematics we typically look first at the overall form and fill in
the details later. Mathematically sophisticated people do this automatically, but there is a
potentially helpful halfway between the styles where we first give the form without the
details and only when that has sunk in provide the details. My advice is to read anything
mathematical in a series of successive passes, first absorbing the general form and then
honing in successively on more and more detail. This contrasts with the way we usually
understand sentences of spoken languages, where we tried to make sense of everything
as  soon  as  we  encounter  it,  and  tends  to  halt  in  confusion  if  we  cannot  do  so
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immediately.  (The  difference  between  sound  and  sight  may  be  relevant  here:  most
mathematics is written.)
This is connected with the contrast I made in chapter 5 between inside-out and outside-
in ways of understanding a sentence. Mathematics is more often outside-in and spoken
language is more often inside-out. It also connects with the advice early in this book to
make  some  forms  of  thinking  automatic,  though  under  the  control  of  conscious
reasoning. (See chapter  2 section 3 and exercise 14,  and chapter  5 section 6.) The
connection is that when we understand the general form of an assertion we can see what
particular  kind  of  automatic  thinking  we  should  do.  The  general  form is  consciously
understood and the details are thought through automatically.
>>   have you noticed that there are some people who focus exclusively on the topics
you are mentioning, and not on what you are saying about these topics?  you say "I do
not think your behaviour was wrong" and all they hear is "think – behaviour – wrong"
and then get upset.  this is an extreme form of inside-out language processing.
9:8 (of 8) extra: English to logic
Given a sentence of quantifier logic, and a context in which it is used, one can construct
an English sentence that says roughly the same. Or a sentence of  almost any other
natural language. This is not to say there are easy rules for doing this. You have to think
what the sentence means, which models it would make it true, in the given context. The
same is true in the other direction, English-to-logic. In this chapter I have concentrated
on helping you to think in terms of quantifiers, so that you can see what quantified logic
sentences mean and then be able to reproduce them in English. But there is also the
opposite task, of saying in logic terms what an English sentence means. I cannot give
rules for translating between English and quantifier logic. (And if I can’t, no one can!) I
am sure there are no rules that do not have many exceptions. For one thing the meaning
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of an English sentence depends much more on the context in which it is produced —
when  and  where  it  was  said,  by  whom  and  to  whom  against  what  background
assumptions — than a sentence of logic. Still, if you have understood the chapter so far,
helped by some exercises at the end of the chapter, you should be able to represent in
logic terms most of the English sentences that you see involving “all”, “some”, “each”,
“every”, “there is”, and similar words. This last section of the chapter describes some
strange irregular features of quantification in English. It is not meant to make translation
easier for you as much as to persuade you that any firm rules for doing it  must be
fiendishly complicated, and to make you appreciate the relative tidiness of logic. (And the
relative subtlety and expressiveness of natural language.)
A complication here is that there are usually several different sentences in symbolic logic
which are equally good as renditions of a given English sentence in a given context. Very
often, these are logically equivalent, true in the same models. But we do not discuss
logical consequence and equivalence for sentences with quantifiers until chapter eleven.
So sometimes the version that seems right to you will be different from the version in
this text or which is mentioned in class, but just as good. The only way of dealing with
this is to speak up and ask a question!
>>  which of the following seem intuitively equivalent?
no cats purr all cats do not purr
cats are purring animals cats purr
cats chase mice there is a cat that chases all mice
every cat chases every mouse every cat chases some mouse
Begin with sentences in which no quantifiers are mentioned, such as “Amy likes cats”, or
“Cats kill birds”. These can mean many things. “Amy likes cats” can mean “take any cat:
Amy likes it” — "x (Lax  Cx) —  and it can also be used to express the thought “take
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anything: If Amy likes it then it’s a cat” —  "x (Lax  Cx) — whether or not it can literally
mean this. (Suppose you are comparing the animal tastes of three people. George only
likes dogs, Mo adores frogs, and Amy does not share either of their tastes, but she likes
cats.) Very often “Amy likes cats” will mean something that cannot be expressed exactly
with “all”, such as “Amy likes many cats” or “there have been cats that Amy has liked”.
“Cats kill birds” can mean “take any cat: it kills some birds”. And it could mean “take any
cat and any bird: the cat will kill the bird” (that would take a very special context: we
mustn’t  pair  kittens  and  eagles).  It  often  means  “cats  typically  kill  birds”,  where
“typically” says something much more subtle than adverbs of universal  quantification
such as “invariably” or “always”.  (This  is  what linguists call  a “generic”  sense of  the
sentence.) Sometimes, too, a bare plural can have an existential rather than a universal
meaning. Contrasting with the “all” meanings of “Amy likes cats” there is the “some”
meaning of “Amy was feeding cats”. This means roughly that there were cats and Amy
was feeding them.
>>  say "Amy likes cats", meaning these different things, and see if your stress pattern 
and intonation vary.  can you draw any general conclusions?
I said that “Amy likes cats” can be used to communicate that Amy only likes cats. But
“only” has its own complications. It is unlikely that in saying “Amy only likes cats” we are
denying that Amy likes food, or friendship, or breathing. Most likely we mean that among
animals cats are her favourites. What about “Amy only likes black cats.” Here are three
things it can mean, even restricting ourselves to literal general “all”-type meanings.
if Amy likes it, it’s a black cat "x 
(Lax  (Cx & Bx))
if it’s a cat and Amy likes it, then it’s black "x ((Lax& Cx)  Bx)
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if it’s black and Amy likes it, then it’s a cat "x ((Lax & Bx)   Cx)
(The last of these requires the most context or to be said with just the right stress.
Suppose we know that Amy generally goes for bright colours: she wears purple clothes
and has a yellow car. But there is an exception, she thinks of herself as a witch and black
cats as her familiars: she only likes black cats.)  
>>  describe situations in which any one of these would be true and the other two false
We can say similar things about “Amy likes all black cats”: she likes all black cats, or all 
black cats, or all black cats. 
>>  write these three out in logical symbols
Then there are the differences between “all”, “each” and “every”, and between “some”,
“there is”, “there are”, and “exists”. Some of these are very subtle and hard to capture in
terms of standard symbolic logic. To complicate things, many of these words can have
both universal and existential meanings. The most ambiguous word that can indicate a
quantifier is the indefinite article “a”, as already mentioned. In “if a dog is thirsty, it will
bark” or “a barking dog is dangerous”, the “a” represents a universal quantifier. “If a Dog
is  Thirsty,  it  will  bark”  has  the  form  "x  ((Dx  &  Tx)   Bx ) and  “a  barking  dog  is
dAngerous” has the form "x ( (Dx & Bx)  Ax). But in “a barking dog is standing in the
yard”, the “a” indicates an existential quantifier. The sentence has the form $x (Dx & Bx
& Yx). Why is this? It may be just the effect of what we expect to be true. Suppose that
someone did not know anything about dogs but is looking for a barking dog. Then that
person might understood the sentence “a barking dog stands in the yard” as information
about barking dogs in general: you can find them because they stand in the yard.  
To show how bad it can get, though “some” normally indicates an existential quantifier,
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there are sentences where it can be taken as universal. Consider for example “if some
stranger comes to the door, don’t let them in”. That is clearly  "x ((Sx & Dx)  ~Lx ).
Consider also “if there are honest politicians, they are Canadian” which seems to have
the form "x ((Hx & Px)  Cx). In both of these, the influence of the “if” seems to be to
lure “some” or “there are” from their usual existential meanings to universal ones. (This
may be linked to the rules for “prenex form” discussed in chapter ten.) Quantifiers that
one might think of as universal can be used with an existential sense, too. In “I doubt
that any cat has ever written a haiku” the “any” has the sense of “some”.
These are the  exceptions:  most  English quantified  sentences are  better  behaved,  so
these are puzzles that will not often affect us. But they do underline one of the main
points of this chapter, that it is better to understand quantifier logic in its own terms
rather than by translating from a natural language.
words in this chapter that it would be a good idea to understand: inside-out, outside-in, 
pronoun, quantifier, variable.
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exercises for chapter nine 
A – core
1)  In the Fears model
   Fears alice bo carlos deepa
alice YES YES YES YES
bo YES NO YES NO
carlos YES YES YES YES
deepa YES YES NO YES
(a) i)  Find x:  Fxx
ii)  Find x: $y (Fxy & ~~Fyx)
iii)  Find x: "y (Fxy  ~Fyx)
(b)  in each case describe in English the property being searched for.
(c)  which of these is true in the model? 
i)  "x Fxx ii)  $x Fxx
iii)  "x $y (Fxy & ~Fyx) iv)  $x $y (Fxy &~Fyx)
v)  "x "y (Fxy  ~Fyx) vi)  $x "y (Fxy  ~Fyx) 
( iii and vi go beyond what is discussed in this chapter, so take them as a challenge.)
2)  Which of these English sentences mean roughly the same?  (some of them do not 
have such clear meanings) 
a)  there is a cat that wears pyjamas
b)  there are cats that wear pyjamas
c)  if it’s a cat, it wears pyjamas
d)  alice only loves cats in pyjamas
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e)  all pyjama-wearing cats are loved by alice
f)  there are some pyjama-wearing cats 
g)  every cat wears pyjamas
h)  alice loves cats if they are wearing pyjamas
i)  all cats wear pyjamas
j)  if cats are wearing pyjamas, alice loves them
k)  cats wear pyjamas
l)  if it’s a cat and wears pyjamas then alice loves it
m)  alice loves cats in pyjamas
n)  if alice loves it then it’s a cat and wears pyjamas
o)  if alice loves it and it wears pyjamas then it’s a cat
p)  alice loves cats only when they are wearing pyjamas
q)  alice only loves pyjama-wearing cats
r)  some cats wear pyjamas
3)  Which English sentence corresponds to each of these sentences of quantifier logic?
(a)  "x ((Cx & Hx)  Fx)
(b)  "x ((Fx & Hx)  Cx)
(c)  $x (Cx & Fx)
(d) "x ((Hx & Cx)  Fx)
(e)  "x Cx & "x Hx
(f)  "x (Cx  Hx)
(g)  $x (Cx & Hx & Tx)
(h)  $x (Cx & Hx) & $x (Cx & Tx)
(j)  "x Cx  "x Hx
(i) all cats are hungry
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(ii) everything is a cat and everything is hungry
(iii) if everything is a cat then everything is hungry
(iv) some cats are both hungry and thirsty
(v) some cats are hungry and some cats are thirsty
(vi) all hungry cats are fierce
(vii) all fierce and hungry things are cats
(viii) some hungry cats are fierce
(ix) there are fierce cats
4)  Which sentence of quantifier logic corresponds to each of these English sentences? 
(Dx = x is a dog, Lxy = x loves y , a = Alice ) 
first group 
Everything loves itself   
All dogs love themselves
All dogs love Alice
Alice loves all dogs
i) "x (Dx  Lax )
ii) "x (Dx  Lxa )
iii) "x Lxx
iv) "x (Dx  Lxx )
second group 
Some dog loves all dogs who love themselves 
Alice loves all dogs who love her 
Alice loves all dogs who love some dog 
v) $x (Dx & "y (Dy & Lyy)    Lxy)   
vi) "x ( (Dx & $y Lxy)    Lax )
vii) "x (Dx & Lxa)    Lax ) 
viii) $x ( Dx & "y ((Dy & Lyy)    Lyx) )
5) 
Prudent Quarrelsome Realistic
ai YES YES NO
bertram NO YES YES
chiu NO NO NO
destry YES NO NO
elspeth NO YES YES
Which of the following are true?  
a)   "x (Px  Rx) b)   "x (Px  ~Rx)    c)   $x (Px & Qx)
d)   $x (Px & Rx ) e)  "x ( (~Rx & Qx)  Px)    f)   "x ((Px & Qx & Rx)  ~Px)
g)  "x ((Px & Qx)  Rx) h)   "x (Px & Qx)    "x Rx) 
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6)  You probably were first aware of variables when you met them in algebra class in 
school. (Though you used them in the form of pronouns expressing quantifiers long 
before, as explained in chapter nine.) Usually when we use a variable in a mathematical 
expression there is an unstated quantifier. Rephrase the following and supply quantifiers, 
so that the result is true.
ax2 + bx + c = 0 has two real or imaginary roots
the solution to 3x – 12 = 0 is x = 4
Newton’s law of gravitation giving force F for masses m1, m2 separated by distance
r is  F = km1m2/r2
B – more 
7)   For each of the sentences in quantifier logic below write the letter of the English 
sentence that best captures its meaning.   Cx = x is Crazy , Bx = x is Boring, l = Lee , m
= Mo ,Rxy = x is happier than y
~(Cl v Bl) $x (Cx & Bx) "x (Cx    Bx)
"x (Cx    ~Bx) "x (Bx    ~Cx) $x "y Hxy
"x $y Hxy "x $y Hyx "x (Hxm  Cx)
"x (Cx   Hxm) "x $y (Cy & Hyx) "x $y (Cy & Hxy)
(a)  Crazy people are not boring
(b)  Someone is both crazy and boring
(c)  Lee is neither crazy nor boring
(d)  Crazy people are boring
(e)  No-one boring is crazy
(f)  For everyone there is someone happier than them. 
(g)  Some person is happier than everyone. 
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(h)  Everyone is happier than someone.
(i)  Everyone is happier than some crazy person.
(j)  All crazy people are happier than Mo.
(k)  Given any person there is a crazy person happier than them.
(l)  Everyone happier than Mo is crazy
8) The map below shows nine locations, where three individuals are found. We know that
all individuals are found at one of these nine locations. They are related by ‘x is to the
North of y’ (that is, due north and further north) and ‘x is to the West of y’ (that is, due
West and further west). One individual, wally, satisfies the following conditions, 
$x Nwx
$x Nxw
~$x Wxw
Where’s Wally? And where are the other two?
North
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ?
C – harder
9)  On the map below three Ships are marked ship 1,2, 3, and three Icebergs are marked 
iceberg 1,2, 3. Correlate the logic and the English versions of the following claims
logic
"x (Ix  $y (Sy & Nxy)
"x "y (Sx & Iy & ~$z ((Nxz & Nzy) v (Wxz & Wzy))  ~$w (Nwx v Nwy)
"x  ( $y (Sx & Iy & Wxy)  $z (Sz & Wzx) ) 
"x (Sx  $y (Iy & Nxy)
English
Every ship is to the north of an iceberg
Every iceberg is to the north of a ship
If a ship is west of an iceberg then it is east of a ship
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All the ships and icebergs that are next to one another are as far north as one can 
go.
North
ship 1 ship 2 iceberg 1
ship 3
iceberg 2 iceberg 3
Which are true, which false
10)  In the appendix to chapter five I gave eight rules to define the well-formed formulas
(sentences, propositions) of propositional logic. Modify rule one to read
Rnm  is a relation symbol for each integer n and m.
(This gives us infinitely many n-place relations Rnm, for each n.)
vm is a variable for every integer m. (This gives us infinitely many variables. We can 
abbreviate v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6 as x, y, z, u, v, w.)
If s is a variable or a string of variables then sm is a string of variables, for 
every integer m.
This gives us infinitely many variables v1, v2, ….  (We can abbreviate v1, v2 ,v3 as x, y, 
z.)
If R is a relation symbol and s is a string of variables then Rs is a well-formed formula.
This gives us infinitely many atomic propositions Rnm v1,..,.vn, where v1,..,.vn is a 
string of variables.
“What other rules need to be added, to define the well-formed formulas of quantifier 
logic?
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chapter ten: multiple quantification
This  chapter  discusses  sentences  with  several  quantifiers.  There  is  even  more  of  a
contrast with spoken languages here than in the one quantifier sentences of the previous
chapter, though you cannot appreciate quite how incomplete and ambiguous a language
such as English is in this respect until you can express the meanings that it misses or
runs together. The topic is too big for this chapter, though, or indeed for this book. In this
chapter I focus on strings of quantifiers in a row: to give a fore-taste, the sort of thing
we find in “every student takes some course that at all later times they remember with
delight”  or “there is  a mountain on which all  members of  the team trained in some
season”. This is a source of much of the richness and power of symbolic logic. In the next
chapter,  the last,  we will  partially connect this wealth with the other main source of
logic’s power, the ability to join closed and open sentences with Boolean connectives.   
10: 1 (of 10) scope distinctions: negation and quantifier order
What did Abraham Lincoln mean when he said "you can fool some of the people all of the
time"? It could be that there are people who will always be fooled, or it could be that at
any moment  we can find  people  who are  fooled  (but  it  may be  different  people  at
different times.) This is a scope ambiguity with "some" and "all", like the ambiguities
involving OR and AND.
>>  do  you  think  that  people  who  cite  the  Abraham  Lincoln  saying  know  which
interpretation they mean?
The simplest cases involve just one quantifier and negation. "John is not rich or happy" is
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confusing because it could be heard as meaning "John is not rich OR John is happy" or "it
is not the case that John is rich or happy". (And the second of these is equivalent to
"John is not rich AND John is not happy", you'll remember: de Morgan's laws.) The same
holds for the universal and existential quantifiers. This is not surprising given the analogy
between the universal quantifier,  ",  and AND, and the existential quantifier,  $, and OR.
Suppose someone says “all of my term papers are not stolen”. (Perhaps someone has
accused him or her of stealing them off the internet.) What does the person mean?  Here
are two possibilities.
(a)     ~"x (Tx  Sx)  The following is false. consider anything. if it is a  term paper of
mine it is stolen▪  
(b)    "x (Tx  ~Sx)  Consider anything. if it is a term paper of mine it is false that it
is stolen▪ 
These are different. (a) says just that not all of the papers are stolen, while (b) says that
all of them are not stolen. So if exactly half are stolen (a) is true, though (b) is false. 
Both are possible meanings in different conversations. (a) “You stole all your papers!”
“No, all of my term papers are not stolen – just some.”  (b) “I think some of your papers
were stolen.” “No all of them are not stolen.” The ambiguity can be resolved in English by
rephrasing. “Not all my term papers are stolen” is clearly (a), and “Every one of my term
papers is not stolen” is clearly (b). (So one reason we have "each" and "every", besides
"all", is to allow us ways to clarify these matters. But the differences between these in
English are subtle and complicated.) The fact remains that there are English sentences
that can easily be taken as being like (a) or like (b). And this sets up a tendency in us to
slide in reasoning from “not all” to “all not”.  
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>> what is the difference between "most of my cats do not have fleas", and "it is not the
case that most of my cats have fleas"?  describe a situation where one is true and the
other false
We use the all/every distinction in everyday English to help with another scope distinction
also, to signal which of a universal and an existential quantifier is within the scope of the
other. Consider the difference between "all the plants were covered with a plastic sheet"
and "every plant was covered with a plastic sheet". The first of these can most easily be
understood as saying that there is one plastic sheet that covers all the plants, while the
second can most easily be understood as saying that each plant is covered by its own
plastic sheet. So the "all" version says $x "y (Sx & (Py  Cxy)).  SOME ALL: there is a
sheet and if it's a plant then that sheet covers it.  The "each" version says 
"y $x (Py  (Py & Cxy)).  ALL SOME: take any plant: you can find a sheet that covers it.
>> do you see how the routine for using "if" with "all" and "and" with "some" applies
here?
Consider again the Abraham Lincoln quotation: "You can fool all of the people some of
the time". It might mean that there are occasions when you can fool everyone, and it
might mean that  for  each person there are times when you can fool  that particular
person. The first is SOME ALL — there is one or more  times such that for all people —
and the other is ALL SOME — for all people there is one or more times. Suppose there
are  only  three  potential  fools  concerned,  and  that  on  Mondays,  Tuesdays,  and
Wednesdays you can fool Alice but not Bob or Carol, on Thursdays and Fridays you can
fool Bob, but not Alice or Carol, and on Saturdays and Sundays you can fool Carol, but
not Alice or Bob. Then it is true that for each person there is a time at which you can fool
them, but not true that there is a time at which you can fool all the people. 
>>  the Lincoln quotation continues "And you can fool some of the people all of the time,
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but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time."  again we have a some/all sentence,
but it is different from either of the two we've just seen.  state the two meanings, and
make a days of the week model in which one of them is true and the other false, and in
which both the the interpretations of "you can fool all of the people some of the time" are
false.
These are simple sentences but quite confusing. There are several reasons that they get
one's mind in a twist.  One of them is that there are four possibilities, and when we
understand these sentences we tend to contrast them with others that might have been
said, but the alternatives sound similar. Here are the four possibilities: in each case I will
state the meaning in mangled (improvised, approximate) English designed to make it
intuitively clear which ones are consequences of which others. The four:
a) "t $x Fxt    every time has its sucker 
at every time this is true: someone gets fooled
b) $x "t Fxt    there's some constant victim
there's a person such that this is true: they get fooled at all times
c) $t "x Fxt    there's a time when everyone's a victim 
there's a time such that this is true: everyone gets fooled
d) "x $t Fxt everyone has their vulnerable moment
for every person this is true: they are sometimes fooled
Think about these until it is clear to you that they correspond to one another. This should
help  get  it  fixed  in  your  mind  how to  understand  quantifiers  in  the  scope  of  other
quantifiers. If you state these in terms of 'some' and 'all' it is very easy to slide from one
to another. But in fact a) is a logical consequence of b), d) is a logical consequence of c),
and all the others are independent of one another. We will not be able to show this in a
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careful way until the next chapter, but the versions in brown should make it intuitively
clear. If (b) is true then someone, call him Mr Victim, is always getting fooled, so then,
(a), at every time there is someone, him, who is fooled. And if (c) there's a moment, say
Wednesday, when everyone is fooled, then (d) everyone is fooled then. But (a) can be
true when (b) and (c) are false, if every time has a different sucker and there are more
people than times, when c) and (d) are also false. Similarly (d) can be true when (c) is
false, if everyone is fooled at a different time and there are more times than people,
when (b) and (a) are also false. 
>> how can (b) be true and (c) and (d) be false?  how can (c) be true and (b) and (a) be
false?
>> "but his name might not be Mr Victim", "the day might not be Wednesday".  why are
these irrelevant worries?
10:2 (of 10) quantifier words pretending to be names 
I have used (a) to (c) make the scopes clear. But this is not the case for the original
Lincoln  sentences,  or  for  many other  ways  of  presenting  quantifiers  in  English.  The
reason is that one central way that English, and many other languages, make quantified
assertions  is  to  put  a  quantifier  word  ("someone/everyone",  "something/everything",
"some cats/all  cats",  "a  few cats",  "most  cats"  and so  on)  in  the  same places  in  a
sentence where we might find a name such as "Maggie". For example just as we say
"Maggie is sneaky" we might say "Someone is sneaky", "Every cat is sneaky", "Most cats
are sneaky", and so on. This has its puzzling side: who is this "Someone" who is sneaky
as long as even one (other?) person is sneaky? If it is true that someone is sneaky and
someone is not sneaky, is Someone then both sneaky and not sneaky?  
>>  why would it make No-one even more of a puzzle than Someone if we thought
quantifiers were a kind of name?
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One could refuse to be puzzled and continue to speak this way. But the trouble gets
deeper when we have two quantifiers in the same sentence, and then it gives another
reason why we often find them confusing. Consider a simple sentence with two different
quantifiers, such as "everyone was angry with some person". Does that mean "we can
take any person and we can find someone who they were angry with", or "there is some
person who everyone was angry with"? Either way we can tell a story so that it is natural
to understand it in that way.
>>  tell the stories
We can make it  clear which quantifier is in the scope of which, in perfectly ordinary
English. We can say "each person was angry with someone or other", "everyone had
someone they were angry with" and so on, to be explicit that the existential is within the
scope of the universal. And we can say "there was some particular person who everyone
was angry with", or "the same person was the object of everyone's anger", to be explicit
that the universal is within the scope of the existential. But the fact remains that for
many  English  sentences  we  cannot  tell  from  the  grammar  of  the  sentence  which
quantifier has the widest scope, and must rely on what we know about who produced it,
who was the audience, and what is most likely to be taken as true. We cannot assume
that the quantifier that comes first  is  meant to have the widest  scope.  For  example
compare the two sentences (sandwich) "someone stole  every sandwich"  and (death)
"someone died every minute". They have very parallel structures, and it is hard to see
how anything about their grammar will give "someone" and "every" different scopes in
the two sentences. But the natural way of understanding (sandwich) gives "someone" the
widest scope — there is a person who stole every sandwich — and the natural way of
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understanding (death) gives "every" the widest scope — each moment was one where
some particular person died. (The natural reading of (sandwich) is even more dominant if
we rephrase it as "some thief stole every sandwich".) And the reason is obvious: it is
easy to see how there could be a thief who took all the sandwiches, but not easy to see
how there could be a person who died and then died again a minute later. So we tend to
choose the interpretation that is most likely to be true.
>> find a story in which it makes sense to understand "some thief stole every
sandwich" so that "every" has widest scope.
>> find  a  story  in  which  it  makes  sense  to  understand "someone died  every
minute" so that "someone" has widest scope.
The same ambiguity and the same sensitivity  to  context is  found with other  natural
language ways of expressing quantifiers. "Someone is always guarding the store" can
mean "at any time there is someone who is the person guarding the store at that time",
or "there is a person who at all times guards the store", depending on the conversation
or story it is part of. "Sometimes if you guard the store you fall asleep" can mean "there
are times when anyone guarding the store falls asleep" or "anyone guarding the store will
at certain times fall asleep". The fact is that natural languages rely on context as much
as on grammar to make clear the scope of quantifiers, and that one basic reason for this
is that many quantifiers are treated like names.
>> is this a problem with natural  (spoken) language?  is anything wrong with
relying on context to settle ambiguity about the scope of quantifiers ?
>> make stories in which these two ambiguous sentences are pushed towards one
or the other interpretation.
10:3 (of 10) a graphical representation of quantifier order
Quantifier order can be illustrated graphically. If we number the individuals in the domain
(or if they are numbers) a two-place relation R corresponds to an area in the plane, the
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set of points (x,y) such that Rx,y, as illustrated in (a) below. When "x$y Rxy is true there
is a point vertically above every point on the x-axis, where Rxy, as illustrated in (b).
When $x"y Rxy is true there is a point on the x-axis from which a vertical line extends all
the way up, as illustrated in (c). When  "y  $x Rxy is true there is a point horizontally
across from ever point on the y-axis, as illustrated in (d). And when $x"y Rxy is true
there is a point on the y-axis from which a horizontal line extends all the way out,
as illustrated in (e). There are many ways of distributing points which make
"x$y Rxy or $x"y Rxy true, but I have chosen (b) and (c) so that $x"y Rxy is not true in
(b) and "x$y Rxy is not true in (c). And I have chosen (d) and (e) so that  "y $x Rxy is
not true in (d) and "y $x Rxy is not true in (e). You will see that  "x$y Rxy  is true in (c),
as it is in any model for $x"y Rxy. Any graphical depiction of "x$y Rxy will have some
sort of horizontal barrier all the way across, ad any graphical depiction of $x"y Rxy will
have a vertical line extending upwards from some point on the X axis, but they may have
other points as well: these are the core models, pared down to contain only what they
need to make the corresponding sentences true.
These graphs may remind you of something from chapter 1. In a relational grid we have
a row of YESs when there is an individual that has the relation to every individual, and
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we have a column of YESs when there is an individual that every individual has the
relation to. When every individual has the relation to some individual there is a YES
somewhere on every row, and when some individual has the relation to every individual
there is a YES somewhere on every column. (And we have a column of YESs when there
is an individual that has the relation to every individual, also a YES somewhere on every
column when every individual has the relation to some individual.) These are really the
same as the diagrams above, given the convention of making the horizontal axis the x-
axis, except that a relational grid can only be used to show a small finite number of
individuals.
Notice that (b) and (d), and (c) and (e), are flipped versions of one another.  Exchanging
two variables is the same as flipping the graph around a diagonal. This may help with a
point in the next chapter.
4 (of 10) why these ambiguities matter 
Suppose we have a sentence whose grammar is ambiguous between two readings but
which is much more likely to be true if understood one way than the other.  Isn't that
interpretation then the obvious one to use?
Often, it is.  But there are situations where it is not.  Here are four of them.
conjecture  Sometimes it is clear that something is true, but a less obvious thing might
also  be  true.  So  we  want  to  be  able  to  say  "yes,  sure,  but  here  is  a  more  subtle
possibility." For example, most likely time had a beginning, so that for every time there is
an earlier one: but it is also possible that time goes back forever, so that for all times
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there is an earlier one. We want to be able to state these so that it is clear that they are
different.
saying the unlikely  In a similar way, sometimes we want to make a claim which will
surprise people, and we don't want them to say "oh yes, everyone knows that".  For
example, we might want to say "There is a cause for all diseases", and mean not the
unsurprising "every disease has a cause" but the bold and implausible "there is a cause
which is at the origin of all diseases." Someone claiming this would have to choose their
words carefully so that it was clear what a radical suggestion it was.
interpretations  It is often clear which way of understanding a sentence is more likely to
be true, when the words mean what they usually do. But often they do not. An extreme
example is when words are used with very different meanings to their normal ones. So
we might use names of animals as names for sports teams (the cougars, the bears) and
refer to the results of sports contexts in exaggerated terms (the cougars were lucky to
escape with their lives, the ducks destroyed the bears.) Then your expectations of what
is true are completely unreliable, and given a claim such as "all bears can take care of a
cougar" you do not know which way to understand it.
complicated argument    When we consider subtle arguments in philosophy or complex
proofs in mathematics we are often operating at the limits of  our understanding. So
instead of relying on a real grasp of what we are talking about we often hold onto the
bare words. But this makes us victims of a kind of "bait and switch" trick, where we allow
an assumption because it seems harmless and then If we are not careful it is used in a
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much less harmless form. For example we might begin by assuming that every physical
system can be described mechanically and later reason as if we had assumed that the
universe is one big machine. Or we might start by thinking that people can be mistaken
about any particular item of information and go on as if this was the same as thinking
that we can be mistaken in everything we think.  These are both examples of  "/$ scope
reversal. 
>> why are they?
A historically important example from mathematics is the assumptions that are needed
to make sense of differentiation and integration in calculus. These were at first confusing
and inconsistent, and to state them clearly mathematicians had to give clear definitions
of limit, derivative, integral, and various kinds of continuity. Care about quantifier scope
was crucial in doing this, and it is surely no coincidence that only after this had made the
topic important did logicians come up with adequate treatments of quantifiers21. Another
example is axiomatic set theory, where the axioms have to be stated with great care,
which the precision of symbolic logic, particularly with respect to the order of quantifiers,
makes possible.22
What to conclude from all this? Just that natural language works fine as long as each
little utterance is surrounded by a sea of context, people speaking to one another share a
lot  of  assumptions  about  the  world  around  them,  and  their  aim is  to  communicate
definite  truths  rather  than  conjectures,  possibilities,  or  interesting  ideas.  Take  these
away, and language needs a lot of propping up. We should not hold this against it, but we
21 A nice discussion of these issues is in David M. Bressoud A Radical Approach to Real Analysis, 
The Mathematical Association of America 2007.
22 An exception is David Lewis's Parts of Classes (Wiley-Blackwell 1991), a sophisticated book on 
set theory which uses no symbols. A marvel of clear writing.
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should learn how to do the propping up on those occasions when it is needed. We can do
a lot of the propping from within our usual language, but a little outside help and, most
importantly, an awareness of what the dangers are, is always useful. 
10:5 (of 10) invisible quantifiers  
Many sentences have several quantifiers. We tend not to realise how many because we
hide them in various ways. (Perhaps we do this because if we spot them we think about
them, and then we get confused.) Here are some ways quantifiers can hide.
words with quantified meanings  A person is a parent if they are a parent of someone, a
daughter if they are the daughter of someone, and so on. A person is a president if there
is some organization of which they are president. But we would not say, for example "if
there is someone of whom a given person is a parent then in very few cases is there an
organization of which that person is president." Instead we will make the words swallow
the quantifiers and say "parents are rarely presidents" .
Most of these words have absorbed existential quantifiers. But there are a few cases in
which the quantifier is universal. A view is panoramic if one can see in all directions, a
wrench is universal if it can be used to turn  all bolts. A person is promiscuous if they
have sex with many other people.
>> find other examples 
passives   A thing is broken if something has broken it; a bottle is opened if something
has  opened  it;  a  person  has  been  stabbed  if  someone has  stabbed  them.  Passives
reverse the order of a relation: if x loves y then y is loved by x. But they also serve to
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avoid mentioning a quantifier. We say "x is loved" to mean "someone loves x". (We also
say "x loves" to mean "x loves someone". "I have loved and been loved" is "I have loved
someone and someone has loved me".) English and some related languages have passive
versions of  verbs; many languages do not (although some have anti-passives, which
quantify the object rather than the subject.)
>> find other examples 
tense  In  English we say that,  for  example,  someone has eaten all  the cherries,  to
communicate that there is a time which is past and that at that time someone at all the
cherries.  This has the form  
$x (Personx & "y (Cherryy  $t (Timet & Pastt & Eatsxyt ) ) )
The future tense is similar, except that for Past we have Future.
There are more complicated tenses. We might say "alice ate an Apple and by then she
had Eaten a Pickle", which has the form, if we write it as a single sentence of quantifier
logic, 
$x $y $s $t (Ax & Py & Times & Timet & Pastt & Beforest & Exys & Exyt) 
It is easier to understand if we write it as a series of English semi-sentences:
We are discussing two times, both in the past. At the second Alice eats an apple
and at the first she eats a pickle. The second is later than the first.
The "had" tense (the past perfect, language teachers will say) asserts that there exists a
past time at which something happened, and there exists another past time, at which
something else happened, and the first of these is earlier than the second. This looks
really complicated, written out like this, so you can see why language might choose to
hide the quantifiers with a device such as the tense of a verb.  
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>>  why do the time quantifiers usually come within the scope of other quantifiers?
(hard question)
>>  if you speak a language that does not have these ways of hiding quantifiers, does it
have different ones?
There are other ways of hiding quantifiers. Every language has its own ways of keeping
things simple. I suspect that these devices, hidden in the meanings of words, in passive
constructions, in tenses, and elsewhere, have their own rules for making the scopes of
quantifiers clearer. But these rules are not obvious. Consider tenses for example. "Every
student argued with the teacher" is ambiguous: it could mean (a) there is a past time t
such that for every student s, s argues with the teacher at t, or (b) for every student s
there is a past time t such that s argues with the teacher at t. To express (b) we might
be more likely to say "every student has argued with the teacher" which suggests that
one  function  of  having  both  simple  past  tenses ("argued")  and  perfect  tenses  ("has
argued") may be, instead of or as well as what language teachers will tell you, to clarify
the scopes of the quantifiers that are hidden in tenses.  
>>  I wrote "student s quarrels with the teacher at time t", using a present tense. I had
to use some tense or other, to make a good English sentence.  is this a problem for the
view that tenses are quantifiers over times?
Another  example  concerns  adverbs  of  quantification.  Consider  "all  the  hummingbirds
were occasionally at the feeder". This can be understood as (a) for every hummingbird h
there were times t such that h was at the feeder at t, or (b) there were times t when for
every hummingbird h, h was at the feeder at t. To my ear (b) is the only meaning of
"Occasionally all the hummingbirds were at the feeder", and (a) is the only meaning of
"Each hummingbird was on occasion at the feeder".   
Or consider "some elephants will invariably fear mice". It can mean (a) there is at least
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one particular elephant which is frightened of any mouse, or (b) for any mouse there are
elephants which are afraid of it. I suspect that (a) is the more natural meaning and that a
very particular context will be needed to push the sentence towards (b). (But think of
this story: I am telling you about the elephants in a particular herd, and about the mice
that live nearby, and I say "Most of the elephants will be ok with the mice but I'm sure
that there are one or two elephants that will be spooked: some elephants will invariably
fear (these) mice.") 
The ambiguities are even found with words which have an implicit existential quantifier.
"All the men are uncles" can mean (a) for any man m there is a person p such that m is
uncle of p". But it can also mean (b) there is a person p such that all the men are uncles
of p. (You ask why a group of men at a wedding are having their photograph taken
together and you are told “they are all uncles”, meaning that they are all uncles of the
bride or groom, and it is a rare occasion when they meet.)     
There  may  be  subtle  rules  which  make  it  likely  that  a  sentence  involving  hidden
quantifiers together with the choice of traditional quantifier word ('each', 'every', 'some',
'there is, and so on) will tend to one scope order rather than another. That is, these
sentences though sensitive to context and expectation, may be less sensitive, not so
easily moved from one meaning to another, given these subtle rules. But I know that,
though I have been speaking English fluently every day for many decades, I could not
state these rules to save my life.  
10:6 (of 10) from two to three
We often think and communicate thoughts  which would contain  three,  four,  or  more
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quantifiers if we analyzed them. These are often hidden, in ways that I have discussed,
and  when  stated  explicitly  they  can  be  very  ambiguous  and  confusing.  Some  of
language’s devices for making the order of the quantifiers clear do not apply well, and
the range of possible meanings can overwhelm us. Logical symbols avoid these problems,
but many people are simply baffled by them when they get beyond a certain complexity.
The purpose of this section is to get you to understand sentences with three and four
quantifiers. A string of quantifiers at the beginning of a sentence of quantifier logic is
called the quantifier prefix, and the simple or complex relation between the variables is
called the matrix. We will only discuss the simplest case, in which the quantifiers come all
together first, followed by a matrix which is a simple relation between the variables.  (But
already this is different from the spirit of ordinary language, where in inside-out fashion
we state very few quantifiers at the beginning of a sentence and bury the rest within it.)  
As I have remarked in earlier chapters, it is often helpful to understand mathematical
notation in an outside-in way. Then we can process them in stages, leaving the inside
content till later while focusing on the outside content. For an example that has nothing
to do with formal logic consider the summation operator. (I once had a very intelligent
colleague who said he could understand all mathematics up to the level where ∑ enters. I
expect he is typical of many people, and variable binding operators prefixed to
functions  are  a  kind  of  barrier,  requiring  an  approach that  is  typicallymathematical.)
Expressions like ∑
0≤n≤100
3n6+5 — don't worry: it is explained
below — can be hard to digest if you try to understand them as if they were unified
combinations of symbols whose meanings had be put together all at once. A better way
is to think of this along the following lines. "We are adding up a series of numbers. Each
member of the series is a function of the variable n, and we will add them up beginning
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when n is 0 and stopping when n is 100. The function in question is 3n6+5." A single
expression has been unpacked into a series of linked sentences, each of which can be
understood in the way that we ordinarily understand language. Notice that the formula,
when we understand it  this way, shows us how to do a mechanical  calculation of its
value, without thinking at every stage what we are doing.
>>  how does it show how to do a mechanical calculation?
We can do the same with complex quantifier sentences. (This is not surprising, since they
are a form of variable-binding operator, and the analogy with summations and integrals
must have been in the minds of their inventors.) Begin with the very simplest cases, the
two quantifier sentences we have already seen. Consider for example "x $y Bx Detests xy
. To explain it by separating the quantifier prefix and the matrix into separate sentences
that were as natural English we could say
Everyone has one. Someone they detest, that is.·
And in the same vein we could explain the contrasting sentence $x "y Bxy as
There is a person who has this relation to everyone. That is, he or she detests
them·
These make the contrast between the sentences clear. But the English is less natural-
feeling  in  other  more  complicated  examples.  So  here  is  a  variety  of  similar  English
versions. First for "x $y Bx Detests xy .
Pick any person. That determines another person. The first  person detests the
second· 
Everyone has their un-favourite. They detest that person· 
Take any person. They have someone who they hate· 
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For every person there is a second person. That person detests the second person· 
For any first person there will be some second person. The first will detest the
second·
Next for  $x "y Bxy. 
There is a particular person. They detest everyone·
There is a hate-filled person. They detest everyone·
There  is  a  first-person  who  has  an  attitude  to  everyone.  That  attitude  is
detestation·
Now that you have seen these you can invent many variants for yourself. They show very
clearly the difference that the order of the quantifiers makes. You may think that they
are just clumsy ways of saying things that can be expressed by simpler and more natural
English sentences. You would be right. But they introduce means of expression that can
make the meanings of sentences with many quantifiers easy to understand. So I am
introducing them in cases where you already know the meanings. As the number of
quantifiers  increases it  will  be increasingly  useful  to  be able  to  break a sentence  of
quantifier logic into a sequence of sentences that can be understood in an outside-in way.
All of the versions I have listed have to find some substitute for a useful device in spoken
language: we use names of kinds of things to mark the difference between variables. So
we can say "every cat fears some dog" or "there is a cat that fears all dogs" and we can
stretch these out as "for every cat there is a dog. The cat fears the dog" and "There is a
particular  cat.  She  fears  all  dogs."  When  we  are  talking  about  arbitrary  individuals,
arbitrary people, or  whatever is  in the domain of  some model,  we do not have this
resource.
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Now consider sentences with three quantifiers. They are easiest to understand when they
relate three different kinds of things, so I shall use the resource I just mentioned.
Consider an English sentence such as “every skier skied at one of the resorts on some
day”. Think of the meanings it can have. (Suppose we are discussing two skiers, two
resorts,  and  three  days  of  some  week.)  Some  of  these  meanings  can  be  given  in
stretched out form as follows. 
For each person there was a place and a  time when the person did it. They skied
at that resort on that day·
On one particular day and one particular resort everyone did it – skiing·
At one particular resort everyone did it on one day or other. That is, they skied·
On one particular  day everyone did it  somewhere or other.  What they did was
skiing·
>> make stories ending with “every skier skied at one of the resorts on some day” that
make the sentence have each one of these meanings 
 
>> choose two of these sentences and describe a situation where one is true and the
other false, then a situation where the second is true and the first false
In logical symbols, we can abbreviate these as follows, using Ssrt to mean that skier s
skied at resort r at time t.  (They’re in the same order and colour as the quasi-English
versions.)
"s $r $t  Ssrt  
$r $t "s  Ssrt  
$r "s $t  Ssrt 
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$t "s $r  Ssrt
It is important to see that these are all different. They are got by putting the universal
“skier” quantifier in different positions with respect to the two existential “resort” and
“time” quantifiers. So you should think of models where some are true and others false.
A model cannot make the second one— $r $t "s Ssrt — true without also making the first
one  —  "s $r $t Ssrt  —   true, but all other combinations of truth and falsity are
possible.
>  so which ones are logical consequences of which others?  we have not given
any rules for this, yet, so the question is just what seems intuitively to follow from
each of them
I have made these easier to read by writing "s for “all skiers” and  $r for “there is a
resort”, and so on. If we are discussing a model which has skiers, resorts, times, and
other things (cats, professors, prime numbers) in one domain, then we will have to say
that it is a skier that fills the first place of the relation. So for example the first of the four
sentences above would become  
"x $y $z ( Sx  (Ry & Dy & Sxyz)) 
(for anything we can find two others, so that if it is a skier then they are a resort and a
day when the skier skis there) or some variant using different letters. 
There are more possibilities, if we combine the quantifiers and the skiers, resorts, and
times more freely. We could say "Some skier skied at all the resorts at some times",
which would itself have a range of possible meanings. (Compare the four meanings in the
Abraham Lincoln example in section 1.) And there are others. See exercises 6, 11, 12 for
more practice with 3-quantifier sentences.
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> state the meanings of "Some skier skied at all the resorts at some times" in less
ambiguous words and in logical symbols
10:7 (of 10) picturing models with many-place relations
So far we have discussed the cases of 2 and 3 quantifier prefixes where the matrix has
no quantifiers, and often consists of a single relation. More than three explicit quantifiers
in  a  single  sentence  are  rare  in  spoken  language,  but  there  are  often  more  hidden
quantifiers that would increase the number if they were made explicit. ("Some deserts
arrived, but all the uncles and grandmothers had been disgusted and so they weren't
eaten." 6!) My aim is to give you an intellectual tool that will allow you to think in terms
of longer quantifier prefixes, expressing very subtle thoughts. At the end of this chapter I
discuss  examples  with  six  explicit  quantifiers,  to  show  that  they  are  really  not  so
terrifying. Before we get to this, we need a way of describing models for 3-place and 4-
place relations,  so  we can discuss  the  logical  connections  among 3 and 4 quantifier
sentences.  
Consider  the  skiers-resorts-days  example  again.  One  way  of  picturing  the  kind  of
situation these sentences discuss is a modified arrow diagram of the three-place relation
"s skis at r on day d". Here, for just two skiers, two resorts, and three days, is a model of
one possibility: 
skiers resorts days
alice, bo snoparadise Mon, Tues,
powderheaven Wed
black arrows: where and when Alice skis
red arrows: where and when Bo skis
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The diagram shows that Alice skis at Snoparadise on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday,
and Bo skis at Snoparadise on Monday, and Bo also skis at Powderheaven on Monday,
Tuesday, and Wednesday. The diagram would get messy and hard to read if there were
more  skiers,  resorts,  or  days.  I  doubt  that  there  is  a  way  of  making  diagrams  for
relations with three or more places that does not involve some serious compromises.  
>>  which of the skier sentences above are true in this model?
>> how would you rewrite the model presented this way as a database for a relation, as
discussed in chapter one? 
>> if diagrams for many-place relations are so tricky, might we do better just to express
them in spoken language?  
We can make diagrams like this for two-place relations also, and they are useful in seeing
the difference that quantifier  order  makes.  Here are presentations of  models for  the
relation "admires" between two people.
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Note that in these diagrams the same individuals are named in both columns. In the first
model "x $y Axy  is true and $x "y Axy is false, and in the second model "x $y Axy is
false and $x "y Axy is true. (Be sure that you see why this is so.) Because of diagrams
like these, relations such that  "x $y  Axy is true are sometimes called ladder relations,
and relations such that  $x "y Axy are sometimes called wheel relations. (Notice that
there can be extra rungs and spokes, besides the ones that picture a ladder or a wheel,
so that the words are just tricks for remembering the two kinds of relations.)
>>  what are the truth-values of "y $x Axy and $y "x Axy in these two models?
>>  what are the advantages and disadvantages of representing a model for a two-place
relation this way, as opposed to arrow diagrams?
There are other ways of presenting models for relations with three or more places. Some
are used in the exercises at the end of this chapter. It is good to be able to make and
understand a variety of diagrams since, to repeat, making a suitable diagram is often the
key to solving a practical logic problem. 
10:8 (of 10) 4-place relations
Diagrams for relations can suggest and help us understand language that expresses the
scope  relations  between  quantifiers.  There  are  two  aspects  to  this.  First,  we  see  a
relation as a kind of chain: it  goes from one argument place to another,  to another,
depending on how many argument places it has. For example the skis relation goes from
skiers to resorts to days. Second, we see that sometimes where a relation goes from one
place depends on where it  has come from. For  example in  "for  every skier  there is
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somewhere that she skis on some day" the place and time that a particular skier skis
depends on which skier you choose. And in "for any skier and resort there is a day that
the skier skis there" the day that a particular skier skis at a particular resort depends on
which skier and which resort you choose. There are many ways of doing this using the
resources of a language such as English. We can break long complete sentences down
into linked series of less complete sentences, as we've seen several times in this chapter
and previous ones. And we can use prepositions such as "for" to indicate the function of a
quantifier. These can combine the prefix and the matrix into separate chunks, which can
be understood independently.  We can handle very large prefixes and matrices in these
terms. 
When we have four variables we can have two existential and two universal quantifiers so
it is possible to alternate twice, "$"$ or $"$", This is more interesting, potentially more
expressive, because with three two will be of one kind and one of the other, and for
example ""$ is not so different from "$, since it can be taken as saying "for all pairs of
individuals  there is  an individual  such that ..".  ("For  every happy couple there is  an
apparent friend who would like to see them separate.") Consider these four-quantifier
sentences. Be aware of the fact that the order of the variables in the quantifier prefix, or
of the individuals referred to in the statement of the chain, is often not the same as the
order in the matrix or the relational statement. They serve different functions: the prefix
says  which  choice  of  which  variables  depends  on  which  and  the  matrix  says  what
individuals are linked by the relation. It  is a basic advantage of  quantifier logic over
everyday language that it keeps these separate.  
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sentence I
"v $p "m $c Pvpmc
From which villages are there paths leading up which mountains from where you
can see which churches? Start from any village and it will have a path that goes
from the village up all of the mountains, and then, depending on which village and
which mountain it is, one or another church will be visible·
sentence II
"v $m "p $c Pvpmc
Talking about villages with paths to mountains where you can see churches: start
with any village. in terms of that village there will be a mountain, and whatever
path we take will lead from that village up that mountain to where some church
will be in sight· 
sentence III
"p $v "c $m Pvpmc  
Villages and paths from them lead up mountains to see churches: Consider a path,
any path, and it will lead from some village up a mountain. Choose a church and
given any one there is a mountain from which, whatever church you've chosen, it
can be seen·
Convince yourself that all the English-ish sentences have different meanings, and that
their differences are not just the different choices of words and sentence-structure. Then
see how each fits the quantifier prefix of its formal version. And to check all this, think
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which of them is true in which of the models given by the following diagrams for “from
village v path p leads up mountain m from where church c is visible”.
Diagram A
Diagram B
Diagram C
.
So which is true in which? Please think about this for yourself  before reading below.
Some hints:
In sentence I the four quantifiers are village-path-mountain-church, which is the
same order as in the matrix. So we want to look for a model in which — starting
from the left — every village is connected to a path which is connected to some
mountain which is connected to every church.
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In sentence II the order of the variables in the quantifier prefix is different to the
order  in  the  matrix. It  says  that  whatever  village  you choose  you  can find  a
mountain to which every path from that village leads and goes on to some church.
In sentence III the order is again different. The prefix has the same  universal-
existential-universal-existential order as in sentence II but in this case it is path-
village-church-mountain. So the sentence says that starting with any path you can
find a village that it goes from which leads via some mountain to all churches.
The diagrams can have extra links besides the ones that are necessary to make
them represent a model for a sentence. In particular, when we have a universal
quantifier followed by an existential quantifier all that is required is that everything
of  the  first  kind  be  connected  to  something  of  the  second,  but  in  the  model
everything of  the first  kind may be connected  to  more than one thing of  the
second kind. ("Everyone has a friend" just requires that for each person there is
someone who likes them, but it is still true if for each person there are several who
like them.)
Now think hard about which sentence is true in which model. To encourage you to think
rather than just look out for the answers I shall  now include some further examples
before the answers which are way way down. 
Two people can work together to frustrate the plans of a third. Take any of the
people we're discussing and there will be a third corresponding to him or her. Then
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taking anyone at all as the second person we find that the first of these and this
second frustrate the plans of that third·
This is clearly of the form "x $z "y Fxyz  rather than  "x $y "z  Fxyz  .
Let's discuss cases where the number of people working in four buildings forms a
geometrical series. This will be relevant to designing a disaster evacuation plan for
the neighbourhood. In fact if  we choose suitably we can find one which is the
second in such a series whatever we choose as the first,  where the third and
fourth are chosen in terms of them·.
This is clearly of the form $y "x $z $w $z Sxyzw  rather than  "x $y $z $w Sxyzw .
>> How in these two last examples could we express the 'rather than' formulas in
English-ish?
An attempt  to  make friends with  someone can be thwarted  by  other  people's
quarrels. In this instance whoever we consider, their quarrel with someone had the
effect of thwarting all of some person's overtures to people they would like to be
friends with. 
This is clearly of the form "z $w $x $z "y Axyzw , taking the relation to be "x's attempt
to make friends with y is thwarted by z's quarrel with w', rather than  
"x $y $z $w Sxyzw .  Contrast this with
An attempt  to  make friends with  someone can be thwarted  by  other  people's
369
quarrels. One particular person's attempt to make friends with another is blocked
by the fact that everyone has someone who is quarrelling with them.  
This is clearly of the form $x "y "z $w Axyzw , rather than
$x "y $w "z Axyzw or  $z $w "x $y $z $w Sxyzw .  
>> How might we express these two alternatives in English-ish?
It is now time to confess that I lied and the answers are not way way below but right
here. Sentence I is true in the model represented by diagram B, sentence II in A, and III
in A B, and C.
10:9 (of 10) inside-out  
To repeat, the hard cases are when the variables in the prefix are in a different order to
those in the matrix, when written in logical notation. These are hard to give in clear
English.  I  have been producing "outside-in" English which mimics the way these are
handled in logic. But there are also "inside out" ways of saying the same things. I will
briefly give some examples. I  use a three-place relation because the English passive
voice can play less of a role. The relation Gxyz is "x gives y to z"; so there is a giver, a
present, and a receiver. Consider the sentence of logic "x "y $z Gzyx. This does not say
that everyone gave everyone a present, or that there is a present that everyone gave to
everyone, as by now you understand. In terms of givers and presents it says that for
every present and receiver there is a giver who gave it to the receiver. (So, incidentally,
we see how having a rich and redundant vocabulary — giver, receiver, present, as well
as gives — allows more ways to express yourself clearly.) But let us try to express this
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with just the relation G and quantifier words. Here are some possibilities.
Someone — but which person depends on what they give and who they give it to
— gives each present to each person. 
Some person, but we cannot tell until we know what is given and who it is given
to, gives any present you choose to any person you choose. 
Someone, depending on the present and the receiver, gives each present to each
receiver.
The  last  of  these  is  probably  the  clearest,  but  it  uses  the  vocabulary  of
giver/present/receiver to get the effect of reordering the relation. The moral is that we
can if we really want put quantifiers in the places where names go, but if we do we also
need ways of showing which ones depend on which others. This will often mean referring
forward to something that has not been mentioned yet.  
But isn't it simpler to say this, in outside-in style?
Consider any person and any thing: someone gives it to her.
>>  how would you say "everyone gave everyone a present" and "there is a present that
everyone gave to everyone" in this inside-out style?
10:10 (of 10) complicating the matrix    
In the examples so far the matrix has been a single relation, to focus on the quantifier
prefix. But the matrix can be complicated too. Think about the meanings of the following
examples, which use the two-place relational symbols I and  A so that  Ixy when  x is
Impressed with y, and Axy when x Admires y, and the three-place R so that Rxyz when
x Refuses to help y in bullying z. 
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$x "y (Axy  Ayy)  
One person, m, has this relation to everyone: when she admires a person then that
person admires herself
Admiration works this way for some person: when she admires anyone then that
one admires herself·
There is someone who admires people only when they admire themselves
$x "y "z (Axy  Ayz)
Admirers and the people admired by them: for one person, and any two further
people if the first admires one of the pair then the second does not admire the
second of the pair·
There's someone who admires people only when they don't admire anyone.
>> if this sentence is true then anyone the person admires does not admire them, in fact
admires no-one.  Why?
>>what is the difference between this sentence and "everyone admires only people who
do not admire anyone?
"x $y "z (Axy  Rxzy )
Here's one connection between admiration and refusal to take part in bullying.
Take any person and in terms of them there is another so that given any third, if
the first admires the second then she will refuse to take part in that third person's
bullying of the second·
Admiration and not taking part in persecution: everyone has someone who, if they
admired them, they would refuse to take part whoever was bullying them·
Everyone has someone who if they admired them they would refuse to take part in
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anyone's bullying of them
>> this can be true  without its being true that for everyone there is someone
who's persecution by anyone they will refuse to take part in.   how?
"x $y $z (Rxzy & Ayx & ~Ayz)  
Refusing to go along with bullying can lead to admiration. Every person generates
two  further  people,  a  bully  and  a  victim.  She  refuses  to  join  the  bully  in
persecuting  the  victim;  the  bully  admires  her;  the  bully  does  not  admire  the
victim. 
For every person there are two more: she refuses to join the first of  these in
bullying the second, is admired by the first who does not admire the second·
>>  "two  further people", "two  more": these phrases are potentially misleading.
why?  how could we avoid them?
To end this chapter and to convince you that you can now understand things you could
not before taking this course, here are a couple of sentences with six quantifiers.
Whichever door you take there will be a hallway leading to a bank of elevators,
every one of which goes to a floor where every hallway has a dragon that is the
same colour as the door.
Doors lead to hallways lead to elevators up to floors with dragons, but you have to
take the right ones. Start with any door and then a suitable choice of hallway is
possible, so you can continue with any elevator and make a suitable choice of floor
to leave it; then take any hallway and finish by choosing a dragon on that hallway.
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This sequence of door, hallway, elevator, floor, dragon fits the condition that you
can follow it from door to same-coloured dragon.
>> how could this sentence be true without it being true that any route from door
to dragon gives one of the same colour?  describe a situation where this sentence
might be true but "any sequence of door, hallway, elevator, floor, hallway, dragon
leads to a door-dragon colour match" is false.  
This sentence was of the form ""x $y "z $m "n  $o Axyzmno". Six quantifiers, though
they are best thought of as three "$ pairs. The six variables are connected by the relation
A, which could be analysed as a long conjunction
Dx & Hy & Hm & Ez & Fw & Do & Lxy & Lyz & Lzm & Lno & Lno & Sxo
where the one place attributes are "Door", "Hallway", "Elevator", "Floor",and "dRagon",
the two-pace relation L is "leads to", and the two-place relation S is "has the same colour
as". The meaning of the sentence should be clear by this point, and it should be clear
that the meaning is different from variants, such as this:
"x $y $z $m "n $o  Axyzmno
Start with any door, and then make a suitable choice of hallway, elevator, and floor
so that any choice of hallway will then lead to a dragon of the same colour as the
door.
More subtly, both of these are different from 
"x "z $y $m "n $o  Axyzmno  
Start with any door, and go to any elevator by a suitable choice of hallway, then
there is a floor where for every hallway there is a dragon of the same colour as the
door.
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>>  how do these versions separate the quantifier prefix from the matrix? (To what
extent do they allow you to think of them separately?)
The difference is that in the sentence we are considering now there is a suitable choice of
hallway for every combination of door and elevator, while with the previous one there is a
hallway that is part of a path to a dragon from any door and any elevator it leads to. (For
example suppose that several hallways leads from any door to several elevators. The
previous sentence requires only that one of these hallways lead to elevators all of which
get us to a dragon. But this second sentence requires that any elevator be joined to any
door by a hallway that allows us to continue.)  
>>  draw a diagram of a situation where one of these is true and the other false. 
words in this chapter that it would be a good idea to understand:  quantifier prefix, 
quantifier scope, matrix of a quantified sentence, multiple qualification.
375
exercises for chapter ten
A – core
1) “Someone does not love someone” can have three meanings. State all three so it is
clear  that  each is  different  from the  others,  and tell  a  mini-story  in  which  it  would
benatural to say “someone does not love someone” with this meaning.
2) Which of the following sentences are naturally taken to have the $" "wheel" pattern,
iven the facts in the real world? (Like “someone ate all the sandwiches [who was he?]”)
Which have the "$ Ladder pattern? (Like “someone dies every minute.”)
a) Someone is the mother of every child.
b) Someone loves everyone. [Some living human !]
c) Some positive number is smaller than each positive number. [“positive
number” includes zero.]
d) Somewhere is at least as far north as anywhere.
e) Some chicken lays every egg.
3) In the model below, taking the relation as R and the attribute as P
a)   Find x: Rxo b)   Find x: Rox
c)   Find x: Rox d)   Find x: Rxo  
c)   Find x: Rxl d)   Find x: Rlx
(You may want to look back at chapter 1 to remind yourself of how the difference 
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between Rxy and Ryx is shown in a relational grid.)
Which of the following are true?
e)   "x Rxo f)   "x Rox g)   "x Rxl
h)   "x Rlx i)   "x (Px   Rxo) j) "x (Rxo  Px)
k)   "x (Rxl  Px) l)   "x (Rxl  Px) m)  $x Rxm
n)  $x Rmx
Once these are decided, settle the truth values of
o)   "x$y Rxy p)   "x$y Ryx q)   $x "y Rxy
r)   $x "y Rxy s)   $x $x (Rxy & ~Ryx)   t)   "x "y (Px  Rxy)  
u)   "x "y (Px  Ryx) v)   "x "y (Rxy  Ryx)   w)   "x "y (Rxy  Ryx)
P   R l m n o
l YES l YES NO YES YES
m NO m YES NO NO YES
n NO n YES NO NO YES
o YES o YES NO NO YES
4) Here are four stories about deception (‘fooling’).
(a) The sun is setting as all three of our characters enter the house. Each has a problem,
since Aidan has told Beth that he loves her, but needs to reassure his real love, Charlie.
Beth needs a thousand dollars in a hurry to pay a blackmailer. Charlie has to get rid of an
incriminating photo in a hurry. Aidan is hand in hand with Beth but pulls it to his stomach
and groans “oh, I need a bathroom immediately”. “Sure says Beth, just rush, and I’ll help
by holding your briefcase.” Aidan runs upstairs to meet Charlie, gives Charlie a kiss and
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explains that he needs to seduce Beth to get her answers to a logic quiz. Charlie is
actually reassured, but pretends not to be and tells Aidan to eat the crumpled photo as a
sign of devotion. Aidan does so, and returns to Beth, who meanwhile has gone through
his briefcase and removed a thousand dollars in cash.  So,  you see, there are times
everyone fools everyone. 
(b) Our three characters have all left the house on different evil purposes. Aidan returns
home on Monday, sends an email to the others saying that there has been a leak from
the upstairs water tank and he urgently needs two hundred from each to get it repaired.
To his surprise, they all believe this lie and send him the money. He goes out on a binge
and spends it all that evening. The next day Beth returns and is relieved to see no visible
water damage, but pretends to collapse, so that Aidan sends another email, to Charlie,
saying to return immediately. Once Charlie has arrived Beth persuades Aidan and Charlie
to work on her logic homework, while she lies groaning on the sofa.  his takes them all
night, eating pizza that Charlie pays for. In the morning Charlie gives a forged version of
the pizza bill to Aidan and Beth, and gets them to pay twice what the pizza cost. The
moral of this little tale is that there are times when everyone fools everyone. 
(c)  Aidan and Beth decide to play a trick on Charlie. They lie on the floor with fake
knives sticking out of their chests and fake blood all over the place. Charlie screams and
calls an ambulance, and by the time it  arrives Aidan and Beth have cleaned up and
pretend Charlie is crazy. Charlie decides to take revenge and the next day persuades
Aidan to cooperate in a trick on Beth. They hack into her email and choose a particularly
embarrassing item, which they send to everyone on her address list. Of course Beth is
furious, and to get back at Aidan she persuades Charlie to help her make a realistic
dummy of Aidan’s mother, who he fears and avoids. When Aidan comes home he goes to
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his room and finds his “mother” sitting on his bed. He rushes out of the house in a panic,
and they lock the door, leaving him shoe-less and coat-less in the snow. One conclusion
from the antics of these three is that there are times when everyone fools everyone.  
In these three stories “there are times when everyone fools everyone” has three different
meanings. In one story for all people x there is a person y such that for some time t x
fools y at t. In one, for all people x there is a time t such that for all people y x fools y at
t. And in one, for all people x and all people y there is a time t such that x fools y at t.
Which is which?
(In fact, you have to understand “all people y” as “all people y distinct from x”. This
should not cause you problems, and the stories would have got more complicated if I
wanted to avoid this.) 
5)  In the six graphs below say which depict a model where (a) "x$y Rxy (b) $x "y Rxy 
(c) "y $x Rxy (d) "y $x Rxy is true, as described in section 3 of this chapter. In some of 
them more than one, or none, may be true. The graphs are drawn so that the bottom 
edge is the x-axis, the left edge is the y-axis, the shaded area is the set of pairs (x,y) 
such that Rxy, and the whole rectangle is the domain of the model. 
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6)  Below there are plans of the floors of a fire trap building. Each has a central room, 
marked S, and you can get to exits by paths from the doors of S. (Both the exits on the 
outside and the doors from S are indicated by gaps in the walls.) A path is a sequence of 
moves in a straight line allowing 90° turns but not allowing one to go back in a direction 
one has already taken. When a path gets beside an exit it has two go through it. (This is 
what you would naturally take a path to an exit to be, but I am trying to forestall 
quibbles.)
[A]   Which floor plan satisfies which of the following conditions:
(i) For all doors from S all paths lead to an exit
(ii)  There is a door from S such that some path from that door leads to an exit
(iii) For all doors from S there is a path leading to an exit
(iv) There is a door from S from which for each exit there is a path leading to it
(v)  For all doors from S and all exits there is a path leading from the door to the 
exit.
[B]  Using a single 3-place relation between doors, paths, and exits write) (i) to (v) in 
the language of quantifier logic state in words what the relation means.
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7)  Given the relational grid below, what are
(i) the individuals that have R to some individual
(ii) the individuals that have R to all individuals
(iii) the individuals to which all individuals have R
(iv) how do the answers to questions (i), (ii), (iii) relate to the issues in sections 1 and 2 
of this chapter?
..R a b c d
a YES YES YES NO
b YES YES YES YES
c NO YES YES YES
d NO NO YES YES
8)  Relations can be classified by restrictions they place on all the individuals they relate.
A relation R is
reflexive if "x "y Rxx
symmetric if  "x"y (Rxy  Ryx)
antisymmetric if "x "y (Rxy  ~Ryx)
transitive if  "x"y"z ((Rxy & Ryz)  Rxz)
a)  One of these means that when the relation holds in one direction it always holds in
the opposite direction. One of them means that when the relation holds in one direction it
never holds in the opposite direction. One of them means that the relation holds between
every individual and itself. And one of them means that an individual always has the
relation to all things that something it has the relation to has the relation to. Which of
these applies to which of the four definitions above?
b)  Which of the relations below is reflexive, which symmetric, which antisymmetric, and 
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which transitive? (A relation can be of more than one of these kinds.)
a)  bigger than b)  has the same birthday as c)  loves 
d)  lived 300 years before e)  is in a course given by f) mother of
f)  got a better grade than g)  has the same GPA as
9)  a), b), c) are quasi-English 3-quantifier sentences. Which of them corresponds to 
which of i) – ix) below?
a)  Which farmer feeds which carrot to which donkey? Start with any farmer and
then this fixes a donkey, but then any carrot will do·
b)   Chains  of  roads link  between buildings:  suppose  you begin  with  the  right
building. then you can take any road and find a suitable building for the third link·
c)  About which lure is right to catch which fish under which of these weather
conditions: choose a fish first — it can be any fish at all — and that will determine
the weather, and then you can find a lure that will work for that fish under those
conditions·
i))  $f "d $c Ffcd ii)  "f $d "c Ffcd iii)  "f $d $c Ffcd
iv)  $b "r $c  Crbc v)  $b "r $c Cbrc vi)  "b $r "c Ffcd
viii)  "f $w $l Ffwl viii)  "f $w "l Flfc ix)  "f $w $l Flfc
10) Revisit exercise  14 of Chapter 2. That exercise involved searching for individuals
satisfying a quantified criterion, as you can now see. The criterion was stated as “ we are
looking for individuals l such that there is another, m, where Rlmxy and Rzsmt — x, y, z,
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s, t can be any individuals at all”. 
(a) state this criterion using quantifiers
(b) that exercise presented a model, in the form of an arrow diagram for a 4-place
relation R, where searches for individuals satisfying the criterion could be performed. The
model  satisfies  the  sentence  that  we get  by putting  the  universal  or  the  existential
quantifier at the beginning of the criterion, binding the variable l, but not the sentence
that we get by using the other. Which?
(c) [harder] a universal or an existential quantifier can be put further into the matrix, for
example  in  second place  so  that  it  is  within  the  scope of  the  quantifier  binding  the
variable m. Again there are two choices, the universal and the existential quantifier. For
which choice(s) is the sentence we now get true in the model?
B –more
11)  Let L be the relation “is to the left of” as applied to these one-dimensional maps
i)  [a  b  c] ii)  [a  b] iii)  [a  b  c  d  e  f] iv)  [a]
So in the first Lab, Lbc, Lac.
Which of the following are true in which of these maps, taken as models for L?
a)  "x $y Lxy b)  $x $y Bxy c)  "x $y ~Lxy
d)  "x Lxx e) "x "y (Lxy  Lyx) f)  "x $y "z (Lyx & ~Lyz) 
12)  (You may want to look back at question 8 for definitions of reflexive and symmetric
relations.)  There  are  stronger  and  weaker  opposites  of  reflexive  and  symmetric
properties of relations. They are scope distinctions. A relation is irreflexive when it is not
always  reflexive,  and  it  is  anti-reflexive  when  it  is  never  reflexive.  A  relation  is
asymmetric when it is not always symmetric, and it is antisymmetric when it is never
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symmetric. Give definitions of these two pairs of opposites using quantifier logic.
13)  We have three farmers, McDonald, McTavish, McGregor, three donkeys, alice, beth,
carlos, and three  days, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday. The tables below say when each
farmer rides each donkey.
mon tues wed
alice beth carlos alice beth carlos alice beth carlos
mcD NO YES NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
mcT YES NO NO YES NO YES YES NO NO
mcG NO NO YES NO YES YES YES NO YES
a) Writing Rfdt for "f Rides d on t" which of these are true?
i) "f $d "t Rfdt
ii) $f "d "t Rfdt
iii) "f "t $d Rfdt
iv) "f "d $t Rfdt
b) Suppose you want to assert  "f "t $d Rfdt  and deny  "f $d "t Rfdt . Which of the 
following would be the clearest way of expressing yourself?
a) for every farmer on every day we can find a donkey that he rides that day, but
we can't find for every farmer a donkey that he rides every day.
b) for every farmer we can find a donkey that he rides every day, but we can't 
find for every farmer and every day a donkey that he rides that day.
c) there's a donkey that all the farmers ride each day, but there isn't a donkey 
that is ridden each day by each farmer.
d) each farmer each day rides a donkey, but each farmer does not have a donkey
that he rides every day.
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14)   We have three elevators and two outside doors on the ground floor of an office
building, as in the diagrams below. In the night, people have come out of the elevators
and left trails of muddly footprints on the floor. Focus on the relation "trail t Leads from
elevator e to door d" — Lted .  There are four possible patterns of footprints: in which of
them is each of the sentences below true?
∀e ∀d ∃t Lted  take any elevator: for all doors there is a trail leading from that elevator 
to them
∀e ∃t ∀d Lted  take any elevator: there is a trail leading from it to all doors
∃t ∀d ∀e Lted  there is a trail: it leads from all elevators to all doors 
∀d ∃t ∀e Lted  take any door: there is a trail leading from all the elevators to that door
(You could find yourself expressing any of these with "there's a trail from any elevator to any 
door". But they're all different.) 
This is a good opportunity for controlled automatic thinking, as described in question 13 of 
chapter 3.
15)  This is an extension of exercise 5, and so it refers to section 3 of the chapter. Below
there are six diagrams, each representing a model for a 3-place relation R, and seven
sentences of quantifier logic. Say of each sentence which if any model it is true in. In
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each diagram assume that there are no individuals beyond each axis as drawn.
I think the best way to approach this question is first to look at the diagrams without
considering the sentences and think which quantifier patterns are true in each. Then with
this as preparation look at the sentences and match them to the models.
(i)   "x $y $z Rxyz   (ii)   "x $y "z Rxyz   (iii)   "y "z $z Rxyz   (iv)   "x "y $z Rxyz
(v)   "x "y $z Rxyz    (vi)   $x $y $z Rxyz   (vii)  $x "y Rxyz  
C - harder
16  Call a relation R a partial ordering if it is antireflexive, antisymmetric  and transitive
(for definitions see question 8). R is also “total” if "x "y (Rxy v Ryx). Which of the four
relations below is a partial ordering, and which total?
.
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17) (You may want to look back at exercise 8) before answering this.) A non-transitive
relation is simply a relation that is not transitive. But because there are three quantifiers
involved,  there are several  candidates for  anti-transitive. Write three using quantifier
logic. Which is the most plausible candidate for "never transitive"?
18)  Make up three stories like those in question 5, to illustrate the corresponding 
quantifier orders where the relation is “x meets y at a store owned by z”
19)  The two quantifier sentences  "x"y Rxy and $x$y Bxy are closely related to a search
for pairs Find (x, y): Rxy. How?
There is no such simple relation for "x$y Rxy and $x "y Bxy  . Why?
Can you describe a search: and a condition on its results that correlates with the truth of
each of these?
20)  The Univers"l and $xistential quantifiers are sensitive to their order.  "x $y Rxy is
different from $x "y Rxy. But either one by itself is not sensitive: "x "y Rxy is equivalent
to  "y "x Rxy. (For example " everyone loves everyone" is true whenever "everyone is
loved by everyone" is true. Do you see why the difference between these comes down to
a difference in the order of universal quantifiers?) And  $x $y Rxy is equivalent to
$y  $x  Rxy.  But not all  quantifiers are like this.  An example is  the "Most" quantifier:
"Mostx Px" is true when most (more than half) of the individuals in the domain are P.
"Mostx Mosty Rxy" is not equivalent to "Mosty Mostx Rxy".  ("Most people love most
people"  is  not  the  same  as  "most  people  are  loved  by  most  people".)  This  fact  is
somewhat surprising, but the examples to show it can be very simple. Give a domain
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with just three individuals, and a relation  R, such that  "Mostx Mosty Rxy" is true but
"Mosty Mostx Rxy" is false.
21) Part I of this book was about searching within models/databases. Part I I was about
searching  for models. Now part III is about quantifiers. Quantifiers can make very rich
criteria for queries, so the topic has not changed that much. There is another connection,
though. Consider three relations, two one place relations (attributes) R, L and a two place
relation S. We are going to search in a model M given by the table below.
.
P Q     S a b c d e
a YES a NO a NO NO NO NO NO
b NO b NO b YES NO YES YES NO
c YES c NO c NO NO YES NO YES
d YES d YES d YES YES YES YES YES
e NO e NO e NO NO NO NO YES
(a)  What are the results of these two searches?  Find x: $y Rxy  ,   Find x: "y Rxy
(b) How do these results relate to the attributes P and Q?  
(c) Can you make the same connection for other quantified searches using R?
(d) How does this relate searching for a model to searching in a model? (The answer is 
hinted in chapter 2.)
(e) Can you generalize this to three-place and four- place relations, and in general 
relations with any number of places?
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chapter 11: logical consequence in quantifier logic 
11:1 (of 6) derivations and counter-models 
People are pretty good at reasoning — for example when thinking about how to find
things — except when their thinking is affected by several disturbing factors. Common
pitfalls of human thinking are our tendency to be too confident in our beliefs, our limited
capacity to keep complex information in short term memory, and our reliance on the
ways of presenting information that spoken language suggests. Because we are generally
pretty good reasoners, and because we are prone to some kinds of error, we usually find
principles of logic fairly obvious. Who is surprised when told that from “if it is raining the
sidewalks are wet” and “it is raining” we can conclude “the sidewalks are wet”? But when
told that some conclusions are invalidly derived we can be surprised. We might easily
derive “it is not green and not a book” from “it is not a green book”. So the Boolean
principle “not (green and book) if and only if not green or not book”, is a useful counter
to the effects of being misled by language. 
When we think using quantifiers we are particularly subject to memory overload and the
misleading  effects  of  language.  The  range  of  models  making  premises  true  can  be
confusingly large. And language encourages us to confuse the scopes of “some”, “all” and
“not”. So we need ways of catching plausible but invalid quantifier deductions. 
One way of doing this would be to present a system of derivations for quantifier logic like
the  system  of  Boolean  derivations  in  chapter  seven.  Then  we  might  hope  that  a
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deduction that could not be reproduced in terms of the derivations would be invalid. Such
systems are well developed in logic. Their basic principles are very simple, and yet when
we combine  them with  the  very  complex sentences that  we can have when we put
quantifiers  within  the  scope  of  other  quantifiers  the  result  is  an  extremely  powerful
system of  deductions.  It  is  in  basic  and  important  ways  vastly  more  powerful  than
Boolean logic. Unfortunately its power is also its problem. The variety of derivations one
can make is so great, and some of them are so un-obvious, that trying to incriminate
invalid inferences by listing valid ones is hopeless. (In fact, to show that something was
not a logical consequence by this method, one would have to check through infinitely
many possibilities, so the problems are not simply practical. They raise very fundamental
issues.) So although as an appendix to this chapter I describe a system of derivations for
quantifier logic, this chapter has two less ambitious aims. The first is to discuss counter-
models  to  invalid  arguments  involving  quantifiers,  that  is,  ways  of  showing that  the
premises can be true although the supposed conclusion is false. And the second is to
describe some ways in which we can get conclusions from premises with quantifiers.
>>  even in Boolean logic, is it safe to think "I cannot find a valid derivation showing 
this, so it must be invalid"?
>>  this section seems to identify good reasoning with logical deduction, although 
chapter 6 section 4 warned against this.  how would you put things in a more subtle 
way?
11:2 (of 6)  scope distinctions 
"Not for all" is different from "for all not" and "not for some" is different from "for some
not". As we saw in the previous chapter the difference between "for every A there is a B"
and "there is a B which for all A" is just the tip of a large series of differences. It is not
hard to make counter-models illustrating these points.
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For example if we want to confirm that “not all” is different from “all not” we should show
that the following four arguments are invalid. I give a counter-model for each of them.
Note that in each case one of the premises is ambiguous in everyday English, and the
formulation in logical symbols fixes a meaning for it. So one effect of showing that these
are invalid is to say: watch what you really mean.
not everything is A ~  "  x Ax  INVALID!
everything is not A "x ~Ax
counter-model 
A
a NO
b YES
You can see that in the model the premise, that not everything is A, is true because one
thing, a, is not A.  But the conclusion, that everything is not A, is false, since something,
b, is A. So the argument is invalid. The conclusion is not a logical consequence of the
premise.
not all A are B                                    ~  "  x (Ax    Bx)  INVALID!
all A are not B "x (Ax  ~Bx)
counter-model
A B
a YES NO
b YES YES
You can see that in the model it is not the case that all A are B, since one thing that is A,
a, is not B. So the premise is true. But the conclusion, that all As are not B, is false, since
one A thing, b, is B. So the argument is invalid. 
There are also valid arguments relating the two quantifiers. If not everything is enjoyable
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then something is  not  enjoyable:  ~"x Jx   |= $x ~Jx  . And if  it  is  not  the  case  that
something is perfect (if not even one thing is perfect) then everything is not perfect:
 ~$x Px  |= "x ~Px . These are special cases of two equivalences: 
 ~"x P is equivalent to $x ~P , whatever P is. And 
 ~$x P is equivalent to "x ~P , whatever P is
>>  so "x P and ~$x ~P , and also $x P and ~"x~P, are equivalent.  do you see why? 
In spite of these equivalences, there are very similar patterns that are not valid. "Not all
cats hunt mice" does not entail "Some cats do not hunt mice". This may seem surprising.
But consider the following:
Not everything he said was false does not entail that something he said was not
false: for he may have said nothing.
Not all the pearls in the drawer are black does not entail that some pearl in the
drawer is not black: for there may be no pearls in the drawer.
So if we are being really careful we should say that "Not all cats hunt mice"  plus the
additional assumption that there are cats, entail "some cats do not hunt mice".    
>>  "But  everyone  knows  there  are  cats,  so  we  don't  really  need  to  state  this
assumption."  describe situations when this is not a good reply.
These deductions are more familiar in English if we also say "Nothing" and "No one" for
"it is not the case that some", and use "even one" or "at least one" as a variant on "there
is". So it follows from "everyone is not happy" that "no one is happy" or equivalently "not
even one is happy". And it follows from "not all individuals are listed" that "at least one
individual is not listed".
>>  write these "nothing", "no one", "at least one" sentences using the quantifiers " and
$.
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A surprising invalidity, closely related to the fact that "not all cats chase mice" does not
entail "some cats do not chase mice", concerns deriving "some" from "all". "Everything is
A"  entails  "Something is  A",  whatever we choose for  A.  The reason is  that  we only
consider models with non-empty domains, and if the domain is not empty and everything
in it is A then any of those things will show that something is A. Contrast this to "any life
on Mars is carbon-based" which can be true when "there is no life on Mars" or to "all the
pearls in drawers 1 to 10 are black" which entails "all the pearls in drawer number 3 are
black", even though there may be no pearls in drawer number 3.
>> is the difference between "all" and "any" relevant here?
>> the pearls example is a bit different.  how?
In logic, as you know, "All unicorns have horns" is symbolised with the pattern 
"x (Ux  Hx) and "some unicorns have horns" with the pattern $x (Ux & Hx). So in a
domain that has no unicorns the former is true and the latter is false. The "all" sentence
is true because the antecedent of the conditional Ux  Hx is always false, and so, given
the truth table for , the whole sentence is false. (See the next section for a little more
detail here.) So it will also be true that all unicorns fly. And also that all unicorns do not
fly!  
>> so are "all unicorns fly" and "all unicorns do not fly" both true? If not which one is
false?  both? 
>> we do not use models or databases with empty domains.  what might the reasons
be?
You may have noticed that while I have given counter-models for some invalid arguments
I have listed some as valid without really showing why they are. We begin this in the
next section. Before then, one more basic kind of counter-model, in this case involving a
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relation. Again, the English sentences are ambiguous and could be read in different ways.
everything has R to something "x $y Rxy INVALID!
something has R to everything $x "y Rxy
everything has R to something                                      "  x  $  y Rxy  
something is such that everything has R to it $x "y Ryx INVALID! 
 
We can use the same counter-model for both of these. 
R a b
a YES NO
b NO YES
You can see that in the model each individual has R to something, so the premise (of
both arguments) is true. But no individual has R to everything, so the conclusion of the
first  argument  is  false.  And there  is  no  individual  that  everything  has R  to.  So the
conclusion of the second argument is false. So both arguments are invalid. 
11:3 (of 6) arguments that are almost Boolean 
"All  people  are  animals;  all  animals  die.  Therefore  all  people  die.”  That  is  a  valid
argument. In fact it is a syllogism, a traditional form where we have two premises each
of which involves only one quantifier23. In this book we are not particularly concerned
with syllogisms, but they are an easy source of examples. Put in logical symbols the
argument has this form: 
"x (Ax  Bx)
"  x (Bx      Cx) 
"x (Ax  Cx)
>>  what about "some people are animals; some animals die. therefore some people 
23Syllogisms were for centuries one of the two standard cases of careful reasoning in philosophy 
and mathematics. The other standard case was Euclid's geometry. But there is an irony here: 
syllogistic is not adequate for representing the reasoning in Euclid's proofs, which involve 
intrinsically many place relations. As far as I can see, nobody noticed this.
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die", that is 
$x (Ax & Bx)
$  x (Bx & Cx)  
$x (Ax & Cx) ?
is this a valid argument? 
The validity of the "all people are animals..." argument can be seen in two ways, which
are in fact closely related. In this section I describe only the first way, leaving  the second
way, which your course may be skipping, to the following section.
first way: small domains  Suppose we are considering a model domain of only two 
individuals. Call them a, and b. Then the two premises are true in the model if and only 
if
(Aa  Ba) & (Ab  Bb)   and 
(Ba  Cb) & (Ba  Cb)   are true.
But these have (Aa  Ca) & (Aa  Ca) as a logical consequence. And if it is true in the
model then  "x (Ax   Cx) is true. So if the premises of this syllogism are true in this
model then the conclusion is also true.
We can reason the same way for a 3-individual model, and in fact for any model whose
domain  contains  finitely  many  individuals.  So  for  finite  models  at  any  rate,  if  the
premises of this argument are true then its conclusion is true. 
We can  make  a  case  for  the  validity  of  many quantifier  arguments  in  this  way,  by
considering " as a big conjunction, one conjunct for every member of the domain, and
$ as a big disjunction. Note that the equivalence of "x P and ~$x ~P  then becomes an
instance of de Morgan's law, that (p&q) is equivalent to ~(~p v ~q) , but with a large
number  of  conjuncts  or  disjuncts.  In  fact  we  often  express  de  Morgan's  law  with
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something near to a quantifier. We say "if they're both true then it cannot be that one of
them is false", or "if they are not both true then one of them is false." 
>>  what does the equivalence of ~$x P and  "x ~P become? 
We can handle premises and conclusions with more than one quantifier in this way, too.
Consider for example the following  valid argument. (It resembles the invalid quantifier
patterns of the previous section in a potentially confusing way; that might be part of the
explanation why those earlier arguments can seem valid.)
something has R to everything                                                $  x  "  y Rxy  
for everything there is something that has R to it "x $y Ryx
VALID!
>>  this valid argument can also be seen as $x "y Rxy |= "y $x Rxy.  do you see why?  
does this way of writing it make it seem more or less obviously valid?
Consider a two element domain again. The premise is true when 
(Raa & Rab) v (Rba & Rbb)  is true, and the conclusion is true when
(Rab v Rab) & (Rba v Rbb)  is true. Again the conclusion is a Boolean consequence of the
premise. It is worth getting out pencil and paper, seeing how the premise and conclusion
do  take  these  forms  under  the  conjunction  and  disjunction  interpretations  of  the
quantifiers,  and  seeing  that  the  conclusion  really  does  follow  from the  premise,  by
propositional  logic.  It  is  p v  (q  &  r)  |= (p  v  q)  &  (p  v  r),  but  where p is  itself  a
conjunction.
(Consider a particular case, with just Bo and Mo. One of them is angry at both of them, 
so either Bo is angry at Bo and Bo is angry at Mo or Mo is angry at Bo and Mo is angry at
Bo. So it is true that one of the two is angry at Bo and that one of the two is angry at 
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Mo.) 
Again we can do this not only in a 2 element domain, but in any finite domain. This isn't
a watertight proof that the argument preserves truth in all domains whatever, since there
are some arguments that are valid in all  finite domains but not in all  domains. (See
exercise 13 at the end of this chapter.) Still, these considerations should give us some
reassurance  about  these  arguments.  See  exercise  1(b)  and  3  for  other  arguments
involving quantifiers which can be turned into Boolean validities.
>>  give an example of something that is true in a two-element domain that is not true 
in some larger finite domain. 
The fact that $x "y Rxy |= "y $x Rxy  — or equivalently $x "y Rxy |= "x $y Ryx   ,
$y "x Rxy |= "x $y Rxy , and $y "x Rxy |= "x $y Ryx  , which differ just by using different 
variables — holds not just in finite domains but taking all domains into account, can be 
seen intuitively by considering diagrams like those from section 3 of the previous chapter.
Although it is NOT true that
It is true that
And this is intuitively right: a straight line absolutely horizontal to the right is a special 
case of a horizontal barrier in general, but not the other way around. (And similarly an 
absolutely vertical straight line is a special case of a vertical barrier in general, but not 
the other way around: the various equivalent formulations correspond to flipping the 
diagram around some diagonals, without changing its basic shape.).)  
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11:4 (of 6) second way: indirect argument  [Check with your teacher whether you 
should study this section.]
We often reason, especially in mathematics, using variables for which we can substitute
anything  in  the  domain,  or  any  member  of  some particular  class  of  things,  for.  For
example if we say that (3x)2 = 9x2  we mean that this equality is true when x is zero, and
when x is 0.5, and when x is 423, and in fact whenever x is a real number.
>>  is this the same as saying ""x (Realx  (3x)2  = 9x)2 ”?  exactly the same?
So consider the syllogism "all humans are animals; all animals die; therefore all humans
die". Assume that the members of the domain are d1, d2, ....   without assuming anything
about  how  many  these  are.  Then  make  a  derivation  as  follows
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"x (Ax  Bx) (1)
"x (Bx  Cx) . (2)
d1  Bd1 (31) (see note 1)
Ad2  Bd2 (32) (see note 1)
  ….. ....
Bd1  Cd1 (41) (see note 1)
Bd2  Cd2 (42) (see note 1)
   ....
/ \
   Ad1  Cd1 ~(Ad1  Cd1) (51)  EM
| Ad1 & Cd1 (61)
| Ad1 (71)
 | Cd1 (81)
|  /     \
|    ~Ad1     Bd1 (91)  from (31)
|      X / \    
|    ~Bd1 Cd1 (101)
|      X   X
Ad2  Cd2 ~(Ad2  Cd2) (52)  EM
| Ad2 & Cd2 (61) 
| Ad2 (71)
| Cd2 (81)
|  / \
|      ~Ad2       Bd2 (91)  from (31)
|         X / \
|      ~Bd2 Cd2 (101)
| X X
.....   ..... see note 2!
|
"x (Ax  Cx) (11) (see note 3)
This is a lot like the Boolean derivations we studied in chapters 7 and 8. There are
significant differences, though, since it is potentially bigger than any Boolean derivation
could get. Note three important points.
note 1: Line 3 is where the derivation gets big. The "...." indicates more lines, for d3, d4, or
as many as there are individuals in the domain. Clearly unless the domain is small we
can not write it on the page without the "....". I have written out Line (31) and line (31).
They are all  consequence of the premise at (1), and all the lines 4 are consequence of
the premise at (2) because that is what " means: for each member of the domain. But
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this is not something that our rules for Boolean derivations covered.
note 2: The derivation of Ad2  Cd2 by closing all other branches would be exactly parallel
to that of Ad1  Cd1 , as would the corresponding derivations for all the other individuals
in the domain. Notice that one branch includes all of these unclosed conditionals.
note 3: Line 11 adapts conjunctive argument, discussed in chapter 8, because of the fact
that Ad1  Cd1,, Ad2  Cd2 .... are the only branches of the tree that have not closed, and
the meaning of ", given the fact that d1, d2,.... are all the members of the domain. We are
applying conjunctive argument in an extended way, to a long branch — perhaps  very
long — but it is basically the same rule.
>>  is the fact that the derivation if fully written out could have many, perhaps infinitely 
many, branches a reason to mistrust it?
>>  (for mathematicians) some models have indenumerable (uncountable) domains: is 
this an extra worry here?  (it turns out that this makes no difference, but that is not an 
obvious fact.)
We can make similar derivations with the  $ quantifier,  though now we are extending
disjunctive  argument  from  chapter  8  rather  than  conjunctive  argument,  and  the
derivation gets very wide rather than very long. A simple, almost trivial, example is $x
(Ax & ~Bx) |= $x ~(Ax & Bx). ("Some anarchists are not Brazilian: therefore some people
are not both anarchist and Brazilian").  We can turn this into a derivation as follows.
1)   $ x  (  Ax & ~Bx)    
       / ........../..... | .........\......\ ......
2) Ad1 & ~Bd1 .. Adn & ~Bdn ................. (note 1)
3)       ~(Ad1 & Bd1)  .. ~(Aan & Bdn) .............. (note 2)
4)     $x ~(Ax & Bx)  ..$x ~(Ax & Bx) ............ (note 3)
5) $x ~(Ax & Bx) (note 4)
note 1: this uses the analogy between $ and v. Think of the existential quantifier as an
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infinite disjunction and then the  v-rule of derivations applies. But it is also where the
derivation gets infinitely wide.
note  2:  in  each  case  here  a  few steps  of  derivation  in  propositional  logic  could  be
inserted.  I  have  left  them out  for  simplicity,  given  that  the  items on  line  3  are  so
obviously consequences of the corresponding items on line 2.
note 3: here we could again appeal to the analogy between the existential quantifier and
disjunction. All we could use a very basic property of the existential quantifier, Aa |= $x
Ax (if a particular thing has an attribute then there is something that has it).
note 4: this is where the indirect principle of disjunctive argument is used. 
$x ~(Ax & Bx) is a consequence of each of the disjuncts we get when we construe the
premise as an infinite disjunction, so it is a consequence of the disjunction itself.
These were very simple examples. They did not feature the main source of the power of
quantifiers,  the interactions between them when several  quantifiers are found in  the
same sentence. But they do illustrate how systems of derivations can be extended to
quantifier logic.
There are many ways of making systems of deduction and derivation for quantifier logic.
They typically do not involve derivations that are infinitely wide or infinitely long. Instead,
they make subtle use of variables, involving restrictions which have to be stated and
followed precisely, and often principles of indirect argument which resemble the uses of
conjunctive and disjunctive argument from this section. These are often combined. In the
appendix to this chapter I describe a a fairly simple example of this. It combines the use
of variables and one form of indirect argument, argument by contradiction. But it will not
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capture the patterns of many everyday arguments and mathematical proofs.
The  standard  systems  are  complete,  meaning  that  if  one  sentence  is  a  logical
consequence  of  a  set  of  premises  then  they  will  always  show  that  it  is.  This  is  a
remarkable fact, as suggested by the assumptions behind my two sample derivations.
They assumed that we can write down a series of names that apply to everything in the
domain, and in fact to everything in any domain in which the premises are true. But even
with infinitely many names, this is not obvious. (There may be into innumerably many
individuals in the domain, and even if there are no more than there are integers the
names might get attached to, say, just the even-numbered ones.) And though logical
consequence is a matter of what holds in all models for the premises, including infinitely
many infinitely big ones, derivations in these systems are finite. So the fact that there
are  complete  systems  of  quantifier  logic,  that  the  syntactical  and  the  semantic
approaches coincide, is not something to take for granted before one sees a proof. But I
am not going to give a proof, either here or in the appendix.
One way of seeing what the completeness proofs show is that a system of derivations for
quantifier logic can construct enough models to substitute for all the possible models for
the sentences involved, much as truth tables can substitute for all  the possible truth
assignments. That is how they tame infinity. But this is itself a remarkable fact.
11:4 (of 6) to and from prenex form 
In everyday language we distribute quantifier words throughout a sentence, in roughly
the places names can go. The previous chapter argued that we appreciate the force of
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quantifier logic when we see its resources for putting quantifiers at the beginning of a
sentence,  so  that  the  variables  bound  by  the  quantifier  rather  than  the  quantifiers
themselves, are distributed within the sentence like names. But sentences in logic with
quantifiers can have them in the middle of the sentence too. The (false) English sentence
"every  Canadian  loves  some  moose"  could  be  translated  into  logic  as  either  of  the
following:  
"x (Cx  $y (My & Lxy))        or
"x $y (Cx  (My & Lxy))
We do not have to worry about the choice between these, because they are logically
equivalent. But this does raise an important question: when is a sentence equivalent to
one whose quantifiers all come at the beginning? When can we 'move' the quantifers to
the front? A sentence with all its quantifiers at the beginning is said to be in prenex form.
In fact every sentence is logically equivalent to one in prenex form, and in this section we
will  see the rules for this. But first some  non-equivalences, both as warnings against
haste and as practice in finding counter-models. 
$x (Ax & Bx) is not the same as $x Ax & $x Bx . There are birds and there are insects, 
but there is nothing that is both a bird and an insect. (not even a bee hummingbird.) The
simplest counter-model is 
A B
m YES NO
n NO YES
>>  this counter-model shows that $x Ax & $x Bx can be true while $x (Ax & Bx) is false. 
so which one is not a logical consequence of which?
"x (Ax v Bx) is not the same as "x Ax v "x Bx.  Everything is either a bird or a non-
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bird, but it is not true that either everything is a bird or everything is a non-bird. The
same counter-model illustrates this, showing this time that "x (Ax v Bx) can be true
while "x Ax v "x Bx is false. 
>>  so which is not a logical consequence of which?
"x (Ax  Bx) is not the same as "x Ax  "x Bx . It is false that all moose have wings" but
"if everything is a moose then everything has wings" is true, on the Boolean reading of
"if", since it is false that everything is a moose. The same counter-model that we have
used for the previous two cases will do for this.
>>  give Venn diagrams as counter-models for these
Now to state the ways in which we can validly move quantifiers to the beginning of a
sentence. First consider cases such as "x Ax & P , where Ax contains the variable x and P
does not. (P might be like Cd or like $y Dy, in any case there is no variable x in it.) Then
"x Ax & P is equivalent to "x (Ax & P). Everyone is happy and 2+2=4 is true if and only
if everyone is such that they are happy and 2+2=4. To argue it more carefully, note that
if P is true then "x Ax & P  is true if and only if if all individuals in in the domain are A,
which is the case if and only if every individual  x is  such that Ax & P. And if  P is false
then both "x Ax & P and "x (Ax & P) are false. 
Similar reasoning will show that 
$x Ax v P is equivalent to $x (Ax v P) 
$x Ax P is equivalent to $x (Ax  P)
"x Ax v P is equivalent to "x (Ax v P) 
P  "xBx is equivalent to "x (P  Bx) 
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There are a couple of similar formulations that I haven't included because they would be 
wrong; we'll get to them.   
Often applying these equivalences will give two quantifiers at the front, where there was 
originally only one. For example 
$x Ax & $x Bx  is equivalent to $x Ax & $y By is equvalent to $x $x (Ax & By)  
"x Ax v "x Bx is equivalent to "x Ax v "y By is equivalent to "x "x (Ax v By)
"x Ax  "x Bx is equivalent to "x Ax  "y Bx is equivalent to "x "x (Ax  Bx)
>>  between the second and third of each of these equivalences there could be an 
intermediate step, in which only one of the two quantifiers is moved.  can you state this 
step?
The  general  message  of  these  equivalences  is:  move  quantifiers  to  the  front,  after
changing  variables  to  avoid  conflicts  between  distinct  quantifiers.  There  are  a  few
exceptions to this message, though. The first pair  we have already seen, and is not
surprising.  ~$x  Ax is  equivalent  to "x  ~Ax  (rather  than  to  ~$x  Ax) and ~"x  Ax is
equivalent to $x ~Ax (rather than to "x ~Ax.) The other pair can seem surprising
$x Ax  P  is equivalent to "x (Ax  P) 
"x Ax  P  is equivalent to $x (Ax  P)
$ becomes " when it is moved from the antecedent of a conditional, and vice versa. This 
makes sense when we think of P  Q as equivalent to ~P v Q : the antecedent of a 
(material) conditional is a negatively flavoured position. And the first of these can sound 
correct in ordinary language: "if even one person comes to the party I'll be delighted" 
sounds equivalent to "consider anyone: if she comes to the party I'll be delighted". But 
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the second can definitely sound wrong. It identifies, for example, "if all the sandwiches 
are mouldy then we have no lunch" with "there is a sandwich such that if it is mouldy 
then we have no lunch". Why should one sandwich be more important than the others?
But think of the sandwich case this way: suppose we are examining all the sandwiches,
hoping to find at least one that is edible, and stopping when we do. Think of the last one
we look at. If even that one is mouldy then we can say Good-Bye to lunch. So saying "if
all the sandwiches are mouldy then we have no lunch" is the same as saying "consider
the last sandwich we examine: if even that one is mouldy then we have no lunch." The
intuitively troubling nature of the equivalence is a consequence of thinking of the Boolean
conditional as if it were the "if" of everyday language and thinking that "there is" requires
us to identify an individual in advance. (There is also a mysterious way in which "if"
affects our understanding of scope, so that we tend to think of "something is such that (if
it is A then P)", as — wrongly — "something is such that if it is A, then P".) 
>>  find other examples where the equivalence of "x Ax  P and $x (Ax  P) seems at first
surprising, and analyse them in ways like my treatment of the sandwich example.
The general rule for converting a sentence to prenex form is as follows:
First whenever two quantifiers use the same variable re-letter one of them so they are
different. Second move each quantifier in turn as far to the front of the sentence as you
can without moving it past any sentence it was in the scope of. But in doing this universal
quantifiers become existential and existential become universal if they are negated or in
the antecedent of a conditional.
This sounds complicated but in practice it is straightforward. For example
"x Ax  $x "y (Rxy & Ryx)  becomes  $x $y "z (Ax  (Ryz & Rzy) 
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"x ( $y Rxy  $y Ryx)    becomes  "x "y $z ( Rxy  Rzx)
$x "y ( Ay  Rxy)  $x "y Sxy becomes 
"x $y $z "w (( Ay  Rxy)  Szw)
Sometimes  the  rules  can  be  applied  in  two  ways  to  give  two  different  results  (for
example "x Ax  "x Bx can become both $x "y(Ax  By) and "y $x (Ax  By) .) But when
this happens the results are equivalent. ("There is one of us such that if that person is
heartless then we are all doomed" is equivalent to "We are all in this situation: if there is
a heartless person among us then we are doomed.") 
>>  give several interpretations of A and B for "x Ax  "x Bx and rephrase the two 
prenex forms so that it is clear that they are equivalent. 
The  forms  with  the  quantifiers  spread  through  the  sentence  are  often  easier  to
understand using resources derived from everyday language, and the prenex forms are
usually easiest to manipulate in purely mechanical ways, and also often give more easily
give logical insight. For example consider the second example of the previous paragraph:
the version nearer to everyday language is 
"x ($y Rxy  $y Ryx)
and the prenex version is 
"x "y $z ( Rxy  Rzx) . 
For example
consider anyone: if they have a child then they have a friend
consider any pair of people: there is a person who if the second of the pair is child 
of the first then that person is friend to the first. Rephrased: take any parent and 
child and you'll be able to find a friend of the parent.
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The first version is easier to understand quickly. But the truth of the second might be
easier to check. Instead of checking of each person whether they had a child and then if
they have a child checking if they have a friend, we would list all pairs and filter them for
parenthood, and for those that got through check for the existence of a friend. 
11:5 (of 6) Goldilocks and the three bears 
An important part of understanding a sentence is knowing what models it  can have.
Knowing what is and is not a logical consequence of the sentence, and what it is and is
not a logical consequence of, helps here. But many sentences have a large number of
models, including some that are very different from others. In this section I try to give
you a sense of how wide the variety of models for a sentence is, by giving practice in
answering the question "is this sentence true in this model?" 
The models will be presented as arrow diagrams, with arrows for a two-pace relation and
circles for attributes. Interpret the the arrows as a relation S, “sees” , and the circle as 
an attribute B, that of being a bear. Look at model (i). What is true in it?
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True in (i):  That there are three bears; that there is someone, not a bear who sees one 
of them; that a bear sees ‘her’. So these are true in (i).  
$x Bx $x ~Bx $x $y Sxy $x $y (By & Sxy)
$x $y ( ~By & Sxy) $x $y ( Bx & ~By & Sxy)  
These say that there is a (at least one) bear, and one non-bear, that someone sees 
someone, that there is someone who sees a bear, that there is someone who sees a non-
bear, that some bear sees a non-bear. 
Contrast (i) with (iii). At first they may look similar. The difference is that in (iii) all the 
see-arrows go from the non-bear to the bears, and in fact to all the bears.  So if 
something is a bear the non-bear sees it. 
$x "y (By  Sxy)
It is also true in (iii) that the person only sees bears. If she sees it, it’s a bear.
$x "y (Sxy  By) 
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Now look at (ii). We’ve lost Goldilocks. But still there is a lot of seeing going on between
the bears. You can imagine the three of them as pictured in the bear enclosure, each one
looking at the back of the next. So all of these are true
"x (Bx  $y Sxy) "x $y (Bx & Sxy) 
"x "y (Sxy  (Bx & By)) "x "y ( Sxy  ~Syx)
>>  how can we say each of these in English?  which ones are also true in (i) and (iii)?  
(don’t look for the answers. think first.) 
Now think in the opposite direction, from sentences to models. Consider the sentences
$x $y (Bx & Sxy)  $x Sxx $x $y $z ( Sxy & Sxz & ~Syz)
Which models are these true in? The first requires two individuals, of which the first is a 
bear and sees the second, which may or may not be a bear. So it is true in all except (iii).
The second requires one individual, which sees itself. So it is true only in (vi). The third 
requires three individuals such that the first sees the second and the first sees the third, 
and the second does not see the third. In English we’d say “Someone sees two others, 
who don’t see each other.” This is true in (iii), (iv), (v), (vi).
So in which of the models is each of the following true? 
"x "y (Sxy  Bx) "x "y (Sxy  By)
"x "y (Sxy  $z (Bz & Sxz) )
$x "y ( $z (Bz & Syz)  Sxy )
The first two should not be hard (but notice how they are different.) In the third focus on
$z (Bz & Sxz).  This  says that x sees a bear.  So the whole sentence says that if  an
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individual sees an individual then the first individual sees a bear. We could say this in
looser English as “anything that sees anything sees a bear”, but we would have to be
careful not to understand this as “anything that sees everything sees a bear”. So it is
true in all the models except (i).
In the fourth focus first on the $z (Bz& Syz).  It says that y sees a bear. So the whole
sentence says “There is something. if anything sees a bear, then it also sees that thing.”
In more regular English: there is something that sees anything that sees a bear. So it is
true in none of the models. 
There is a third kind of task to be considered. It is more creative: given a sentence to
think of models in which it is true, ideally as different from one another as possible. Start
with a simple case, "x "y (Sxy  (Bx & By)) . In any model for this sentence whenever
one individual has the relation S to another both have the attribute B. Consider the
models below. (a) to (d) are all models for this sentence. But they are very different from
one another. (To put it in mathematical terms there is no structure-preserving map, no
isomorphism, between any two.) (a) is what you might have imagined on understanding
the sentence: bears see bears and only bears see bears. This is true in (b) also, but most
bears do not see anything. The sentence is true in (c), though surprisingly because there
are no bears. In (d) there are lots of bears, but they fall into two classes, which ask to be
defined. In (e) only bears see or are seen, but most of them do neither. In (f) again the
bears fall into two classes, and the diagram suggests more generalization. (“Mother bears
watch baby bears, but the babies don’t look back” perhaps.)
>>  how could we define the two kinds of bears in (d)?  in (f)?
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A more formal way of asking “make varied models for this sentence”. Is “make a model
for S1 in which S2 is not true.” In other words “show that S2 is not a logical consequence
of S1”. 
(a) shows that "x "y (Sxy  Syx) does not follow from
"x "y (Sxy  (Bx & By)), 
(b) shows that "x "y "z ((Sxy & Sxz) Syz) does not follow, from the same assumption.
(c) shows that $x Bx., does not follow from it, 
(d) that "x (Bx  ($y Syx v $y Sxy)) does not follow from it. 
(e) that "x ~(Ax & Bx)  "x "y ( Ax   Sxy) does not follow  from it. 
And if your first idea of a model for the sentence was along the lines of (f), you would 
think that "x "y "z (Sxy   Szx) followed, but (a) and more subtly (d) show that it does 
not.
>>  express all these in everyday language
11:6 (of 6). Infinity 
Some of the power of quantifier logic comes from the fact that it does not restrict the
sizes of domains. "x Ax is true in a domain {a, b} if Aa & Ab is true, and it is true in a
domain {a, b, c} if Aa & Ab & Ac is true, and so on. This is what forced the justification of
simple logical consequences in section 3 above to be so complicated. (We can avoid some
of the complications by subtle use of variables, as in the appendix to this chapter. But the
use has to be very subtle, easy to get wrong.) This suggests a very basic question. Given
that some sentences with quantifiers are true in models with very small domains, and
that some need very large domains — something that is plausible but which we have not
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actually  proved  — are  there  sentences  which  are  true  only  in  models  with  infinite
domains?
Yes. There are sentences that are true only in infinite models. Let's try to make one. 
In an infinite model given any finite number of individuals there will be one that is 
"beyond" them. So we might begin with "x $y Bxy . “Take anything. there is 
something beyond it  ” (Notice that the quantifiers have to be in this order. $x "y Bxy won't
do it.)
>>  why will $x "y Bxy not do it?
But this allows a 2-individual model in which each is beyond the other. (See i below.)  We
can rule this out by adding another condition: anti-symmetry, B never goes both ways. 
"x "y (Bxy  Byx )
This rules out the model we just considered. But it allows another unintended model, in which
we have three individuals in a cyclic pattern. (see ii.) Then B never goes directly backwards,
but goes round in a cycle,  a finite cycle.  We can rule this  out by requiring B to be
transitive. 
"x "y "z ((Bxy & Byz)  Bxz )  
Then we have what we want. Given any series of individuals linked by B, there will be
another that is beyond all of them. So if we take all three conditions and make a single
sentence  out  of  their  conjunction,  that  sentence  will  only  have  infinite  models.  The
simplest will look like the numbers 0,1,2,3,... related by < . (See iii.) 
>>  find another model for these sentences, besides this one.  it will also be infinite.
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This  example  illustrates  the  importance  in  our  thinking  of  being  able  to  have  one
quantifier in the scope of another. It is because of this that we can have the concept of
infinity. (Creatures who could not understand embedded quantifiers could not think about
infinity.) We can think “for every moment there is a later (or an earlier) one” or “for
every event there is a cause”, or “for every number there is a bigger one”. For humans
these are not very difficult thoughts, but they have many interesting consequences. 
You can take this as the final persuasion that quantifiers are a big step beyond Boolean 
connectives. In an infinite domain "x Bx cannot mean  Ba1 & Ba2 & …& Ban for any 
integer n. It has to go on forever. And that isn’t a regular Boolean connective. It is 
something quite different, a quantifier   
words in this chapter that it would be good idea to understand:  almost Boolean 
argument, empty domain, prenex form, syllogism.
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exercises for chapter 11 
The exercises for this chapter are not in the three parts that organized the exercises for
earlier chapters. But they are in a rough order from easier to harder. So if you want a
challenge try those towards the end, and if you find the later ones difficult do not let this
trouble you.
1)  The study of syllogisms is the simplest part of quantifier logic. A syllogism is an
argument with two premises and a conclusion, all of the form "all A's are B's", "some A's
are B's", or "no A's are B's". Aristotle studied syllogisms more than 2000 years ago.
a) Below are four valid syllogisms. Symbolize each of them in the language of quantifier 
logic.
i)   all cats are animals ii)   all cats are felines
     no martians are animals       some animals are cats
     no martians are cats       some animals are felines
iii)   there is an honest philosopher iv)   all oilers fans are drunks
       no-one honest is happy                some oilers fans love hockey
       some philosopher is not happy        some drunks love hockey
(note: no As are B = all A are not B = "x (Ax  ~Bx)  .)
b)  When we are considering a finite domain the universal quantifier is closely related to
conjunction, and the existential quantifier to disjunction. For example in a domain of
three individuals, a, b, c, "x Ax is true if and only if  Aa & Ab & Ac is true, and $x Ax is
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true if and only if Aa v Ab v Ac is true. (Do you see why this is so?) Turning the universal
and existential quantifiers into conjunction and disjunction, and considering a domain of
three individuals, show that the conclusion of each of the syllogisms in  a) becomes a
logical consequence of the premises, similarly transformed, in propositional logic..
c) why does this not show that the arguments are valid (though they all are valid), 
taking all models into account?
2)  Below are four invalid syllogisms. The conclusions are not logical consequences of the
premises.  Symbolise  each  of  them in  the  language  of  quantifier  logic  and  make  a
counter-model, in which the premises are true and the conclusion false. The counter-
models can all be finite, and in fact very small.
i)   all cats are animals ii)   all felines are cats
     all animals have hearts       some animals are cats
     anything with a heart is an animal       some animals are felines
iii)   there is an honest philosopher iv)   some oilers fans are 
drunks
       no-one honest is happy                      some drunks love hockey
       some happy person is not a philosopher        some oilers fans love hockey
3)  The equivalence of "x Px and ~$x ~Px , and the equivalence of $x Px and ~"x ~Px
are  like  Morgan's  laws  from  chapters  4  and  5.  Use  a  finite  model  to  show  the
resemblance, as in question 1(b).
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4) Which of the following arguments are logically valid (trust your intuitions, but
think) If they are not valid describe a counter-model.
i) There is always an earlier time
    There is an earliest time             
ii) For every rich man there is an even richer one
Some man is infinitely wealthy
iii) Not all students want to work in the oil industry    
all students do not want to work in the oil industry
iv) Not all students want to work in IT  .           
Some students do not want to work in IT  (think unicorns)
5)  Give a counter-model to show that "x $y Rxy is not a logical consequence of
$x "y Rxy . (Note how this is different from the valid argument mentioned in section 3.)
6) Which of these are equivalent according to the rules for prenex form? (Assume that 
they contain no variables besides those shown.)
(i)   $x "y(Ax  By) (ii)   $x (Ax  "yBy)
(iii)"x $y (Rxy  By) (iv)   "y("x Ax  By)
(v)   $x "y(Ax & By) (vi)   "x $y (Rxy  By)
(vii)   "x $y Rxy & "x $y Sxy (viii)  "x $y "z $w (Rxy & Szw)
(ix)   $x "y $z (~Rxy v Dz) (x)    ~"x $y Rxy v $y Dy
(x)   $x $y "z (~Ryz v Dx) (xi)    "x Ax  "yBy
7)  Facts: A princess has a number of suitors. She is not sure how many as she is too
busy choosing dresses and gossiping about her friends. One suitor, or perhaps more than
one, is an expert rider. There may be an archer among her suitors, though she has not
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been paying attention. There is also at least one champion swordsman. All of her suitors
are rich, and none of them is intelligent. There is one rider who is not a poet. Three poets
have written descriptions of her beauty. Moreover, no archers are riders, though some
riders  are  poets.  All  archers  have  red  hair.  No  red  haired  people  are  rich.  All  the
swordsmen are intelligent, with just one exception.
Question: How many suitors does she have?
8) (a) Which of the following are true in the model below, when C is Cat, F is Fierce, D is
Dogs, and the arrows represent the relation L “Looks at”?
i)   "x(Cx    Fx)
ii)   "x $y Lyx
iii)   $x $y (Lxy & Lyx)
iv)   $x "y ( Dx & ((Lxy & Cy)  Fy) )
v)   $x "y ( (Dx & ((Fy & Cy)  Lxy )))
vi)   "x "y ( (Lxy & Lyx)    (Dx & Cy))
vii)   "x ( (Fx& Cx)  $y (Dy & ~Lyx) )
viii)   "x "x ( (Lxy & Lyx)    ((Dx & Cy) v (Dy & Cx)) )
(b)  For each of these English sentences say which of the formulas in (a) it is a rough 
translation of
s) when two animals look at each other, one is a dog and the other a cat
t) some dog looks at all fierce cats
u) some dog looks only at fierce cats
v) every fierce cat does not look at some dog
w) Every animal is looked at
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(c)  Find all individuals that:
(i) are fierce and look at something
(ii) are fierce and look at something that looks at a cat
(iii) are fierce cats and look at something that something looks at
(iv) look at all the dogs that a fierce cat looks at
(v) look at something that looks at her cat
(vi) look at all the dogs that a fierce cat looks  at
(d) write each of these in the language of quantifier logic.
9)  "xAx  "y By is equivalent to $x "y(Ax  By) and also to "y $x (Ax  By), 
converting to prenex form in two different ways. So the two prenex forms are equivalent.
Use this fact to show that $x "y Rxy |=  "y $x Rxy . Why does this not lead to a proof of
the complementary entailment  "y $x Rxy |= $x "y Rxy also?
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10)  The arrow diagrams I and II below represent two typical strict partial orderings
(antireflexive, antisymmetrical, and transitive — see exercises 5 and 8 of chapter 9.)
Taking them as typical, one might think that all strict partial orderings can represent a
comparison of the extent to which individuals have some quantity. (Both of these, for
example, could be interpreted as “is at least as happy as” or many other comparisons.) 
But  there  are  models  with
partial orderings which are much less easily represented as comparing the individuals
that have the relation. Examples are the partial orderings below.
(Check that III and IV are partial orderings.) State an assumption that rules out models 
such as these. Express it both in English and in quantifier logic.
11)  In exercise 10 a strict partial ordering was defined as a relation that is antireflexive,
antisymmetric, and transitive. In fact the requirement of antireflexivity is not needed, as
any  relation  that  is  antisymmetric  and  transitive  is  antireflexive.  Give  an  informal
argument to show this.
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12)  Adapt the argument in section six that there is a sentence that is true only in
infinite domains, to show that there is an invalid argument whose only countermodels are
infinite. That is, there are arguments that are valid if we only consider models with finite
domains.
13)  The universal and existential quantifiers are not the only quantifiers represented in
English  or  other  languages.  It  may  be  a  historical  accident  that  following  on  from
Aristotle's logic subsequent logical systems have given them a central place. A quantifier
that is similar to the universal quantifier is "most". Mostx Px is true in a model if and
only if more than half of the members of the domain of the model satisfy P. But the logic
of  this  quantifier  is  rather  different  from that  of  the  universal  quantifier.  There  are
logically valid arguments turning on “most”.  For a trivial example   
All As are Bs    
Most As are Bs
but on the other hand the following is (perhaps surprisingly) not a logically valid 
argument.   
Most As are Bs
Most Bs are Cs
Most As are Cs
(Compare exercise 16 of chapter 10.)
Find a finite model in which the premises of this argument are true but the conclusion is 
false.
14)   Give a counter-model to show that “Most As are Bs” is not equivalent to
“Most x: Ax  Bx”. 
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16) Summation, ∑,  and product, ∏, are variable-binding operators (see sections 1 and 3
of chapter 3, and section 5 of chapter 10.) Give examples 
(a)  where ∑
0<n<10
∏
0<m<10
f (n,m) is not the same as ∏
0<m<10
∑
0<n<10
f (n,m) .
(b)  where these are not the same in the system of arithmetic from question 41 of 
chapter 5.
(c)  where ∑
0<n<10
∏
0<m<10
∑
0<r<10
f (n,m ,r ) is not the same as ∑
0<n<10
∑
0<m<10
∏
0<r<10
f (n,m ,r ) . 
(And more examples where generally three-operator combinations are sensitive to the 
order of the operators.)
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appendix: a system of derivations for quantifier logic
There are many obviously valid arguments involving quantifiers that cannot be captured
by the principles of Boolean logic. Valid syllogisms are an example. Besides syllogisms,
consider the following:
   " x Px                  Everything is pretty                                                                 
  ~ $x ~ Px  it is not the case that there is something that is not pretty
 ~  $  x Px       Nothing is pretty          
 "x ~ Px  Everything is not pretty
"  x (Hx      Ax)                                            all horses are animals                         
"y ( $x (Hx &  Tyx)   $x (Ax & Tyx) )      the tail of a horse is the tail of an animal
And there are arguments that are valid, but not obviously so. We need a logical theory to
guide us through these. For example
$  x  "  y Rxy        Someone loves everyone
"y $x Rxy Everyone is loved by someone
"  x (  $  y Hxy      Ax)       all creatures with hearts are animals     .  
"x "y (Hxy   Ax)         if one thing is the heart of another then the second thing is an animal
Any model in which all the assumptions of any of these arguments are true will make its 
conclusion true.
I shall present a system of derivations for the logic of quantifiers. It is similar in spirit to
the system of derivations for Boolean logic of chapter seven. It has all the rules of that
system  plus  some  additional  ones,  to  handle  quantifiers.  For  simplicity  I  will  not
formulate the rules so that when a conclusion is a consequence of some premises one
can get the conclusion by a series of steps from the premises. Instead I shall rely on the
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other alternative way of showing that an argument is valid used in chapter eight: to show
that C follows from {P1,…,Pn } we show that {P1,…,Pn ,~C} is a contradiction.
The Boolean rules, repeated from chapter seven, are:
       A   & B        A   & B   (&)
A B
       A   v B   (v)
       /    \
      A      B
       A      B    ()
       /    \
   ~A      B
    ~(  A  &  B  )   (~&)  ~(  A  v  B  )  (~v)  
     ~A v~B   ~A & ~B            
    ~(  A     B  )  (~)          A  (EM)
      A & ~B        /   \
      B     ~B
I will not repeat the explanations of these rules. Check back in chapter seven if need be.
To them we add four more. The first two describe the interaction of the quantifiers with
negation.
 ~ $  n A   (~$)  ~  "  n A   (~")
 "n ~A   $n ~A
n here can be any variable, and A any sentence, open or closed. Notice the similarity of 
these rules to (~v) and (~&).  
The  next  two  rules  describe  the  relation  between  sentences  with  quantifiers  and
sentences without.  They allow us to add and remove quantifiers.
$m A ($)
  A[n]
what this means is that if you have an existential quantification, where the  $ is at the
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beginning of  the sentence —  m represents any variable at  all  — you can derive the
sentence got by stripping the  $ off  the beginning of  the sentence and replacing the
variable that it bound with a name, which to state the rule I am calling n. It must be a
new name,  not  one  occurring  in  A  or  anywhere  else  in  the  derivation  so  far.  Two
examples of the $ rule:
 $  x (Ax & Bx)     $  z   "  y (Rzyn & By)  
     An & Bn     "y (Rzyn & By)     
In the second of these we could not have derived  "y (Rzy & By)   . because that would
have meant substituting n for the variable z, which is forbidden since n already occurs in
the premise.
The idea behind the rule  is  that  if  an  existential  quantification  is  true then there is
something in the domain that makes it true. But we do not want to beg any questions
about which object  in the domain it  is,  so until  the derivation forces us we make it
completely distinct from everything else that has been mentioned.
The other rule is
 " m    A    (") 
  A[n]
where n can be any name that has occurred in the derivation, or a new one. Moreover,
when — by use of the rule ($) – a new name is introduced later in the derivation it also
may be substituted for the variable m.
Two examples of the " rule (the second example uses both rules, so we can see them 
working together).
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  An  "  x  $  y Rxsy   
 " x (Ax     Rnx)    $y Rmsy     (")
  An  Rnn   (")     $y Rssy (")
    / \      Rmyt     ($)
~An   Rnn          
  X
Note how in the first of these the fact that n already appears in the premises requires us
to use it as a substitution for x. Note how in the second of these the fact that we have
used the ($) rule requires us to go back and make a substitution using the new name
that the ($) rule has introduced. 
The idea behind this rule is that if a universal quantification is true then everything in the
domain has the attribute in question. So we should attribute it to everything that we can
mention. 
These are all the rules. They are fairly simple, but they are very powerful. The interaction
of the ($) and (") rules means that a derivation can keep on going, looping round and
making new substitutions. It need never stop. This is important as some of the models
that make quantified sentences true are infinite. 
Some examples of the rules in action. It will help if I state the general strategy that the
combination of  rules  is  meant  to  fit.  We prove that  a conclusion  follows from some
premises by showing that the premises plus the negation of the conclusion lead to a
contradiction. So we are heading for contradictions. We want to make branches close. We
do this by stripping off quantifiers and trying to find simple sentences that contradict
other simple sentences. So the slogan is: break up complex sentences and make as
many small sentences as you can, hoping that some will contradict others. Of course you
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will generally have to use more specific strategies than that, if you are not to blunder
around aimlessly. But they will fit into this general slogan. After each derivation I will give
an informal version in English fitting the same strategy.
"x Px |= "y Py     
(1) "x Px (P, Premise)
(2)   ~  "  y Py   (P, Premise) (note: this is the negation of the conclusion,
as we are going to show that "x Px and  "y Py are 
inconsistent.)
(3)  $y ~Py (2, ~")    
  ~Pn  (3, $)
.   Pn  (1,")
    X
“Everything  is Perfect,  so  assume  that  everything  is  not  perfect,  and  we  get  a
contradiction, since any arbitrary thing will be both perfect and not perfect. So however
you express it everything is perfect.)"
"x ~ Px |=  ~$x Px   
(1)   "x ~Px (P)
(2)  $  x Px         (P)
(3)    Pn (2, $)
(4)  ~Pn   (1, ")
    X
"Everything is not Perfect. (Each thing fails to be perfect.) Assume that there was one 
perfect thing. Call it n. It would be perfect, but since everything is not perfect this is a 
contradiction"
"x Px |=  ~$x ~Px
(1)  "x Px (P) 
(2   ~~ $  x ~ Px    (P)
(3)   $x ~Px  (2, Shortcut)
(4)   ~Pn  (3, $x)
(5)    Pn (1, ")  
    X
"Everything is perfect. Assume that there is not even one thing that fails to be perfect. 
Call it n. It will be both perfect and not perfect. So there cannot be any such thing."
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Here, and elsewhere below I use a shortcut, marked Shortcut. (See line 3 above.)
Shortcut: if you have a sentence S and  S |= T  can be shown using the rules for Boolean
derivations in chapter 7, then derive T in the same branch as S.
Of course before you can make a complete derivation using this shortcut rule you have to
have shown using the Boolean rules that S |=  T. 
"x (Hx  Ax)  | = "y ( $x (Hx & Tyx)  $z (Az & Tyz) )    
(1)  "x (Hx  Ax) (P)
(2)  ~ "  y   ( $ x (Hx & Tyx)     $  z(Az & Tyx) )   (P)
(3)   $y ~( $x (Hx & Tyx)  $z(Az & Tyz) ) (2: ~"x)
(4)  ~( $x (Hx & Ttx)  $z(Az & Ttz) ) (3: ")
(5)  $x (Hx & Ttx) & ~$z(Az & Ttz) (4: ~  )
(6) $x (Hx & Ttx)   (5: &)
(7)   Hh & Tth   (6: $)
(8)   Hh  (7: &)
(9)   Tth (7: &)
(10) ~$z(Az & Ttz) (5: &)
(11) "z ~(Az & Ttz) (10: ")
(12)  ~(Ah & Tth) (10: ")
(13) ~Ah v ~Tth (12: ~&)
    / \
(10)         ~Ah  ~Tth (v)
(11)           Ah (1:", shortcut) X
(12)           X
"All horses are animals. So assume that some tail is a tail of some horse h. It will also be
an animal tail. Assuming that there are horsetails and there are animal tails that are not 
horsetails will be contradictory: given our assumption about horses and animals. It will 
either contradict our assumption that h is a horse or our assumption that t is the tail of 
h."
$x "y Lxy  |=  "y $x Lxy
(1)    $x "y Rxy (P)
(2)  ~ "  y  $  x Rxy  (P)
(3)   "y Rly (1, $)
(4)   $y ~$x Rxy  (2, ~")
(5)     ~$x Rxl  (4, $)
429
(6)     "x ~Rxl (5, ~$)
(7)    ~Rlm (6, ")
(8)      Rlm (3, ")   
          X (7, 8)
"Someone loves everyone. To see that this means that everyone is loved by someone, 
assume the contrary. Call the guy who loves everyone loverboy. l loves any person you 
choose. But the contrary assumption is that there is an unloved person u. However l 
loves u, so this cannot be."
"x ($y Hxy  Ax)  |=  "x "y (Hxy  Ax) 
(1) "x ($y Hxy  Ax) (P)
(2)  ~  "  x  "  y (Hxy     Ax)  (P)
(3)   $x ~ "y (Hxy  Ax) (2,~$)
(4)    ~"y (Hny  Ax)     (3, $)
(5)    $y ~(Hny  Ax) (4, ~")
(6)    ~(Hnm  Am) (5, $)
(7)    Hnm & ~Am (6,~ &)
(8)     Hnm (7, &)
(9)    ~Am (7, &)
(10)   $y Hxm  Am (1, ")
(11)  ~$y Hxm (shortcut, 9, 10)
(12)   "y ~Hxm (11, $)
(13)    ~Hnm (12, ")
        X (13,8)
"If you have even one enemy then you will be alert to dangers. So whenever one person 
has an enemy they are alert. Assume the contrary and you will find that p has e as an 
enemy and also does not."
These examples suggest what is in fact the case, that the rules we have just seen allow a
wide variety of derivations, and some of them are very subtle. Each time a rule is applied
it is a mechanical business to verify which rule has been applied and that it has been
applied correctly. But there is no mechanical way of testing whether one sentence follows
from another or whether a set of sentences is consistent. In fact, many famous unsolved
mathematical  problems  amount  to  asking  whether  we  have  logical  consequence,
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consistency, or inconsistency. Surprisingly, it can be proven that when one sentence of
quantifier logic is a logical consequence of another, then there is a derivation showing
this. (The result is Gödel's completeness theorem for quantifier logic of 1929, not to be
confused with his even more famous incompleteness theorem for arithmetic of 1931.) In
theory, if  one sentence is  a logical  consequence of  another then by following out all
possible lines of derivation we will eventually hit on a successful one. But it may take
longer than any human life, and if the one sentence is not a logical consequence of the
other then we can try all these derivations for the lifetime of the universe and be no
wiser at the end. This fits with the points that I illustrated at the end of chapter 8, that
“checking whether a derivation is correct is easy, knowing whether one formula follows
from another is harder, and knowing whether one formula does not follow from another is
hardest of all.” Quantifier logic is complex enough that we can begin to illustrate these
points in more detail. But logic can get much more complicated than that. 
Given that quantifier logic is complicated and there is no automatic strategy for making
derivations with it,  you may wonder why we bother with it rather than with informal
alternatives like those I have given after each derivation. There are two reasons. The first
is that there are many arguments which we cannot capture with the informal versions, or
that we will find too confusing. Often they involve rich quantifier prefixes. The second
reason is that the informal reasoning uses names in a way that can easily go wrong. For
example the "loverboy" argument above is very similar to the following: "Everyone is
loved by somebody. So if we choose an arbitrary person p we can find a person l who
loves them. But p was chosen arbitrarily — it could be anyone — so we always have that
l loves p. So there is at least one person who loves everyone." No doubt this argument
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feels wrong to you, but you are unlikely to be able to say what is actually wrong about it.
And anything you can say will probably fail when there are many quantifiers or the topic
is unfamiliar and you do not have familiar truths to steer by.
This leaves us with a dilemma. Either we use the formal logic of quantifiers and have to
concentrate to keep the details straight, or we argue informally and are likely to fall into
fallacies  with  complicated  or  unfamiliar  material.  A  wise  combination  of  the  two  is
probably  the  best  response.  Another  response  is  to  work  on  variations  on  spoken
language that can be understood in the ways that we readily learn and communicate
verbally, but which can be given clear rules which are less prone to ambiguity. There are
many experiments along these lines in this book.
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index
This is a list of topics by chapter sections rather than by pages. It should be stable under mild 
editing of the text. I have underlined the sections where a term is explained or defined. “n:m” 
means “chapter n section m”. I have only listed exercises when they go further than the chapters.
  2:6  2:7, 3:4, 4:2
$ 9:4
~  3:2, 4:2
 |= 7:2
" 9:4
almost Boolean arguments  11:3
argument  1:1, 6:1, 6:4, sound argument 6:4, valid argument 6:4
argument by contradiction  8:1,  8:2
arrow diagram  1:11, 2:9 
assumption  see premise
atomic proposition  1:4, 5:1, 5:2
attribute  1:4, 1:5
Boogle (Boolean search on the Internet)  5:9
Boolean connectives  2:2, 5:2
Boolean search  3:2, on a library database 3:6, on the internet 3:6, 3.7, 5:9  
branch of a derivation  7:1, 7:2  
branching argument  8:3 
branching searches  2:4
C-derivation  7:5  
central connective 5:4
closed branch  4:2, 7:2  
complement  2:2
completeness  6:4, of propositional logic, of quantifier logic 11: appendix
conditional ()  2:6, 2:7, 3:4, 4:2, consequence for 6:7
conditional argument  8:3
contraries vs contradictories  7: exercises 7:4, 10, 11
conditional rule  7:1  
conjunction (&)  1:6, 2:5, 3:2, 4:2, 6:7 
conjunction rule  7:1,  
conjunctive argument  8:3  
conjunction/disjunction confusions  2:5, 7: exercise 12
conjunctive normal form  5: exercise 35
consequence  see logical consequence
consistent propositions  8:4, 7:5  
contradiction  5:6, 7:5 
contraposition  6:7  
counter model  6:3 , 11:1   
434
database  1:3
deduction  1:1, 6:1, 6:4
de Morgan's laws  5:6, 5:7
derivation  7:1,  7:2,  7:3,  8:1
diagrams in reasoning  1:3  
difficulty of judging correctness, consequence, and non-consequence  8:5,  of quantifier logic 9:2  
direct vs indirect argument  8:2, 8:3, 8:5, in quantifier logic 10:4  
disjunction (v)  1:6, 3:2, 4:2, 6:5, 6:7  inclusive and exclusive 1:6, 5:2
disjunction rule  7:1,  
disjunctive argument  8:3
disjunctive normal form  5:8 
domain of a database or model 1:3, empty 11:2, finite 11:3, infinite 11:6
eclipsky  2: exercise 24
elimination of alternatives  6:6  
equivalent propositions  5:6,  6:1
Euclidean geometry  11:3 
excluded middle (EM)  7:3  
existential quantifier ($)  9:4  
formula  5:3 
hidden information games  6:2
if  see conditional  
independent propositions  7:5,  8:4  
indexed tables  1: exercise 27, 2:9
individual  1:3
indirect argument  see direct argument 
inside-out  5:4, 9:7, 10:6, 10:9  
intersection  2:2
iterated searches  3:8
ladder relation  10:7  
library databases  3:6
linear vs branching argument  8:2
logical consequence  1:1, 6:1, 6:6,  distinguished from reasonable argument 6:4 , and derivations
7:4,  many ways of showing 7.5 
logical independence  7:5  
logically valid  6:1, 6:8
material conditional  see conditional
mathematical thinking  2:3, 2: exercise 14, 3:1, 3:3, 3:8, 5:4, 7:2, 9:7, 10:6  
model  1:3, 4:1, 5:6, 11;5, constructing 4:2
modus ponens  6:6, 6:7, 8:2  
modus tollens  6:6, 6:7,  8:2  
molecular proposition  5:1
most, logic of  10: exercise 16, 11: exercise 11
negation (~)  3:2, 4:2
negation rules  7:1  
object and attribute table  1:3
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or  see disjunction 
outside-in  see inside-out
parallel searches  2:4
partial ordering  11: exercises 10, 11  
passive verbs  10:5
premise  1:1,  6:1
prenex form  11:6
probability  5: exercise 41
problem-solving  1;1,  7:5
proof  7:2  
pronoun  3:1, 8:3  
proposition  4:1
propositional logic  5:1, 5:3
quantifier  9:1, context sensitivity of  9:3,10:4, multiple 10:1, 10:3 (double), 10:6 (triple), 10:8 
(quadruple), 10:10 (sextuple), prefix 10:6, matrix 10:6, 10:10, scope 10:1, 11;2, illustrated 
graphically 10:3, 10:7, 8, exercises 5, 13, and names 10:2,11:4  
query  1:4, 3:1
recursive definition  5:appendix
reductio ad absurdum   see argument by contradiction 
relation  1:7, 2:9, antisymmetric 10: exercise 7, asymmetric 1:7, 10: exercise 7, reflexive  10: 
exercise 7, representations of 1:7, 1:10, 1:11, 2:9, symmetric 10: exercise 7, transitive 10: 
exercise 7
relational grid  1:7
riddle  1:4
scope  2:1, 3:3, 3:5, 10:1, 11:2    
search command  1:4
search in series, parallel, branching  2:4, iterated 3:8
search on the Internet  3:6, 3:7
search tree  4:2,  6:1
semantic and syntactic  6:3, 7:2
sentence  4:1, 5:1
soundness  6:4
syllogism  11:3
syntactic, see semantic
tautology  5:6, 7:4 
tense  10:5  
transitive relation  10: exercises 7, 14, 11: exercises 10, 11
transitivity of the conditional (if)  8:1, 8:2  
translating between English and quantifier logic  9:7,  9:8
truth function  5:2
truth table  4:3, 5:2
truth assignment 5:2  
truth value  1:5, searching for 1:5, of complex propositions 5:5
turnstile ( |= )  7:2  
union  2:2
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universal quantifier (")  9:4  
valid argument  see logically valid
variable  3:1, 9:6, 11:3, 11: appendix  
variable-binding operator 3:1, 3:3, 9:1, 9:3 , 10:5, 11:exercise 16
Venn diagram 2:2
well-formed formula 3:5, 5:3, 5: appendix
wheel relation  10:7
width of a query  4:5    
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planning a course using this book
The eleven chapters of this book have material on a variety of themes, aimed at covering
the  standard  material  of  introductory  symbolic  logic  while  giving  a  more  discursive
course, engaging a greater variety of interests. You have to decide which material and
which  themes fit  into  the  course  that  you want  to  give.  So you must  decide  which
chapters,  and  which  sections,  you  will  discuss  and  have  the  students  read.  Your
expectations of the interests and capacities of the particular students you will be teaching
are central here. The exercises for each chapter roughly mimic the order of the topics in
the chapter, but if you are only covering some of these topics you must tell the students
which exercises are relevant. Since some exercises for some chapters anticipate, prepare
for, or refer back to topics explicitly covered in other chapters, you could look through the
exercises and consider assigning some from chapters or sections of chapters that you are
not explicitly covering.
In my opinion it gives students a better grounding in modern logic to cover all chapters,
though,  even  at  the  price  of  going  into  some  topics  in  less  detail.  Logic  teachers
sometimes think that they can get a one term class with no prior knowledge to manage
propositional  logic  intensely  and  in  detail  in  one  term  while  throwing  in  some
quantification theory at the end. I am sure this is an illusion. Whatever their results in
the exam, very few of the students will remember any details six months later. And for a
majority of the students the material on quantifiers will be an irritating mystery, arriving
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just when the burdens of the term were getting heaviest in all courses. But this is a
shame: one of the main benefits of a logic course is to contrast how English and logic
handle  quantification.  This,  besides  the  intrinsic  interest  to  students  of  issues  about
search, is a reason for introducing formal queries as variable binding operators early on.
They prepare the ground so that when quantifiers arrive weeks later they are already half
familiar.
Instructors who have given a standard logic course may worry that chapter five covers
too much for one chapter. But much of the material has been covered in earlier chapters
in  slightly  different  form.  (Chapter  4,  which  is  short  on  formal  details,  makes  the
conceptual transition from search to deduction. It is important to get students to see how
this works.) In my experience students who have been prepared by the earlier material
treat most of the content of this chapter as familiar and obvious.
Throughout  the  text  there are  remarks and questions in blue,  marked with  >> and
formatted in a distinctive way. These are meant to suggest questions to think about when
reading,  or  to  prompt  class  discussions.  I  have  aimed  to  make  the  exposition  clear
enough that the instructor does not have to spend much class time repeating it, and can
focus on discussion, problem solving, and exercises. Students should remember, though,
that the instructor will not have time to discuss every interesting question, and some
topics are far from the instructor's agenda for the course. If a course meets twice a week
one class could be discussion and one could be problems and exercises. Some of the
exercises are easy and some are hard. There are more fairly easy exercises in the early
chapters, to convince students that they can handle this material. For this reason I would
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discourage instructors from giving difficult tests early in the course. This is the kind of
material where low self-confidence can be self-fulfilling. I have always started gently, and
by the time we get to more challenging material students' confidence is high and to their
delight they are operating at a remarkable level. In this connection there are remarks
and exercises throughout that are meant to give math-phobic students a sense of what it
is to think mathematically. One of the incidental functions of a logic course is often to
persuade students that a lack of facility with numbers need not exclude them from formal
methods in general.
About  the  exercises.  There  are  continuities  between  the  exercises  in  the  different
chapters, for example between chapter 1 and chapter 11. One aim of this continuity is to
keep  central  issues  and  techniques  live  in  students  minds  throughout  the  course.
Conversely, some exercises anticipate ideas that will appear officially in later chapters.
These can be tackled with common sense and general intelligence, and are designed to
demonstrate the underlying familiarity of the ideas and to begin mental preparation for
the later exposition.
I have not provided answers to the exercises (those that have definite answers). The 
class will appreciate it if you provide them. But the work of preparing and checking them 
will naturally come after your decisions about which sections to cover and hence which 
questions to assign. If you do provide answers it is important that they be accurate, as 
small slips can undermine the faith in you of stronger students and undermine the 
confidence of weaker students. (They do not know that you have done them in a hurry 
the night before the first class.)
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There is material in the book for a number of distinct courses, with different emphases
on the formal and the conceptual side of the subject. You should read through it all and
decide  which  sections,  and  consequently  which  exercises,  you  are  going  to  require,
ignore,  or  suggest  as  supplementary  reading.  As  part  of  deciding  what  character  of
course you are going to give you might look at the >> remarks and think which ones you
want to be prepared to have a class discussion about. There are too many for you to
prompt a discussion of all of them, so your encouragement can be influential. Of course,
it is of the nature of discussion that it goes where it goes.
When writing the book I had an eleven week term in mind, so there are eleven chapters.
(Often there is an extra class at the beginning of term or an extra class at the end.)
Some courses  will  have  twelve  or  more  weeks.  If  this  is  the  case,  or  if  the  course
concentrates on some topics by skipping others, some chapters are designed to break
into two. The chapter text and the exercises can be easily divided over two weeks. This is
true of chapters 5, 7, and 8. And there are the appendices to chapters 5 and 11. The first
of  these  could  occupy  a  week  if  well-formedness  and  the  play  between  syntax  and
semantics is something you want to discuss. And the second could occupy any amount of
time, depending on how much emphasis you want to put on it. 
I have sometimes included term papers in the final grade. Sometimes these have been
compulsory and sometimes optional. (But in the second case grading them fairly against
test results is difficult.) The C exercises and the >> remarks are sources of topics. Term
papers make the course more like the courses that many students are used to, and they
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restore a balance between reflective and quick-witted mentalities.
When I have taught this material I have given regular tests, and counted them towards
the final grade. In recent years I have not given them in class time but let students do
them on the internet. As protection against having one's math major sister take the test,
I have also had a final exam, with the proviso that the final grade is not an average of
the tests and the exam, but is rather a non-linear function which rewards improvement
but also penalizes large downward disparity. If a student's test average is A and their
exam is B+ then they get an A-, but if the test average is A+ and the exam is C then the
result is a C. (If you have got your sister to take the online tests for you then you will not
learn the stuff, and you are setting yourself up for a C.) Of course this scheme should be
announced to the class at the beginning, and it is best to put it in the written syllabus, to
protect against later professions of ignorance.
You may edit the text to insert or remove material, as long as you acknowledge your
debt to this work, and as long as you do not make a profit. (So no submitting it to a
publisher!)  One  area  where  additions  would  be  helpful  is  with  diagrams,  especially
animated diagrams. I make some suggestions about these in the appendix that contains
the full Creative Commons statement.
Good luck. Give a course that both you and the students enjoy.
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copyright and changes
You may use this material in any way that fits your teaching. You may add to it, and if you do I
encourage you to post and circulate the result so that others can use it. By using it you commit to
the conditions specified more precisely in the Creative Commons wording that follows.
Promising areas for additions are:
– exercises: if your emphasis in teaching is different from mine you may want additional exercises
reinforcing the points that are central for you.
– answers: I have not supplied solutions to the exercises. In any case they should be circulated
separately  to  encourage  students  to  complete  their  answers  before  checking.  I  think  it  is
important to  avoid even slight mistakes in answers,  as the confidence of weaker students in
themselves  is  adversely  acted  when  they  think  they  have  got  an  answer  wrong,  and  the
confidence of stronger students in the instructor is adversely affected when they find even small
errors. (Although it is a sign of a good student that she finds ways of improving what you have
done.)
–  diagrams. Some people learn best from pictures, and with an online text we do not have to
worry about the space they take. We also do not have to worry about printing expensive colours.
So the right diagram in the right place is always helpful.
– animated diagrams. One advantage of an electronic text is the possibility of moving diagrams.
These are better than still diagrams for explaining many things. (See the diagrams in Wikipedia
found in the articles on Maxwell's equations, Quicksort [particularly relevant], Solar system, Wave
equation, Watt's linkage. Some of these articles are fairly technical: the content of the text does
not matter; what is important is what can be done with a moving diagram.) In the version of
these notes that I used for several classes I inserted fairly primitive moving diagrams in the text.
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These were powered by Flash, which is generally avoided these days. So I invite someone with the
needed skills to make more and better.
Places where animated diagrams would fit well:
- ch 2 end of sec 4, discussing the difference between filters in parallel and filters in sequence.
The idea is to see the names of the individuals move through the filters or be blocked by them.
-ch 2 end of sec 8. The idea would be to see the arrow diagrams for two relations turn into an
arrow diagram for one relation, the result of combining the two 2-place relations In the indicated
way.
– Chapter 3, middle of section 1. The idea would be to show the variable, perhaps represented by
a little machine, going through the domain and picking up things fitting the criterion, then doing
something with them. It could count them, or collect them in one place, or look for an exception
falsifying a universal  quantification, or for a single case verifying an existential quantification.
Ideally it would do all of these, with the student able to choose which, and as a result the student
would see that they are all processes that are well symbolized by a variable binding operator.
– Chapter 5, end of section 7. The de Morgan flip: See the static diagram for the basic idea and
then make individuals pass through the filters in their various configurations.
These could be inserted in a version of the text, or put on a separate web page. It would be in the
spirit of the project if these too were made generally available.
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Creative Commons Legal Code
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
Official translations of this license are available in other languages.
Creative Commons Corporation (“Creative Commons”) is not a law firm and does not provide legal
services or legal advice. Distribution of Creative Commons public licenses does not create a lawyer-
client or other relationship. Creative Commons makes its licenses and related information available on
an “as-is” basis. Creative Commons gives no warranties regarding its licenses, any material licensed
under their terms and conditions, or any related information. Creative Commons disclaims all liability
for damages resulting from their use to the fullest extent possible.
Using Creative Commons Public Licenses
Creative Commons public licenses provide a standard set of terms and conditions that creators and
other rights holders may use to share original works of authorship and other material subject to
copyright and certain other rights specified in the public license below. The following considerations are
for informational purposes only, are not exhaustive, and do not form part of our licenses.
Considerations for licensors: Our public licenses are intended for use by those authorized to give
the public permission to use material in ways otherwise restricted by copyright and certain other
rights. Our licenses are irrevocable. Licensors should read and understand the terms and
conditions of the license they choose before applying it. Licensors should also secure all rights
necessary before applying our licenses so that the public can reuse the material as expected.
Licensors should clearly mark any material not subject to the license. This includes other CC-
licensed material, or material used under an exception or limitation to copyright. More
considerations for licensors.
Considerations for the public: By using one of our public licenses, a licensor grants the public
permission to use the licensed material under specified terms and conditions. If the licensor’s
permission is not necessary for any reason–for example, because of any applicable exception or
limitation to copyright–then that use is not regulated by the license. Our licenses grant only
permissions under copyright and certain other rights that a licensor has authority to grant. Use of
the licensed material may still be restricted for other reasons, including because others have
copyright or other rights in the material. A licensor may make special requests, such as asking that
all changes be marked or described. Although not required by our licenses, you are encouraged to
respect those requests where reasonable. More considerations for the public.
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License
By exercising the Licensed Rights (defined below), You accept and agree to be bound by the terms and
conditions of this Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License ("Public
License"). To the extent this Public License may be interpreted as a contract, You are granted the
Licensed Rights in consideration of Your acceptance of these terms and conditions, and the Licensor
grants You such rights in consideration of benefits the Licensor receives from making the Licensed
Material available under these terms and conditions.
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Section 1 – Definitions.
a. Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or
based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered,
arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the
Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the
Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always
produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image.
b. Adapter's License means the license You apply to Your Copyright and Similar Rights in Your
contributions to Adapted Material in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Public
License.
c. Copyright and Similar Rights means copyright and/or similar rights closely related to copyright
including, without limitation, performance, broadcast, sound recording, and Sui Generis Database
Rights, without regard to how the rights are labeled or categorized. For purposes of this Public
License, the rights specified in Section 2(b)(1)-(2) are not Copyright and Similar Rights.
d. Effective Technological Measures means those measures that, in the absence of proper
authority, may not be circumvented under laws fulfilling obligations under Article 11 of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty adopted on December 20, 1996, and/or similar international agreements.
e. Exceptions and Limitations means fair use, fair dealing, and/or any other exception or limitation
to Copyright and Similar Rights that applies to Your use of the Licensed Material.
f. Licensed Material means the artistic or literary work, database, or other material to which the
Licensor applied this Public License.
g. Licensed Rights means the rights granted to You subject to the terms and conditions of this
Public License, which are limited to all Copyright and Similar Rights that apply to Your use of the
Licensed Material and that the Licensor has authority to license.
h. Licensor means the individual(s) or entity(ies) granting rights under this Public License.
i. NonCommercial means not primarily intended for or directed towards commercial advantage or
monetary compensation. For purposes of this Public License, the exchange of the Licensed
Material for other material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights by digital file-sharing or similar
means is NonCommercial provided there is no payment of monetary compensation in connection
with the exchange.
j. Share means to provide material to the public by any means or process that requires permission
under the Licensed Rights, such as reproduction, public display, public performance, distribution,
dissemination, communication, or importation, and to make material available to the public
including in ways that members of the public may access the material from a place and at a time
individually chosen by them.
k. Sui Generis Database Rights means rights other than copyright resulting from Directive 96/9/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of
databases, as amended and/or succeeded, as well as other essentially equivalent rights anywhere
in the world.
l. You means the individual or entity exercising the Licensed Rights under this Public License. Your
has a corresponding meaning.
Section 2 – Scope.
a. License grant.
1. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a
worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise
the Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to:
A. reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part, for NonCommercial
purposes only; and
B. produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material for NonCommercial purposes only.
2. Exceptions and Limitations. For the avoidance of doubt, where Exceptions and Limitations
apply to Your use, this Public License does not apply, and You do not need to comply with
its terms and conditions.
3. Term. The term of this Public License is specified in Section 6(a).
4. Media and formats; technical modifications allowed. The Licensor authorizes You to
exercise the Licensed Rights in all media and formats whether now known or hereafter
created, and to make technical modifications necessary to do so. The Licensor waives
and/or agrees not to assert any right or authority to forbid You from making technical
modifications necessary to exercise the Licensed Rights, including technical modifications
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necessary to circumvent Effective Technological Measures. For purposes of this Public
License, simply making modifications authorized by this Section 2(a)(4) never produces
Adapted Material.
5. Downstream recipients.
A. Offer from the Licensor – Licensed Material. Every recipient of the Licensed Material
automatically receives an offer from the Licensor to exercise the Licensed Rights
under the terms and conditions of this Public License.
B. No downstream restrictions. You may not offer or impose any additional or different
terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, the
Licensed Material if doing so restricts exercise of the Licensed Rights by any
recipient of the Licensed Material.
6. No endorsement. Nothing in this Public License constitutes or may be construed as
permission to assert or imply that You are, or that Your use of the Licensed Material is,
connected with, or sponsored, endorsed, or granted official status by, the Licensor or others
designated to receive attribution as provided in Section 3(a)(1)(A)(i).
b. Other rights.
1. Moral rights, such as the right of integrity, are not licensed under this Public License, nor are
publicity, privacy, and/or other similar personality rights; however, to the extent possible, the
Licensor waives and/or agrees not to assert any such rights held by the Licensor to the
limited extent necessary to allow You to exercise the Licensed Rights, but not otherwise.
2. Patent and trademark rights are not licensed under this Public License.
3. To the extent possible, the Licensor waives any right to collect royalties from You for the
exercise of the Licensed Rights, whether directly or through a collecting society under any
voluntary or waivable statutory or compulsory licensing scheme. In all other cases the
Licensor expressly reserves any right to collect such royalties, including when the Licensed
Material is used other than for NonCommercial purposes.
Section 3 – License Conditions.
Your exercise of the Licensed Rights is expressly made subject to the following conditions.
a. Attribution.
1. If You Share the Licensed Material (including in modified form), You must:
A. retain the following if it is supplied by the Licensor with the Licensed Material:
i. identification of the creator(s) of the Licensed Material and any others
designated to receive attribution, in any reasonable manner requested by the
Licensor (including by pseudonym if designated);
ii. a copyright notice;
iii. a notice that refers to this Public License;
iv. a notice that refers to the disclaimer of warranties;
v. a URI or hyperlink to the Licensed Material to the extent reasonably
practicable;
B. indicate if You modified the Licensed Material and retain an indication of any previous
modifications; and
C. indicate the Licensed Material is licensed under this Public License, and include the
text of, or the URI or hyperlink to, this Public License.
2. You may satisfy the conditions in Section 3(a)(1) in any reasonable manner based on the
medium, means, and context in which You Share the Licensed Material. For example, it may
be reasonable to satisfy the conditions by providing a URI or hyperlink to a resource that
includes the required information.
3. If requested by the Licensor, You must remove any of the information required by Section
3(a)(1)(A) to the extent reasonably practicable.
4. If You Share Adapted Material You produce, the Adapter's License You apply must not
prevent recipients of the Adapted Material from complying with this Public License.
Section 4 – Sui Generis Database Rights.
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Where the Licensed Rights include Sui Generis Database Rights that apply to Your use of the Licensed
Material:
a. for the avoidance of doubt, Section 2(a)(1) grants You the right to extract, reuse, reproduce, and
Share all or a substantial portion of the contents of the database for NonCommercial purposes
only;
b. if You include all or a substantial portion of the database contents in a database in which You have
Sui Generis Database Rights, then the database in which You have Sui Generis Database Rights
(but not its individual contents) is Adapted Material; and
c. You must comply with the conditions in Section 3(a) if You Share all or a substantial portion of the
contents of the database.
For the avoidance of doubt, this Section 4 supplements and does not replace Your obligations under this
Public License where the Licensed Rights include other Copyright and Similar Rights.
Section 5 – Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitation of Liability.
a. Unless otherwise separately undertaken by the Licensor, to the extent possible, the
Licensor offers the Licensed Material as-is and as-available, and makes no representations
or warranties of any kind concerning the Licensed Material, whether express, implied,
statutory, or other. This includes, without limitation, warranties of title, merchantability,
fitness for a particular purpose, non-infringement, absence of latent or other defects,
accuracy, or the presence or absence of errors, whether or not known or discoverable.
Where disclaimers of warranties are not allowed in full or in part, this disclaimer may not
apply to You.
b. To the extent possible, in no event will the Licensor be liable to You on any legal theory
(including, without limitation, negligence) or otherwise for any direct, special, indirect,
incidental, consequential, punitive, exemplary, or other losses, costs, expenses, or
damages arising out of this Public License or use of the Licensed Material, even if the
Licensor has been advised of the possibility of such losses, costs, expenses, or damages.
Where a limitation of liability is not allowed in full or in part, this limitation may not apply to
You.
c. The disclaimer of warranties and limitation of liability provided above shall be interpreted in a
manner that, to the extent possible, most closely approximates an absolute disclaimer and waiver
of all liability.
Section 6 – Term and Termination.
a. This Public License applies for the term of the Copyright and Similar Rights licensed here.
However, if You fail to comply with this Public License, then Your rights under this Public License
terminate automatically.
b. Where Your right to use the Licensed Material has terminated under Section 6(a), it reinstates:
1. automatically as of the date the violation is cured, provided it is cured within 30 days of Your
discovery of the violation; or
2. upon express reinstatement by the Licensor.
For the avoidance of doubt, this Section 6(b) does not affect any right the Licensor may have to
seek remedies for Your violations of this Public License.
c. For the avoidance of doubt, the Licensor may also offer the Licensed Material under separate
terms or conditions or stop distributing the Licensed Material at any time; however, doing so will not
terminate this Public License.
d. Sections 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 survive termination of this Public License.
Section 7 – Other Terms and Conditions.
a. The Licensor shall not be bound by any additional or different terms or conditions communicated
by You unless expressly agreed.
b. Any arrangements, understandings, or agreements regarding the Licensed Material not stated
herein are separate from and independent of the terms and conditions of this Public License.
Section 8 – Interpretation.
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a. For the avoidance of doubt, this Public License does not, and shall not be interpreted to, reduce,
limit, restrict, or impose conditions on any use of the Licensed Material that could lawfully be made
without permission under this Public License.
b. To the extent possible, if any provision of this Public License is deemed unenforceable, it shall be
automatically reformed to the minimum extent necessary to make it enforceable. If the provision
cannot be reformed, it shall be severed from this Public License without affecting the enforceability
of the remaining terms and conditions.
c. No term or condition of this Public License will be waived and no failure to comply consented to
unless expressly agreed to by the Licensor.
d. Nothing in this Public License constitutes or may be interpreted as a limitation upon, or waiver of,
any privileges and immunities that apply to the Licensor or You, including from the legal processes
of any jurisdiction or authority.
Creative Commons is not a party to its public licenses. Notwithstanding, Creative Commons may elect
to apply one of its public licenses to material it publishes and in those instances will be considered the
“Licensor.” The text of the Creative Commons public licenses is dedicated to the public domain under
the CC0 Public Domain Dedication. Except for the limited purpose of indicating that material is shared
under a Creative Commons public license or as otherwise permitted by the Creative Commons policies
published at creativecommons.org/policies, Creative Commons does not authorize the use of the
trademark “Creative Commons” or any other trademark or logo of Creative Commons without its prior
written consent including, without limitation, in connection with any unauthorized modifications to any of
its public licenses or any other arrangements, understandings, or agreements concerning use of
licensed material. For the avoidance of doubt, this paragraph does not form part of the public licenses. 
Creative Commons may be contacted at creativecommons.org.
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